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[The following article was, at my request, written by Lord MacDonnell before he became acquainted with the provisions of the Home Rule Bill. We agree in thinking it desirable that the article should appear without alteration as an expression of the views which Lord MacDonnell had formed on the subject.—The Editor.]

I am asked to state my opinion as to the changes of Administrative Direction and Control which should be introduced into the system of Irish Government in the event of a Home Rule Bill becoming law.

As I write (in March) I am not acquainted with the provisions of the promised Bill and my conjectures in regard to them may, in some respects at all events, fall wide of the mark. But there are cardinal principles which, presumably, must govern the Bill, and lend to conjecture some approximate degree of accuracy. Among such principles are the establishment of a representative assembly (Mr. Birrell has told us there will be two Houses), with powers of legislation and of control over the finances allocated to Ireland; the maintenance of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament; and the preservation of the executive authority of the King in Ireland.

Assuming then that the Bill will, in essence, be a [pg 051] measure of devolution under which the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament will be preserved, the Executive Power in Ireland will continue vested in the King (as under the Bills of 1886 and 1893) and a representative body controlling the Finances (and consequently the Executive) will be established, an intelligent anticipation may be made of the organic changes in the existing system of Irish Government which are likely to be required when the Bill becomes law.

I do not propose to push this anticipation into regions beyond those of constitutional or organic change. It may happen that re-arrangements of the Civil Service in Ireland, Inter-Departmental Transfers of the Executive Staffs, and reductions of redundant establishments, may ensue on the creation of the Irish Legislature.63 But these changes, if they take place, will not be organic or constitutional changes; nor could anticipations in respect of them be now worked out with due regard to vested rights or economical administration. If not so worked out, such anticipations would be either valueless or harmful.

I shall therefore not attempt on this occasion to allocate establishments, or to suggest scales of pay, for the departments of the future Irish Government which I shall suggest in the following paragraphs. But I shall, as opportunity offers, point to such retrenchments of higher administrative posts as appear to follow from the organic changes I shall indicate as necessary.

The dominating constitutional change will, of course, be the establishment of a Parliament which, operating [pg 052] through a Ministry responsible to it, will control and direct the various departments engaged in the transaction of public business. It is unnecessary to consider here how that Parliament will be recruited, though I may express my conviction that justice to minorities, the mitigation of political mistrust, and the promotion of efficiency in the Public Services, urgently require the recruitment to be on the system of proportional representation. But I assume that when recruited, the Parliament's general procedure will be fashioned on the model of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. To that end the first thing the new Parliament will have to do is to create its own establishment of officers and clerks, to frame its Standing Orders relating to the conduct of public business, and to settle any subsidiary rules that the Westminster precedents may suggest.

Having thus provided itself with the requisite machinery for the exercise of its powers, the Irish Parliament would naturally next proceed to bring under its supervision the various existing agencies for the direction and control of the public business of the country.

At present the business of Civil Government in Ireland is carried on through the following forty-seven Departments, Boards, and Offices, which I group with reference to the degree of control exercised over them by the Irish Government at the present time.

Departments, etc., under the Control of the Irish Government.

	(1) Royal Irish Constabulary.
	(2) Dublin Metropolitan Police.
	(3) Prisons Board.
	(4) Reformatory and Industrial School Office.
	(5) Inspectors of Lunatics.
	(6) General Registry of Vital Statistics.
	(7) Registry of Petty Sessions Clerks.
	(8) Resident Magistrates.64
	(9) Crown Solicitors.
	(10) Clerks of Crown and Peace.
	(11) Office of Arms (Ulster King of Arms).

Departments, etc., under the Partial Control of the Irish Government.

	(1) Land Commission.
	(2) Commissioners of charitable donations and bequests.
	(3) Public Record Office.

Departments, etc., not under Control of the Irish Government, but having the Chief Secretary as Ex Officio President.

	(1) Local Government Board.
	(2) Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction.

Departments, etc., not under the Control of the Irish Government except as regards Appointments and, in some instances, the Framing of Rules of Business.

	(1) Board of National Education.
	(2) Board of Intermediate Education.
	(3) Commissioners of Education. (Endowed Schools).
	(4) National Gallery.
	(5) Royal Hibernian Academy.
	(6) Congested Districts Board.

[pg 054]

Boards Exercising Statutory Powers in Ireland but not under Control of the Irish Government.

	(1) Public Loan Fund.
	(2) Commissioners of Irish Lights.
	(3) Queen's University, Belfast.
	(4) National University.

Departments, etc., not Controlled by the Irish Government.

	(1) The Judiciary.
	(a) The Supreme Court of Judicature and its officers.
	(b) Recorders.65
	(c) County Court Judges.
	(2) Registry of Deeds.
	(3) Local Registration of Titles.
	(4) Railway and Canal Commission.
	(5) Commissioners of Public Works.
	(6) General Valuation and Boundary Survey of Ireland.
	(7) Treasury Remembrancer's Office.
	(8) National School Teachers' Superannuation Office.

