Читать книгу The Railroad Question - William Larrabee - Страница 15

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From time immemorial efforts have been made by designing men to control either commerce or its avenues, the highways on the land and on the sea, by a power which law, custom, ingenuity, artifice or some other agency had placed into their hands.

The ancient Phœnicians early aimed at and finally obtained the empire of the sea by making themselves masters of the most commodious harbors of the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Gulf. They established a regular intercourse with the countries bordering on the Mediterranean as well as with India and the eastern coast of Africa. From these latter countries they imported many valuable commodities which were not known to the people of other parts of the world, and during a long period they held this lucrative branch of commerce without a rival. The character and the situation of the Phœnicians aided them greatly in acquiring this mastery of commerce. Neither their manners and customs nor their institutions showed any marked national peculiarity; they had no unsocial prejudices and they mingled with the people of other countries without the least scruple or repugnance. As their native country was small and quite barren, they early learned to rely upon commerce as the best source of riches and power. Like the other Semitic tribes, the Phœnicians were noted for their energy and acumen, and while they were not a literary people in the strict sense of the word, ancient civilization received probably a more powerful impetus through their commercial supremacy than through any other agency.

During the reign of King Solomon the Jews made an attempt to wrest from the Phœnicians at least a part of the world's trade. Solomon built ships and imported Phœnician sailors for his fleet. For a time it seemed as if the Israelites might become the rivals of their teachers in the art of navigation and in the mysteries of trade; but their peculiar religious customs in that early day proved a serious impediment to commercial ascendancy, as it rendered them incapable of that unreserved intercourse with strangers so essential in commerce.

The monopoly of the sea, at least of the Mediterranean, passed to the Carthaginians, their descendants. The latter extended their navigation toward the west and north. They planted colonies and opened new harbors, and up to the time of the Punic wars kept almost the entire trade of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean in their hands.

After the downfall of Carthage the control of the commerce of Southern Europe and Northern Africa descended to the Romans. When Rome became the capital of the world, it gathered the wealth and valuable productions of all its provinces. Under the consuls and the earlier emperors the vigilance of the Roman magistrates and the spirit of the Roman government gave every possible security to commerce and prevented for a time the rise of monopoly. Nowhere was national union so complete or commercial intercourse so perfect as in the Roman empire. The intelligence and the power of Rome stimulated and regulated the industry of her people and permitted them to enjoy the fruits of their efforts without public or private restrictions.

We have seen that the intercourse of Rome and her provinces was facilitated by the construction of roads and the establishment of imperial posts. During the decline of the empire the maintenance of these posts led, however, to a grave abuse. We are informed by Gibbon in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire":

"But these beneficial establishments were accidentally connected with a pernicious and intolerable abuse. Two or three hundred agents or messengers were employed, under the jurisdiction of the master of the offices, to announce the names of the annual consuls and the edicts or victories of the emperors. They insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct either of the magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the eyes of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign they multiplied to the incredible number of ten thousand, disdained the mild though frequent admonitions of the laws, and exercised in the profitable management of the posts a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who regularly corresponded with the palace, were encouraged by favor and reward anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection to the actual preparation of an open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the guilty or the innocent, who had provoked their resentment."

After the downfall of the Romans, commerce remained paralyzed during the period of Gothic ignorance and barbarism. The crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land from the Saracens, in the eleventh and following centuries, opened again communication between the east and the west by leading multitudes from every European country into Asia; and though the object of these expeditions was conquest, and not commerce, their commercial effects were both beneficial and permanent. The crusades were especially favorable to the commercial pursuits of the Italian states. The vast armies which marched from all parts of Europe toward Asia gave encouragement to the shipping of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, which sometimes transported them, and always supplied them with provisions and military stores. Besides the immense sums which these states received on this account, they obtained commercial privileges of great consequence in the settlements which the crusaders made in the East. All the commodities which they imported or exported were exempted from every imposition, the property of entire suburbs in some of the maritime towns, and of large streets in others, was vested in them, and all questions arising among persons residing within their precincts, or who traded under their protection, were decided by their own laws and by judges of their own appointment. When the crusaders took Constantinople, the Venetians did not neglect to secure to themselves many advantages from that event. Nearly all the branches of commerce were in time transferred from Constantinople to their city. At the end of the crusade period Venice had monopolized nearly all the foreign trade of Europe. She supplied the people of Italy, France and Germany with those commodities with which the crusaders by their intercourse with more refined nations had become acquainted. The possession of many Eastern ports and the maintenance of a powerful navy made it possible for the Venetians to retain their monopoly for several centuries.

