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Securities For Religious Freedom

It may be of interest before dealing with the safeguards for religious liberty in Ireland to describe those adopted in other countries. This survey, made in no controversial spirit, may help to give a proper sense of perspective and proportion. A brief comparative study of the legal safeguards for religious liberty may not perhaps help much to inspire the spirit of charity and toleration, which are its best supports. But we know our own position better when we know that of others. It is some gain also to find that others have had the same problems as ours, and have solved them with more or less success. Certain fears are much abated when it is recognised that it is proposed to make in Ireland an experiment of a kind which has been satisfactorily carried out elsewhere. Political justice has been found, in the countries to which I refer, compatible with religious freedom. Why not in Ireland?

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Constitutional Limitations

I. Progress of Religious Liberty

In most States to-day religious liberty exists with some qualifications—it is one of the most characteristic features of modern legislation. All religious denominations are tolerated; some may be favoured; all are free so long as they do not come into conflict with generally accepted principles of morality. In most States there is a further advance; we find a tendency, more and more accentuated, towards religious equality; more and more is it the policy of States to place all religious denominations upon the same footing. This principle is not carried out completely in all or indeed in most States. Certain churches are in a special sense State Churches. In some countries, the churches of large parts of the population are treated as “recognised churches,” to their advantage and to the exclusion, it may be, of others. In Austria, for example, there are six recognised churches and religious societies; and a similar system exists in Hungary.

I do not attempt to analyse the many causes of these movements. The fact at all events is that, whether as the result of the attrition, everywhere going on, of dogmatic creeds, or of the growth of the spirit of tolerance, or of indifference, or the rediscovery of charity as a fundamental principle of Christianity, or because toleration is the line of least resistance, or because it best accords with democracy, almost everywhere in modern times in Europe and America religious equality seems to be the condition towards which States are moving. It is worthy of notice that complete freedom is demanded by many sincere adherents of churches [pg 092] who are impatient of State control, and who believe that spiritual life thrives best in an atmosphere of freedom. It is the creed, I am inclined to think, of an ever increasing number that the existence of a free Church in a free State is to the welfare of both.

Even where the principle is questioned, practice tends to conform thereto. Reluctantly and grudgingly conceded as a favour, religious toleration becomes part of the habitual attitude of mind at first of the more enlightened and then of ordinary men. The principle of religious liberty or equality is still disputed by the Church of Rome.84 The doctrines of Gregory VII. and Innocent III. are still asserted as of old. The syllabus of Pius IX. condemns the principle of equality as enshrining an error not less pernicious because common; it is the vain attempt to equalise creeds incomparable with each other and radically different; such liberty is no better than liberty to err. That is the position taken up in the Papal Syllabus. But in modern times all churches, the Roman Catholic not excepted, have yielded, often insensibly and reluctantly, to the pressure of facts. The ideal condition may be domination of the church; the practical problem in adverse circumstances is how to make the best compromise. Vatican decrees notwithstanding, the powers which issue them cannot, and do not, press their claims as they once did. Immutable in doctrine, they are found to be adaptive in practice. Churches which retract nothing alter their practice; they do not escape the influence of the age and the country, Ireland not excepted, in which they work. Everywhere the tendency is towards religious equality; I find abundant [pg 093] evidence of it even in the policy of the Church of Rome. Many books have been written describing the recent increase of the pretensions of Papal absolutism. There exists, so far as I am aware, no complete history of the policy pursued by the Church of Rome in countries in which it cannot give full effect to its doctrines respecting the true connection between Church and State. Such a history would reveal the existence and exercise of a singularly adaptive power; the growth of a policy suitable for and acceptable in non-Catholic countries and under democratic rule. In the wonderfully rich system of the Canon law are devices suitable for all circumstances. The Church may promulgate a decree in one country and not in another; the Tridentine decrees at the close of some four centuries are not yet made universally obligatory. It may for centuries leave it uncertain whether a bull specially assertive of the power of the Church, is in force in a particular country. The doctrine of the Canon law as to the efficacy of customs, and particularly local customs, permits of variations in accordance with the necessities of time and place. Semper eadem, but elastic and always opportunist—such is the character of the actual policy of the Church;85 and there is no reason to think that it will be otherwise in Ireland under popular government.