English Civil Departments Working in Ireland and not under the Control of the Irish Government.

	(1) Customs.
	(2) Inland Revenue.
	(3) General Post Office.
	(4) Board of Trade (Dublin and other Ports).
	(5) Quit Rent Office (Woods and Forests).
	(6) His Majesty's Stationery Office.
	(7) Civil Service Commissioners.
	(8) Inspector of Mines.
	(9) Inspector of Factories.
	(10) Registrar of Friendly Societies and Trades Unions, Building and Co-operative Societies.
	(11) Ordnance Survey of Ireland.
	(12) Public Works Loan Commissioners.
	(13) Exchequer and Audit Department.

It is thus apparent that at present the Irish Government exercises control over only a small portion of the official agencies working in the country. Many of these agencies—some of first-class importance and dealing with strictly Irish business—are uncontrolled by the Irish Government, while the supervision exercised over them by the Imperial Parliament is of the most shadowy character. The congestion of public business in Westminster effectually prevents attention being paid to any Irish business—at least to any Irish business out of which party capital cannot be made.

In these circumstances, the first duty of the new Parliament will be to co-ordinate, and establish its control over, the dísjecta membra of Irish Government. To that end it will, presumably, group into classes or departments the various “Boards,” “Offices,” and other official agencies enumerated above on the principle of common or cognate functions. Such a classification is an essential preliminary to the establishment of effectual Parliamentary control over the transaction of public business. I proceed to suggest such a scheme of classification, but a preliminary word is necessary.

Some controversy has taken place as to what is, and [pg 056] what is not, business of a “purely Irish nature,” with which alone, the Irish Government is to be concerned under the promised Bill. In my opinion, the following Departments, out of those enumerated above, namely:

	(1) Customs,
	(2) Excise,
	(3) Post Office, Telegraphs, etc.,
	(4) Treasury Remembrancer's Office,
	(5) Civil Service Commissioners,
	(6) Exchequer and Audit Office, and
	(7) Public Works Loan Commissioners,

can not be so classed, for the following reasons.

The control of the levy of Customs and Excise Revenue by the Irish Legislature, would imperil the fiscal solidarity of the United Kingdom, and be destructive of the further extension of Home Rule on federal lines. The Imperial Parliament should continue to control these all-important Departments, but power may be usefully reserved to the Irish Legislature to vary, under certain defined conditions, the duties on particular articles or commodities, without, however, any reservation of power to vary the articles themselves. For such a reservation, there is a precedent in the Isle of Man (Customs) Act of 1887, as I explained in an address delivered before the Irish Bankers' Institute last November. The suggestion was further developed in an Article on Irish Finance, which I contributed to the Nineteenth Century and After for January, 1912. In this connexion, it should be remembered that Mr. Gladstone's Bills of 1866 and 1893, excluded the Customs and Excise Revenue from Irish Control: and that the present Leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, following, in this respect, Mr. Parnell's example, has recognized the propriety of the exclusion.

The suggestion I make preserves the principle, thus [pg 057] confirmed by high authority, while it allows to Ireland, working in concert with Great Britain, the opportunity of adjusting her taxation to her own special necessities.

The Administration of Posts and Telegraphs in Ireland is intimately associated with the Department's Administration in Great Britain; and though Ireland has an indefeasible claim, which can be readily conceded, to the great bulk of the patronage within her shores, (patronage mostly of a petty and purely local character) I fail to see in that claim sufficient justification for localizing the Irish part of the business and thereby incurring the risk of dislocating the working of a great Imperial Department. And my objection to transferring the Postal Department to the new Government is emphasised by the fact that in Ireland this Department is worked at a loss of about a quarter of a million sterling annually. There would, therefore, be a tendency on the part of the new Irish Government to curtail expenditure on the Post Office, to the detriment of the public convenience of the United Kingdom, in order that the expenditure on the Department should balance the income.

The Treasury Remembrancer's Office will probably disappear with the system of which it is the symbol: but the Civil Service Commission calls for further consideration. As I am, at present, Chairman of the Royal Commission on the Civil Service, I feel myself precluded from writing on this important matter with complete freedom; but this much I may say—in recruiting her Civil Service Ireland will be well advised to follow the same general system of appointment, promotion, and conditions of service as prevail in Great Britain, (though this uniformity need not be taken to apply to scales of emolument). The enforcement of this principle will not militate against the establishment [pg 058] by the Irish Parliament, if so advised, of an Irish Civil Service as distinguished from the service which now exists for the United Kingdom as a whole. But I earnestly trust that if a separate Irish Civil Service be established there will be no limitation of candidature to Irish-born subjects of the Crown. Ireland would, in my opinion, commit a fatal mistake—fatal in more ways than one—if she imposed any impediment to the free competition by British-born subjects for appointments in the Irish Service, should one be created. She will gain far more than she will lose from reciprocity in this connection.