The growth of commerce in Central Europe was but slow, owing to the dangers to which it was exposed in those days of feudalism. The mountain fastnesses of robber knights, which controlled every road and navigable river, were so many toll-gates at which the wayfaring merchant was stopped to pay tribute. In time this system of plunder grew to such an extent that hundreds of feudal lords relied upon it for their support. Such a tax upon commerce greatly enhanced the value of all commodities, and this deplorable state of things lasted until the cities made their power felt by forming alliances for mutual protection. One of these alliances, the Rhenish League, comprised in time seventy towns, and the ruins of the strong castles destroyed by its forces still exist along the Rhine, picturesque memorials of these lawless times.

Perhaps the most powerful commercial union of the middle ages was the Hanseatic League. To protect their commerce, the cities of Hamburg and Lubeck formed about the middle of the thirteenth century an alliance for mutual defense. The advantages derived from this union attracted other towns to the confederacy. In a short time about eighty of the largest cities lying between the Baltic and the Rhine joined this famous league, which in time became so formidable that its alliance was courted and its enmity was dreaded by the greatest monarchs. The League divided its territory into several districts. Its members, like railway associations of the present day, made their own laws, and met for this purpose at regular intervals in the city of Lubeck. The original object of the League, mutual assistance against outside attacks, was soon lost sight of, and its constantly growing power was used to obtain still greater commercial privileges in the adjoining countries, and even to force their rulers to concede to its members a commercial monopoly. In 1361 a controversy arose between the League and the King of Denmark, which led to a long and bitter war between them. This war was participated in by no less than seventy-seven cities on the part of the League. It terminated in 1370, leaving the Hansa master of the situation. For many years after this the League exerted its power in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, and the rulers of these countries were compelled to respect the wishes and even submit to the orders of these proud merchants. The countries bordering on the Baltic Sea remained the domain of the League for several centuries. They gathered there immense quantities of raw material, which they sold in the various ports of Europe. The influence of the League even reached as far as Novgorod in the east and London in the west. In both cities the League had its quarters, and within them it virtually exercised the right of sovereignty. Its main market was at Bruges in Flanders, which was then a bee-hive of industry and thrift. There the Italian traders came with the products of the east, such as spices, perfumes, oil, sugar, cotton and silk, to exchange them for the raw materials of the north. While taxes and imposts everywhere else harassed merchants, commerce was free in the cities of Flanders, owing to the liberality, or rather shrewdness, of her rulers. In Bruges the members of the Hansa met the merchants of Venice on equal terms, and the exchange of the products of the north for those of the east and south could be effected there to the greatest advantage of both.

While it must be admitted that the Hanseatic League developed the resources of Northern Europe, and that, even at the time of its greatest power, there was always competition among its own members, the fact remains that it abused its power by the suppression of all outside competition, and that it usurped rights which belong only to the state, thus often producing abuses as great as those which it was organized to remedy. Its final downfall was caused by the development of national power in the northern kingdoms and the growth of commerce and navigation in Great Britain. A stubborn assertion of antiquated privileges on the part of the Hansa involved it in a feud with the illustrious and lion-hearted Queen Elizabeth of England. In 1589 the Queen caused sixty of their vessels to be captured on the Tagus, and later even took possession of their hall and wharves in London. After this the League's decline was very rapid, though its organization was kept up till 1669, when its delegates held their last session.

