Читать книгу Collateral Damage Autocracy? - Tobias Lechner - Страница 13
Оглавление1 Sanctions: Useful toys of diplomacy or disastrous weapons of mass destruction?
“The Security Council [decides] that all States shall prevent [the] import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution […].”
—UNSC Resolution 757, 1992-05-30
Belgrade, May 1992: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) just had announced to impose the most comprehensive economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) it ever imposed. These sanctions should end Slobodan Milosevic’s involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ban includes import, export, financial transactions, and even academic and cultural cooperation and Yugoslavia’s participation in international sports events.12 These sanctions are described as “the most rigorous implementation effort ever attempted in the history of sanctions.”13
Years later, scholars write that the sanctions significantly strengthened Milosevic and his clique, they increased his budget, his power and the overall level of repression,14 and they “undercut democratic reform movements.”15 A powerful criminal class with ties to the regime emerged which could benefit from the black market. While the middle class impoverished and half of the population slipped below the poverty level, 5 percent of the population have become enormously rich.16 Sanctions “reflect an effort to manipulate the vulnerabilities that come from economic interdependence, but sanctions can unintentionally foster clandestine forms of interdependence.”17 The literature on sanctions against Yugoslavia found three reasons for this surprising outcome:
←29 | 30→
First of all, the sanctions unintentionally boosted a thriving black market, that gave rise to a powerful criminal class with ties to the regime. Smugglers controlled the trade in oil and other goods.18 Milosevic’s son even became the smuggling head in one border area.19 Smuggling was seen as a patriotic duty by the regime and publicly praised. It led to a criminalizing of society which didn’t end with the fall of Milosevic – the criminalized collateral damage of sanctions had a long-lasting, post-sanctions legacy.20
Second, the disruption of trade benefited state-owned enterprises, which could sell their products independently from their quality. The economic (-political) elite had an interest in maintaining the sanctions.21 The regime was able to gain a large share of sanctions rents, not only through criminal activities but also through centralizing the distribution of goods. These sanctions rents “might be smaller than the earnings from legitimate pre-sanctions trade but they have the advantage of accruing directly to the regime and its immediate circle of supporters.”22 Furthermore, the regime systematically destroyed and appropriated properties by minorities and citizens that were not part of the winning coalition.23
And third, the sanctions enabled Milosevic to blame others for his economic mismanagement and to increase Serbian nationalism, which resulted in a pro-regime rally around the flag.24 The Milosevic regime became “a mixture of communist heritage and a nationalist mafia that monopolized the still existing resources.”25
What were the political results? The sanctions weakened the opposition forces: Middle-class liberals and students left the country. Sanctions on academic cooperation hurt intellectuals. Independent media were isolated. The sanctions strengthened the regime: The enemy abroad lead to hardline nationalism. The economic-political elite gained the sanctions rents. Powerful criminal gangs with ties to the apparatus rose with a long legacy.26 The economic sanctions against ←30 | 31→Yugoslavia “strengthened the very power structures that it sought to challenge, and weakened or even destroyed the civil society and political opposition.”27
“Anytime you see a statement coming out of the government, just remember there’s a rat’s nest of people fighting underneath the surface.”
—K. Harris on the Iranian leadership28
In July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed, an agreement aimed at ending the nuclear weapons program of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Also, it partly ended the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council. Regarding this policy outcome, the sanctions against Iran can be evaluated as a success story, contradicting the pessimist narrative of ineffective sanctions.29 However, the economic sanctions left their mark on Iranian politics and society: Sanctions enhanced a process of autocratization that started already before the imposition of sanctions. The ruling elite around president Ahmadinejad and his military clique used the absence of external actors to redistribute the resources and to accumulate wealth and power. The business portfolio which his clique grabbed ranged from oil fields to the monopoly of telecommunication. Iran was described as transforming from theocracy to military dictatorship.30 How could that happen?