Assuming for the purpose in hand that the present general policy of recruitment for the Civil Service will continue, the question arises whether there should be an independent Civil Service Commission established in Dublin: or whether the Irish Government should ask the Burlington Gardens Commission to hold examinations in Ireland for the Irish service, associating with themselves some distinguished Irish educationalists. Personally I am strongly in favour of the latter alternative, on the ground of economy; and because of the advantage of using experienced British agencies for common purposes. Good feeling and mutual understanding will be thereby promoted.

Turning to the remaining Imperial Departments, I think the Exchequer and Audit Office should relinquish its Irish functions to a similar office restricted in its operations to Irish finances only66; while the Public Works Loans Commissioners would probably cease to do business in Ireland.67 Loans to municipalities [pg 059] and other public bodies in Ireland would, under the new dispensation, be probably made by the Irish Treasury acting on the advice of the Irish Board of Works.

I had, at first, thought of adding the Department of “Woods and Forests” (Quit Rents) to the list of excluded Departments, but I trust that, following the treatment proposed in Clause 24 of the Bill of 1893, this source of income may be made over to the Irish Parliament. If not, the Department should swell the list of exclusions. In the same way I had at first intended including the Land Commission in the excluded list, because of the imperative necessity which exists of retaining the Finance and Administration of Land Purchase under the control of the Imperial Treasury. I need not labour this point; all intelligent persons are agreed that the use of British Credit is essential to the furtherance of Irish Land Purchase, that Ireland, of herself, could not finance her great Land Purchase undertaking, because the cost would be prohibitive and would bring to an end that great scheme on whose successful accomplishment the peace and prosperity of Ireland so greatly depend. If the Government decides to exclude the Land Commission permanently from the control of the Irish Legislature no Irishman need object; but, for reasons to be stated in the sequel, I am disposed to think that the Land Commission might be better placed in a temporarily reserved, than in a permanently excluded, list.

With these exceptions I think that all the other public Departments and Offices enumerated may be regarded as dealing with business of a purely Irish character, the administration of which may be localized to Ireland. All of them, with the important addition of “Finance” and of certain other minor subjects which [pg 060] are known officially as “Votes,” I would group into Departments of Government in the following way, premising that I do not pretend to give an exhaustive list of “sub-heads,” which, indeed, must vary with changing circumstances and the growth of work. As I have said, the object of this grouping or classification is to facilitate the introduction of parliamentary control over every branch or kind of public business in Ireland.

Suggested Scheme of Administrative Departments of the Reformed Irish Government.

Group I.—The Treasury.

(1) General Finance.

(a) Taxation, Bills before the Legislature.

(b) Budgets, Recoverable Loans, Local Taxation Account.

(c) Courts of Law, Legal Establishments, Legal Business.

(d) Other Civil Departments, Pensions, Valuation and Boundary Surveys.

(e) Trade and Commerce.

(f) Exchequer and Audit.

(2) Local Finance.

(a) Municipalities, Urban Councils.

(b) County and Rural Councils.

(3) Registry, Receipt and Issue of Letters.

Group II.—Law and Justice.

(1) Supreme Court of Justice and its Officers.

(2) Recorders.

(3) County Court Judges.

(4) Resident Magistrates.

(5) Crown Business.

(a) General.

(b) Law Officers.

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(c) Crown Prosecutors, Crown Solicitors.

(d) Petty Sessions Clerks.

(6) Police.

(a) Royal Irish Constabulary.

(b) Dublin Metropolitan Police.

(7) Prisons, Reformatories, Criminal Lunatics.

(8) Miscellaneous.

(9) Registry, Receipt and Issue of Letters.

Group III.—Education, Science and Art.

(1) Primary.

(2) Secondary.

(3) University.

(4) Technical.

(5) College of Science.

(6) National Gallery, Public Libraries, Museums.

(7) Registry, etc., of Letters.

Group IV.—Local Government.

(1) Rural.

(2) Urban.

(3) Sanitation.

(4) Medical Relief, Hospitals.

(5) Poor Law Relief, Orphanages and Asylums.

(6) Crop Failure, Famine Relief.

(7) Labour questions, Housing of the working-classes.

(8) Audit of Local Accounts.

(9) Registry, etc., of Letters.

Group V.—Public Works.

(1) Roads and Buildings.

(2) Railways and Canals.

(3) Marine Works.

(4) Drainage, Irrigation and Reclamation.

(5) Mines and Minerals.

(6) Registry of Letters.

[pg 062]

Group VI.—Agriculture.

(1) General.

(2) Relief of Agricultural Congestion. (Congested Districts Board).

(3) Land Improvement, Seeds, Manures, Agricultural Implements, etc.