Contemporary with the decline of the Hanseatic commerce in the north was that of the Italian cities, especially Venice, in the south. They had prospered by their commerce with the Levant until Vasco de Gama discovered the sea route to East India in 1497. His countrymen, the Portuguese, soon utilized this discovery. They took possession of the coast of India and of the islands to the south of it. They also succeeded in excluding the Arabs from the commerce with that country, of which up to that time they had had exclusive control. For this purpose they built fortresses and factories on the west coast of Hindostan, took possession of the island of Socotra in the Arabian, and of Ormus in the Persian Gulf, and forced the Indian princes to grant them the exclusive privilege of trading with their subjects. They also captured the city of Malacca, where the trade between China, Japan, the Philippine Islands, the Moluccas and India had concentrated itself. In this way they got in a comparatively short time control of the commerce of India, Arabia, and even Egypt. By forcing the Venetians and their commercial allies out of those markets, they secured for themselves a monopoly of the commerce between Europe and the east. The political ascendancy of the Turks in the islands situated in, and in the countries bordering on, the Eastern Mediterranean, caused the loss of Cyprus, Crete (Candia) and Morea to the Venetians and greatly aided the Portuguese in establishing their commercial supremacy. Less profitable for the latter was the possession of their American colonies. They, as well as the Spaniards, adopted here a policy which ultimately brought commercial and industrial ruin upon both. Entirely neglecting agriculture and relying on the mineral resources of their transatlantic colonies, which were believed to be inexhaustible, they strove to amass riches by reserving for themselves the exclusive privilege of supplying them with the manufactures of Europe in exchange for American gold. Neglecting home industries, they bought their supplies as well as those of their colonies in France, Holland and England. A spirit of speculation and adventure enervated their people, and led in time to commercial bankruptcy and political disaster.

Spain also drained her treasury by her wars with her Dutch dependencies, and the loss of her northern provinces was a serious blow to her commerce. Antwerp, which had become the successor of Bruges as the commercial emporium of the north, began to decline, and Amsterdam, the metropolis of the new Dutch republic, became heir to its glory and its riches. The young republic at once commenced to compete in the carrying trade with Spain and Portugal, and to make inroads into the eastern commerce of the latter.

The Dutch East India Company, which was organized in 1602, sent a fleet of fourteen vessels into the Indian Archipelago to found colonies in Java, Sumatra and the Moluccas. In a short time they had monopolized the entire spice trade, which immediately became a source of great wealth. A cargo of five vessels, which returned to Amsterdam in 1603, consisted of over two million pounds of spices. This cargo was purchased for 588,874 florins and was sold for 2,000,000 florins. It is under these circumstances not surprising that the dividends of the company's stockholders often amounted to 75 per cent., and never went below 12–½ per cent. previous to 1720. Holland's colonial trade made Amsterdam the commercial metropolis of Europe. It became the grain market from which Spain, Italy and other countries drew their supplies. All the products of the world found purchasers here, and a well-developed banking system greatly facilitated the exchange. The rapid accumulation of fortunes by the Dutch merchants and bankers was without precedent in Europe. Besides this, the progress which Holland made in ship-building and navigation and the advantages which she derived from her colonial trade placed her in a position to outstrip all other nations in the carrying trade of Europe. During the first half of the seventeenth century the Dutch were justly called the freighters of Europe. But the injury which their policy did to the commercial and manufacturing interests of other European nations led both England and France to adopt measures well calculated to accomplish, in a short time, their commercial emancipation. Louis XIV., in order to build up French shipping, collected a tonnage from every foreign ship which entered a French harbor. England went still further. In 1651 Oliver Cromwell promulgated the Navigation Act, by which foreign ships were prohibited from importing into England any goods except such as were produced or manufactured in their own countries. This was a heavy blow at the Dutch, who were thus deprived of the privilege of effecting the exchange of commercial commodities between England and her colonies as well as the continent. The war which the Dutch Republic waged against England, to force her to revoke this act, resulted in favor of the latter and ended the commercial supremacy of the Dutch in Europe.

England, which before this time had played but a secondary role as a commercial power, rose fast to prominence after her successful struggle with the Dutch. She commenced to strengthen her industries by the adoption of a high tariff policy, and her merchants were encouraged to enter into commercial relations with colonists and foreigners. The privileges which had been given to foreign tradesmen were revoked, while ship-building and navigation were greatly favored by the government. As England gained greater strength as a naval power, her foreign policy became more aggressive.

In 1600 the "Company of Merchants of London Trading to the East Indies" obtained a charter, and, in spite of Dutch and Portuguese opposition, soon gained a foothold on the Moluccas and the coast of Malabar, whence it extended in time its dominion to Surat, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. Here they built forts and established their commerce. From these places the company pushed into the interior, until finally, after repeated struggles with the natives and European rivals, the whole of Hindostan came under English dominion. As its power increased, the company commenced to abuse shamefully the monopoly which it had been granted, by inaugurating a system of plunder and oppression which is perhaps without its equal in the annals of history. These growing abuses led to frequent revolts and seriously imperiled England's dominion in these territories.

