Читать книгу Phenomenology of Productive Imagination: Embodiment, Language, Subjectivity - Saulius Geniusas - Страница 5

When Paul Ricœur delivered his lectures, Imagination as a Philosophical Problem, at the University of Chicago in 1975, he initiated his discussion with reflections on the reasons that had forced philosophers to disregard imagination in their investigations. At the very beginning of his Introductory Lecture, Ricœur lamented that imagination is a largely forgotten theme in philosophy in general. He spoke of the “eclipse of the problem” and of the reasons behind this eclipse. “At the present time,” he bemoaned, “there is nearly nothing which could be called ‘a philosophy of the imagination’” (Ricœur unpublished, 1:1).1 Edward S. Casey expressed a similar sentiment a year later in his 1976 Imagining: A Phenomenological Study. In this outstanding investigation, Casey spoke of the “tradition of condemnation and neglect” of imagination, of philosophical attitudes that range “from distrust to disgust,” and of the pompous assumption that thinking is, or at least should be, image-free. In light of this diagnosis, Casey set himself the task “to rectify the tendency on the part of many Western philosophers to belittle imagination—or, still worse, to neglect it altogether” (Casey 1976, ix).

The philosophical landscape has changed tremendously over the last decades. Since at least the beginning of the twenty-first century, there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in philosophy and its related fields, so much so that one can state without exaggeration that imagination now occupies a central place in contemporary philosophical and, more broadly, intellectual discussions. This view is strongly expressed in recently published handbooks on the philosophy of imagination (See Kind 2016) and in cross-disciplinary handbooks on imagination (See Abraham 2020). How are we to understand such a radical change of mindset across the disciplines? In particular, what is it that motivates philosophers nowadays to reflect on imagination? Of course, the reasons are highly diverse. Some present their investigations in specific philosophical fields, such as aesthetics, epistemology, philosophy of mind or cognitive science, with the aim of disclosing the highly diverse ways in which imagination is implicated therein. Others see research on imagination as a fresh chance to open up cross-disciplinary discussions between different research fields. Others, still, are concerned with showing the rich variety of ways imagination has been addressed in the history of philosophy, indicating, precisely, the place it has been assigned in diverse philosophical frameworks and traditions. Yet others are concerned with concept clarification, that is, with the question: what does the concept of imagination mean and is it possible to provide a definition of it that would accommodate the different ways it has been employed in everyday use and in scholarly discussions? In these and other highly diverse ways, philosophical research corroborates the view that imagination lies at the very heart of our existence and that it constitutes an inextricable feature of our experience.

It should be stressed that the widespread interest in imagination in philosophy and related fields over the past decades has been largely triggered by recent technological developments. Since the mid-1990s, Internet and smartphone technology has had an enormous impact on the general culture. Whether in public or in private spheres, we are haunted by images, which are always there for our consumption, and which are channeled through our smartphones, iPads, laptops, TV screens, etc. This ubiquity of images has had a profound impact on human experience: manufactured and mass-produced images shape the way we see the world. This has led some postmodern thinkers to contend that, nowadays, the order between reality and the images of reality has become reversed; our everyday reality now imitates images, which were supposed to be imitations of it, but which now precede and shape the real world. In Jean Baudrillard’s words, we live in a world of hyperreality, understood as the generation of models of reality without origin in reality: “the territory no longer precedes the map… it is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory—precession of simulacra—that engenders the territory” (Baudrillard 1994, 1).

Yet paradoxically, this ubiquity of images signals the retreat of imagination: insofar as they are everywhere, images rob us of the space that was previously reserved for autonomous imagination. As Richard Kearney insightfully remarked in the late 1980s, “one of the greatest paradoxes of contemporary culture is that at a time when the image reigns supreme the very notion of creative human imagination seems under mounting threat” (Kearney 1988, 3). This is not surprising; insofar as we are continuously haunted by images, we have no reason to shape them ourselves. To express this in phenomenological terms, the ubiquity of image consciousness renders phantasy-consciousness obsolete.2

Or so it would seem at first glance. And yet, before rushing to conclusions, we should ask ourselves the following questions: how can the cultural transformations I am here alluding to render imagination a thing of the past? Do these transformations really signal that images can no longer be understood in terms of their “subjectivity” or “phenomenality,” but must, instead, be conceived as anonymous commodities? How can the image precede the reality that it represents? How can it infiltrate human experience and shape the appearance of phenomena? So, also, we should ask ourselves, what is this autonomous imagination that is now, supposedly, rendered obsolete by the ubiquity of images? Could it be the case that certain forms of imagination are irreducible from human experience, that although they can be covered up, they cannot be eliminated? In other words, is it, perhaps, impossible for a cultural transformation to emerge that would lead to their demise or replacement? Even with the uncertainty of all of these questions, one thing is uncontroversial: the widespread cultural transformations I am here alluding to give rise to numerous philosophical concerns.

