Читать книгу Hitler’s Terror Weapons: The Price of Vengeance - Richard Overy - Страница 12
ОглавлениеIn that April of 1942, and amid these stringencies, came a proposal by Oberst Walter Dornberger, chief of weapons testing unit 11 (Wa Pruef 11), and in charge of German rocket development, which he hoped would gain his project top priority in production and development. Dornberger’s booklet, entitled ‘Proposals for the Operational Employment of the A4 Rocket’, was distributed to ‘the highest authorities civilian and military’.1 It called for 5000 rockets a year to be launched from northern France against industrial and supply areas and communications in ‘southern England’. Dornberger provided details of the firing organisation, the basic unit of which was to be the ‘abteilung’. Each abteilung was to be divided into 3 batteries, each of which was to possess a mobile firing platform. One abteilung could sustain a fire of 27 rockets per day; three abteilungen, grouped as a regiment, could fire 100 rockets in an eight hour period, although problems of supply would limit this barrage to only once in every twenty-four hours.
An abteilung would consist of some 750 men. These troops were to be fully motorised, which meant an establishment of 560 vehicles per abteilung. They would require 70,000 tons of liquid oxygen per annum – at the time only some 26,000 tons were available. The alcohol to be used was ethanol, which was manufactured by the fermentation of potatoes. Thus the stratospheric rocket would be dependent upon the potato crop, a curious mixture of the new age with the old. Here the requirement was 30,000 tons of alcohol per annum.2
It may be wondered how the rocket project had survived the first three years of a war which was so demanding of national resources. In February 1940 Goering had closed down all projects that would not be finished in 1940/1, which had stopped work on the Jumo 004 jet engine, the Messerschmitt Me262 jet fighter and ground to air missiles.3 Yet the rocket survived the battles of France and Britain, the carnage of men and equipment in Russia, and the night bombing offensive, due mainly to the protection afforded by the politically powerful army and the artful zeal of Dornberger.
On September 5th, 1939, von Brauchitsch, the commander in chief of the army, decreed that the rocket project at Peenemunde was to be expedited as being ‘particularly urgent for national defence’. But its projected completion had now to be brought forward by Dornberger from September 1943 to September 1941.4 By October 9th 1939 General Becker was asking for a completion date of May 31st 1941, which would demand some 9000 construction workers (it already had 5000); by the 11th October, it gained first priority from General Georg Thomas (head of the Defence Economics and Armaments Directorate), together with the U boat and Ju88 programmes; but on 20th November, to Dornberger’s horror, Hitler cut back the steel quota from 6000 to 2000 tons.5
Hitler had visited Kummersdorf in March 1939, and to Dornberger’s amazement, the Fuehrer had not been moved.
‘In all the years I had been working on rocket development this was the first time that anyone had witnessed the massive output of gas at enormous speed, in luminous colours, from a rocket exhaust, and heard the thunderous rumble of power thus released, without being either enraptured, thrilled, or carried away by the spectacle’, he wrote.6 That irascible dictator can seldom have been criticised for an over calm and objective appraisal of a situation; but four years of ruinous war would later dull the German dictator’s critical faculties, and a dim hope of salvation and a thirst for vengeance would by then aid the wiles of the crafty military salesman.
Neither the tense uncertainties of war nor the brimming euphoria of victory were able to unseat the army’s pet project at Peenemunde. When Hitler had withdrawn the rocket from the priority list in the spring of 1940, the army commander in chief, and Dornberger’s old battalion commander, von Brauchitsch had, displaying ‘wise foresight’ and ‘a high sense of responsibility and imagination’, and without Hitler’s knowledge, withdrawn 4000 technically qualified men from the fighting troops for work at Peenemunde7.
In April 1940 General Becker, hounded over a munitions crisis by Georg Thomas, Goering and Hitler, committed suicide. “I only hope”, he had said to Dornberger two days before the melancholy event, “that I have not been mistaken in my estimate of you and your work.”8 Perhaps, when Becker’s great leader followed him into voluntary extinction almost exactly five years later, his mind may also have dwelt for a time on wonder weapons and Dornberger’s promises.