The Roman Catholic Church has lately shown itself [pg 094] accommodating in Germany in regard to the marriage law. When Dr. Hogan of Maynooth College writes of “the peaceful character and disposition of the church and her reluctance to cause any disturbance of the social affairs of States or communities, even where the vast majority of the people are hostile to her religious claims”; when he adds “if it can be shown that a new law (the Ne temere decree) inflicts any serious grievance on Protestants in this country, we are satisfied that due consideration will be given to any representations which may be made in this matter,” he is borne out by the recent policy of his Church, even if one cannot admit the accuracy of his further statement: “Such has always been the policy and practice of the Church in this matter.”—(See Irish Ecclesiastical Record, February, 1911). The system never breaks, but it bends—bends to the exigencies of new situations, and particularly of democratic institutions, such as will exist in Ireland under Home Rule.

II. Securities for Religious Liberty

How to obtain and still more how to secure such liberty or equality is a problem in every modern State. The actual solutions, though many, fall into a few [pg 095] groups86; I enumerate the chief. There are countries with State Churches in which have gradually been made concessions to other denominations. England is the typical example. Religious equality (so far as it exists) is the result of a long series of measures; the successive removal of disabilities of Dissenters and Roman Catholics; of measures relating to the tenure of public offices, and as to marriage, or oaths. No one Act states any governing principle. After the fashion of English legislation there has been movement from point to point, though, on the whole, always, or with few relapses, in modern times, in one direction. The securities for equality are found in a long series of individual statutes. Such, also, may be said to have been the history of religious equality in Hungary; as in so many countries there has been a gradual abandonment of the old maxim cujus regio, ejus religio.

I am concerned with the safeguards for equality within a State, and so I need say little or nothing of the Gallican system, which was intended to secure liberty against foreign intrusion. It was the liberty claimed by a church, which refused toleration to other denominations; the protests of a national Church part of [pg 096] Catholicism against the intrusion of the Papacy; it was the assertion of claims, which, to quote Saint Simon, “blessent douloureusement la Cour de Rome”; assertions of the doctrine that the French kings were in secular matters independent of the Pope, and that the Pope's spiritual authority was limited by the laws of the church. In some countries, churches have secured a large measure of religious liberty or autonomy by means of Concordats with the civil Power. The typical case is that of the Catholic Church in France, where such a system may be said to have existed from the Concordat of Bologna, concluded between Francis I. and Leo X. in 1516, until recent times, with the exception of a short break at the Revolution; they may be said to have established an offensive and defensive alliance between Church and State.

I come to systems and devices chiefly used in modern times to secure religious liberty or equality. They are to be found in particular in countries possessing written constitutions. Either they lay down with more or less clearness principles of religious equality, or, dealing specifically with some pressing danger or difficulty, they provide a safeguard as to it. The first striking example of this kind of restriction is to be found in America. Dread of the existence of an established Church and of its ultimate effects upon republican institutions was shared by the framers of the United States Constitution and most of the framers of the States Constitutions. The provision which Jefferson caused to be inserted in the Virginia Bill of Rights and the article in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights have been copied with variations by the States. Speaking generally, they provide for equality of treatment of religious denominations (Stimson, “Federal and State Constitutions,” p. 137). In the Constitution [pg 097] of the United States there is only one Article on the subject (Amendment, Article 1). “Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment87 of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In the United States true equality exists; all denominations are treated alike; the modern tendency towards equality has triumphed as the result partly of national habits and partly of constitutional restrictions.

I may here cite one or two examples of modern Constitutions which have laid down principles designed to secure religious equality.88 Naturally Switzerland, with its population nearly equally divided into Catholics and Protestants, has been obliged to deal with this question, and so far as I am aware, it has done so with success. The principles of religious equality are embodied in the amended Constitution of 1874. I quote the chief provisions, because they are on the whole the most complete set of existing safeguards which I have found.

“Article 49.—La liberté de conscience et de croyance est inviolable. Nul ne peut être constraint de faire partie d'une association religieuse, de suivre un enseignement religieux, d'accomplir un acte religieux, ni encourir des peines, de quelque nature quelles soient, pour cause d'opinion religieuse.

