Читать книгу On Temporal and Spiritual Authority - Robert Bellarmine - Страница 25

The civil law does not bind in conscience less than the divine law, even if it is less stable and firm. To explain, divine and human law are different regarding their solidity, since divine law cannot be abrogated by man, while human law can. But regarding their obligation they are not different because both bind in conscience, under pain of either mortal or venial sin according to the gravity of the issues themselves. Thus there is not a better rule for understanding whether human law binds under pain of mortal or venial sin than to think of this law as divine and then see how it would bind.⁹⁰

This is proved, first, because binding force is the essence of the law, as is said in De Summo Pontifice, book 4, chapter 16, and to bind is a necessary effect of law. Therefore, every law binds in the same way, by whomever it is made, whether by God, an angel, or a man, and among men, by a bishop, a king, or a father. The consequence is proved by analogy. Since the essence of man is to be rational and his proper characteristic is to be able to laugh, every man is reasonable and able to laugh, whether he be created by God alone, like Adam, or by God out of another human, like Eve, or procreated by men, like Cain.⁹¹ The antecedent is clear, as law is a normative rule. However, it is a central feature of a rule to direct intrinsically in such a way that to deviate from it is a sin against the prescribed norm, just as to deviate from a rule in nature is called a sin of nature, as in the case of monsters, and to deviate from a rule of an art is a sin against that art.

Here it is to be noted that just as other things depend on an agent for their existence, but not for their essence, since the essences are eternal, and [regarding the question of essence] it is also possible that things participate in a certain way in the divine essence, the law also depends for its existence on the legislator, for there will be no law unless it is established by him who has authority. But for its essence, the law does not depend on the legislator, for the binding force of the law is something eternal and immutable and stems from a certain participation in the eternal law of God, which is the first and greatest rule. Blessed Augustine seems to have intended this in Contra Faustum, book 22, chapter 27, when he says: “A sin is something said or done or desired against the eternal law of God.” In fact whoever transgresses the law, be it natural law, positive law, divine law, or human law, always sins against the eternal law, since every law participates in the eternal law. And even though it is impossible that any given true law does not come from God, since no law can be made unless by him who has authority, and there is no authority but from God (Romans 13), nevertheless if per impossibile a law did not come from God, it would still bind under pain of sin, just as if per impossibile there were a man who was not made by God, he would still be rational.⁹²

The second proof is that if the law only bound because it is divine, then clearly all laws would be equally binding, for there would be the same reason for the obligation in all of them. But this is false, for the law “thou shalt not kill” is more binding than the law “thou shalt not steal,” and this more than “thou shalt not lie,” and this more than “thou shalt not say careless words.”

Third, it is furthermore clear that a divine law is more binding the more contrary its violation is to the end of that law—namely charity. Hence it is worse to kill than to steal, as killing is more against charity; and to say a pernicious lie is a mortal sin, while to say an officious lie is a venial sin, because the former is against charity and the latter is outside of the realm of charity. But human law also has charity as its end, and it regulates the means to this end, for when the apostle says that “the end of the commandment is charity,”⁹³ it is meant for all commands. This is clear, for a just civil law is either a conclusion or a determination from the divine moral law. Therefore they have the same end, and they differ only in this: that the human law directs human acts to external acts of love, that is, to the peace and preservation of the commonwealth, but the divine law directs also to internal acts of charity; therefore the reason of the human and the divine laws is the same insofar as the obligation is concerned.

But you will object: if the gravity of the sin comes from the nature of the thing and from the relation to charity, then laws are superfluous, since we are equally obliged before and after the law to avoid what by its own nature harms charity and to do what is necessary to preserve charity.