Before tracing the paths towards mass production of the rocket and the flying bomb, it may be useful to dwell for a little while on the nature of German war production under Nazi rule, to understand by what means or influence policy decisions were made.
There were four general bodies concerned with production. firstly, Reichsmarshal Herman Goering headed a four-year plan organisation (begun in 1936) that dealt with the orientation of the economy to war. Goering wanted to prepare for a total war, which would be lengthy and for which ‘all energies must be directed’; it would require ‘a complete transformation of the economic structure.’9 Goering also created the ‘Reichswerke Hermann Goering’ from German and European industry, a state owned and run integral part of the Nazi economy. But Goering, was inefficient, vain, corrupt and impatient of self-discipline. ‘His subordinates had no other course than to by-pass him in order to get anything done.’10
A Ministry of Economics existed, under Funk, to allocate raw materials, with a Ministry of Weapons and Ammunition under Fritz Todt (replaced on his death by Albert Speer). finally, there was the economics and armaments branch of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, under General Georg Thomas, which was supposed to sort out the conflicting contracts and raw materials demands of the three services. Thomas had a staff of over 1000, and the Army Ordnance Directorate (the Heereswaffenamt) had 2–3000, all regarded by Speer as inexperienced and inefficient. ‘Development was haphazard, research uncontrolled and lack of coordination between the competing requirements resulted in hopeless confusion.’11 All these bodies had been ill served by those within German industry itself who, expecting a consumer boom, sabotaged the controls imposed on them.12
When Speer was appointed as Minister of Weapons and Ammunition by Hitler in February 1942, he began to transfer responsibility to industrial experts, strengthening the system of industrial rings, each with a responsibility for a particular product, begun by Todt. ‘Best practice’ in the manufacture of a product was imposed on the rest, the differences between best and worst often being quite ludicrously large. Industry was made to produce more efficiently, production being concentrated in fewer and larger centres, and stocks being reduced. Production runs became less subject to stoppage for minor modifications. Equipment was standardised where possible. An economic ‘miracle’ in production resulted, but this was partially reversed by the effects of allied bombing, which forced firms to accumulate stocks again (due to the destruction of the delivery systems) and forced industry to disperse.
All this was not achieved by sweet reasoning or the offer of inducements alone. In Appendix 2 is a report on the methods of Karl-Otto Saur, Speer’s deputy, a party member of long standing, and a rationalisation expert.
The Nazi state was chaotic and divided. All power derived from Adolf Hitler; thus Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsfuhrer SS, who controlled whole divisions of resolute armed men as well as the Gestapo, would have been deposed at a word from the Fuehrer, as would Bormann, Goering, Goebbels and the rest. Bormann, with no divisions at his command, was Himmler’s equal in power, not because he was Reichsleiter of the Nazi party, but because he had Hitler’s ear. All below Hitler was disunion, with power blocs jockeying for position – the army, Reichsmarschall Goering’s Luftwaffe and the four year plan, Himmler and the SS, Goebbels the head of propaganda, the Nazi party, the Gauleiters or Nazi district governors, and big business. But Hitler himself, the font of all power, whose personality charmed, mesmerised or intimidated all his subordinates, was deliberately secretive.
Perhaps Hitler’s deepest belief in war was the power of the will. Germany, he felt, had given in at five minutes to midnight in 1918; it would not happen again. Analysis was presumed to be weakness, and talk of strategic withdrawal treason, but optimism showed strength. Argument with a Fuehrer order was at best a waste of time, and might lead at worst to being thrown to the other jackals who prowled around him. Yet Hitler, at times, ‘edged along hesitantly, almost fearfully’.13
The paths of glory in Nazi Germany were therefore plain; gain the ear of the Fuehrer, say (as obsequiously as possible) what he wants to hear, be loyal to your own power base and seek to augment its position, and remember the political shibboleths – remember 1918!