To remedy these evils, Parliament at the close of the seventeenth century annulled the charter of the company and declared the commerce with the East Indies open to all of the King's subjects. A number of small companies were formed, but in 1702 they all combined and organized the East India Company. Monopoly was again established, but the patience of the natives was exhausted, and England's interests in Hindostan were in a critical condition. At this juncture the East India Company adopted a policy of moderation, and this, together with the aid which the government gave to the company, enabled it to strengthen again its weakened commercial relations and to further enlarge its territory. But the temptation to abuse its power was too great for this strong corporation to be long resisted. Abuses again crept into its management and continued to grow until its charter was finally repealed.

The policy adopted by Great Britain for the government of her American colonies during the eighteenth century was less rapacious, but scarcely more just than that pursued in her eastern possessions. To retain those colonies as commercial no less than as political dependencies, Parliament enacted laws compelling their people to trade with the mother country exclusively and laying restraint on their manufactures. But the American pioneers felt that they had brought with them across the ocean the rights of Englishmen; they objected to taxation without representation, and the men who for opinion's sake had left comfortable homes to brave upon a distant shore the dangers of frontier life were prepared, if necessary, to emphasize their objection by armed resistance. England, intent upon maintaining her barbaric system of discriminative duties and commercial monopolies, blindly attempted coercion, but the war which resulted wrested from the English crown its brightest jewel, and the War of 1812 established upon American soil the principle of industrial and commercial liberty.

It must not be supposed, however, that America and the United States in particular have been free from monopolies growing out of the transportation business. Nothing would be farther from the truth. There is no law so stringent but that it will be violated; there is no government so vigilant but that it will at times be imposed upon. It is true, our government sanctions no monopoly, but the very liberty of action which exists here among corporations as well as individuals offers to organized wealth and power a wide field for abuses.

We have seen in the foregoing that almost from time immemorial efforts have been made to monopolize transportation and trade, and that these efforts were successful whenever either from ignorance or weakness the masses fell into political apathy. There is a natural tendency among men to utilize commercial advantages to the detriment of others. In modern times the opportunities for building up large monopolies have greatly increased and have been turned to the most profitable account by designing men. Great and even unbearable abuses have always followed where the greed and ambition of such men have not been checked by governmental agencies. In this respect the people of the United States have had about the same experience as the rest of mankind. Ever since the introduction of railroads into this country there has been a well-marked drift toward monopolizing the transportation business.

As long as the dangers of monopoly remained unknown to the American people, legislation for the control of railroads and other public carriers was both scarce and crude, and shrewd railroad men were not slow in taking advantage of the situation. It is foreign to the design of this treatise to give a complete history of railroad monopoly in the United States. The author will therefore confine himself to showing that transportation companies will, like the great commercial organizations of the past, when left to follow their instincts, invariably use their power to oppress the public by exacting excessive charges for their services, or to discriminate against the many by extending special privileges to the few. Hundreds of cases might be given to illustrate the above rule, but a history of two of these corporations will suffice to show to what extent corporate abuses can be carried, and to serve as a warning against the adoption of any "laissez faire" policy in the railroad legislation of the future. The corporations selected for this purpose are the Camden and Amboy Railroad and the Standard Oil Companies, both typical representatives of the Rob Roy policy which organized wealth has pursued since the dawn of civilization, when not prevented by the wisdom and strength of a good government.

THE CAMDEN AND AMBOY RAILROAD COMPANY.

For almost forty years the Camden and Amboy Railroad was the only direct route between the cities of New York and Philadelphia. It is doubtful whether previous to the war a more important or a more remunerative road existed in the United States, for, besides connecting the two largest cities in the Union, it formed part of the direct land route from the East to the South.

The efforts to open a direct through route between New York and Philadelphia date back to the year 1812, when the construction of a canal between the Hudson and the Delaware was proposed, but an ill-advised jealousy of the State of Pennsylvania delayed for many years the realization of the project. When this obstacle was finally overcome, a change of sentiment had taken place in New Jersey. Railroads had just made their appearance in the United States, and a large number of the people of New Jersey preferred a railroad to a canal.