The sanctions were imposed in 2006. Iran’s announcement of the nuclear program convinced the Security Council (UNSC) of the United Nations to apply economic sanctions, consisting of travel bans, an arms embargo, freezing of assets and commodity boycotts.31 Both the U.S. and the EU executed additional unilateral sanctions in various fields, especially in the energy (oil and gas), transportation, and financial sector (exclusion from SWIFT), which came close to a full-trade embargo.32 Four key factors indicated a high impact of economic sanctions in Iran: a significant pre-sanction trade linkage, limited substitution possibilities for sanctioned goods, unexpected sanctions scale, and unexpected SWIFT sanctions.33
←31 | 32→
In the last decades, the overly complex and therefore weak constitutional design with a multipolar distribution of power – which is prone to fights for power – enabled several groups in Iran to accumulate wealth and power. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military elite group with strong ideological claims, emerged as most powerful group. Under the presidency of Ahmadinejad almost all members of the cabinet were members of the IRGC, including the president himself.34 The IRGC cemented not only their political influence but also their economic power, especially in the branches of finance, construction, telecommunication (monopoly on the internet), heroin production35 and in the oil industry (president Ahmadinejad gave the IRGC the control over an oilfield – before that, the National Iranian Oil Company had the monopoly on the oil and gas sector.36 Legal and illegal dummy companies at home and abroad and the weak legal system enabled the IRGC to benefit from economic sanctions: Foreign companies had to leave the country – the Supreme Leader announced a “resistance economy.”37 The IRGC closed the gap and strengthened its economic and political standing at home.38
Whereas the liberal urban middle class suffered most from the sanctions, the elite-loyal upper-middle class had the most opportunities in circumventing the sanctions and in taking advantage of the vast opportunities the new black market offered. Especially Dubai-based companies and dummy companies of Iranian businessmen and influential actors such as the IRGC were active in illegal oil exports and money laundering.39 These domestic winners of the economic sanctions also opposed the nuclear deal of president Rouhani. In contrast to the case of Yugoslavia, sanctions didn’t cause a rally around the flag, still, they enabled the ruling elite to accumulate a massive amount of wealth and to further centralize power.40
In both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Islamic Republic of Iran, economic sanctions helped the regime to consolidate its power. The regime ←32 | 33→centralized the distribution of goods and benefited from the sanction rents. The sanctions unwillingly created the opportunity for members of the elite to accumulate even more resources in political and economic terms (power and wealth). In Yugoslavia, disrupted trade led to benefits for the local political, economic, and criminal elite and weakened middle class and opposition. In Iran, we observe since the mid-2000s a shift of power from a so-called theocracy to a military dictatorship. The sanctions helped the new political elite to strengthen its power by offering opportunities in business. The sanctions disadvantaged the middle class and strengthened those in power. In both cases, economic sanctions had a remarkable spill-over effect on the political sphere of the target country. Economic causes and psychological factors explain the process.
The evaluation of sanctions by media was devastating: “Sanctions have seemed only to empower dictators,” writes The New York Times in regard to the cases of North Korea, Iraq, Cuba and others,41 and another journalist describes sanctions as “a policy that helps dictators.”42 Not only media, but also scholars observe similar dynamics to the ones described in the previous chapter in a number of countries that were subject to sanctions, e.g., in Ian Smith’s Rhodesia in the 1960s,43 in Haiti in the early 1990s,44 in Saddam’s Iraq in the 1990s,45 and in contemporary Russia: Some think that U.S. and EU economic sanctions against Russia led Putin “to consolidate his authoritarian rule.”46 By import substitution policies, “the Russian leadership has been able to reallocate resources to its allies within the elite and also to key economic constituencies across Russia.”47 Also, sanctions enabled the Kremlin to blame the West for the poor performance of the economy and could thus generate a pro-regime rally around the flag.48
Besides anecdotal evidence, scholars found empirical evidence that sanctions encourage leaders to increase repression,49 reduce the level of political freedom in the target country,50 decrease the level of democracy,51 they cause protectionism ←33 | 34→benefitting the elite,52 enhance economic transfers from the population to the elite,53 and they stabilize autocratic rulers with strong claims to legitimacy.54 With pressure from all sides, a very popular tool of modern foreign relations comes under scrutiny.
