Читать книгу The Educational Writings of Richard Mulcaster - Richard Mulcaster - Страница 10

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Some well-meaning people, when they wish to persuade their fellow-countrymen either by pen or by speech, to adopt a certain course, if they can claim the authority of any good writers favouring their opinions, straightway assume that their own arguments are sufficiently supported to ensure their proposal being carried out. This assurance, however, is checked sometimes by reflection, sometimes by experience. Wise reflection may foresee that the special circumstances of the country will not admit of the proposed change, or after some trial the unsuitability may be shown by experience. So that in cases where authorities persuade, and circumstances control, those who would use earlier writers to maintain their credit must always keep in view the application to particular conditions. I see many people of good intelligence, considerable reading, and facility of expression, both abroad and at home, fall into great error by neglecting special circumstances, and overstraining the force of authority. In dealing with education, must I entreat my country to be content with this because such a one commends it, or force her to that because such a State approves of it? The show of right deceives us, and the likeness of unlike things doth lead us where it listeth. For the better understanding with what wariness authority is to be used, let it be considered that there are two sorts of authors that we deal with in our studies. Of the one kind are writers on the mathematical sciences, who proceed by the necessity of a demonstrable subject, and enforce the conclusions by inevitable argument. Of the other kind are writers on the moral and political sciences, who, dealing with human affairs, must have regard to the circumstances of every particular case. With the former the truth of the subject-matter maintains itself, without the need for any personal authority, and is beyond debate; it is with the latter that controversy arises, the writer’s credit often authorising the thing, and in this case great injustice may be done by quoting without discrimination as to difference of circumstance. It is no proof that because Plato praiseth something, because Aristotle approveth it, because Cicero commends it, because Quintilian or anyone else is acquainted with it, therefore it is for us to use. What if our country honour it in them, and yet for all that may not use it herself, because the circumstances forbid? Nay, what if the writers’ authority be cited without considering in what circumstances the opinion was originally expressed? Is not a great wrong done by him who wresteth the meaning of the author he quotes? He that will deal with writers so as to turn their conclusions to the use of his country must be very well advised, and diligently mark that their meaning and his application are consistent, and must consider how much of their opinion his country will admit. Whether I shall myself be able to carry out what I demand from others, I dare not warrant, but I will do my best to use my author well, and to take circumstances into account, never, if I can help it, to offer anything that has not all the foundations that I promised before, namely, nature to lead it, reason to back it, custom to commend it, experience to approve it, and profit to prefer it.

I think a student ought rather to invest himself in the habit of his writer than to stand much upon his title and authority in proof or disproof, as it is well understood that all our studies are indebted to the original devisers and the most eloquent writers. Therefore, to avoid undue length, I will neither give authorities nor examples, as it is not a question of a man’s name, but of the real value of the argument. I shall not busy myself with citing authors, either to show what I have read or how far I am in agreement with others. It is not needful to heap up witnesses where nothing is doubtful; the natural use of testimony is to prove where there is doubt, not to cloy where all is clear. In such cases, for want of sound judgment, a catalogue of names and a multitude of sentences, which only say what no one denies, are forced on to the stage to seem to arm the quoter, who is fighting without a foe, and flying when there is no cause for fear.

In points of learning which are beyond controversy, I appeal to the judgment of those who have gone over the same ground, and can test the truth of what I say without being told the name of the author, whom they will admit to have been well cited when they find me saying as he saith, whether it be through recollection of what I have read or from coincidence of judgment where I have not read. I do honour good writers, but without superstition, being in no way addicted to titles. But seeing that Reason doth honour them, they must be content to remain outside themselves, and use every means to bring her forward, as their lady and mistress, whose authority and credit procure them admission when they come from her. It is not so because a writer said so, but because the truth is so, and he said the truth. Indeed, the truth is often weakened in the hearer’s opinion, though not in itself, by naming the writer. If truth did depend upon the person, she would often be brought into a miserable plight, being constrained to serve fancy and alter at will, whereas she should bend to no one, however opinionative people may persuade themselves. This is known to the learned and wise, whose courtesy I crave. As for the unlearned, I must entreat them, for their sakes if not for mine, not to debate with me on points where they cannot judge. In matters that are intelligible to both, I must pray them to weigh my words well, and ever to give me credit for good intentions.