The following study will focus on one particular form of imagination—productive imagination; it will address this from a phenomenological point of view, with the aim of showing how this figure of imagination has been conceptualized in the phenomenological tradition. One can only be surprised that, to this day, there are no book-length studies that have exclusively focused on the phenomenological analyses of productive imagination. The fundamental goal of this study is to show why such an investigation is needed and why, in its absence, our understanding of the phenomenology of imagination remains severely limited. My goal is to show that such an investigation can in significant ways enrich our understanding of subjectivity. More precisely, my goal is to disclose the fundamental ways that our world experience has been shaped by our bodies, consciousness and language, and also to uncover the central reasons why our embodied consciousness of the world, taken in its linguistic and pre-linguistic modalities, is soaked in imagination.

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From the moment we are born, we exist in the flesh. Embodied existence is the only mode of existence we are familiar with. To what degree, and in what ways, is the power of imagination shaped by our embodied existence? At the same time, imagination is a feature of conscious life. Only insofar as we are conscious are we able to imagine. What must consciousness be like if it is to relate to the world, not only perceptually and conceptually, but also imaginatively? When we focus in on that specifically human form of life, we cannot help but admit that humans are speaking animals. To what degree, and in what ways, does language shape the powers of imagination? These are some of the central questions this book focuses on.

The following chapters will investigate the different ways that the concept of productive imagination has been conceptualized in phenomenology. The uncertainty about the meaning of productive imagination is strongly imbedded in this philosophical tradition. Some of the voices in this tradition have identified the narratives on productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy (especially in German idealism and romanticism) as an “orgy of overestimation” (see Casey 1976, 1) – which must be replaced by dispassionate phenomenological descriptions. Others have argued that this concept still remains underdeveloped and that its further clarification constitutes one of the central tasks of the phenomenology of imagination.3

In phenomenology, Ricœur stands out as the philosopher of productive imagination. There is, however, one claim that we come across repeatedly in Ricœur’s writings on the imagination that I find deeply problematic. According to Ricœur, the history of the phenomenology of imagination is the history of reproductive imagination. One of the goals of this study is to demonstrate that Ricœur’s claim is unwarranted and that, in the classical phenomenological tradition, we come across both explicit and implicit investigations of productive imagination. These investigations should be viewed as either precursors, or as enrichers, or even as viable alternatives to Ricœur’s own phenomenology of productive imagination.

Chapter I will provide an account of the Kantian conception of productive imagination. It will also sketch the history of productive imagination in post-Kantian philosophy, thereby exposing the historical framework within which specifically phenomenological analyses of productive imagination can be understood. In this chapter, I will also provide a preliminary conception of productive imagination that will guide my analysis throughout this study.

Chapter II will investigate the different senses in which we can speak of productive imagination in Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl provides us with the possibility of conceiving of productive imagination as a relative term, a term whose meaning is derived from its opposition to reproductive imagination. Such a methodological approach, which addresses Husserl’s writings on phantasy and image consciousness (see Husserl 2005), is highly promising. Husserl’s phenomenology is exceptionally fruitful when it comes to identifying the different ways we can speak of reproductive phantasy. Following such an approach, I will argue that there are three fundamental senses in which phantasy can be said to be productive in the framework of Husserlian phenomenology. First, phantasy is productive because it can intend “original” appearances—not in the sense of perceptual appearances, but in the sense that the phantasized appearances do not reproduce perceptual appearances. Second, phantasy is productive because it opens the field of pure possibilities and thereby provides consciousness with access to the field of the a priori as the field of essences. Third, and most interestingly, phantasy is productive because it intends configurations of sense, which consciousness can subsequently transfer from the field of phantasy to the field of actuality. In this third fundamental sense, phantasy is productive because it co-determines the meaning of perceptually given phenomena. Productive phantasy thereby proves to be a fundamental source that underlies the constitution of the lifeworld.

In Chapter III, I will turn to Max Scheler’s contribution to phenomenological studies of imagination. Here, also, productive phantasy will be understood as a type of intentional experience, which does not merely produce non-existent objects called fictions, but also shapes the contours of the surrounding world. As we will see, Scheler conceives of productive phantasy as an ingredient of original perception (Urperzeption). Because of Scheler’s work, we recognize that perceptual phenomena cannot be reduced to a configuration of sensations, but always already entail phantasmatic content. In my analysis, I will address the psychic, historical and cultural dimensions of productive phantasy, while focusing on the relation between phantasy, on the one hand, and drives, instincts and desires, on the other hand. In addition, I will also focus on the psychic and cultural developments of productive phantasy. It will also be important to see how Scheler’s reflections on productive phantasy relate to his other established views, and especially to his thesis that the sense of reality is determined through resistance.