(4) Improvement in the breed of Horses, Cattle, etc.

(5) Diseases of Animals and Plants.

(6) Agricultural Schools, Experimental and Demonstration Farms, etc.

(7) Arboriculture, Afforestation.

(8) Registry of Letters.

Group VII.—The Land Commission.

(1) Land Purchase.

(2) Relief of Congestion.

(3) Recovery of Annuities and Sinking Fund.

(4) Fixation of Judicial Rents.

(5) Registry, etc., of Letters.

Group VIII.—Registration.

(1) General and Vital Statistics.

(2) Deeds.

(3) Titles.

(4) General Records.

(5) Friendly Societies.

(6) Registry of Receipts and Issue of Letters.

Group IX.—General Purposes.

(1) Sea and Inland Fisheries.

(2) Labour Questions, other than Housing.

(3) Scientific Investigations.

(4) Thrift and Credit Societies; Agricultural Banks.

(5) Quit Rents.68 (Woods and Forests).

[pg 063]

(6) Temporary Commissions of Enquiry.

(7) Stationery.

(8) Office of Arms.69

Before proceeding to discuss the method by which the control of the Legislature may be most easily and effectively established over these various departments, I wish to consider whether any of them should be temporarily reserved from that control. There is undoubtedly, a strong feeling among Irish Unionists, and among many moderate Nationalists, that, if Home Rule does come, Judicial Patronage, and the control over the Police, should be in the beginning reserved or excepted from the general transfer of control to the new Government which would take place when the Bill becomes law. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party are, I understand, anxious that there should be no delay in transferring the judicial patronage. They have been dissatisfied with the exercise of judicial patronage in the past: and they wish for a distribution more to their liking in the immediate future.

I have myself no fear that judicial patronage will be misused to the detriment of any party by the Irish Government of the future; but Irish Unionists are apprehensive on the point; and in my opinion something should be done to allay their fears. If the Bill should contain provisions similar to Clause 19 of the Bill of 1893, which maintained in the Irish Supreme Court two judges with salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, appointed by the King in Council, and removable only by his Order, the Unionist apprehensions might be, to some extent at all events, removed. But as the Financial Provisions of the coming Bill will probably be different [pg 064] from those of the Bill of 1893, a clause like Clause 19 of that Bill may not be inserted.70

In that case, I think it would tend to the establishment of general confidence if the patronage in connexion with judicial appointments were, during the transition period, reserved and administered, as at present, by the Lord-Lieutenant. I think it would be good policy to abstain from every transfer of authority from the Lord-Lieutenant to which the Irish minority may at the outset reasonably object. There must be a period of transition—be it seven years or ten years or even longer—during which the minority will be suspicious of such change as I am now concerned with. I would let these suspicions wear themselves out, as in time they are sure to do with the growth of further knowledge and of that saner outlook on Imperial and Irish affairs, which collaboration towards common objects brings with it. It seems to me that in the reassurance of opponents and hesitating well-wishers, and even in the immunity, for a time, from the pressure and annoyances of this class of patronage, the new Irish Government may well find, in its infancy, satisfaction for the temporary withholding of a part of its prerogatives. It might be an instruction to the Lord-Lieutenant, that, during the transition period, (which need not be long) the wishes of the Irish ministry, in regard to appointments to judicial vacancies, should be ascertained and fully considered before the vacancies are filled.

But if this view cannot prevail then I suggest that during the transition period the patronage in connexion with the Supreme Court should, at all events, [pg 065] be reserved. It is highly desirable that the apprehensions of the Irish Unionists should be allayed in every practicable way.

Advantage should, I think, be taken of this opportunity to remove the Irish Chancellorship from the list of political appointments. Whatever strong reasons or justification may exist in England for the Lord Chancellor changing with the Government, there should be none that I can discover in the Ireland of the future, unless it be in connection with the appointment of Justices of the Peace. But fairness in distributing that sort of patronage can surely be secured by other means than a frequently recurring and unnatural change of Chancellors, whereby the Pension List is heavily and unnecessarily burdened.

In connexion with the Royal Irish Constabulary, I am clear that the control should rest, as now, with the Lord-Lieutenant (that is, with the Imperial Government) until Land Purchase has made further progress, and the new Government has gained experience of administration; but it is only fair that during this period of reservation the Imperial Government should allow Ireland a drawback on the cost of the police force, the present strength of which is excessive if judged from the Irish point of view.