The matter was finally compromised in the legislature of New Jersey, which on the 4th of February, 1830, simultaneously granted charters to the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company and the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company, fixing the capital stock of each company at $1,000,000, with the right to increase it to $1,500,000. The charter further stipulated what taxes should be paid to the State, and also contained the provision that within five miles of the starting-point and within three miles of the terminus of each line no other railroad or canal should be built. It was believed the existence of both a water and a land route would be sufficient to maintain competition on this important thoroughfare of interstate traffic. The construction of the railroad, which had been surveyed in almost a straight line between its termini, was at once commenced. A number of well-to-do and practical men took hold of the enterprise, among them one John Stevens, who together with his three sons took one-half of the capital stock. The canal project did not do so well at first. At the middle of the year 1830 only about one-twelfth of its capital stock had been sold, and there was great danger that the company might forfeit its charter, as the time allowed for the subscription of its stock was nearing its end. At this juncture Robert Field Stockton, a young man of ability, enthusiasm and wealth, came to the rescue of the canal company. He not only bought for himself a goodly share of the canal stock, but also prevailed on his rich father-in-law, Mr. John Porter, to invest $400,000 in the enterprise. The financial difficulties of the company were thus removed. At the next session of the legislature Mr. Stockton secured an amendment to their charter which apparently only authorized the enlargement of the canal, but in reality empowered the canal company to construct a second railway.

It was from the beginning Mr. Stockton's object to share with the railroad company the advantages which their line promised to give them. The enlargement of his company's franchise placed him in a position to dictate terms to the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company. The latter was given the choice, to prepare for competition with a rival railroad line, or to consolidate with the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company. It chose the latter alternative, and on the 15th day of February, 1831, the two companies became one. The consolidation still required the sanction of the legislature. This was obtained in consideration of the transfer of 2,000 shares of the capital stock of the company to the State. It was further stipulated that the new company should pay to the State a tax of 10 cents for each passenger and of 15 cents for each ton of freight carried over its line through the State, as well as an annual tax of $30,000, and that the State in return should protect the company against any and all competition in the direct passenger and freight traffic between the cities of New York and Philadelphia. Serious doubts were at the time entertained by many, whether the State of New Jersey under the Federal Constitution possessed the right to thus create a monopoly in transportation facilities, and to regulate arbitrarily the commerce between sister States.

Five days after it had granted this charter to the Camden and Amboy Company, the legislature granted another charter authorizing the construction of a railroad from Jersey City to New Brunswick on the Raritan River. On the 23d of February of the same year a charter had been granted by the legislature of the State of Pennsylvania to a company which had been formed for the purpose of constructing a railroad from Philadelphia to Trenton. This company had likewise been authorized by its charter to buy the right of way for a railroad from Trenton to New York, which it proceeded at once to do. It was evident that as soon as the two new roads would meet at New Brunswick, an understanding would be reached between them, by which another through line would be created between New York and Philadelphia, which would have the advantage over the Camden and Amboy road that it touched the capital of New Jersey and could thus make itself serviceable to members of the legislature, officers of State and influential politicians.

The Camden and Amboy Freight Company soon arrived at the conclusion that it could not permit such rivalry. It appealed to the legislature for protection. Resolutions were passed in its favor, but the Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Company paid no attention to those resolutions, but quietly continued to lay its track. Mr. Stockton and his friends did not dare to invoke the aid of the courts, because a judicial investigation might have resulted in the destruction of their own charter. The situation was critical, but Mr. Stockton was equal to the occasion. He bought quietly a sufficient number of shares to control the management of the Philadelphia and Trenton road, and, in April, 1836, secured the consolidation of the Philadelphia and Trenton and the Camden and Amboy railroad companies.

The canal of the company was not completed until 1838. It had consumed a sum of money largely in excess of the original estimate. To connect the two lines of the consolidated company, a branch road was constructed from Trenton to Bordentown. Later the road from Trenton to Brunswick was completed and an agreement entered into with the Jersey City company for a division of the traffic of the two roads. The large cost of these improvements suggested to the company the advisability of increasing its revenues and of decreasing its expenditures. Its charter provided for a payment to the State of 10 cents for each through passenger. By an artifice the company avoided the payment of this tax. It compelled its through passengers to walk over the bridge at Trenton and then continue their journey by rail via Bordentown to Jersey City.