“L'exercice des droits civils ou politiques ne peut être restreint par des prescriptions ou des conditions de nature ecclésiastique ou religieuse, quelles qu'elles soient.

“Nul ne peut, pour cause d'opinion religieuse, s'affranchir de l'accomplissement d'un devoir civique.

“Nul n'est tenu de payer des impôts dont le produit est spécialement affecté aux frais proprement dits du culte d'un communauté religieuse à laquelle il n'appartient pas. L'exécution ultérieure de ce principe reste réservée à la legislation fédérale.

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“Article 50.—Le libre exercice des cultes est garanti dans les limites compatibles avec l'ordre public et les bonnes mœurs.

“Article 54.—Le droit de mariage est placé sous la protection de la conféderation.

“Aucun empêchement au mariage ne peut être fondé sur des motifs confessionels.”

While declaring the principle of liberty of conscience, the Swiss Federal Constitution permits the cantons to give a privileged position to certain religious denominations; they may give them subsidies; they may invest them with certain prerogatives denied to other bodies less favoured. For example, in Fribourg, the Catholic and the Protestants are put on a footing of equality. Owing to the powers possessed by the separate cantons religious equality is not so complete as at first sight might seem. No serious difficulty appears to have been experienced in giving effect to the above provisions89 which are not so complete as those found in the Home Rule Bill.

III. Safeguards in Colonies

I come to legislation which may seem of a kind more helpful and instructive than that of Continental countries. In the British Colonies there is no connection between the State and Church. The sole important exception is in Canada, where “the church can compel by law the payment of dues by Roman Catholics, and thus obtains great privilege from, while independent of, the State.”90

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In framing the Constitution for the Canadian Dominions the religious question chiefly considered related to education; it was deemed necessary to guard against legislation which might impair existing rights. It was with an eye to the possibility of injustice being done to the denominational schools that special provisions were inserted in the North American Act accordingly (30 & 31 Vic., c. 3, 1867, Section 93):

“In and for each province the Legislative may exclusively make laws in relation to education, subject and according to the following provisions:

“(1) Nothing in any such Act shall prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to denominational schools which any class of persons have by law in the province at the union;

“(2) All the powers, privileges and duties at the union law conferred and imposed in Upper Canada on the separate schools and school trustees of the Queen's Roman Catholic subjects shall be and the same are hereby extended to the dissentient schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic subjects in Quebec;

“(3) Where in any province a system of separate or dissentient schools exists by law at the union, or is thereafter established by the Legislature of the province, an appeal shall lie to the Governor-General in Council from any Act or decision of any provincial authority affecting any right or privilege of the Protestant or Roman Catholic minority of the Queen's subjects in relation to education;

“(4) In case any such provincial law as from time to time seems to the Governor-General in Council requisite for the due execution of this section is not made, or in case any decision of the Governor-General in Council on any appeal under this section is not duly executed by the proper provincial authority in that behalf, then and in every such case, and as far only as the circumstances of each case require, the Parliament of Canada may make remedial laws for the due execution of the [pg 100] provisions of this section, and of any decision of the Governor-General in Council under this section.”91

Lately there have arisen religious difficulties to which this section has no application. By the Confederation Act (Section 91) the Dominion Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction as to marriage and divorce; jurisdiction which would appear to relate to capacity as to marriage. By Section 92 in each province the legislature may exclusively make laws as to “the solemnisation of marriage in the province,” which would appear to extend to all matters affecting the form and ceremony; a division of powers certain to produce sooner or later conflicts. Recently the Ne temere decree was promulgated in Canada. The effect upon Roman Catholics has been considered in what is known as the Hebert case, the chief facts of which were these: Eugene Hebert and Emma Clouatre, both Roman Catholics, were married by a Protestant clergyman. The marriage was declared null and void by Archbishop Bruchesi. His decision was confirmed by Judge Laurendeau. But on appeal it was reversed by Judge Charbonneau, who held that any officer qualified by the State to marry persons could marry persons of any religious faith; that the Ne temere decree had no legal validity and was binding only upon the consciences of Roman Catholics.