The situation will, of course, be anomalous inasmuch as there will be an Executive Government responsible to the Irish Parliament yet relieved of the prime responsibility resting on all Governments—the maintenance of law and order. This anomaly cannot be avoided: it inevitably arises from the political conditions of the case. The best way of dealing with the situation will be to maintain existing arrangements which are directed by the Under-Secretary and to preserve the subordination of the Law Officers to the [pg 066] Lord-Lieutenant in all matters relating to the maintenance of order. But while the Minister for Law and Justice should have no control over the police during this transition period, his wishes in regard to any matter will, of course, be carefully considered; his request for the performance by the police of all duties not of a purely police character which they now customarily discharge, will be complied with, and his proposals to reduce the strength of the force, and thereby effect saving in the public expenditure, will no doubt be favourably considered by the Lord-Lieutenant if the state of the country permits.

I presume the Bill will indicate the kind of police force which in time will take the place of the existing force. I confess I am not prepossessed in favour of the plan embodied in this connexion in the Bill of 1886 or 1893. I think the best plan will be to retain the organization of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and to reduce the present force by short recruitment when the Imperial Government think that can be safely done. I deprecate the creation of a local force under the control of the local authorities.71

Finally, the question whether the force to be locally employed should be armed, or not armed (as the Bill of 1893 proposed), may be left to be decided at the time by the Imperial Government: but, in any case, it will, I think, be necessary for the Irish Government to maintain a sufficiently strong armed body of police in Dublin and other suitable centres to deal with emergencies.

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The control over the staff of Resident Magistrates is so intimately bound up with the existing system of police administration that one cannot be safely separated from the other, and this section of Law and Justice should, in my opinion, also be reserved during the transition period. At the same time I think the services of the Resident Magistrates can be more fully utilized in the business of general administration than they are at present.

There is less reason for retaining the Dublin Metropolitan Police under the Lord-Lieutenant's direct control during the transition period than for retaining the Royal Irish Constabulary; and if the national feeling would be gratified by giving to the Irish Parliament, at once, the control of the Dublin police, I would defer to that feeling. But my personal opinion is that the Irish Parliament in its earliest days would be wise to concentrate upon self-organization, the establishment of control over the departmental system, and the taking stock of the condition of the country in all the various aspects of national life. It will then with greater assurance of success take over from the Imperial Government the responsibility for the maintenance of order.

I have already referred to the Land Commission. There is a general agreement that the department of land purchase, which depends essentially upon the use of British credit, should remain with the Imperial Government. The only question is: should this department be permanently excluded from Irish control, or only temporarily excluded, the period of exclusion being in the discretion of the Imperial Government? In view of the temporary character of the Land Commission, the possibility that Legislation affecting land may be necessary before the Annuities generally cease, [pg 068] and the certainty that when they do cease, either generally or in any particular area, it will be desirable to remove all limitations on the functions of the Irish Legislature in reference to land, I am disposed to think it, on the whole, better to treat the Land Commission as a “reserved” instead of an “excluded” subject, and thereby make its ultimate transfer to Irish control a matter of executive action on the part of the Imperial Government. But I admit the existence of strong reasons for total exclusion, and I should not question a decision in favour of the latter course.72 Should it be excluded, I would suggest that it shall be open for the Irish Government to bring to the notice of the Lord-Lieutenant any matters in which the administration of the Land Commission seems to be defective.

In this connexion I desire to call attention to the Congested Districts Board and the power which it at present exercises of purchasing land under the Land Purchase Acts. It is imperatively necessary, if this Board is to be retained in its existing or in any modified shape, that its work of relieving congestion and improving the condition of the peasantry of the West should be brought under the supervision and control of the Irish Legislature. But if the land purchase operations of the Land Commission are to be excluded or reserved from control by the Irish Legislature, it is very difficult to defend the subjection to such control of the land purchase functions of the Congested Districts Board. How can the British Treasury be reasonably asked to become responsible for prices fixed by an Irish body over which it will have no control whatever? Such a situation would be utterly anomalous.

[pg 069]

The anomaly can be avoided (as suggested in my Minute appended to the Report of the Royal Commission on Congestion, 1908) by relieving the Congested Districts Board of its functions as a purchasing authority and having purchases of land made for it, on its requisition, by the Land Commission.

Having thus indicated my opinion as to the departments or sections of departments to be temporarily reserved from the control of the Irish Parliament, I come to the question of how that control should be exercised over the departments remaining on the list. In this connexion I invite reference to Clauses 20–22 of the Irish Council Bill. That Bill (Clause 19) contemplated the appointment of committees of council, with paid chairmen, to administer the departments into which public business was to be distributed under the Bill. It was my own expectation, had the Council Bill become law, that the chairmen of these Committees of Council would in course of time have become ministers for the departments concerned; but, in the beginning and until experience had been gained, it seemed desirable to give the embryonic ministers the help, and to impose on them the restraint, of colleagues. Whether the future Irish Legislature will see prudence or wisdom in this course, one can only conjecture; but one may trust that it may. In the following observations, however, and without meaning to imply any preference for “Ministers” over “Chairmen of Committees,” I shall employ the word “Minister.”73