I reply: the consequence is denied, for if the law does not help by prescribing or prohibiting something in general, many things which are bad for one person will not be so for another. For example, without a law that prohibits the carrying of arms, carrying arms will be bad for him who is easily moved to anger and who has enemies whom he wishes to harm, but it will not be bad for a peaceful man who wants only to defend himself. Nevertheless if the law prohibits it, then it is bad for all, as the law does not have to consider whether it might be good or bad for one or another, but what is advantageous and what is not for the commonwealth. Besides, there are many things that are necessary or harmful to the common good, which, nevertheless, are neither good nor bad for anybody in particular, unless they are prescribed or prohibited by law. For example, a tribute to the king is necessary. But if there is no law, it is not necessary for me to pay, for what I pay benefits the king little, and it does not concern me to see what the commonwealth needs; and all people could say the same. Similarly, it is harmful to the commonwealth that gold be exported from the province, but it is evidently not harmful to me to export my own gold; and all people could say the same. Therefore a law is necessary which, by making general prescriptions or prohibitions, can provide for the advantage of the commonwealth.

Fourth, the divine positive law binds under pain of sin, since it makes the act that it prescribes into an act of virtue, which it was not before. For if a Jew ate pork, which is prohibited in the law, though in moderation, not contemptuously but for hunger, without a doubt he would sin, but he would not sin formally against obedience, since he did not do it out of contempt and therefore against temperance; and eating pork in moderation is not in itself against temperance, but an indifferent thing. Therefore there was a law which made that abstinence a necessary act of temperance. And we see the same in human law. In fact, the divine law makes that which in itself was indifferent into an act of virtue for no other reason but that it is a rule of behavior imposed by Him Who has the authority to make prescriptions. But also man can make prescriptions and establish rules of behavior, as we showed above; therefore man can make an otherwise indifferent act into an act of virtue by his law, and accordingly divine and human laws are equal with regard to obligation.

Fifth, divine and human laws are as different as the law of the king and that of the viceroy, or the law of the Pontiff and that of his legates. But those latter cases bind in the same way and differ only in stability, and the same applies therefore to the first case also. The proposition is clear, since the Scriptures here and there attest that kings are ministers of God, and from Him they have the authority and judge in His place (Proverbs 8, Book of Wisdom 6, Romans 13, 1 Peter 2). The assumption is also clear, since the authority of the viceroy comes from the king, and that of the legate from the Pope; and the same is proved by experience and confirmed by the holy Fathers Augustine and Bernard. Augustine in his commentary on Psalm 70 says: “Where the father orders what is not against God, he has to be listened to as if he were God, etc.” Now it is certain that the authority of the king is greater than the authority of a father, as Augustine himself says in sermon 6 on the word of God. Bernard, in De praeceptis [praecepto] et dispensationibus [dispensatione], says: “When someone, whether God or a man, in place of God, gives a command, the command undoubtedly has to be obeyed with the same care and carried out with the same reverence, provided that the man does not command anything contrary to God,” and here he clearly says that the laws differ with respect to their content, not with respect to those who make the prescription.

But you will object that Bernard in the same passage, speaking of the commands of men, says that orders are not neglected without guilt, nor are they scorned without committing a crime, for neglect always deserves blame, and scorn must always be condemned; in this he seems to say that human law never binds under pain of mortal sin unless by reason of contempt. I reply that we are talking here of precepts about small matters in which there cannot be crime except by reason of contempt. For not even priests can bind under pain of mortal sin out of their own will.

Sixth, it is proved because the assumption that the prince can bind with respect to punishing, but not with respect to guilt, seems to imply a contradiction, since obviously punishment and guilt are related; blessed Augustine in book 1 of his Retractationes, chapter 9, says: “Every punishment, if it is just, is punishment of a sin,” and in epistle 105 [186] and elsewhere, he says that God Himself would be unjust if He condemned an innocent. How, therefore, can the princes condemn to death those who transgress their laws if they have not committed a sin? If they have not committed any error of conscience?

You will say, how is it, then, that the rules of some religious orders bind with respect to punishment but not guilt? I reply that they are binding not as a law, but as an agreement and a pact, as purely penal laws. And it is not even a proper punishment, but the infliction of a penalty in order to aid the spirit.