To quote a report of Judge Charbonneau's judgment:

“I do not think that the Roman congregation ever intended the Ne temere Decree to have a civil effect. It applies to Roman Catholics only. As for the Archbishop's nullification, it has the same legal effect, but not more than the decree upon which it is [pg 101] based. It simply declares that no Catholic marriage ceremony was performed.”—(Globe, Toronto, February 23rd, 1912.)

So far as I know, there has been no appeal to the Judicial Committee, and I take it that Judge Charbonneau's decision is binding in Canada.92

In the Constitution of the Australian Dominion is a provision similar to that quoted above from the Constitution of the United States. (Section 116):

“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the constitution.”

This enactment, so far as I am aware, has not been the subject of interpretation. Religious equality in Australia has virtually no history.

IV. Safeguards for Ireland

I come to the position of things in Ireland. It may be well at the outset to make clear two points. The first is the present legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in that country. It is the same as that of any other voluntary association; its position theoretically [pg 102] no better and no worse. It possesses autonomy; it enjoys freedom as to doctrine and worship; its constitution is not interfered with; it regulates clerical education; it nominates its bishops; it administers its property in its own way.

It may thus enjoy immense power, especially if there be no true national system of primary education; it may well be doubted whether it possesses as much power in any other country as in Ireland. But like other voluntary religious associations the Catholic Church is not wholly withdrawn from the supervision and control of the Law Courts. A series of decisions of our highest courts with reference to Churches in Ireland and Scotland, and the colonies, have laid down certain principles equally applicable to the Roman Catholic Church and to all other religious bodies; in particular, these principles: that the State can exercise control over all religious bodies possessing property when it is proved to be contravening its rules to the injury of members. In the case of societies resting upon a consensual basis, Courts of Justice are bound when due complaint is made that a member of the society has been injured as to his rights in any matter of a mixed spiritual and temporal character, to inquire into the laws or rules of the Society.93 Further the authority of a Church cannot be legally used for purposes inimical to the State or contrary to any statute. It may make rules for its own members; it cannot enforce them against others; they are invalid against them if contrary to the terms of any statute. It may, for example, declare that it will not regard a marriage with a deceased wife's sister as valid; it may refuse to recognise as members those who so marry. But such [pg 103] rules will not legally invalidate a union which a statute has legalised. Probably this has not always been fully borne in mind by those who have denounced the promulgation of the decree Ne temere in Ireland. Resolutions have been passed against it here and in Ireland. Many Nonconformist bodies have protested against the promulgation of the decree in British Dominions. The decree is, I think, objectionable for several reasons, and not least because it discourages mixed marriages, an effect which seems to me deplorable, for nothing is better calculated to put an end to uncharitableness and hatred than the frequency of such unions. But while such a decree may do harm, it will have no direct effect except as between the members of the Catholic Church in foro conscientiæ. The Irish marriage law, which with a few exceptions is the same as the English, is binding on all Catholics and Protestants. Lord Llandaff who speaks at once as a lawyer and as a Catholic, puts this point clearly:

“The invalidity was that of the sacramental and not of the legal marriage, and what the Church said to one of her subjects in such circumstances was: ‘You are married; you are a husband; but you may not receive the sacrament, and therefore you are in a state of sin, and in that sense your marriage in void, according to your conscience, though not according to the law.’ ”94

A movement of retrogression the promulgation of the decree may have been; but every religious body must be free to lay down rules as to its membership. To quote the letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury of November 8th, 1911, on this subject: “Any branch of the Church of Christ must clearly have the power [pg 104] of defining the conditions of membership.”95 It is but fair to remember that the decree Ne temere is part of a settled policy. The Church of Rome has often shown its disapproval of mixed marriages which Benedict XIV. declared “abominable.”96 It is but fair also to take note of the plea that this decree is the latest attempt to secure uniformity in regard to marriage law; attempts which have been pursued since the Tametsi decrees of the Council of Trent. Before the reform in the marriage law then effected there was much confusion and looseness. All that was required for a valid marriage was that the contracting parties should express to each other their mutual consent by words de præsenti; a state of things which favoured fraud and led to uncertainty. The Tridentine change must appear to most lawyers to have been a great reform; marriage was to be solemnised in the presence of the parish priest of one of the parties and of two witnesses. But this ecclesiastical law is not even now in force in several countries. It was promulgated in most Catholic countries; it was never promulgated in purely Protestant countries, or in all countries with a mixed population. It applied to marriages between two Catholics but not necessarily to mixed or to Protestant marriages. It might be in force in one part of a country and not in another. Thus the Tametsi decree was in force in the [pg 105] greater part of the province of Armagh since the time of Elizabeth. Not until 1827 was it promulgated in the province of Dublin. Now we are told that it was to secure still further uniformity that the decree Ne temere was published. It requires all persons baptized in the Catholic Church, and those who have been converted to it from heresy or schism, to marry in the presence of the parish priest or ordinary of the place in which the marriage is to be celebrated, otherwise the Church will regard it as null. If neither of the contracting parties is a Catholic the Church recognises the marriage as valid wherever it is celebrated.97 How far other motives may have operated I cannot say; it is only fair to bear in mind that the decree is defended as a fresh effort to introduce certainty and definiteness as to a fundamental institution.

