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One possible way to answer the question on what grounds speakers choose between different types of referring expressions at a particular stage in the discourse is to look at the semantic-pragmatic contribution of these referring expressions. Semantic theories account for speakers’ referential choices by distinguishing between two main types of expressions in terms of definiteness. Languages vary with respect to the lexical or morphological means they employ to mark noun phrases. In English, for example, definiteness can be realized by: the simple definite article (e.g. the), demonstrative articles (e.g. this/ that), personal pronouns (e.g. I/ you), (unmodified) proper nouns (e.g. Mary, Germany), possessive adjectives (e.g. my house), and quantifiers (e.g. every, all). Indefiniteness marking can be realized by the simple indefinite article (e.g. a/an), and by different quantifiers (e.g. some, any, one). Research in the field has generally focused on the prototypes of definite and indefinite expressions, namely on singular nouns headed by the definite article the and the indefinite article a/an (Russel 1905, Christophersen 1939, Strawson 1950, Heim 1982, among others). These two types of referring expressions are thought of in terms of one particular property that applies in equal strength to all members of one of the two categories, but not to the other. In contrast to proper names and pronouns, the sentence semantic contribution of definite and indefinite noun phrases is the enrichment of the proposition with descriptive material. In distinguishing the defining properties of definite and indefinite noun phrases, uniqueness, familiarity and salience have been shown to be important factors. In classical semantics (Frege, 1892; Russell, 1905; see Heim 1991, 2011 for an overview), definite noun phrases contribute a uniqueness condition to the sentence semantics and denote a uniquely identifiable referent. Indefinite noun phrases, on the contrary, are treated as quantifiers that assert the existence of their descriptive content but are neutral towards uniqueness, as they do not imply non-uniqueness. Under the uniqueness account, the definite determiner in example (1a) signals that there is only one vase in the discourse domain to which the description the vase can be applied. The unique status of the entity can come about by mechanisms as different as the explicit mention of the associated referent in the previous discourse (the anaphoric use), or the demonstrative use of the referring expression, to name just a few (see Hawkins 1978 or Lyons 1999 for a detailed discussion on the different uses of definite noun phrases). The indefinite noun phrase a vase in (1b), on the contrary, is not specified for uniqueness. In other words, the use of the indefinite noun phrase is felicitous in a context in which we can find at least one entity in the discourse domain that fits the description of the noun phrase.

(1)	(a)	Telia broke the vase.
	(b)	Telia broke a vase.

Within the framework of “dynamic semantics” (Karttunen 1976, Kamp 1981, Heim 1982), in which the developing context of interpretation plays an important role in mediating between linguistic form and reality, both definite and indefinite noun phrases are analysed as two types of referring expressions that contribute a discourse referent to a discourse representation. The difference between the two types of noun phrases is that definites (usually) refer back to familiar (i.e. already established) discourse referents, whereas indefinites canonically introduce new (novel) and non-familiar discourse referents into the common ground. For example, the definite noun phrase the doll in sentence (2a) is analysed as referring to one unique individual in the discourse whose existence is presupposed and with which both the speaker and the hearer are familiar. The indefinite noun phrase a doll in sentence (2b) is rather analysed as introducing a new entity in the discourse (Heim 1982, Prince 1992), and referring to an unfamiliar and non-presupposed entity. The fact that the speaker chooses an indefinite noun phrase to refer to the doll in sentence (2b), when he could have opted for a definite noun phrase, indicates an asymmetry in the amount of shared knowledge between the discourse participants.

(2)	(a)	Telia bought the doll on Monday.
	(b)	Telia bought a doll on Monday.

In the realm of indefinite noun phrases, which constitute the focus of this book, an additional distinction was discussed in terms of specificity (Fillmore 1967, Karttunen 1969, Partee 1970, Kripke 1977, Ludlow and Neale 1991, von Heusinger 2002). Indefinite noun phrases have been shown to display an ambiguity between specific and non-specific readings. The notion of specificity is generally understood in terms of the referential intention of a speaker. For example, the indefinite noun phrase a Croatian in (3) is interpreted depending on whether the speaker intends to refer to a particular Croatian, or not. The continuation given in (3a) disambiguates the indefinite noun phrase towards the specific reading, in which the speaker refers to a particular Croatian Paula wants to marry. The referent is fixed, independently of the interpretation of the clause. On the contrary, the continuation in (3b) disambiguates the indefinite noun phrase towards a non-specific reading, in which the Croatian is non-identifiable to the speaker or to the matrix subject, Paula. Moreover, the observation that only (3a) allows the insertion of “a certain” to modify the indefinite noun phrase, underlines once more the different readings in terms of specificity given in example (3).