The first Department on my list is the Treasury. Here the new Irish Administration must break entirely fresh ground and build from the foundation. An Irish [pg 070] Exchequer must be created, a system of Treasury Regulations and accounts must be evolved; an Irish Consolidated Fund must be established; and a Bank must be selected with which the Irish Government will bank. (Much pressure will, I anticipate, be brought to bear on the Irish Ministry to distribute its favours in this connexion; but, it would, I submit, be highly inconvenient to keep accounts with separate banks). At present the Chief Secretary's office in Dublin Castle has a financial section, but the new Government will derive no inspiration from its procedure. It will be better to look for precedents in Whitehall. They will show a Treasury Board composed of members of the Government but with the responsibility resting on one called the Chancellor of the Exchequer who is answerable to Parliament for the country's finances and, subject to the decision of the Cabinet, possesses complete control over them (excepting the Army and Navy Estimates). It will, I suggest, be wise for the Irish Legislature to follow this precedent, and place the Irish Treasury in charge of a Body of Commissioners (being Members of the Parliament) with a Treasurer or Chancellor of the Exchequer, specially responsible to it.

The governing principle, from the parliamentary point of view, of our financial system, is that no expenditure can be proposed to Parliament except by a Minister of the Crown.74 I trust that the principle will be reproduced in the Irish Parliament, and rigidly enforced. In no other way can an adequate safeguard be provided against irresponsible and hasty proposals for spending public money.

The Imperial Treasury at present, exercises financial [pg 071] control over every department and branch of the public service (over the Army and Navy estimates I believe the control is less effective than in other directions). This is a wholesome practice, and it should be copied by the Irish Legislature with one qualification. At present, the financial control of the Treasury is occasionally accompanied by a degree of administrative interference which I venture to think is sometimes injurious to the public interests. The Treasury is deficient in administrative knowledge; and for this reason its interference has not infrequently led to inefficiency. Some administrative restraint is, of course, inseparable from financial control; but when money is sanctioned for a particular purpose, the administrative officers on the spot can regulate detailed expenditure better than gentlemen at a distance.

The new Parliament should certainly provide a Public Accounts' Committee; and a Comptroller and Auditor-General, as under the Exchequer and Audit Act of 1866; and I suggest for consideration, that the Departments should be competent to challenge, before the Public Accounts' Committee, any over-interference on the part of the Treasury in administrative details. While I should be glad to see in Ireland the most effective check upon wasteful expenditure, I deprecate the exercise of a meticulous interference in administrative details.

The secretariat arrangements to be made in connection with the Department of Law and Justice, will depend on the extent of “temporary reservation” to be effected. If there is to be the larger reservation, during the transition period which I have suggested above, nothing need now be done. Matters will continue, during that period, on their present footing. If there is to be only partial reservation, the portion of [pg 072] the existing office staff in Dublin Castle which deals with the unreserved sections can be detached for employment under the Minister, who in this case would doubtless also hold another portfolio. When the Department is brought fully under Irish control, there will be found in Dublin Castle gentlemen specially competent to give effect to the policy of the Legislature in this Department of Irish Government.

But, whether the Judicial Department is brought sooner or later under Irish control, an early opportunity should be taken of reviewing the entire judicial organization with the view of pruning away redundancies and placing it on a more economical basis. Few will be found to deny that the existing staff of County Court Judges and legal officials of various grades is excessive; and no one, with knowledge, will maintain that a Supreme Court of 14 Judges, costing with their subordinate officers £181,209 a year, is not too costly for a country with a population of 4-¼ millions. In the House of Commons Return (Cd. 210 of July, 1911), the number of civil servants of all grades in the Supreme and Appellate Courts of England (with their 39 judges) is shown as 461, while in the Supreme and Appellate Courts of Ireland (with their 14 judges) it is shown as 257!

The administration of Education is at present distributed between three Boards and the Irish Government and the circumstances call for drastic reorganization. The Boards of National and Intermediate Education should be abolished, and a Department of Education created under the control of a Minister responsible to the Irish Legislature. Such a Minister would find ready to his hand an official staff (working under the direction of a very competent “Commissioner of Education”) which will not at the outset require any large increase.

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In the Irish Council Bill a Committee of Council for Education was proposed, which provided for the admission of gentlemen not being members of the Irish Council; the object being to conciliate public feeling which is notoriously sensitive upon this matter, and to secure special opportunities for representatives of the various religious creeds of making their views felt. I believe that the liberality of that provision was very inadequately understood in 1907; but in the altered conditions of the present time, I do not repeat the proposal. The Irish Parliament, under the coming Bill, will be a stronger representation of the popular will than the Irish Council would have been, at all events, at the outset.

