Читать книгу Environmental Political Theory - Steve Vanderheiden - Страница 14

While well grounded in the physical sciences, the idea of ecological limits is abstract and defies sensory observation. We can observe a rising price for gasoline at the pump, from which we might infer decreasing market availability, but such observational data are several steps removed from resource scarcity itself. Planned production decreases designed to raise the price of crude oil, geopolitical conflicts in oil-producing regions, or overseas economic expansion are more likely explanations for oil price increases than is diminishing supply (as a nonrenewable resource, oil supplies can only decrease, albeit at varying rates, whereas market prices fluctuate in both directions). Likewise, we might observe diminished snowpack in the mountains or reduced water levels in our reservoirs (key indicators of future water availability where I live), but the climatic changes that lie behind these indicators can only be grasped conceptually, utilizing theory and abstraction, not observed empirically.¹

The concept, in turn, arises to explain observable phenomena, and then alongside competing explanations. Ecological limits and scarcity may contribute to a lot of bad outcomes, but they are never their only cause. As the case studies in Jared Diamond’s Collapse (2005) illustrate, several historical instances of relatively small and isolated societies contributing to and then experiencing severe resource scarcity (Easter Island, the Anasazi of the American southwest, etc.) underscore the importance of accommodating ecological limits in the ideals that inform the organization of those societies. However, settler colonial societies tend to exploit distant sources of such resources to counter any domestic shortages, in so doing preventing (with a few notable exceptions) the concept’s appearance in the social and political thought of such societies, as Locke’s treatise illustrates. Biophysical limits and sustainability imperatives remain abstract and contested, not urgent and serious.

Now, in what John McNeill has aptly termed the “great acceleration of the Anthropocene”² (itself in reference to the dominance of human impacts on the environment within the geologic epoch), whereby the past half-century has, according to natural scientists, “without doubt seen the most rapid transformation of the human relationship with the natural world in the history of humankind,”³ the observable indicators of increasing ecological scarcity cannot so easily be ignored. Nor can their human causes or impacts, as these become increasingly evident and linked in the public imagination to our failed planetary stewardship. The effects of this failure cannot readily be mitigated through resource colonialism – where affluent countries plunder ecological goods and services within poor ones to make up for their domestic overuse – as the impact of the Anthropocene and transgression of ecological limits transcends borders; nor can they be entirely transferred onto distant and powerless others: put out of sight and mind.

The good news is that humans have historically shown a remarkable ability to adapt to change and may yet be able to successfully adapt to anthropogenic environmental change and the increasing scarcity that it involves. In addition to our infrastructure and institutions, our norms and ideals must also find a way to accommodate ecological limits if humans are to successfully adapt to the environmental changes that we (through our existing infrastructure and institutions, as well as norms and ideals) have brought about. This book explores what that latter form of adaptation might look like, with the attendant urgency that these paragraphs suggest is appropriate. We cannot continue to deny the facts of scarcity or their relevance to our social and political ideals, as Locke could and did; nor can we continue to uncritically accept, as what John Stuart Mill called “dead dogma,”⁴ the many received ideas and ideals that have been constructed upon such a faulty foundation. So long as it remains possible to aspire toward enlightened or informed versions of those social and political ideals that have admirably guided human struggles against injustice in the past, we must subject them to critical examination in light of these facts, preserving what we can of them.

In doing so, we must remain cognizant of the importance of such a project, but also of its limits. With abstract ideas like ecological limits, there can often be a significant lag between our recognition of the implications and force of an idea and its full incorporation into many of our other received ideas that were shaped by its absence. For many years, the aphorism “the solution to pollution is dilution” was repeated and internalized by those managing water resources, and was also routinely acted upon. Because ecological limits (in this case, the capacity of lakes or streams to assimilate waste) seemed sufficiently distant, those dumping their wastes in water might for decades have believed this convenient claim about cornucopian abundance. At some point, sensory evidence would belie the fiction as sewage and other waste began to harm the nonhuman users of polluted surface waters and then did the same to humans, with the resulting dissonance calling for some explanation.

Abundance is a powerful myth, however. Long after we intellectually acknowledge that dilution isn’t really a “solution” to pollution created through human activity, human societies continue to act as if it is. The continued existence of an atmospheric commons that is almost entirely open to nearly unlimited greenhouse gas pollution, despite the ample observable indicators of dangerous climate change, attests to that power. Intellectual acknowledgment is one thing, but accommodating the ideas within our system of related ideas and practices is another and more daunting challenge. Ideas such as resource abundance, which allows for unlimited growth, can create a kind of path dependence through which they continue to exert influence long after they have been formally discredited, acting (to preview a term from chapter 5) as a kind of zombie, dead in some technical sense and yet still able to cause a zombie apocalypse alongside other ideas.