Chapter IV will revisit the Davos disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger. This debate is commonly framed in terms of its political implications. However, such an approach suffers from a serious hermeneutical shortcoming in that it overlooks that the origin of this debate comes from a dispute over the meaning, nature and significance of productive imagination. Should we identify productive imagination as an original ground of human experience? Or should we identify it as a mediating power between the understanding and sensibility? Is productive imagination formative of reason? Or is it rooted in reason? These are some of the fundamental questions of the Cassirer-Heidegger debate. The thesis that everything that appears is always already shaped by productive imagination is the central point of agreement in Cassirer’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions of productive imagination. For both thinkers, productive imagination produces the transcendental horizons of sense, that is, the operational fields or the modes of vision, which pre-determine human experience. There is, however, an important point-of-departure for Cassirer and Heidegger on the topic of productive imagination. The point-of-departure does not come from Heidegger’s own thesis that Cassirer recoils from finitude, while Heidegger himself faces it head-on. It comes, instead, from the idea that Cassirer and Heidegger express two fundamentally different ways of conceptualizing finitude. In what sense, if in any way at all, can philosophy rise above finitude? The most important question here is whether philosophy should strive to rise above finitude, or whether it should commit itself, not just thematically, but also methodologically, directly to finitude? The Davos dispute leaves us, I will argue, with these fundamental philosophical questions.

Chapter V will focus on Miki Kiyoshi’s contribution to the philosophy of imagination. In the West, Miki’s work is severely underappreciated, which is understandable, since only parts of his magnum opus, The Logic of the Imagination, have been translated into English. Despite this limitation, one has to admit that Miki is an outstanding thinker whose contributions are largely shaped by phenomenological undercurrents, and who has developed his line of thinking far beyond classical phenomenology. In the present context, I will focus on the first two chapters of The Logic of the Imagination. These chapters address the significance of myth and institutions, conceived as figures of social imaginary. Within such a context, it will be important to see how productive imagination shapes our world-understanding. Building on Miki’s investigations, I will contend that imagination shapes our world-understanding in three fundamental ways: by generating (1) collective representations, (2) symbols and (3) forms. I will further contend that, with these three different frameworks, we can identify the same logic of the imagination as it has been conceived in terms of formation, reformation and transformation. This threefold logic allows us to identify Miki’s philosophy of imagination as a philosophy of absolute creativity, situated between pathos and logos, hope and despair, elation and disenchantment, cultural crisis and its overcoming.

Chapter VI will trace the developments of Merleau-Ponty’s reflections on imagination, starting with his earliest work on this theme and ending with his final writings. In Chapter, I will show that even though Merleau-Ponty does not rely on the conceptual distinction between productive and reproductive imagination, this distinction is exceptionally well-suited to his philosophy of the imagination. As we will see, in his early period, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of imagination was heavily influenced by Sartre’s work on imagination. In his late period, Merleau-Ponty progressively distanced himself from Sartre with the result that a remarkably rich conception of productive imagination emerged – a conception that was at once transcendental and ontological, dialogical and dialectical. Here, we face a conception of productive imagination that is rooted in the body rather than in consciousness, but is rooted in the body in such a way that it becomes a necessary medium through which the visible can see itself. Productive imagination in this phenomenological framework manifests itself as a sui generis mode of intentionality that binds embodied subjectivity to the ontological and transcendental dimensions of the visible world, a bind which, in his late period, Merleau-Ponty identifies as the invisible dimensions of the visible.

In Chapter VII, I will turn to the most elaborate set of phenomenological resources, as far as philosophy of the imagination is concerned. Here, I will focus on Ricœur’s published writings on imagination. My goal will be to interpret Ricœur’s writings alongside the phenomenological tradition as a whole. Within such a framework, I will argue that imagination has an inherently paradoxical structure: it enables one to flee one’s socio-cultural reality and to constitute one’s sociocultural world. Most philosophical accounts of imagination leave this paradox unexplored; to the best of my knowledge, Ricœur is the only thinker to have addressed this paradox explicitly. According to Ricœur, to resolve this paradox, one needs to recognize language as the origin of productive imagination. Chapter VII will explore Ricœur’s solution to this paradox by offering a detailed study of reproductive and productive imagination set within the framework of poetic imagination. In my analysis, I will subject Ricœur’s distinction between reproductive and productive imagination to a critique that relies upon the principles of classical phenomenology. According to my central thesis in this chapter, the imaginative powers of language are themselves rooted in pre-predicative experience. This realization broadens the scope and significance of Ricœur’s solution by enabling one to resolve the paradox of imagination not only at the level of language-based imagination (as is done by Ricœur), but also at the level of both dreams and daydreaming as well as at the level of non-language-based art.