The company's charter also stipulated, that the fare between New York and Philadelphia should not exceed $3 per passenger. Its officers interpreted this stipulation to apply only to the intermediate traffic and proceeded to collect $2.50 for the trip from New York to Trenton, and $1.50 from there to Philadelphia, thus increasing the fare for the entire journey to $4.00, one dollar above the maximum allowed by law. One Jacob Ridgway, who was the owner of a ferry-boat at Camden, saw here an opportunity for starting a lucrative business. He bought a steamer and carried passengers from Philadelphia to Trenton for one-third of the fare demanded by the railroad. After the Camden and Amboy Company had made several unsuccessful attempts to intimidate Mr. Ridgway and his force, one of which even brought Mr. Stockton in contact with the criminal courts, it purchased the boat with all terminal facilities at Philadelphia and Trenton. The attention of the legislature of New Jersey was repeatedly called to the company's failure to comply with the provisions of its charter, but these appeals were on the whole of no avail. In 1842, after a long discussion, a resolution was carried declaring the charge of $4 for the through journey illegal, but the company entirely ignored this legislative reminder and continued its old tariff.

The company's charter also reserved for the State the right to acquire the Camden and Amboy road under certain conditions upon the payment of a reasonable compensation. In 1844, through Mr. Stockton's engineering, the constitution of New Jersey was so amended as to practically deprive the State of the power to acquire the company's property.

During the first few years of the existence of the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company its business was managed in the interest of its owners, but soon a few of its leading stockholders managed to turn its enormous profits into their own pockets. The Stevens and Stockton families, together with two other directors of the Camden and Amboy Company, had come into possession of a line of steamers that plied on the Raritan, between New Brunswick and New York. The enterprise, in spite of its largely watered capital, had been made to pay dividends ranging from 30 to 40 per cent. Its owners saw an opportunity for a larger field of usefulness and larger dividends. In 1834 a majority of the board of directors of the Camden and Amboy Company proposed that the company rid itself of the responsibility connected with the transportation business and lease its railroad and canal. Mr. Stevens, as representative of the Camden and Amboy Company, then negotiated with Mr. Stevens, the representative of the Napoleon Steamer Company, and the negotiations soon resulted in an agreement between the two companies by which the latter leased the railroad and canal lines of the former and agreed to pay it a fixed toll of $7.64 per ton upon all freights carried by rail, and one-quarter of all its revenues derived from the canal. Soon afterward the Napoleon Company entered into a similar contract with the Camden Ferry Company and now had a complete monopoly of the transportation business between New York and Philadelphia. It at once commenced to develop a system of organized plunder. Instead of the maximum charter tariff of 8 cents per ton per mile, it charged 10, 12, and even 15 cents. The through rates charged were several times as high as those fixed by the charter. Canal rates were raised to such an extent as to make them prohibitory and to compel the public to ship by rail. It is difficult even to estimate the total annual profits of the directorial syndicate. Their accounts, if any were kept, were not accessible, and surmises can only be based upon such data as occasionally found their way to the public. In 1845 the share of the canal tolls paid to the company's stockholders was $359,000. The directors' share under the terms of their lease is thus found not to have been less than $1,077,000. Another item of $170,000, tolls collected for the transportation of 27,000 tons of freight, was so divided that the Camden Ferry Company, or its other self, the directorial syndicate, received $32,000 for one mile, while the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company received $63,000, or less than twice as much, for ninety-two miles. The directors under their lease were entitled to the remaining $75,000.

The service of the company was as bad as it was expensive; its trains were slow and irregular, and its employes arrogant. The syndicate which controlled the company defied its stockholders, the public and the courts alike. When one of the stockholders, a Trenton merchant by the name of Hagar, applied to the courts for an order to compel the directors to produce their books and render an account, the syndicate bought Mr. Hagar's shares, for which he had paid $125 a share, at the price of $1,456 a share. The suit was then withdrawn and the matter hushed up.

