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CHAPTER 7 The same is defended from antiquity

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The fifth reason is drawn from the origin, for even if servile subjection began only after Adam’s sin, there would still have been political authority even in the state of innocence. The proof is, first, that even then man would have been by nature a civil and social animal, and therefore he would have needed a ruler.

Second, there is proof from the Creation itself, as God made the woman from the man and did not create many men at the same time, but one man only, from whom all others would have been born so as to indicate the order and primacy which He wanted to be among men, as Chrysostom observes in homily 34 on the first Epistle to the Corinthians.

Third, in that state there would have been differences in gender, status, talents, wisdom, and honesty, and therefore primacy and subjection, for in human society there must be order. But a proper order implies that the inferior be ruled by the superior, the woman by the man, the younger by the older, the less wise by the wiser, and the less good by the better, and in this way it can be proved that these differences would have had a place even then.

In that state there would have been procreation, as is clear from Genesis 1: “Be fruitful, and multiply.”61 There would also be a difference in gender, which necessarily precedes procreation, and a difference in age, which necessarily follows procreation, and a difference in wisdom and honesty, which follows the difference in age, since there would not have been perfect men in that state, but they would have had to learn and progress little by little. Certainly all would have been born in the grace of God, and with a greater intelligence than now, as Augustine teaches in De baptismo parvulorum, book 1, chapter 38, but without a doubt they would have not been as perfect as adults, and because of their free will some of those adults could devote themselves more to knowledge than others.

Finally, a variety of talents arises from the variation in bodies; but there would have been bodies of different dimension, form, strength, and so on, as is clear from the fact that those bodies were not exempt from the laws of nature but were dependent on food, on air to breathe, and on the influences of the celestial bodies. Accordingly, there would even then have been a variety of talents. See blessed Thomas, Summa, 1a, questions 96 and 105.

Fourth, among the angels there is primacy and subjection: why then would there have been none in the state of innocence? Beelzebub is, of course, called the prince of the devils (Matthew 12), and he certainly did not acquire his sovereignty by sinning but maintained that which he had before over those angels who followed him. And in Apocalypse, chapter 12, it is said: “Michael and his angels.”62 Finally Dionysius in chapter 9 of the Hierarchia coelestis says that the first angelic hierarchy has primacy and rules over the second, and the second over the third. Also blessed Gregory, homily 34 on the Gospel, says that the names of the principalities and dominions among the angels clearly indicate that some have primacy over others.

On the basis of these points we reply to the fifth argument, that the freedom in which we were created is not incompatible with political subjection but only with despotic subjection, that is, with true and real servitude.63 Political subjection is different from servile subjection because one who is subject in a servile manner works for another, and one who is subject in a political manner works for himself; the servant is ruled not for his own, but for his master’s advantage, while the citizen is ruled for his own advantage, not for the advantage of the magistrate. Likewise, by contrast, a political prince, as long as he rules the people, seeks not his own, but his people’s utility, while a tyrant and master seeks not his people’s utility but his own, as Aristotle teaches in his Nicomachean Ethics, book 8, chapter 10. Therefore, in truth, if there is any servitude in political government, he who is in charge, not the subject, is more properly called a servant, as Augustine teaches in De civitate Dei, book 19, chapter 14; and this is the literal meaning of what our Lord says in Matthew 20: “And whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant.”64 In the same way the bishops call themselves servants of their people and the Supreme Pontiff the servant of the servants of God.

To the first passage from chapter 1 of Genesis I say that it is about despotic government, as this was the way man had to dominate the fish of the sea and the fowl of the air and the other living things.

To the second one I say, the woman, both before and after sin, is partner and subject to the man: partner in procreation, and subject in government. That phrase “and he shall rule over thee”65 does not mean every single kind of subjection, but the involuntary one, with sadness and fear, such as for the most part married women experience; as blessed Augustine teaches in his commentary on Genesis, book 11, chapter 37, where he says: “We should not believe that before sin the woman was created only to be dominated by the man and only to direct herself to serving him. The right opinion is that this servitude was meant as one of condition rather than of choice.”

To the third I say, Cain was the first to have built an actual city, but from this it does not follow that political government started then, since a commonwealth and a kingdom can exist even without an actual city, and it cannot be denied that Adam’s sons and grandsons were subject to him.

To the fourth I say, Augustine speaks of proper servitude, as is clear from that whole chapter, where, among other things, he says: “The condition of servitude is understood as being lawfully imposed on the sinner, etc.” And it is not a problem that Augustine says there that the first just men were made shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men, so that God could demonstrate what the order of the creatures required and what the punishment of sins demanded; for in this passage he refers to the abuse of the title of king, which is sometimes understood as a despotic government. Indeed, as Augustine himself says in De civitate Dei, book 5, chapter 12, a king is called such because of his rule and counsel, not because of his command and dominion; and in this sense Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob could have been called kings. Nevertheless, since human greed thinks that a king is called such because of his command and dominion, our Lord says in Luke 22: “The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them”;66 hence the first just men were called shepherds of flocks rather than kings of men.

To the fifth I say, Gregory does not talk simply about political government, but of that which is accompanied by dread, sadness, fear, etc., things which are brought about by sin, and when he says that all men are equal by nature, and become unequal through sin, and therefore one has to be ruled by another, he does not mean that men are equal in wisdom and grace, but equal in the essence of humankind. From this equality it is rightly inferred that one must not dominate the other, in the way in which man dominates beasts, but only that one has to be ruled by another politically. Hence in the same passage he adds: “In fact it is against nature to be haughty or to want to be feared by another,” since indeed sinners, through their sin, become similar to beasts and degenerate from the integrity of the nature in which they were created. Therefore, in the same passage Gregory says, rightly, that after sin one started to dominate the other with threats and punishment, which would not have happened in the state of innocence.

On Temporal and Spiritual Authority

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