I may here refer to the fears expressed as to the effects of the decree, Motu Proprio, Quantavis Diligentia of October 9th, 1911; a decree which, it is said, might conceivably place every sincere Roman Catholic in antagonism with his duties to the State. The principle of that decree seems to me highly objectionable; it is an impossible attempt to revive the past; a form of the greatest of all heresies, disbelief in spiritual forces unsupported by privilege. But here, too, it is well to understand the case made by defenders of that decree, and before deploring its effects in Ireland to be certain that, in the view of the Catholic Church, it is in force there. When the Church was all powerful, there existed a privilegium fori according to which no layman could bring a cleric before a lay tribunal; a privilege based upon the words of St. Paul to the [pg 106] Corinthians who resorted to the Pagan Courts. By various Concordats the Papacy had agreed to abrogate this right wholly or partly. In some countries the privilege had become extinct. In October 1869, was issued the bull of Pius IX., Apostolicæ Sedis Moderationi convenit which appeared to revive the privilegium fori. This, however, is denied by Roman Catholic theologians; according to them where no such Concordat exists, a custom has grown up that breaches of ecclesiastical immunity are to be overlooked; in any case it operates only as to canonical offences.98 Whether that interpretation is correct or not, I need not enquire. But obviously such a rule has no legal efficacy; and it would be a strong measure to deny the Church the right to give to its adherents such monitions—for its commands are no more—as it thinks fit.

V. Future Safeguards

In the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 were elaborate provisions designed to secure equality of treatment. Thus the Irish Legislature was prohibited from making any law.

Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; imposing any disability or conferring any privilege on account of religious belief; abrogating or derogating from the right to establish any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity; prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at that school; or impairing without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an address presented by the legislative [pg 107] body of Ireland, or the consent of the Corporation interested, the rights, property or privileges of any existing corporation, incorporated by Royal Charter or local or general Act of Parliament.

(Summary of Clause 4 in Bills of 1886 and 1893.)

Two comments may be made upon these provisions. They were so minute as to be at once a source of frequent irritation and certain to give rise to frequent conflicts with the Irish Legislature and as to be calculated to encourage litigation. Further, they did not specifically deal with the subject of marriage, an omission which, in view of the decree Ne temere, seems objectionable. They are replaced by a general clause to the following effect:

“In the exercise of their power to make laws under this Act the Irish Parliament shall not make a law so as either directly or indirectly to establish or endow any religion, or prohibit the free exercise thereof, or give a preference, privilege or advantage, or impose any disability or disadvantage, on account of religious belief or religious or ecclesiastical status, or make any religious belief or religious ceremony a condition of the validity of any marriage.”