In 1848 a number of articles appeared in a paper published at Burlington, Pa., which were signed by "A Citizen of Burlington" and contained much surprising information concerning the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company. It was charged that the directors had defrauded both the State and the company's stockholders of large sums of money, that they had grossly violated their charter by charging illegal and extortionate rates, oppressive to both commerce and travel. It was shown that while the average rate per ton per mile of thirty-five neighboring roads was 2.85 cents, that of the Camden and Amboy Company was 4.54 cents. It was also shown that neither the stockholders nor the State had received the share of the company's revenues to which they were entitled. These articles were extensively reprinted and caused a great commotion wherever they appeared. After the first storm had subsided the directors issued an address to the people of New Jersey, in which they bitterly complained of the people's loss of confidence in their integrity, and declared that the charges preferred against them were founded on falsehoods.

The "Citizen of Burlington" replied by accusing the directors of defalcation and falsifying their books. He charged that from 1840 to 1847 no account had been rendered of the receipt of no less than $5,266,431, on which $493,066 was due to the State. As soon as the legislature convened, a resolution was introduced that a commission be appointed to investigate the charges preferred against the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company. The resolution was adopted, but it was virtually left to the accused to select the members of the commission. That the directors had a guilty conscience appeared from the fact that the last annual report of the company, which had just been printed, was withdrawn and destroyed. To silence their unknown accuser, they threatened him with criminal prosecution. He now gave his name. It was Henry C. Carey, the noted writer and authority on political economy. Mr. Carey did not give up the contest. He proceeded to show how the policy of the managers of the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company depressed commerce, manufactures and agriculture alike. He showed how the company as a public carrier discriminated in favor of industries which they carried on as private individuals. He claimed that the company had forfeited its charter, and that it was the duty of the State to authorize the construction of another road. In the meantime, early in 1849, the legislative investigation committee submitted its report. It was perhaps as shameless a document as was ever placed before a legislative assembly. It lauded the directors, to whose influence the members of the commission owed their selection, and whitewashed their past management of the company's affairs.

But the people of New Jersey were far from being satisfied with this report and demanded the appointment of another committee. Another investigation was ordered, and this time the company, or rather its directors, found it impossible to control the selection of its members. Soon after their appointment the committee asked Mr. Carey to lend them his assistance in their labors, and he readily consented. During the summer of 1849 the members of the committee had occasion to go to Bordentown, to inspect the company's books. From that time on a wonderful change seemed to have come over the committee. They found they could dispense with Mr. Carey's further services. What had previously appeared to them a ring of rapacious monopolists seemed now an association of worthy philanthropical gentlemen. In their report to the legislature they completely exonerated the company's managers. They admitted that the State had not been paid all that was due to it, but they asserted that this difference in the company's accounts was due solely to clerical errors, for which the management were in no wise responsible. The report was accepted, although not even the annexed testimony supported it, and thus the matter was dropped.

This was a great victory for Mr. Stockton and his friends. It demonstrated the success of their methods of dealing with public servants. Mr. Carey repeated his charges, but the directors failed to prosecute him for libel as they had threatened. He asked that he be permitted to inspect the company's books, but was met with a peremptory refusal. Public opinion was defied, and the old methods were continued.

The extortionate and discriminating tariff of the only through route of New Jersey affected seriously the agricultural as well as the commercial interests of that State. The Camden and Amboy monopoly kept the State of New Jersey for many years far behind the New England States in railroad facilities. In 1860 New Jersey had only one mile of railroad for every 17.6 square miles of territory, while the proportion of miles of railroad to square miles of territory for the same year was 1 to 7.9 in Connecticut, 1 to 7.6 in Rhode Island, and 1 to 6 in Massachusetts. At present New Jersey has one mile of railroad to every 3.79 square miles, and therefore leads all the States in the Union in density of railroad track.

The question may be asked how the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company, or rather the syndicate which controlled it, contrived to maintain its power for so many years, to the great detriment of industry and commerce. The only answer that can be given is that the men for whom the maintenance of the monopoly was a source of great wealth were constantly using a part of this wealth for the corruption of those who were in a position to influence public opinion or to direct the policy of the State. Prominent politicians were favored with passes, attorneys were retained by the company as local solicitors, corrupt and servile legislators were bribed by money or the promise of lucrative positions, and newspapers were given large subsidies. In addition to this public men were constantly made to realize the political power of the company, whose many employes had always been trained to do the bidding of their masters. If the opposition, in spite of this, was ever successful at legislative elections, the company's managers found it less expensive to gain the good will of a few members of the legislature after election than it would have been to gain the good will of their constituents before election. Dissatisfied stockholders who threatened with judicial investigation were quietly bought out or impressed with the danger of inviting public discussion in regard to the validity of the company's charter, as it might lead to its annihilation. The good people of New Jersey made several attempts to rid the State of the despotism of the company by making the question a political issue, but they were each time defeated through the lavish and scandalous expenditure of the company's money.

