Читать книгу The History of Cuba (Vol. 1-5) - Willis Fletcher Johnson - Страница 16

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The first governorship of Gonzalo de Guzman was marked with two features of very great importance to the young nation—for such we may properly regard Cuba as having been at that time. One of these was the development of the ecclesiastical establishment into a strong and sometimes dominant force in the body politic and social; and the other was the crisis of the protracted problem of dealing with or disposing of the native Indians. These two matters were, as they had been from the beginning, closely related to each other.

It is a commonplace of history that there was a certain thread of religious motive running all through the exploits of Columbus. He emphasized the significance of his name, Christopher, Christ-Bearer, sometimes signing himself X. Ferens. The same idea was expressed, as we have already seen, in the names which he gave to the various lands which he discovered. Nor were his successors in exploration and conquest neglectful of the same spirit. Accordingly the first Spanish settlers in Cuba took pains to plant there immediately the church of their faith, and to seek to convert the natives to Christianity. Among the very earliest to land upon the shores of the island were priests of the Roman Catholic church, and the first church was built at the first point of settlement, Baracoa.

Some obscurity invests the records of the early ecclesiastical organization, but it seems altogether probable that the first Bishop was Hernando de Mesa, a member of the Order of St. Dominic. There is no available record of his appointment and consecration, but he appears to have begun his episcopal work at Baracoa in 1513 and 1514. He built the first Cuban cathedral at Baracoa, and secured from the Spanish government in 1515 a system of tithes for the support and propagation of the church. These tithes were to be paid not in coin but in merchandise, and they were to be collected not by the priests or other agents of the church, but by officers of the secular government. The latter was, moreover, to retain one-third of them for the erection of new church buildings, a task which it took upon itself as a measure of public works. It was not infrequently remarked that these royal tithe-gatherers were much more diligent, prompt and efficient in collecting the tithes from the people than in turning the proceeds over to the church.

Bishop De Mesa reigned over the diocese for about three years, and then was succeeded by Juan de Ubite, concerning whom the records are much more detailed and explicit. He seems to have been an aggressive and fearless man, who did not hesitate to engage in controversy and even in litigation with the royal government over the matter of the tithes. He protested against the government's retaining and administering the one-third of the tithes which was devoted to church-building, insisting that it also should be turned over to the ecclesiastical authorities, who were best fitted to know the needs and to direct the work of church building. In this contention he was not successful, but he did manage to secure the levying of tithes upon the crown estates the same as upon all other property.

One of the most important achievements of Bishop Ubite was the transfer of the cathedral from Baracoa to Santiago. For this change he gave two reasons. One was, that Baracoa was an unhealthful spot; in which he was surely in error. The other was, that Santiago was a larger and more important place, indeed, the chief city of the island; in which he was quite correct. The transfer was authorized by the civil government in October, 1522, and plots of land were granted to the Bishop for the sites of the new cathedral and of the houses of the Bishop and other clergy. These latter were the same plots which are still occupied by ecclesiastical buildings, in the heart of the city of Santiago de Cuba.

This change of the site of the cathedral was doubtless to the advantage of the church. It was probably profitable, also, to the good Bishop personally. Following it he became the proprietor of extensive lands, of great herds of cattle, and of a number of Negro and Indian slaves. He interested himself to good effect in seeing to it that the civil government provided from its third of the tithes abundant funds for church building, and thus secured the erection of two churches at Trinidad, one at Sancti Spiritus, and one at Havana, a place even at that early date rising rapidly in importance.

Bishop Ubite reigned over the diocese until April, 1525, and then, in circumstances which are obscure and for reasons not clearly apparent, took the extraordinary step of resigning his see. The office remained vacant until early in 1527, when Miguel Ramirez was appointed to it. This third Bishop was, like each of his predecessors, a Dominican. He was officially styled not only Bishop but also Protector of the Indians, with the purpose of making him a sort of check upon the Repartidor. He did not arrive at Santiago until the fall of 1528, when he promptly made up for the delay by plunging into both industrial and political activities. Like Bishop Ubite, he was an extensive land owner, cattle-raiser and slaveholder.

