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Returns to Buyer and Target Firms Combined

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Findings of positive abnormal returns to the seller and breakeven returns to the buyer raise the question of net economic gain from this event. The challenge here stems from the size difference between buyer and target: typically, the buyer is substantially larger. Hence, a large percentage gain to the target shareholders could be more than offset by a small percentage loss to the buyer shareholders. A number of studies have examined this by forming a portfolio of the buyer and target firms and examining either their weighted average returns (weighted by the relative sizes of the two firms) or by examining the absolute dollar value of returns. Exhibit 3.7 reports the findings of 24 studies. Almost all of the studies report positive combined returns, with 14 of the 24 being significantly positive. The findings suggest that M&A does pay the investors in the combined buyer and target firms.

EXHIBIT 3.6 Studies Reporting Long-Term Returns to Acquirers

Study Cumulative Abnormal Returns Sample Size Sample Period Event Window (Days) % Positive Returns Notes
Mandelker (1974) –1.32% successful bids only 241 1941–1963 (0,365) N/A Mergers only. Event date is date of consummation of the deal.
Dodd, Ruback (1977) –1.32% successful –1.60% unsuccessful 124 48 1958–1978 (0,365) N/A Tender offers only. Event date is date of offer.
Langetieg (1978) –6.59%* successful bids only 149 1929–1969 (0,365) N/A Mergers only.
Asquith (1983) –7.20%* successful 196 1962–1976 (0,240) N/A Mergers only.
–9.60%* unsuccessful 89
Bradley, Desai, Kim (1983) –7.85%* unsuccessful bids only 94 1962–1980 (0,365) N/A Tender offers only.
Malatesta (1983) –2.90% whole sample –13.70% *after l970 121 75 1969–1974 (0,365) N/A Mergers only. Event date is date of approval.
–7.70% smaller bidders 59
Agrawal, Jaffe, Mandelker (1992) –10.26%* 765 1955–1987 (0,1,250) 43.97% Mergers only; five-year postmerger performance; tender offer postacquisition performance is not significantly different from zero.
Loderer, Martin (1992) +1.5% 1,298 1966–1986 (0,1,250) N/A Mergers and tender offers; five-year postacquisition performance.
Gregory (1997) –12% to –18%* 452 1984–1992 (0,500) 31% to 37% Uses six variations of the event study methodology; U.K. mergers and tender offers; two-year postacquisition performance.
Loughran, Vijh (1997) –14.2% merger +61.3%* tender 434 100 1970–1989 (1,1,250) N/A Five-year postacquisition returns; segment data also available on form of payment.
–0.1% combined
Rau, Vermaelen (1998) –4%* mergers +9%* tender offers 3,968 348 1980–1991 (0,36 months) N/A Three-year postacquisition returns, with insights into value and glamour investing strategies.
Louis (undated) –7.3%* successful –18.4%* unsuccessful 1,297 308 1981–1998 (0,3 years) N/A Comparison of successful and unsuccessful acquirers.
Pettit (2000) –25.41%* 216 1977–1993 (0,3 years) N/A Tender offers, French sample.
Ferris and Park (2001) –19.80%* 56 1990–1993 (l,+60 months) N/A Sample of mergers in the telecommunications industry.
Kohers, Kohers (2001) –37.39% 304 1984–1995 (1,1,250) N/A Sample of technology mergers.
Moeller, Schlingemann, Stulz (2003) –4.1% 12,023 1980–2001 (0,36 months) N/A

Unless otherwise noted, event date is announcement date of merger/bid.

*Significant at the 0.95 confidence level or better.

Applied Mergers and Acquisitions

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