The original charter of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company was granted for a period of twenty years, and should have expired in 1853, but its managers succeeded in having it extended to January 1, 1859. In 1854 another extension was asked for, and after a long and bitter debate the company was again triumphant. An act was passed on the 16th of March, 1854, making it illegal to build previous to the first day of January, 1869, without the consent of the Camden and Amboy Transportation Company, a railroad in the State of New Jersey for the transportation of passengers and freight between New York and Philadelphia. At the end of this period even a third extension was granted, and the company, though after January 1, 1867, under a new name, maintained its monopoly until it consolidated, in 1871, with the Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

That the spirit of the past is still at work was shown by the recent act of the legislature of New Jersey legalizing the consolidation of the coal roads. The coal barons found the legislature as servile as the managers of the Camden and Amboy Railroad Company had found them of yore, and their well-planned scheme would probably have been successful had it not been for Governor Abbot's courageous veto of the disgraceful act, and it is more than probable that they will yet succeed. They have, in fact, during the last year advanced the price of coal about one dollar per ton.

THE STANDARD OIL MONOPOLY.

The Standard Oil monopoly may be said to be the crowning monument of corporation conspiracy. It is, indeed, doubtful whether the combined brotherhoods of mediæval knights ever were guilty of such acts of plunder and oppression as the Standard Oil Company and its railroad allies stand convicted of before the American people. The facts that have been unearthed by official investigations show a frightful prevalence of corporate lawlessness and official corruption, and there can be no doubt that, could certain high railroad dignitaries have been compelled to testify, and could the truth have been fathomed, it would have been found that not only the public, but railroad stockholders as well, were victimized by those transactions.

The founder of the Standard Oil monopoly was some twenty years ago part owner of a petroleum refinery at Cleveland, Ohio. His fertile brain conceived the thought that with the coöperation of the railroad companies a few men of means could control the petroleum business of the United States. With this end in view he approached the managers of the New York Central, the Erie and the Pennsylvania Central railroad companies, and on January 18, 1872, entered with them into a secret compact by which they agreed to coöperate with the South Improvement Company (an organization formed by that gentleman to aid in the accomplishment of his designs) to grant to said companies certain rebates and to secure it against loss or injury by competition. The South Improvement Company, in consideration of these favors, guaranteed to the railroad companies a fair division of its freights. The existence of this contract soon became known and caused a violent protest among the oil-producers. An indignation meeting was held and a committee was appointed to wait on the railroad managers and demand fair treatment for all.

The railroad companies yielded and promised to give equal rates to all shippers and to grant to no person either rebates or any other advantage whatever. New rates were fixed for the transportation of both crude and refined oil, and it was agreed on the part of the railroad companies that at least ninety days' notice should be given of any change that might be made in the rates. Steps were also taken to have the charter of the South Improvement Company canceled because it had been found that it was neither the owner of a refinery nor of an oil well, and could therefore not comply with the legal requirements concerning the organization of stock companies. While the South Improvement Company thus came to a sudden and rather inglorious end, its founders soon contrived other means to carry out their ingenious plans. They bought a refinery, reorganized by taking the prepossessing title of Standard Oil Company, and were now prepared to resume their operations under the guise of legal authority.

The railroad companies seemed to have relished their novel business connections, for, without paying the least attention to the agreement into which they had entered with the other producers and refiners of oil, they extended the privileges of the defunct South Improvement Company to its successors. The new company received secret rebates ranging from 50 cents to $1.32 per barrel. The agreement also contained the stipulation that if lower rates should ever be granted to their competitors, an additional rebate should be given to the Standard Oil Company. Endowed with these privileges, the favored company proceeded to unite under its banner, by consolidation, purchase or lease, the leading refineries of Cleveland.