In Chapter VIII, I will delve deeper into the foregoing analysis of Ricœur’s philosophy of imagination by taking a closer look at Ricœur’s so-far unpublished lectures on imagination, which he delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975. Ricœur devoted most of his analysis in these lectures to different figures in the history of philosophy who addressed imagination in their reflections. Of all the figures he discusses, Ricœur’s treatment of Sartre is unwavering: three of the seventeen lectures are devoted to the French phenomenologist. In this chapter, I will address Ricœur’s critique of Sartre as it appears in these lectures. It will be important to see that Ricœur’s critique is twofold: hermeneutical and phenomenological. The hermeneutical critique relies on two central claims, namely, that Sartre fails to distinguish between productive and reproductive imagination, and that this distinction is language-based. I will argue that neither claim is justified. By contrast, the phenomenological critique casts doubts on Sartre’s sharp distinction between the real and the imaginary. It relies on Ricœur’s phenomenology of painting, which offers an alternative way to distinguish between productive and reproductive imagination. One of my central goals in this chapter will be to address Ricœur’s phenomenology of painting in some detail, a necessary task, I believe, given that Ricœur never developed his phenomenology of painting in his published writings.

In Chapter IX, I will directly focus on the issues I will have introduced at the very beginning of this study. Building on the basis of the analysis undertaken in the earlier chapters, I will contend that phenomenology of productive imagination is first and foremost concerned with enriching our understanding of subjectivity. It does this in three fundamental ways: (1) by binding imagination to consciousness, (2) with language, and (3) through the body. While the link that binds imagination to consciousness and to language has been addressed quite extensively in the literature, the same cannot be said about the embodied nature of productive imagination. In this concluding chapter, I will put forth the claim that the power of productive imagination is rooted in our bodies. Embodied subjectivity cannot help but shape its relation to the world imaginatively. There are two fundamental reasons why this happens: first, because to be embodied means to occupy “the zero point of orientation,” and second, because to realize that we are embodied means to realize that our relation to the world is largely shaped by our drives, instincts and needs. In short, our embodied subjectivity always already necessarily relates to the world, and relates to the world not only perceptually and conceptually, but also imaginatively. To clarify the meaning of this seminal claim will lead me to conclude this chapter, and this study as a whole, with some reflections on social imaginaries and carnal hermeneutics.

1 Ricœur’s lectures, “Imagination as a Philosophical Problem,” which were delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975 and to which I am here referring, still remain unpublished. I am grateful to George H. Taylor and Patrick Crosby, who have been preparing the edition of these lectures for many years, for granting the permission to quote Ricœur’s lectures. When citing this work, I will refer to it as unpublished and will indicate the lecture number before the manuscript page number.

2 This tendency is born, not with the new technologies I have here mentioned, but with postmodernism in the arts. Consider Andy Warhol’s observation: “I always think quantity is the best gauge on anything…When Picasso died I read in a magazine that he had made four thousand masterpieces in his lifetime and I thought, ‘Gee, I could do that in a day.’ So I started. And then I found out, ‘Gee, it takes more than a day to do four thousand pictures.’ You see, the way I do them, with my technique, I really thought I could do four thousand in a day. And they'd all be masterpieces because they'd all be the same painting. And I started and I got up to about five hundred and then I stopped. But it took more than a day, I think it took a month. So at five hundred a month, it would have taken me about eight months to do four thousand masterpieces... It was disillusioning for me, to realize it would take me that long.” I am not the first one to suggest that postmodernism undermines the modernist commitment to the autonomy of creative imagination and that it signals the critical turn from production to reproduction by robbing artworks of what Walter Benjamin had called their “unique and irreplaceable aura.” According to Warhol, an image is a “mechanically reproducible commodity” and it belongs to the “total communications package.” In the present context, I wish to stress that over the last few decades, this proliferation of images and their transformation into a “mechanically reproducible commodity” is no longer a specific characteristic of the arts but a feature that characterizes our general culture.

3 This view is expressed in a strong way in Paul Ricœur’s lectures on imagination, to which I have already referred, and in a large number of articles that he wrote on imagination. His contribution to the phenomenology of productive imagination will be addressed in detail in Chapters VII and VIII.