How far these provisions will be eluded probably no one can say with certainty. It is difficult enough to ascertain the present situation in Ireland without attempting to predict with confidence the future. Statements diametrically opposite are vouched for by persons of equal experience and opportunity of knowledge. “Facts” in that country are so elusive. What is true in the south is fiction in the north, and vice versa. It may be admitted that machinery designed to protect minorities counts for less than the spirit actuating those who work it. The greatest security no doubt for religious liberty would be the presence of a general spirit of mutual forbearance; militant bigotry could not permanently exist alongside the prevalence of the spirit of [pg 108] charity; and Ulster, as well as other parts of Ireland, might make its contribution thereto. Some new forces there are working for toleration, I believe that they are increasing. Among them are these: the action of democratic institutions in which persons of all creeds take part; the prosperity of the country bringing in its train to all parts of the country new ideas and hopes and interests; the performance by Catholics and Protestants of common civic duties; the constant stream, strongly charged with secular elements, flowing between Ireland and the United States; the silent influence of literature and newspapers permeated by a spirit which no priesthood can exorcise; the frequency of mixed marriages as proved by the action of the Catholic Church against them; the existence of urgent political and social questions as to which men are not divided according to their religious beliefs. These are so many manifestations of the modern spirit, from the operation of which Ireland no more than any other part of the western world can escape. They may prove stronger than legal safeguards.

I shall not attempt to measure the relative strength of these influences, but I should be inclined to rate highest the ultimate effect of democracy, and of a Parliament in which must be a Protestant minority powerful by their talents, their wealth and their energy. Democracy has everywhere its own problems, as engrossing for it as any in which the Church is interested. It will solve them in its own way, which may not be always the Church's. “Nothing,” says Mr. Bryce with reference to America, “excites more general disapproval than any attempt by an ecclesiastical organisation to interfere in politics.” Under democratic institutions there may be the same results in [pg 109] Ireland. The remodelling of primary education will probably be one of the first struggles in which an Irish Parliament will be engaged. The fight will be in the open, which is a clear gain. The Church may for a time succeed in retaining its present hold over the schools. It is quite as likely that it will lose ground, and that the first Irish Minister of Education will be the first to incur ecclesiastical censure. There is much evidence of the growth of a widespread toleration extending it may be hoped, to the northeast corner of Ulster:

“Since the Local Government Act of 1898,” writes Mr. Annan Bryce, “it has not been found that the priest interferes unless in the rare cases where there is a question of personal morality, and then not always with success.”

The opinions of three Lord-Lieutenants upon this point cannot be ignored.

Lord Aberdeen:

“After years of continuous residence in Ireland, watching affairs and meeting people of every class and creed, I am profoundly impressed with the baselessness of alarm about the consequences of Home Rule.

“On Home Rule for Ireland, I repeat and emphasise the opinion of my former telegrams, especially regarding apprehension of religious intolerance.”

The late Lord Spencer:

“I have had some experience of Ireland, and yet I do not know any specific instance where there has been the exercise of religious intolerance on the part of the Roman Catholics against their Protestant countrymen.”

The Marquis of Crewe:

“In 1886 and 1893 the animosity between classes, largely agrarian in its origin, was far stronger than at present, and the line of cleavage [pg 110] roughly followed that of religious difference. But even in those days, as I well remember, it was evident that the possibilities of intolerance in a self-governed Ireland were deliberately and grossly exaggerated, with a party motive. Now, when the various classes know each other better, and there is less occasion for friction, the attempt to excite religious discord will utterly fail, as I firmly believe.”

The safeguards provided by the measure deal specifically with the subjects as to which fears of religious inequality exist: establishment and endowment, education and marriage; as compared with them, the provisions in the Canadian and Australian Acts are very imperfect. They guard, in explicit terms, against the dangers to religious liberty and equality in a way in which probably no other Constitution does.

A necessary supplement to any Legislature with limited jurisdiction is a Court of Appeal. Under the proposed constitution, the Irish Courts will be free to determine the constitutional character of any measures passed by the Irish Parliament; and from their decisions an appeal will lie to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which will decide questions similar to those determined by it with reference to the Canadian and Australian constitutions, and by the Supreme Court of the United States reviewing the constitutional character of State legislation. It may be surmised that the Court will be faithful to the principles which it has laid down in dealing with the powers of the Parliaments of the Dominions. It has not hesitated to interfere in Canada with ecclesiastical sentences or censure which it believed invalid (see e.g., Brown v. Curé de Montreal). It will, we may assume, do likewise in Ireland.

To conclude: He who believes in political freedom will believe also that religious oppression cannot long [pg 111] co-exist with it. Never, so far as I know, has ecclesiastical tyranny been enduring under democratic institutions; and I see no reason why the result should be different in the new Ireland which the Land Acts and the Local Government Act have created. Full and free political life is the best, perhaps the only, solvent of intolerance.

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