Читать книгу America's Siberian Adventure 1918-1920 - William Sidney Graves - Страница 5

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It is difficult to write or even to speak of Russia without being charged with having some bias relative to the Soviet Government. During my service in Siberia, the Russian Far East was completely cut off from any part of Russia controlled by the Soviet Government. I, therefore, had no dealings with the Soviet Government or with any individual claiming to represent that Government.

The only Government with which I came in contact during my entire service in Siberia was the Kolchak Government, if that may be called a Government. Without the support of foreign troops, I doubt if Kolchak or his Government ever possessed sufficient strength to exercise sovereign powers. In what was known as the Inter-Allied Railroad Agreement, relating to the maintenance and operation of the railroads in Siberia, all nations with troops in Siberia recognized Kolchak as representing Russia, and this is as far as any recognition of the Kolchak Government ever extended. No nation ever recognized Kolchak as being the head of any de facto or de jure Government of Russia.

My principal reason for recording the facts and circumstances connected with intervention is the belief that there is an erroneous impression, not only in the United States but elsewhere, as to the orders under which American troops operated while in Siberia. Another reason for recording the facts is that an Englishman, Colonel John Ward, M.P., has written a book which gives and, in my judgement, is intended to give, erroneous impressions as to the conduct and faithful performance of duty of American troops in Siberia. This book can be found in American libraries, and I do not believe it is just to the Americans whom I had the honour to command, to let such unjust implications be handed down to posterity without refutation.

I have not written this book with the object of justifying any act of mine or of the American Military in Siberia. Indeed, the Secretary of War, Honorable Newton D. Baker, and the Chief of Staff, General Peyton C. March, who were in office during the entire period the American troops were in Siberia, have, as shown by the following communications, made any justification superfluous by giving their generous and unstinted approval to the acts of the American Military. Under date of August 31, 1920, I received the following personal letter from the Secretary of War:

“I have just finished reading your comprehensive report of May 26, covering the operations of American Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, from July 1, 1919, to March 31, 1920. The Expedition having been completely withdrawn from Siberia, and its final operations now being a matter of record, I give myself the pleasure of congratulating you upon the tact, energy and success, with which you, as the Commanding General of this Expedition, uniformly acted.

“The instructions given you were to pursue the objects set forth in the Aide Memoire issued by the State Department, announcing to the world the purposes and limitations on the American use of troops in Siberia. In a vastly confused situation your duties were frequently delicate and difficult; because of the remoteness of your field of action from the United States, you were thrown completely upon your own resources and initiative, and because of the difficulties of communications and publicity, and particularly because of interested misrepresentations affecting conditions in Siberia, and the activities of your command, the situation was made more complex.

“You will be glad to know that from the beginning the War Department relied upon your judgment with complete confidence, and I am happy to be able at this time to assure you that your conduct throughout has the approval of the Department.”

The Chief of Staff, in his report to the Secretary of War for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1920, stated with reference to the Siberian Expedition:

“The situation which confronted the Commanding General, his subordinate commanders and troops was a peculiarly difficult and hazardous one. The manner in which this difficult and arduous task was performed is worthy of the best traditions of the Army.”

W. S. G.