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Оглавление

Contents

List of abbreviations

Abstract

Executive summary

1 Sanctions: Useful toys of diplomacy or disastrous weapons of mass destruction?

1.1 Anecdotal evidence

1.1.1 Yugoslavia 1992–1995

1.1.2 Iran 2006–2016

1.2 The analytical puzzle

1.3 Relevance and novelty

1.4 Defining and conceptualizing sanctions

1.5 Outline of the book

Part I Reviewing

2 The collateral damage of sanctions

2.1 Economic sanctions in an age of interdependence

2.1.1 Pre-modern era

2.1.2 League of Nations

2.1.3 United Nations

2.1.4 Re-design: Targeted sanctions

2.2 Impact on democracy

2.3 Redistribution of wealth

2.4 Rally around the flag

2.5 Repression

2.6 Destabilizing

2.7 Determinants of sanctions effectiveness

2.8 Determinants of autocratization

2.8.1 Democracy in retreat

2.8.2 Autocratization

2.8.3 Triggers of autocratization

3 Explanatory factors

3.1 A multidimensional definition of democracy and autocracy

3.1.1 State capacity

3.1.2 Political rights

3.1.3 Civil liberties

3.1.4 Sequence of rights

3.1.5 A multi-dimensional model

3.2 Sanctions variables: Economic costs and democratic goal

3.2.1 Economic costs of sanctions to the target

3.2.2 Democratic goal of sanctions

3.3 Regime variables: Personalism and legitimacy

3.3.1 Personalist regime

3.3.2 Regime legitimacy

3.4 Economic variables: Vulnerability and development

3.4.1 Vulnerability

3.4.2 Development

3.5 Control variables: Natural resources and war

3.5.1 Natural resources

3.5.2 Civil war

3.6 Summary

Part II Designing

4 The market of political survival

4.1 Players: Horizontal and vertical threats

4.2 Tools: Repression, economic transfers, political power

4.2.1 Repression

4.2.2 Economic transfers

4.2.3 Political power

4.2.3.1 Vertical: Co-optation

4.2.3.2 Horizontal: Enfranchisement

4.3 Integrating the variables

4.3.1 Economic costs of sanctions

4.3.2 Democratic goal of sanctions

4.3.3 Personalist regime

4.3.4 Regime legitimacy

4.3.5 Economic vulnerability

4.3.6 Development

4.3.7 Natural resources

4.3.8 Civil war

4.4 Overview process

5 Methodology

5.1 Unit of analysis

5.1.1 Time

5.1.2 Excluded cases

5.1.3 Case coding

5.1.4 Sources

5.2 Operationalizing the dependent variable

5.3 Operationalizing the independent variables

5.3.1 Economic costs of sanctions

5.3.2 Democratic goal

5.3.3 Personalist regime

5.3.4 Regime legitimacy

5.3.5 Economic vulnerability

5.3.6 Development

5.4 Operationalizing the control variables

5.4.1 Natural resources

5.4.2 Civil war

5.5 Limitations

5.6 Econometric model

Part III Evaluating

6 Findings

6.1 Main model

6.2 Robustness checks

6.2.1 Multicollinearity

6.2.2 Resource-rich states and civil war states

6.2.3 Time

6.2.4 Autocracies and global trend

6.3 Interpretation

6.3.1 Variable 1: Economic costs of sanctions

6.3.2 Variable 2: Democratic goal of sanctions

6.3.3 Variable 3: Personalist regime

6.3.4 Variable 4: Regime legitimacy

6.3.5 Variable 5: Economic vulnerability

6.3.6 Variable 6: Development

6.3.7 Sanction design

6.3.8 Re-conceptualizing

7 So what? Implications and recommendations

7.1 Metatheoretical implications

7.1.1 Ontology of success

7.1.2 Epistemological issues

7.1.3 Methodological bias and manipulation

7.2 Research recommendations

7.2.1 Sanctions-related research recommendations

7.2.2 Regime-related research recommendations

7.3 Policy recommendations

7.4 A Kantian use of economic statecraft

7.5 Lessons learned

Appendix

A. Cases of economic sanctions

B. Types and goals of sanctions

C. Results

List of figures

Bibliography

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