Though we have anecdotal and empirical evidence for the described effect, it is puzzling why some (or so many) sanctions increase the level of autocracy. In many cases, sanctions should increase the level of democracy, not decrease them. This book does not analyze the effectiveness of economic coercion but its collateral damage to democracy and its spill-over effect on the internal power structure. Why do some sanctions have an autocratizing impact? The proposed mechanisms are not fully convincing. An analytical gap between case studies, (game) theoretical analysis, and large-N studies urges to specifically ask for the reasons of the deeply disturbing correlation. New data and a combination of autocracy theory and empirical evidence shall help with answering the research question: Why do some economic sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in the target state but others not?
Research on economic dynamics within the system and their impact on regime stability and breakdown is essential not only because of the autocratic resilience in the last decade. The changing political and ideological landscape, with increased economic protectionism and political nationalism, also leads to the question whether economic sanctions are more damaging than useful in the foreign policy toolbox. To know which circumstances are responsible for an autocratizing effect of sanctions is vital for political decision-making. This study wants to contribute by conducting a comprehensive analysis. Reviewing the existing literature, several issues justify a thorough evaluation of the sanctions-autocracy hypothesis.
Ideological bias: Economic sanctions and their effects are heavily debated in politics, media, and academic scholarship. Some see them as a hawkish demonstration of power, others as a peaceful tool of conflict resolution. The prevailing wisdom in scholarship is that economic sanctions have a negative impact on democracy and human rights and are therefore counterproductive. However, the debate about sanctions and their impact on democracy is shaped by proponents ←34 | 35→and opponents and seems to be ideologically biased. There are reasons to suspect that this mirrors the ideological cleavage between realists and liberals in political theory and practice: “[R];ealists tend to denigrate the utility of economic statecraft […], neoliberals believe that economic interdependence can affect the behavior of nation-states for the better.”55 This (quantitative) analysis does not seek to confirm or disconfirm a specific position in the debate and may be helpful in clarifying the facts.
Data bias: Most scholars see economic sanctions as inefficient and even counterproductive, with an (unintended) negative impact on humanitarian issues and democracy. Most of the mentioned studies have a scope of around 1960 to the early 2000s when the standard dataset by Hufbauer et al. was re-introduced.56 Examples: Peksen claims that sanctions lead to increasing repression, using cases between 1982 and 2000.57 Peksen and Drury, using cases from 1972 to 2000, write that sanctions reduce the level of political rights and civil liberties.58 However, sanctions changed a lot since the late 1990s, especially after the experience of the devastating humanitarian impact of sanctions in Iraq. Since then, economic sanctions are mostly combined with measures targeting the elite. Is the collateral damage of economic sanctions still present if we control for the new design of sanctions, and if we consider this issue when selecting the time frame? This study includes cases both before and after 2000.
Economic crises mechanism: Scholars of economic sanctions argue that economic sanctions are causal variables of democratic backsliding: They strengthen the incumbent elite. Comprehensive economic sanctions can have dynamics comparable to those of economic crises. However, many scholars of economic crises think that crises are a causal variable of democratization. They create windows of opportunities in autocratic regimes and catalyze regime change.59 This contradiction is puzzling and was indicated multiple times as a research desideratum: “scholars should focus on how and under which conditions an economic crisis can be turned into a political crisis that will ultimately endanger a democratic regime.”60 Differing views on the same subject ask for a combination of insights of both study areas. Whereas previous non-anecdotal research on the political side-effects of economic sanctions does not provide a credible ←35 | 36→explanation of the underlying mechanism, economic crisis literature suggests valuable explanations on how a leader can turn an economic crisis into a political opportunity. The theoretical mechanism proposed in this book assumes three players (the leader, his winning coalition, the population), and three goods (repression, economic transfers, political power), with political stability understood as an equilibrium of these goods.