Bishop Ramirez appears to have been a great meddler into politics, particularly as a hot partisan of Gonzalo de Guzman. He came into conflict more than once with the royal treasurer, Hurtado, and was denounced by that austere censor as a scandalous disturber of the peace. This characterization was provoked by the Bishop's attitude and conduct toward Vadillo's investigation of Guzman's administration; and it is probably not unjust to assume that the Bishop's attitude and conduct were due to the fact that Vadillo had seized a lot of gold which had been mined by the husband of the Bishop's niece. Vadillo made this seizure on two grounds: That the nephew-in-law was a mere figure-head for the Bishop himself, who had no legal right to engage in gold-mining; and that the gold in question properly belonged to the royal treasury and therefore should be turned over to Hurtado. At any rate the Bishop was furious, and strove to restrain, with threats of excommunication, witnesses from testifying against Guzman in the inquests which Vadillo was conducting. Vadillo was not at all alarmed or abashed by the episcopal wrath, but proceeded to look into the affairs of the church as well as the civil government, and among other reforms ordered the Bishop and clergy to stop charging for funeral masses higher fees than those which were charged in Hispaniola. At this the Bishop seems quite to have lost his head. He began a denunciatory tirade against Vadillo in the cathedral, at which the latter contemptuously turned his back upon the speaker and walked out of the building. Then the Bishop excommunicated him. Vadillo made appeal to the King, and the King, after careful consideration and investigation, compelled the Bishop to withdraw the excommunication, and in addition gave his royal approval to all that Vadillo had done with respect to the church.

In the first clash between the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, therefore, the former were victorious. Nevertheless, the church exerted much and steadily increasing influence, particularly in matters relating to the Indian natives. And these matters were of much importance. Although the repartimiento system, adopted early in the administration of Velasquez, was designed and supposed to put all the natives under government control, it failed to do so. Among those apportioned to the colonists as serfs—practically slaves—dissatisfaction and resentment widely prevailed, and insurrections sometimes occurred. But by no means all the natives were thus apportioned. Some fled to mountain fastnesses, and others, perhaps the majority, to the small islands or Keys off the Cuban coast, whence they became known as Key Indians. They used these islands, moreover, not alone as places of refuge but also as bases from which to make depredatory raids upon the mainland of Cuba, to the great detriment and disturbance of the Spanish settlers.

So numerous, extensive and disastrous did these raids become that Velasquez in 1523 commissioned Rodrigo de Tamayo to organize a military and naval expedition against the Key Indians, and to kill or capture them all. This programme was not fully carried out, but it was sufficiently executed to abate the troubles and to secure peace on the coasts for several years. Tamayo's commission was renewed by Altamarino, as a matter of form, there being then no need of action; and when in the administration of Gonzalo de Guzman there was some recrudescence of hostilities, the royal government specially authorized the waging of a campaign which should bring the last of the Key Indians into subjection. The new outbreaks did not, however, prove sufficiently serious to call for or to warrant strenuous action.

The scene of trouble was, however, shifted from the coast to the interior of the island. Several numerous companies of Indians, securely lodged among the mountains, began hostilities, raiding the very suburbs of Santiago itself. They were known as Cimarrons, or Wild Indians, to distinguish them from the serfs and slaves. Their pernicious activities began in 1529, and in the following year their operations were so extensive and persistent as to simulate civil war. Manuel de Rojas organized a force and led it against them with much success, and would probably have soon made an end of the troubles had he not been restrained by Guzman. The governor was probably jealous of the ability, popularity and rising influence of Rojas, and was not willing that he should gain the prestige which complete victory would confer upon him. So he called him back in circumstances which would, he thought, discredit Rojas and make his campaign seem a failure. Vadillo during his brief administration sought to end the troubles by pacific and conciliatory overtures, but failed.

It was thus left for Rojas, on becoming governor in succession to Guzman, to take up again the work from which he had been recalled by his predecessor. This he did to much effect at the end of 1532. He sent a strong force against the mountain fastness of Guama, the foremost chieftain of the Cimarrons, and completely defeated him, putting him to flight and almost extirpating his band. Shortly after this victory of Rojas's, Guama was killed by one of his own few remaining followers. Rojas then sent his troops to disperse Cimarron bands near Bayamo, and Baracoa, which they did with much success, so that peace and security were pretty well restored throughout the island.

This left unsettled, however, the other and in some respects more important and more trying phase of the Indian question, namely, the treatment and disposal of the "tame" Indians, who for years had been in a state of practical slavery under the repartimiento system. It will be recalled that at the beginning they were placed under the protection of the Jeronimite Order of monks; a protection which did not effectively protect. In fact, within a dozen years of the foundation of the system the Jeronimites were more oppressors than protectors, and were chiefly engaged in making what pecuniary profit they could out of their hapless wards. On this account their nominal protectorate was formally abolished by the crown, in 1526, and Gonzalo de Guzman was made repartidor with powers equal to those which Velasquez had exercised. Indeed, his powers were even more absolute than those of Velasquez, since the supreme court of Hispaniola was deprived of jurisdiction over him in his administration of Indian affairs. Later the Bishop, Ramirez, was made co-repartidor with him.