(3)	(a)	Paula wants to marry a Croatian. He is her neighbour.
	(b)	Paula wants to marry a Croatian. She has to meet one first.

Based on the findings from a cross-linguistic survey, Haspelmath (1997) points out that the distinction between specific and non-specific is so important that certain languages use different types of morphological or lexical markers to encode this distinction. As researchers focussed on one or more properties of indefinite noun phrases, different views on specificity emerged. This being so, it is no surprise that the concept of specificity has been used as a general term for several, partially overlapping phenomena such as: scopal specificity, epistemic specificity, partitive specificity and specificity as noteworthiness. In the literature on this topic we sometimes find the term referentiality being used as a synonymous expression for specificity (Fodor and Sag 1982, Givón 1984). However, in line with von Heusinger (2002), I consider that specificity and referentiality should be teased apart and be analysed as two distinct phenomena. In this book, referentiality is taken to be an indicator for the existence and accessibility in the discourse and specificity is understood in terms of the referential intention of the speaker or of another salient agent in the discourse. Contexts containing modals and non-factive propositional attitude verbs (i.e. operators, Heim 1981) make the distinction between a referential and a non-referential reading of an indefinite noun phrase clear. The indefinite in (3a), for example, scopes over the operator want and allows for an existential assertion of its associated referent. This allows for an interpretation in which the pronoun he in the second conjunct is bound by the indefinite noun phrase in the preceding sentence. The indefinite in (3a) has a referential reading and is specific as well, as it refers to an individual the speaker has in mind1. The indefinite in (3b), on the contrary, is interpreted inside the scope of the operator.

Over the past forty years, a wealth of research has focused on the analysis of referring expressions within larger discourse segments. It is generally accepted that discourses are structured in such a way as to achieve coherence. In order to successfully process a coherent discourse, discourse participants must construct a mental representation of the events being described. Definite and indefinite noun phrases represent one way to achieve such representations and to keep track of the referents introduced in the discourse. It has been argued that the position of an entity in a particular discourse structure determines the use of a particular type of referring expression in the subsequent mention of that referent. Prince (1988: 1) argues that when “a speaker evokes an entity in the discourse s/he first hypothesizes the information status of that entity in the hearer’s mind, with respect to both familiarity and saliency”. In the process of referring, speakers do not randomly opt for a particular type of referring expression; rather they choose the appropriate type of referring expression based on the referential status of the referent it is associated with. In other words, the use of a certain type of referring expression is negotiated at each point in the discourse between speakers and hearers. Thus, whether speakers use an indefinite noun phrase, a definite noun phrases, a pronoun, and so forth, to refer to a particular referent, depends on the information status of that entity at a particular time in the discourse. Prince (1988, 1992) captures the controversial notions of givenness and familiarity discussed above in a more intuitive classificational system of referential status, which impacts the choice of the type of referring expression. She introduces two fundamental referential statuses to account for the use of different types of referring expressions, namely the discourse status and the hearer status, as illustrated in Table 2.1. The discourse status reflects the discourse history of a referent and indicates whether a referent has already been evoked in the discourse (i.e. discourse-old), or not (i.e. discourse-new). The hearer status captures another dimension of the referent that pertains to the shared knowledge between discourse participants. According to this dimension, information is shared between the discourse participants if it was explicitly introduced in the discourse, or if it represents unused, old information for the hearer, otherwise the information is hearer-new.

	Discourse-new	Discourse-old
Hearer-new	Brand-new	-
Hearer-old	Unused	Textually evoked

Table 2.1:

Taxonomy of referential status (Prince 1992)

The discourse status and the hearer status represent two dimensions of an entity and are not independent of each other. For example, if a referent is discourse-old (i.e. textually evoked), it must be hearer-old as well as it simultaneously represents shared information between the discourse participants. However, when a referent is discourse-new, it can represent both hearer-old (i.e. unused) and hearer-new (i.e. brand-new) entities. Prince (1992: 303) notes that the hearer-status is formally marked in English by definiteness, with hearer-new entities being typically realized as indefinite noun phrases and hearer-old entities being realized as definite noun phrases. The discourse status of a referent, however, remains more often than not unmarked.

Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski (1993) propose an alternative discourse-pragmatic model to account for the proper use and felicitous processing of different types of referring expressions. The starting point of their analysis is the observation that the descriptive content of a certain type of referring expression restricts the set of possible referents to which the referring expression might apply to those referents that have (at least) the designated attention and memory status for the hearer. Each type of referring expression is linked to a precise memory node or cognitive status, which is in turn sufficient and necessary so that this referring expression can be used. Gundel et al. (1993) delimitate six cognitive statuses or mental representations, which are understood as processing instructions to the hearer as to which referent suits the referring expression best. The six cognitive statuses are arranged on a scale, ranging from “most restrictive” (i.e. the “in focus” status) to “least restrictive” (i.e. the “type identifiable” status). Table 2.2 illustrates the scale of cognitive statuses, called “the Givenness Hierarchy”, with English examples for each cognitive status.

In focus>	Activated>	Familiar>	Uniquely identifiable>	Referential>	Type identifiable
it	that, this	that N, this N	the N	indefinite this N	a N

Table 2.2:

The Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg and Zacharski 1993)

Because cognitive statuses are considered parts of mental representations, the Givenness Hierarchy does not give instructions about the way in which a certain type of referring expression acquires a certain status. For example, whether a referent is discourse-old or discourse-new in Prince’s (1992) terms, does not impact the cognitive status of the referent. Examples (4a) and (4b) illustrate the relation between a type of referring expression and the mental activation of the associated referent (Gundel et al. 1993).

(4)	(a)	I couldn’t sleep last night. A dog (next door) kept me awake.
	(b)	I couldn’t sleep last night. It kept me awake.

According to this view, the hearer of sentence (4a) only has to know what the word dog means to understand the least restrictive simple indefinite noun phrase a dog. However, the hearer of sentence (4b) cannot understand the most restrictive form it unless s/he has a unique mental representation of the dog in question, which is also in his/ her focus of attention at the time the sentence is produced. The advantage of the Giveness Hierarchy lies in its implicational nature. A referential expression is individually and separately marked for the degree of accessibility its associated referent codes. The statuses are not mutually exclusive, they rather correlate with degrees of specification of some property and do not correspond to absolute degrees of the property. In other words, for any cognitive status on the Givenness Hierarchy, the associated referring expression codes the status indicated and simultaneously entails all lower statuses (i.e. the least restrictive ones, on its right). This prediction explains, for example, why a referent associated with the highest cognitive status “in focus” can be realized by referring expressions associated to all other lower statuses, i.e. “activated”, “familiar”, “uniquely identifiable”, “referential” and “type identifiable”. The indefinite determiner this in example (5), which codes the higher status “referential” can be replaced by the indefinite article a/an, which is associated to the lowest status “type identifiable”, given the unidirectional entailment relations of the Givenness Hierarchy.

(5)	I saw √this/ √a man in my dream, dressed as Santa Klaus2.

The cognitive statuses introduced by Gundel et al. (1993) could be thought of as being in part encoded in the grammar, as a set of constraints on certain lexical items, and in part as information processing mechanisms for the benefit of the hearer (e.g. the use of demonstratives to signal topic-shift). Some interesting questions with respect to the use of a particular type of referring expression in a given discourse are concerned with reference continuation once the referent has been introduced. Is the type of referring expression used by a speaker more than just a backward-looking mechanism into the discourse status and activation level of its associated referent? Are types of referring expressions forward-looking as well, indicating how a referent will be continued in the discourse? That is, given a discourse with several (competing) referents, how do speakers introduce and continue talking about them? The next Sections are dedicated to the discussion of different models of referential management in terms of activation, topicality and expectancy that offer partial answers to these questions. The common denominator of these models on reference tracking is that a referent’s history (i.e. its discourse status according to Prince (1992)) in terms of a set of multiple factors associated with it, affects its current discourse status.