Hitler, unlike Stalin, was not a good manager, and did not follow up his own decisions, which, sometimes impossible to obey or contradictory, were quietly and fearfully ignored.14 He seemed unable to delegate responsibility. He nevertheless browbeat and insulted his generals. The following extracts from the notes of field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), Hitler’s chief military advisor and head of the OKW, will serve as an illustration:
Fuehrer’s general H.Q., 8th October, 1941.
Keitel to Hitler:
“Mein Fuehrer!
I have already submitted, through General Jodl, the results of my investigations concerning the employment of shells based on the ‘hollow charge’ principle. However, in this respect I report personally as follows.
The idea of the ‘hollow charge’ principle came to my attention purely by chance during the spring of this year. I did not, however, expect it to have any practical application during the campaign in the east or for the remainder of this year. When you, my Fuehrer, first drew my attention to the importance of this invention (the work of an SA man) the idea of an early or premature application of this idea never came to my mind. Nor do I recall having received instructions from you, my Fuehrer, to take precautionary steps to prevent the premature use of the invention. I realise, however, that there is no excuse or evasion of responsibility possible for me in this respect and that it was my duty to keep myself informed at all times about future developments in this case. If I had done so, I should have been aware that the use of this invention dates back to May of this year. I am fully aware of the consequences that might arise from the discovery and use of the weapon by the enemy and of their influence on the prosecution of the war.
I believe from your statements and attitude in this matter that your confidence in me has been severely shaken, and I therefore beg you to receive me and to let me know your decision.
Heil mein Fuehrer,
signed Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall”
Pencilled note by Keitel:
“The Fuehrer granted me an audience, immediately, on the 8th October. After a long dissertation about the worst of all mistakes being to employ new weapons before our own defence against these weapons had been developed (this was a criminal neglect of the German high command in the last war), the Fuehrer condemned the present high command in the strongest fashion and claimed that it was guilty of equally criminal actions and even was guilty of stealing the invention itself. He stated that he was personally separated by an abyss from this institution of incompetence, including the high command’s general staff, which has selected the worst of all personnel for the top positions. To my suggestion that he should accept my resignation he answered that obviously he could not replace the general staff because nothing better was available.
As regards myself personally, the Fuehrer insisted that I did not obey his order to prevent the use of the ‘hollow charge’ invention. After several questions about his confidence in me, which the Fuehrer consistently sidestepped, I finally put to him the direct question as to whether he wanted to work with me or not?
Finally the Fuehrer shook my hand and gave an affirmative answer.”15
In September 1940 the rocket had been reduced in priority to lb, which by a strange shorthand placed it third, ‘S’ (for Sealion, the planned invasion of Britain) being top, and la second. By October, Dornberger had managed to wrestle this up to la, after finding that nothing could be accomplished on lb. But the steel restrictions stayed.16
Dornberger now tried another ploy, suggesting in a memorandum that the enemy, particularly the United States, might take the lead in the development of this decisive weapon.17 By March 1941 the development of the rocket was again at top priority, with production second. But Dornberger, finding difficulty getting machine tools on second priority had, in a memorandum for a meeting between von Brauchitsch and von Leeb, alluded to the accuracy of his terror weapon, against which no defence could avail.18 However, Fritz Todt, the armaments minister, in a letter to Fromm (Commander in Chief of the Reserve Army and Chief of Armament) had noted the lavish scale of the social, as well as research, amenities at Peenemunde. He cut 8.5 million reichsmarks from the budget.19 Dornberger, in a memorandum to Hitler, now mentioned the damage to morale that the rocket could inflict, even if air superiority had been lost.20
Hitler, the old soldier, had seen and felt the effects of a ruined morale in November 1918, and he was always alert to a mention of attacking the enemy’s will. With his air legions now deeply deployed in Russia, the dictator must have been considerably influenced by Dornberger’s timely comment, for he met him and von Braun on 29th August, and now apparently believing the rocket to have revolutionised warfare, demanded ‘hundreds of thousands’.21 But he declined to order mass production until the missile had been properly developed – it must be remembered that, at this stage, not one had left the lauch pad.