This change of administrative control, direction, and responsibility in respect of Education will, I trust, have a powerful effect in improving secular instruction, which is at present notoriously inefficient; but it need not (apart from any declaration of policy by the Irish Legislature), involve any change in the religious aspect of the teaching. Teaching in Irish primary schools of all creeds is in practice denominational (though not so in theory). My hope is that it will remain so. What the change will involve is the control of the Department over the appointment, the promotion, the removal, the qualifications, and the conditions of service of every person employed in Irish schools. That is as it should be.

The “Endowed Schools” are conducted under schemes which have, I believe, been settled by the Judicial Tribunals, and I do not suggest any interference with such schemes, but the efficiency of the secular teaching in those schools should be subject to the supervision of the Department of Education.

I come next to the Local Government Board, which consists at present of an ex-officio President (the Chief [pg 074] Secretary) and three members, one of the three being Vice-President and the real head of the Board. The appointment of a Minister, being a member of the Irish Legislature, in place of the ex-officio President who never sits on the Board, will convert this Board into a Department with a responsible Minister in charge. One member of the Board (not the medical member) may be dispensed with, and the Executive Establishment calls for revision. This Board comes into contact with the people in many intimate relations of their lives and on its successful administration will largely depend the popularity of the new Administration.

The next Department is the Board of Public Works and Buildings, which at present is a Treasury Department independent of Irish control. For the “Chairman” should be substituted a Minister responsible to the Legislative Assembly. At present there are three members, but one of these may, I think, be dispensed with at once. I look to this Department to confer benefits, long delayed, on the country; I would, especially, instance, drainage. Ireland stands in need of nothing more than a system of arterial drainage carried out on a large scale.

At present the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland make recoverable loans on behalf of the Treasury for land improvement and such like purposes. In the scheme indicated above, the making of these loans would come within the functions of the Finance Department. But the Department of Works would naturally be the Treasury's Agents advising on the necessity for such loans and supervising the expenditure of them, when borrowed for large betterment undertakings.

The next Department is the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. In the scheme [pg 075] outlined above Technical Instruction has been brought under the Education Department, while the Congested Districts Board has been brought under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture. The Act under which the Department of Agriculture at present works provides for two Bodies, to assist and advise the Vice-President, (who, as in the case of the Local Government Board, is the working head of the department)—a Board having a veto on expenditure, and a Council which gives general advice on policy. Both the Board and the Council were devised to supply that popular element in which the system of Irish Government is at present lacking. Under the new dispensation this popular element will be amply supplied. Both Bodies will therefore be unnecessary; their continuance would conduce to embarrassment and friction with the all-controlling Legislature. Both the Council and the Board should be abolished. The President and Vice-President should also disappear, and in their place should emerge a responsible Minister in charge of the Department. This Department seems to be, after the Judicial Department, the most expensively organised in Ireland. It is true that it comprises some branches which have elsewhere an independent status: but notwithstanding this, I am convinced that a revision of its numerous and costly establishments is needed in the interests of economy and efficiency.

I have already suggested that the Congested Districts Board should be relieved of the duty of purchasing land, the Land Commission being required to make these purchases on requisition from the Congested Districts Board. I would add (in accordance with the principle suggested by paragraph 100 of the Report of the Royal Commission on Congestion in Ireland, (1908)) that the creation of an Irish Legislature destroys [pg 076] the justification for this Board. The work can be better done by an Executive Agency working under the control of a Committee of Parliament. But if a Board is retained it should not be the large Board we have now. A small Board of five will be more conducive to efficiency and far more amenable to the control of the Legislature. That control I venture to add will be most beneficially exercised in bringing about the abandonment of the Congested District Board's present policy of spoon-feeding the congested villages of the West; and of dealing with them not, to any extent, on eleemosynary principles, but exclusively on those of self-help. The Board's methods of relieving congestion should be assimilated to the practice of the Land Commission on dealing with congested areas, if men now living are to see the end of the Board's activities.

In connexion with Registration, I think it is desirable to bring all kinds of registration under the control of one Minister, but the work is mostly of a routine character and a single Minister will doubtless find himself able to direct this and also the last Department remaining on my list.

This Department—for General Purposes—brings together the remaining Boards and Offices dealing with official work in Ireland; and under it may in future be brought any official business of a temporary character, not of sufficient importance to be dealt with by a separate Office, but yet of such importance that a vote is taken for it in Committee of Supply.

I have placed “Fisheries” in this Department because that important industry requires more attention than it has hitherto received, or than it can receive from the Department of Agriculture. It will also be observed that I have placed in this Department the [pg 077] subject of Thrift and Credit Societies and Co-operative Banks: thus dissociating them from the Department of Agriculture, which deals with them at present but with which they have no necessary connexion. They have been made far too much the battle-ground of contending parties. Some supervision by the Government over these co-operative agencies may perhaps be necessary, but they will flourish most when interference by the Government is least felt.