Regime categorization: Previous research suggests that the political constitution of the target state is crucial for the outcome of economic sanctions. So far, studies in this debate didn’t distinguish various types of regimes. Scholars recommended to “pay greater attention to the burgeoning work on politics in authoritarian countries,”61 and to disaggregate different autocratic regime types in future analyses.62 Among the many possibilities, this book bases its regime categorization on Geddes63 (personalist, military, single-party, monarchy) and Wright64 (personalist versus institutionalist), including liberal democracies to categorize the whole universe of regimes.
Sanctions categorization: The main problem of previous sanctions research is the image of sanctions as a binary variable (dummy), which is more than problematic – it is simply wrong. Sanctions consist of a variety of legal texts; in some cases, they are nothing more than a symbol. Most debate contributions distinguish, at maximum, only between “comprehensive” and “targeted” sanctions, which is no satisfying distinction. This book tries to distinguish sanctions according to their economic impact and their goal (and, in a second step, by their design). The reference articles for the present research question do not include this critical factor which is strongly suggested by the sanctions debate, neo-classical trade theory, and economic crises theory.
←36 | 37→
1.4 Defining and conceptualizing sanctions
“The term ‘economic sanctions’ is used in so many different ways that there is much to be said for avoiding it altogether. Unfortunately, the term is so deeply embedded in the literature of economic statecraft that ignoring it is impossible.”65
There is no consensus in the literature regarding a standard definition of economic sanctions. Instead, several synonyms seem to describe a similar phenomenon: economic coercion, economic statecraft, economic warfare, embargo, boycott, positive and negative sanctions, comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions… The naming is often confusing. Several scholars use these terms interchangeably; others offer a more precise and differentiating approach.
Following Russell’s fourfold division of forms of power (wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion)66 and Lasswell’s fourfold division of policy instruments (words, deals, goods, weapons),67 Baldwin develops the following taxonomy of techniques of statecraft: diplomacy (negotiation), military statecraft (use of force), economic statecraft, propaganda (manipulation of information). These four are the tools of statecraft in the international arena (cf. Fig. 1). Policymakers usually use a combination of them.68 (For Hufbauer et al., however, are sanctions ←37 | 38→just a “part and parcel of international diplomacy”.69) Baldwin says to study statecraft is “to consider the instruments used by policy makers in their attempts to exercise power, i.e., to get other to do what they would not otherwise do.”70
Fig. 1: Techniques of statecraft, based on Russell/Lasswell/Baldwin
Among the different forms of statecraft, Baldwin defines economic statecraft as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals,”71 without clarifying the foreign policy goal. Pape argues for a narrow definition and distinguishes economic sanctions from trade wars which refer to economic means (increasing tariffs in a sector, stop oil production) for an economic goal (decrease tariffs in another sector, increasing oil price).72 Most scholars exclude the pursuit of economic goals from a definition of economic sanctions.
Many academics build their definition of economic sanctions on the seminal book by Hufbauer et al.: “We define economic sanctions to mean the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations.”73 Peksen defines economic sanctions as “deliberate, government-led restrictions of export, import and the flow of finance.”74 Some scholars see boycotts and embargos as synonyms or subtypes of economic sanctions. According to Daoudi et al., a boycott implies no use of (legal or military) force, whereas an embargo is a prohibition of trade by government order; thus it is connected with the force of law.75 A standard definition of economic sanctions usually contains two central elements, economic means and a political aim: “the coercive measure needs to be economic in nature and its aim needs to be political.”76 More recently, the imposition of sanctions was defined as “creating a set of systematic, overarching rules of behavior.”77
Baldwin distinguishes further between positive and negative sanctions: Whereas negative sanctions are punishments, positive sanctions are rewards.78 He emphasizes the power of positive sanctions and criticizes political science for excluding them from their concept of power.79 Other scholars classify the stopping of foreign aid as part of positive sanctions.80 Bergeijk, using a traditional ←38 | 39→neo-classical trade model, compares a non-sanction situation with economic interdependence and a sanctions situation with autarky.81
It is crucial to include the goal of sanctions into the definition of sanctions. The success of sanctions is usually assessed based on the goal and on the target’s compliance with the goal. A typical categorization of goals, based on official documents, is provided by the sanctions dataset by Portela et al.:82 democratization, support human rights, fight against narcotics, stop biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction, end nuclear proliferation, termination of bellicosities and/or establishment of peace agreement, fight terrorism (including releasing of hostages).