Hitler’s demand for hundreds of thousands was mistaken, but is perhaps not so ludicrous as it might appear. Certainly, this quantity could not be produced – at their eventual projected price of 50,000 reichsmarks each, just 200,000 rockets would cost 10 billion (10,000,000,000) reichsmarks, which, considering that the total military expenditure of the Reich in 1941 was 68.4 Bn RM,22 was plainly out of the question. If financial limitation, in a totalitarian state which could direct labour where needed, is felt to be an unreliable guide to industrial capacity, then another calculation could have been made: if it took 60 man months to make each rocket23, then 200,000 would require the labour of 12 million man months, or one million man years. The total labour force available to the Third Reich, including prisoners, was some 36 million.24
In the insulting homily so assiduously recorded by field Marshal Keitel, it will be remembered that Hitler had stressed the folly of a too early introduction of a new weapon, which an enemy might copy and use before full advantage had been gained. Dornberger had already stressed the possibility of enemy development in his attempts to gain priority. Hitler’s request, therefore, was not one which should have surprised anybody; once its impossibility had been pointed out to him, a better appraisal of the possibilities of rocket warfare would have been available to the German leader. But it was not pointed out. Like the mice in the ancient story, the sober military leaders who were present at that meeting may all have felt it sensible to place a bell on the cat, but considerations of a more personal strategy made each disinclined to carry out the task himself. It was not what the Fuehrer desired to hear.
But when the German Fuehrer was next found talking A4 rocket quantities, in early March 1942, it was a request for Speer to investigate the raw materials requirements for a quantity of 3000 per month.25
But in April 1942 came Dornberger’s suggestion for 5000 rockets per annum which, it will be remembered, would require all of Germany’s alcohol production and more than all of her current production of liquid oxygen. What effect did that have on Hitler? He had seen the rocket supply scaled down since August 1941 from ‘hundreds of thousands’ to 5000. How many rockets did he think were necessary to have a decisive effect?
From one point of view, it really was necessary to deploy hundreds of thousands of rockets. London was the ideal ‘terror’ target. It was the capital of the people who had themselves launched terror raids on Germany, and the need for vengeance would be satisfied. The free people of the capital might decide to pressure their government if the bombardment became unbearable, for the democratic government could surely not ignore the suffering of the population. But the whole London conurbation occupied some 700 square miles; 57,000 tons of bombs (equating to 57,000 rockets) had already been expended on the British, mostly on London, without significant military effect. Had not Hitler promised, when Berlin was first raided, that he would ‘in one night drop 150, 230 or 400,000 kilograms?’ It has been seen in chapter one, that it was estimated by British scientists that 1250 tons of bombs per square mile were necessary to achieve a 50 per cent devastation. London’s 700 square miles, by this calculation, would need 875,000 rockets; to achieve 80% destruction would need 2900 tons per square mile, or 2,030,000 rockets. This would be, of course, if the aiming error were exactly as planned by Dornberger, ie 2 to 3 mils. (If a destruction of 80% of an area is thought excessive, this was just the fate eventually suffered by the 300 square miles of the Ruhr, as will be seen later). German mathematicians were presumably equally capable of making this calculation. Yet when Dornberger’s memorandum arrived in April 1942, with its call for 5000 rockets, i.e. 5000 tons of explosive, to be launched each year against ‘southern England’, there seems to have been no outburst from the Fuehrer, who was supposed to carry weapon specifications in his head (to the great discomfort of his generals). At Dornberger’s rate of fire, London would have been 80% destroyed by the twenty fourth century of the Christian era, presuming that rebuilding work were to cease for the interval. Could Hitler, whose whole mindset in war pivoted around morale,