There then arose a protracted and bitter rivalry between the governor and Bishop on the one side and the municipal alcaldes on the other, for the exercise of powers of inspection of and supervision over the labor of the natives. Both sides appointed inspectors, whose functions clashed. Appeal was made to the crown, with the result that the dispute was decided in favor of the alcaldes, who were authorized to appoint inspectors, which the governor and Bishop were forbidden to do. As is usual in such cases, the objects of the contention were the chief sufferers. Indeed, so wretched became their plight that some inkling of the truth reached the ears of the King, who thereupon commissioned a Provincial of the Franciscan Order to go from Hispaniola to Cuba, to investigate charges of cruelty, and to punish severely all who were found guilty. The King also directed that he should arrange for the liberation of the natives to the fullest extent for which they seemed to be fitted.

Learning of this before the arrival of this commissioner, Guzman and his friends set energetically to work to defeat his mission in advance. A vast mass of "evidence" was cooked up, pretending to demonstrate the unfitness of the Indians for any greater measure of liberty than they were already enjoying, which was practically none at all. It was declared that the Indians were at that very time largely armed and threatening the Spaniards with massacre and extermination, and that any further privileges granted to them would certainly provoke a tragic catastrophe. The Indians would exterminate the Spanish colonists and of course revert to heathen idolatry, and it would be necessary to conquer and to convert the island over again. This perjured stuff, responsibility for which must be regarded as the worst stain upon Gonzalo de Guzman's fame, was presented to the King in the name of the government and people of Cuba.

But King Charles was no fool. Thousands of miles away though he was, and absorbed in important problems of other parts of his vast empire, he took pains to find out the truth about Cuba. Learning it, he threw the stuff which Guzman had sent him into the waste basket, gave his Franciscan commissioner stronger orders, declared that he wanted the Indians to be treated as free men and not as slaves, and promulgated a set of new laws concerning them. In connection with these laws, as a statement of the need of them, the King delivered himself of a scathing indictment of the Cuban government and people for ill-treatment of the natives and for causing depopulation of the island. (The original population of the island at the time of the first Spanish settlements is unknown, but has reasonably been estimated at several hundred thousand. By the end of Guzman's administration the number of surviving Indians was reckoned at not more than five thousand!)

These new laws, issued in the latter part of 1526, forbade further compulsion of the Indians as laborers in the mines. But in the course of a few weeks some modifications of them—to the disadvantage of the Indians—were obtained through false representations at court, with the result that conditions became almost as bad as before. The King next directed Sebastian Ramirez, who was Bishop of Hispaniola and president of the supreme court, to report to him on the desirability of retaining or abolishing the repartimiento system; and that functionary reported in favor of retaining it. Then Miguel Ramirez was made Bishop of Cuba and Protector of the Indians; and he, as we have seen, fell completely under the influence of Guzman. The result was that no reforms were effected, and the state of the Indians went from bad to worse.

The King learned of this, and was profoundly dissatisfied. In the latter part of 1529 he demanded to know why reforms had not been effected, and especially why there had not been made the experiment of granting the natives entire freedom. Equivocal replies were made, and it was not until the spring of 1531 that Guzman undertook the experiment. At that time one of the colonists, who had held some 120 slaves, died, and Guzman directed that they be set at liberty and be given a chance to show what they could do as farmers. Every conceivable condition was imposed upon them which would tend to make the experiment the failure which Guzman intended that it should be. In the midst of the experiment, which was to last a year, Guzman was removed from office. Vadillo, who succeeded him for sixty days, had no authority to do anything in the premises, and so the completion of the ill-begun business was left for Manuel de Rojas.

Then began one of the most deplorable passages in all the early history of Cuba, in which good intentions were frustrated, benevolent purposes defeated, and the remnants of a race undeservedly doomed to destruction. Manuel de Rojas should be credited with having been of all men of this time one of the most honest and able, and most sincere in his desire to do justice to the native Indians. He saw through the web of trickery and malign conditions in which they had been enmeshed by those who were predetermined that the experiment of emancipation should fail, and he unsparingly denounced it all. The Indians who had been "selected" for the experiment had in fact not been selected at all, but had been taken at haphazard, without regard to their fitness; if indeed they had not been taken largely because of their unfitness. They had, moreover, been subjected to the instruction and direction of those who seemed more interested in extorting profit from them than in assisting them to independence.

