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Note on Primary Sources

As a successful accountant by profession, Charles J. Haughey was aware that the most dangerous trail of all was the paper trail. In his financial affairs he always sought to conceal his wealth – he tried his upmost to deal in cash and preferred for others, chiefly his account Des Traynor, to ‘manage’ his financial dealings. Haughey’s reluctance to maintain a financial paper trail naturally found its way into other aspects of his live. As this book illustrates, he was a very secretive, indeed cunning, man. It is for this reason that we will never be able to provide an unbridled story of Haughey’s involvement with the Northern Ireland question, not least when assessing his involvement with the scandalous Arms Crisis of 1970. He refused to ever speak about his involvement in the Crisis, never mind provide a written record.

Despite the many challenges facing the historian when examining Haughey’s private and public attitude to Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations, all is not lost. In fact, this book has brought together an assortment of archival material never before correlated into a single study. It is no coincidence that the analysis contained within this study focuses predominately on Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy during his period as Fianna Fáil leader (1979–92), chiefly from 1979 to 1987. The explanation for this approach is straightforward. This was a period when Haughey was either taoiseach or leader of the opposition. As a result, a substantial selection of archival material exists that relates directly to Haughey’s involvement with Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations during this timeframe.

Under the Irish government’s current ‘30-year rule’, departmental government files from the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), specifically the Department of the Taoiseach (DT) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), have proved invaluable during the research stages of this book.1 For instance, access to an array of files from these government departments enables a fresh examination of the development and implementation of the Irish governments’ Northern Ireland policy during Haughey’s first period in government from December 1979 to June 1981.2

Extensive research at the NAI was complemented with the availability of a treasure trove of archival materials held by the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), primarily, files from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Cabinet Office (CAB), Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and Northern Ireland Office (CJ). Significantly, due to the British government’s decision in 2013 to introduce a new ‘20 year rule’ policy this book has accessed archival departmental files from the NAUK up to and including 1986.3

The availability of relevant files held by the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI)4 and the Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC) held by the Linen Hall Library (LHL), have likewise proved invaluable to this book. The Linen Hall Library’s collection of the ‘H-Block/Hunger Strike’ files were of particular importance, helping to unearth the Republican movements’ private attitude to Haughey and his Fianna Fáil government during the early 1980s.5

Moreover, this book utilised the personal papers of Margaret Thatcher, held by the Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Cambridge University. Access to the Thatcher papers proved extremely important when analysing the Haughey–Thatcher relationship during the 1980s.6 Additionally, the availability of an extensive online database hosted by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, chiefly the personal files dealing with Thatcher’s period as British prime minister from 1979 to 1985, helped to add a further laying of analysis.7

On publication of this book, the personal papers of Charles J. Haughey, held by Dublin City University, remain closed to the public.8 My requests to access these papers were declined by the Haughey family.9 This issue is compounded by the fact that Haughey never wrote an autobiography or authorised an official biography of his life.10 Fortunately, however, this book has benefited greatly from access to the various personal papers held by University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), including the Fianna Fáil Party Papers (P176), Frank Aiken Papers (P104) and T.K. Whitaker Papers (P175).11

The availability of the Fianna Fáil Party Papers was particularly important, chiefly those files related to the following organs of the organisation: the Ard Fheiseanna; parliamentary party; national executive; and general election materials. Despite the many positive features associated with the Fianna Fáil Party Papers, a few limitations must also be recorded. Given the tradition of Fianna Fáil not to commit the most sensitive material to paper, a practice espoused by Haughey personally, historians are inevitably left with gaps in research possibilities regarding the development of Northern Ireland policy at party level.

For instance, there was reluctance to record discussions on Northern Ireland at Fianna Fáil meetings of the parliamentary party and the national executive, respectively. This is naturally frustrating. The records may show that on occasions ‘special’ parliamentary party meetings convened to discuss Northern Ireland policy. Such meetings could go on for hours, into the early hours of the morning. Yet, all the record shows, at best, are several lines denoting decisions reached.12 This approach continued at cabinet level as all that was recorded were decisions made and not the details of what was discussed.

This problem is compounded by the unavailability of the minutes of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party and the national executive from the late 1970s/early 1980s. UCDA’s current holdings of the minutes of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary party span from 1926 to 1981,13 while its holdings of the minutes of the Fianna Fáil national executive span from 1926 to February 1979.14 Consequently, an examination of newspaper coverage (primarily by the Irish Times) of meetings of Fianna Fáil’s parliamentary party and national executive during the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, has been implemented in an effort to overcome this anomaly.15

Lastly, interviews with influential figures directly related to this book were of great benefit, helping to underpin some central arguments offered by this research. Although the Haughey family refused to be interviewed, I was able to interview the late Harry Boland and Mary Colley (wife of the late George Colley). I was also fortunate to interview retired Fianna Fáil government ministers, including Dermot Ahern, the late Pádraig Faulkner and Dr Rory O’Hanlon. Additionally, I interviewed and corresponded with past Taoisigh, notably the late Garret FitzGerald. The inside information provided by retired British and Irish civil servants and political advisors also proved a worthwhile resource, particularly the views of Lord Robert Armstrong, Noel Dorr, David Neligan and Martin Mansergh.