Читать книгу Applied Mergers and Acquisitions - Robert F. Bruner - Страница 65
NOTES
Оглавление1 1. Grubb and Lamb (2000), pages 9, 10, 12, and 14.
2 2. In England, the village commons was a field jointly used by villagers to graze their animals. Because the field was, in effect, held by all, no one individually looked out for the welfare of the social good. The problem of the commons was to prevent behavior (such as overgrazing by selfish villagers) that would harm the welfare of all.
3 3. The story is rather different for the Time-Warner shareholders, who wound up cushioning the collapse of the Internet bubble for the AOL shareholders.
4 4. In a memorable comment, Caves (1989) wrote, “This technique was a genuine innovation—theoretically well grounded, cheap to execute, and able to evade the problem of holding constant other factors that plague ex post studies of mergers’ effects. A better product, available at a lower price, naturally swept the intellectual marketplace.” (Page 151)
5 5. Tests of significance also depend on sample size. The t values discussed here implicitly assume relatively large samples of observations, such as more than 100.
6 6. [(1.01)52 – 1] = 0.678.
7 7. See Dennis and McConnell (1986) and Billett, King, and Mauer (2003). Also, Maquieira, Megginson, and Nail (1998) report, “Apart from bidding firm stockholders in conglomerate mergers, all major classes of debt and equity securityholders of both bidders and targets either break even or experience significant wealth gains.” (Page 30)
8 8. Meeks defines return on assets as pretax profits (after depreciation, but before tax) divided by the average of beginning and ending assets for the year. The key metric was RChange = RAfter – RBefore where RAfter and RBefore were measures of performance relative to the weighted average of returns of the buyer’s and target’s industries.
9 9. Ravenscraft and Scherer examine the performance between 1974 and 1977 of mergers that occurred from 1950 to 1977. In other words, the period under observation was not the same number of years after merger from one observation to the next.
10 10. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report that average announcement returns to bidders fell from 4.1 percent in the 1963 to 1968 period to –2.9 percent in the 1981–1984 period.
11 11. See Servaes, Lang, Stultz, and Walkling (1991), Harford (1999), and Jensen (1986).
12 12. Jensen and Ruback (1983) give a survey of returns in contested and friendly deals. Numerous studies report positive significant returns to bidders in hostile transactions: Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1987), Gregory (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Lang, Stultz, and Walkling (1989), and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989). On the other hand, Healey, Palepu, and Ruback (1997) found that hostile deals were associated with insignificant improvements in cash flow returns, owing possibly to the payment of higher acquisition premiums.
13 13. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) found that lower equity investment by managers in their own firms was associated with higher propensity to undertake variance-reducing acquisitions. You et al. (1986) found that announcement returns to bidders were lower (i.e., more negative), the lower the managers’ equity stake in the buyer firm.
14 14. Page 55, italics added.
15 15. Dennis Mueller (1979), page 307.
16 16. Jensen and Ruback (1983), page 5.
17 17. Weidenbaum and Vogt (1987), page 166.