Economic sanctions can be further categorized with dichotomous typologies like punishing or coercing, substantive or symbolic, expressive or instrumental, or coercive or symbolic. Whereas most scholars, like Hufbauer et al., base the categorization of sanctions goals on policy changes within the target country,83 few also mention symbolic goals such as punishment, appeasing the audience in the sender state, trying to appear active in the international arena,84 and trying to influence the behavior of third countries, e.g., deterring and preventing the development of nuclear weapons. Did sanctions against North Korea prevent South Korea and Japan from developing their own nuclear weapons? Sanctions “move freely – even simultaneously – between the world of preventive diplomacy and the world of coercive diplomacy.”85
Lindsay argues that economic sanctions have a high impact as international or domestic symbols and deterring states, though they likely fail when the goal is compliance.86 Symbolic sanctions can be aimed at reputation and be applied to areas of culture, education, or sports: “Images matter.”87 If sanctions are symbolic/expressive and show disapproval, they can hardly succeed according to their intended goal, though scholars evaluate them as “non-successful.” The fact that states pursue multiple objectives is an explanation why state leaders like sanctions so much despite the opposition from mainstream academia: “To the extent that sanctions impose an injury on the wrongdoer, international sanctions cannot but ‘work.’ ”88
Giumelli distinguishes between coercing, constraining and signaling sanctions. Coercing sanctions seek a behavioral change of the target regime. Constraining ←39 | 40→sanctions aim at undermining the capabilities of the target regime to achieve policy objectives (zero-sum game). Signaling sanctions do not try to reach a certain effect through material damage because they would be ineffective in such cases; instead, they aim at the domestic and the international audience, they stigmatize non-compliance with a norm.89
The challenge for scholars (and for the targets of sanctions) is to see the real goal of sanctions, to know what the sanctions are intended for. Information asymmetry can be part of the sender’s strategy. Sanctions are not always intended to succeed in their ostensible goal.90 “Targets and goals are usually multiple,” writes Baldwin;91 Kaempfer et al. distinguish between real and stated goal.92 In addition to Giumelli’s taxonomy, this book adds a distinction between de jure goal and de facto goal. Whereas the de jure goal refers to the official goal stated in the legal text, for example in the respective resolution of the UN Security Council, the de facto goal refers to the mechanism, what Giumelli describes as coercing, constraining or signaling. This categorization of sanctions has implications for the success debate: Often, sanctions pursue “high policy” goals (security or political issue).93 It is highly unlikely that a dictator will agree on retiring. Such sanctions are often intended as a signal. An evaluation of sanctions, based on the de jure goal, is, therefore, misinterpreting the very nature of sanctions.
There are different players in the sanctions game. The sender is the executive institution of a state (government), a regional organization (European Commission in the EU) or the UN (Security Council). The de jure target is related to another state or a state-like entity (such as state-like terror groups: ISIS/Daesh, Al Shaabab, Al Qaeda). The target can be further distinguished on the macro level (whole state or whole economy), the meso level (specific sectors or entities), or the micro level (individuals). Scholars mention further de facto targets: Barber distinguishes primary (target-related), secondary (sender-related) and tertiary (international system related) objectives.94 Sender or system-related goals are often justified with a target-related issue.95 Hufbauer et al. see a triple signal of sanctions: to the sender, to allies, to domestic audience.96
←40 | 41→
Finally, sanctions can be distinguished according to their type. The sanctions dataset by Portela et al. provides a useful categorization of types of sanctions:97 arms embargo, freezing of financial assets held by individuals, aid sanctions, commodity embargo (import or export of selected commodities such as natural resources), comprehensive trade embargo (complete ban of trade and financial relations), diplomatic sanctions (also includes suspension of membership in international organizations), flight ban (prohibition of operating flights), financial sanctions (investment ban, ban on financial transactions), interruption of military cooperation, visa ban (includes travel ban).