Seventh, and last, it is proved from the doctrine of the apostles, for in Romans 13 Paul affirms it in many ways. First, when he says: “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God.”⁹⁴ Second, “Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.”⁹⁵ Third, “And they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.”⁹⁶ The Greek and Latin Fathers interpret this last passage as referring to eternal damnation. Fourth, “Wherefore ye must needs be subjects,”⁹⁷ and fifth, “Not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.”⁹⁸ Sixth, “For they are God’s ministers.”⁹⁹ In 1 Peter 2: “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake,”¹⁰⁰ that is, not only for fear of punishment.

These passages demonstrate sufficiently what we want, for if princes have their authority to command from God, certainly those who do not obey them offend not only the princes, but also God; and if those who resist the prince resist the ordinance of God, certainly they sin in conscience, no differently than if they had transgressed the divine laws, and if those who resist receive damnation for themselves, certainly they commit a wrong worthy of that punishment. If they of necessity are subject to individual princes not only for fear of wrath but also for conscience, how do those who are not obedient to them fail to commit a sin? Finally, if princes are God’s ministers and we must obey them for God, certainly those who scorn the commands of princes scorn the majesty of God. ¹⁰¹

As for the contrary arguments, I respond as follows:

To the first, second, and third I reply that from the fact that the political authority is temporal and its end is external peace and that man does not make judgments on internal matters, it is rightly inferred that it can oblige only to perform temporal and external acts, but not that it cannot bind in conscience. For even if this rule directs only external acts, nevertheless, since it is a rule, deviating from it is committing a sin.

You will say, how can the law or temporal authority produce a spiritual effect, namely, binding the conscience? I reply that even if the political authority and its law are called temporal because of their object, which is to deal with temporal and external matters, nevertheless in themselves they are spiritual things. Besides, binding the conscience is not performing something spiritual, but only commanding another in such a way that if he does not obey, he sins; and by the testimony of his conscience he should or could understand that he is indeed committing a sin. Therefore, whoever can command can also bind the conscience, even if he does not make judgments on internal matters or does not examine another person’s conscience.

To the fourth and fifth I say that the prince cannot impose a spiritual and eternal punishment, and he cannot lift such punishment, but he can nevertheless impose an obligation under pain of such punishment, since he does it by the authority of God, Who granted him the latter and not the former. It is as if a king allowed a viceroy to impose an obligation on the subjects under pain of capital punishment but did not allow him to administer justice by himself or to pardon the punishment. Or we can say that political law binds under pain of eternal punishment not because it is the law of man, but because it is the law of the minister of God. Whoever offends a minister of God at the same time offends God, wherefore if per impossibile there were no God in nature, and likewise per impossibile there were a certain political law, this would bind in conscience, and transgressing it would be a sin, but no spiritual punishment or eternal damnation would follow the transgression.

To the sixth I say that it is not absurd that the same sin is punished by many and in many places when it offends many, for often we see that murderers have the hands cut off at the place where the murder took place, and their heads cut off at the place of public execution.

To the seventh I say that it depends on the intention of the legislator whether he wants to command in earnest and to make true laws or wants only to show what should be done without any command. But if he wants to command in earnest and make true laws, it is not in his power to exempt his law from binding under pain of mortal or venial sin, according to the importance of the matter.

To the last I say that the reason why human law gives way to divine law when they cannot both be obeyed at the same time is not that human law does not bind under pain of sin, but that it is established less firmly. For in such a case it ceases to be law, and therefore it ceases to be binding. See what we said in book 4 of De Summo Pontifice; and also John Driedo in book 3 of De libertate Christiana, Adrian in Quodlibeta 6, Francisco de Vitoria in the lecture on civil authority; Alfonso de Castro, book 1 of De potestate legis poenalis, chapter 4, and Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, book 1, question 6, article 4.