It remains to refer to the position and functions of the Lord-Lieutenant under the new dispensation (it is, of course, to be presumed that no religious disqualification will any longer attach to the office). On the assumption that the Executive power will continue vested in the King, all executive acts of the Irish Government must issue by authority of the Lord-Lieutenant through whom will also be communicated the assent to, or the withholding of assent from, Acts of the Irish Legislature. The Bill of 1893 (Clause 5 (2)) provided for:

“An Executive Committee of the Privy Council in Ireland to aid and advise in the government of Ireland being of such members and comprising persons holding such offices under the Crown as His Majesty, or if so authorised, the Lord-Lieutenant, may think fit, save as may be otherwise directed by Irish Act.”75

It will be desirable that such a Committee of the Irish Privy Council should be created to assist the Lord-Lieutenant. But while the majority of the Committee should always be composed of Ministers, it would, I think, conciliate the minority, and otherwise make for efficiency, if some members on the Privy Council Committee, were taken from outside the [pg 078] Government. If the Committee were composed of ten members, seven might be Ministers, and three members might be taken from outside the Government: the decision of the Council would be that of the majority.

Of course, I am conscious of the fact, that this arrangement may be objected to on the ground that it would expose the plans of the Government, in particular cases, to gentlemen who might not be of the Party in Office. But Privy Councillors are bound by oath to secrecy; and I think the danger of a dishonourable betrayal of trust is incommensurate with the advantages which this representation of outside feeling on the Committee, would bring. Moreover, the Lord-Lieutenant would be free not to summon any particular Privy Councillor to a session of the Committee, if the Prime Minister objected to his presence. The proceedings of the Privy Council would be secret, and no Minutes of dissent would be recorded.

I take it that under the coming Bill, the Lord-Lieutenant will have no power to initiate action otherwise than by suggestion to the Ministers concerned, who, may, or may not, act on the suggestion. Ordinarily, the Lord-Lieutenant in Council will accept the Minister's advice: but when he differs, and persists in differing, he would be bound in the last resort to refer the matter to the British Cabinet. Ex-concessis, all proceedings of the Irish Legislature or Government will be subject to the ultimate control of the Imperial Parliament.

It will be necessary to provide for the representation of the Irish Government in the Imperial Parliament (a different thing from the representation of Ireland, which, if the solidarity of the United Kingdom is to be preserved, must be maintained, though, as I have already said, in a proportion “which should be sensibly [pg 079] less than the proportion existing between British Members and their electorates”). Some Member of the Imperial Parliament must answer for that Government; and the question arises whether the Member should be an Irish Member, designated by the Irish Government, as its representative, or a British Minister. In view of the fact that the Acts of the Irish Government will be subject to the control of the Imperial Parliament, and must, therefore, come regularly under the cognizance of the British Ministry, I suggest that the duty should be discharged by the British Home Secretary, pending the time when the establishment of the Federal System (Home Rule all round) will call for a more far-reaching Parliamentary adjustment.

If the Land Commission (Group VII.) be excluded from Irish control, the number of Ministers in charge of departments would be seven, reducible to six by giving the portfolios of Groups VIII. and IX. to the same Minister, and to five if a separate Minister for Law and Justice be not at once appointed. With the Prime Minister, who might have charge of a department, or, as in Canada, might be President of the Privy Council, a Cabinet of seven or six as a minimum number would be composed; and this would seem to be an adequate number, at all events to begin with.

The general result of the preceding suggestions should be that responsibility for every agency engaged in the administration of public business in Ireland will attach to a particular Minister, responsible to the Irish Parliament; that interest in Irish public business will be enormously stimulated in Ireland, and that a salutary public control will be effectively exercised. In particular, it may be expected that public money will be husbanded, and when expended, will be spent to the best advantage.

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It is not possible within the limits of a paper like this, to enumerate the provisions of law, peculiar to Ireland which the organic changes indicated in the preceding paragraphs may necessitate. An enquiry into that matter (as into the redundancy of Judicial, Executive and Secretariat establishments) will no doubt be undertaken by the Irish Government on a suitable opportunity. But it is probably correct to say that changes of substantive law will not be so much required as changes of practice, whereby the administration of the law may be brought more into harmony, than it is at present, with popular sentiment.

It is always to be remembered that the scheme of Home Rule or Devolution which is advocated in this paper, does not contemplate the creation of a body of law for Ireland, different from that prevailing in Great Britain. In all matters of status, property and personal rights, the laws of the two countries will, I presume, remain identical; and no legislation of a restrictive, sectional, or sectarian character will be permissible in the one country, which is not permitted in the other. It is also to be presumed that the decrees of English Courts will be as enforceable by Irish Courts and Authorities as they are now, and vice versa; and that, in fact, the Judicial and Executive Organisations will be as available, under the new order of things, for carrying on His Majesty's Government in both countries, as they are now.

If this be understood, most of the doubts and fears, and forebodings of evil to come from this extension of Irish Local Government, will, I predict, be soon dissipated.

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