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While research into metaphors and linguistic framing is ongoing (at least one study has offered up alternative explanations other than metaphorical framing²), similar studies going back to the 1970s also seem to support this general correlation between things as stated and our reasoning. In studies on “decision framing,” behavioral economists have found that the identical question, asked in different ways, leads to completely different responses.

For example, would you prefer a condom that was “95% effective” or one that had a “5% failure” rate? What about “80% lean” ground beef versus “20% fat” ground beef?³

Rationally, these are identical options. But in repeated studies, most people chose the first option, or the one that either avoided loss or framed things in the positive. The conclusion of behavioral economists such as Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman was that the choices we make are influenced by the way these options are framed.

In what is now an oft-cited study from behavioral economics,⁴ participants were asked to choose between two alternative programs to combat the outbreak of a disease expected to kill 600 people. The first group of respondents was presented with this outbreak situation, with two options to choose from, both framed in terms of lives saved; the second group of respondents was presented with the identical situation and the same two options, but these options were framed in terms of lives lost. What Tversky and Kahneman found was that “choices involving gains were often risk averse and choices involving losses were often risk taking.” While respondents from both groups were asked essentially the same question, answers were nearly reversed between groups. To the extent that framing something triggered a human bias (risk aversion or risk taking in this study), we can conclude that framing—generally—has a powerful effect on the choices we make.

One of the more humorous studies into decision framing came from researchers at the University of Nottingham Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, who posed an interesting question: Would other experimental economists—those professionals who researched these types of topics—be prone to the same framing effects? Using a “natural field experiment” (participants were not aware they were part of a study), researchers used registrations for the 2006 Economic Science Association conference as part of their experiment. As part of the registration process, attendees—the unwitting research participants—were sent an email reminder concerning a fee for late registration. In what is known in web analytics as an A/B test, participants were sent one of two possible emails, each using a different frame. One email warned attendees of a penalty of $50 for registering after the first deadline. The other email communicated a discount of $50 for registering before the first deadline. What were the results? Curiously, 93% of the junior researchers responded to the late fee messaging compared to 67% who responded to the discount messaging.⁵ These results—that things framed in the negative received more engagement—were consistent with other studies.

Of course, many of these studies beg more investigation. With the conference signup, the study points also showed there was no effect for senior researchers. And with the “disease outbreak” study, critics have pointed out that the phrasing might suggest different—rather than identical—outcomes. That disclaimer aside, the effects of framing are well researched and generally agreed upon. In our view, none of this undercuts the broader point we’re trying to make, that behind all of these studies sits a common thread: how we think and reason about things is based on associations between concepts. Framing, as with metaphors, is an example of this cognitive process in action.