Furthermore, sanctions can target soft power issues (such as cultural and academic cooperation or participation in sports events). Portela et al. add another category for sanctions imposed to enforce sanctioning. This type of sanctions, also called secondary sanctions, is similar to the other types of sanctions, they just refer to a new target. The mechanism (economic means, political goal) is the same.
In this book, sanctions are defined as a set of rules that restrict a state. Economic sanctions are a set of economic rules that restrict a state. They are imposed by a state, a regional organization or an international organization, on another state or entities or individuals related to that state. By coercing, constraining or signaling, sanctions are imposed to achieve a non-economic policy goal. Sanctions can include non-economic measures (such as arms embargo, visa ban, diplomatic sanctions). Sanctions can include economic measures (trade ban, investment ban), then they are called economic sanctions. In most cases, both economic and non-economic measures are applied together; therefore, the terms sanctions and economic sanctions are usually used interchangeably. In this book, the term economic sanctions refers to economic or mixed measures, whereas the term sanctions refers to non-economic measures.
This book is structured in three parts, each consisting of two chapters. The first part reviews the debates in research on economic sanctions and on autocratic regimes, and presents the main variables mentioned in these debates. The second part provides an analytical framework for the impact of economic sanctions on political regimes. The third part tries to reply to the original research question.
The first part of the book, consisting of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, searches in the literature for the most relevant factors for the research question. Chapter 2 ←41 | 42→starts with a historical overview on the development of economic sanctions and presents the debates that shaped sanctions research in the past decades: first, the debate about the unintended impact of sanctions on state and society, second, the debate about the effectiveness of sanctions. The last part is particularly important because similar variables might be relevant for the present research question. Among those variables are design-related variables (such as economic costs to the target, duration, targeted measures, threats, symbolic use) and state-related variables (such as institutions in the sender and target state, international institutions, multilateral versus unilateral sanctions, allies, issue). The chapter ends with a look at the autocratization debate, and at potential reasons of the alleged democratic backlash in the last decade.
Chapter 3 builds hypotheses. It extracts from the previous literature review the most likely variables which may explain why some economic sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in the target state but others not. Some of these variables refer to the design of sanctions, some to the political system of the target state, and others to economic characteristics of the target state. After each variable, a hypothesis is formulated. The chapter also includes a detailed definition of the dependent variable democracy, based on a continuous scale. The chapter combines literature, examples, and debates.
The second part of the book is the analytical core and provides the theoretical and analytical tools for the last part. Chapter 4 introduces the causal mechanism which connects international economic sanctions and domestic autocratization. First, it presents the players – leadership, winning coalition, population – then, it presents the “market of political survival.” According to the market analogy, political life can be seen as a market in which goods are exchanged. The chapter includes the variables identified in the previous chapter and ends with modeling the game of survival. After establishing a sound theoretical model, Chapter 5 selects and quantifies the cases, operationalizes all variables, gives information on the limitations of the study and ends with the econometric model.
The third part of the book evaluates the results. Chapter 6 presents the findings. It starts with the main model, includes extensive robustness checks, and interprets the findings in line with the hypotheses established in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 presents metatheoretical implications for the academic sanctions debate (ontological, methodological, epistemological), provides research recommendations (related to sanctions research and regime research) and policy recommendations, reflects the use of economic statecraft, and concludes with a list of lessons learned.
The appendix includes an overview of the cases of economic sanctions in the last decades that was used for the database, a list of types and goals of sanctions, and the code and results of the quantitative analysis.
←42 | 43→
12 Brooks 2002, p. 46.
13 Andreas 2005, p. 357.
14 Kaempfer, Lowenberg, & Mertens 2004, p. 46.
15 Cortright & Lopez 2000c, p. 75.
16 Brooks 2002, p. 47.
17 Andreas 2005, p. 357.
18 Brooks 2002, pp. 46–47.
19 Andreas 2005, p. 341.
20 Andreas 2005, p. 335.
21 Woodward 1995b, p. 294.
22 Kaempfer, Lowenberg, & Mertens 2004, p. 39.
23 Woodward 1995a; cf. Peksen 2017, p. 219.
24 Licht 1995.
25 Licht 1995, p. 158.
26 Woodward 1995b, p. 149; Cortright & Lopez 2000c, pp. 75–76.
27 Licht 1995, p. 159.
28 Qtd. in Filkins 2013.
29 For a general overview, cf. Nephew 2018.
30 Alfoneh 2013.
31 Giumelli & Ivan 2013, p. 13.
32 Patterson 2013, p. 135.
33 Bergeijk 2015, p. 51.
34 Alfoneh 2013, p. 30; Ehteshami 2009, p. 14.
35 Qtd. in Kálnoky 2011.
36 Alfoneh 2013, p. 165.
37 Bazoobandi 2015, p. 64.
38 Alfoneh 2013, pp. 165–191.
39 Bazoobandi 2015, pp. 61–62.
40 Bergeijk 2015, pp. 53, 56; Dizaji & Bergeijk 2013, p. 734.
41 The New York Times, 2003-11-08, qtd. in Marinov 2005, p. 575.
42 Weisberg 2006.
43 Rowe 2000.
44 Gibbons & Garfield 1999.
45 Peksen & Drury 2009, p. 401.
46 Feaver & Lorber 2015.
47 Connolly 2015, pp. 37–38.
48 Connolly 2015, p. 38.
49 Wood 2008, p. 489.
50 Peksen & Drury 2009, p. 393.
51 Peksen & Drury 2010.
52 Pond 2017, pp. 1074–1075.
53 Peksen 2017, p. 221.
54 Grauvogel & Soest 2014, cf. Grauvogel, Licht, & Soest 2017.
55 Drezner 1999a, p. 8; cf. Portela 2010, p. 10.
56 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg 2007.
57 Peksen 2009, p. 75.
58 Peksen & Drury 2010.
59 Teorell 2010, p. 75.
60 Erdmann 2011, pp. 27–28.
61 Drezner 2011, p. 104.
62 Soest & Wahman 2012, p. 30
63 Geddes 1999, pp. 121–122.
64 Wright 2008, p. 323.
65 Baldwin 1985, p. 36.
66 Russell 2004 [1938], p. 4.
67 Lasswell 1958.
68 Baldwin 1985, pp. 13–14.
69 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg 2007, p. 5.
70 Baldwin 1985, p. 9.
71 Baldwin 1985, p. 9.
72 Pape 1997, pp. 93–94.
73 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg 2007, p. 3.
74 Peksen 2014, p. 486.
75 Daoudi & Dajani 1983, pp. 4–5.
76 Portela 2010, p. 1.
77 Nephew 2018, p. 8.
78 Baldwin 2011, p. 706.
79 Baldwin 1971, p. 19.
80 Morrison 2014.
81 Bergeijk 2009, pp. 119–120.
82 Portela & Soest 2012 (GIGA sanctions dataset).
83 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg 2007, pp. 52–53.
84 Drury 2001, p. 486; Nossal 1989.
85 Cortright & Lopez 1995, p. 202.
86 Lindsay 1986.
87 Baldwin 1985, p. 372.
88 Nossal 1989, p. 322.
89 Giumelli 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015.
90 Dashti-Gibson, Davis, & Radcliff 1997, p. 616.
91 Baldwin 1985, p. 371.
92 Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988, p. 792.
93 Drezner 2003, p. 650.
94 Barber 1979.
95 Jones & Portela 2014, p. 15.
96 Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, & Oegg 2007, p. 7.
97 Portela & Soest 2012 (GIGA sanctions dataset).