Rojas demanded that these abuses should be corrected, and that the natives should have at least a fair, unhampered chance to show themselves fit for freedom and Cuban citizenship. As a result of his own painstaking investigation, he reported to the King that the tales of Indian insurrections, actual or threatened, which his predecessor had circulated, were chiefly false; obviously invented for the purpose of discrediting the Indians. It was the old story: "Give a dog a bad name, and hang him." The Indians were to be slandered, and represented as incorrigible criminals, and then doomed to slavery. Moreover, in the few cases in which revolts or attempted revolts had occurred, the blame should rest upon the Spaniards more than upon the Indians, for the former had goaded the latter to desperation by inhuman cruelties, in resisting which the Indians were manifesting not savagery but manhood.

In support of this view of the situation, Rojas was able to cite many specific and perfectly well authenticated instances of cruelty and injustice. To correct these evils he recommended that whenever it was proved that a mine-owner, farmer or other employer of native labor, had deliberately treated his Indians cruelly or unjustly, the men should be taken away from him and either set at liberty or be assigned to a more humane employer. The danger of thus being deprived of their workmen would, he plausibly believed, restrain employers from brutality. He also insisted that the professional "slave catchers," who made a profitable business of running down and returning to their employers fugitive Indians, and who notoriously treated such captives with gross cruelty, should be forbidden longer to ply their nefarious trade.

This wise and humane policy was approved by the crown, and Rojas sincerely and perseveringly strove to make it effective throughout the island; devoting to it for a couple of years the greater part of his time and attention. But unfortunately he found the people, the civil officials, and to a large extent the clergy, arrayed against him. The auri sacra fames possessed the people. Slave labor was profitable; therefore they resented and opposed anything which would deprive them of it. Especially did they oppose the provision that men should be deprived of their workmen because they had treated them cruelly. Fines or other penalties for excessive brutality might be well enough, but to take a man's slaves away from him was, in their opinion, going too far. He was not thus deprived of his horses and cattle. Why should he be deprived of his Indians?

Yet in the face of such opposition Rojas bravely persevered. He seems to have been animated by two motives, both creditable and honorable. One was that of humanity and justice. It revolted him to see his fellow human beings treated as badly as beasts. The other was that of patriotic policy. He believed that it was bad for Cuba, that it corrupted the present and compromised the future, to maintain this abominable system of human slavery. So he flung himself into the work of emancipation and reform with all the resolution and energy of which he was capable. He travelled over the island, personally inspecting the conditions of labor at all points, and personally listening to all complaints, petitions, suggestions and what not that were offered. Particularly was he interested in the "experimental village" near Bayamo, where natives were trying to work out their own salvation on farms of their own. He corrected as far as possible the unfavorable conditions which had been imposed upon them, and encouraged them to their best efforts.

Unfortunately the royal government had been misled into sanctioning the imposition upon these people of burdens "almost too heavy to be borne." Regardless of the fact that as inexpert beginners in agriculture they were not likely in the first year or two to make large profits from their labor, they were weighed down with far heavier taxation than that to which Spanish colonists were subjected. They were required to pay a large tribute in cash as "vassals." They were also required to pay large salaries to various functionaries who were saddled upon them without their desire or need. One was an ecclesiastic, who was charged with protecting their spiritual welfare. Another was a layman, who was supposed to be their political guide, philosopher and friend. These overseers probably did them much more harm than good, though Rojas seems to have selected for those places the best men he could find. But the result of these impositions was that many of the Indians became discouraged and indicated a preference for returning to serfdom or slavery. As free men in the experimental village they had to support themselves and in addition to pay practically all their earnings to the tax-gatherer. It would be better to give all their labor to an employer who in return would at least provide them with the necessaries of existence.

On this ground many of the villagers indicated a desire to abandon the experiment and return to the old system. It is probable that some of them were really convinced that this would be best. They were driven to despair by being thrown upon their own resources and then being oppressed with unjust taxes. But there is also reason to suspect that other influences were brought to bear upon many of them. They were threatened with all manner of punishment and persecution if they did not renounce the experiment and ask to be returned to slavery. Similar tactics were certainly employed against those outside of the villages. Wherever Rojas went on his tours of inspection and investigation, he heard of natives who had complaints to make, or petitions to offer, or who wished to be released from serfdom and to enter the free village. But when he reached the spot and sought for these Indians, they had disappeared, or had changed their minds. He had little doubt of foul play, that they were smuggled out of sight, or were coerced into action and speech contrary to their real desires; but he was seldom able to prove it, so general was the conspiracy against emancipation.

The result was inevitable. Rojas lost heart. It is possible that he still clung to his beliefs, but realized that the obstacles to his policy were too great for him to overcome. It may be, on the other hand, that he became convinced that he had erred, that the Indians were not as fit for freedom as he had supposed, and that their general emancipation was impracticable. In any case, he gave up the struggle. "Before God and his conscience," he said, he was convinced that little if any good had come of the experiment of freedom, and that it would be best to abandon it and to return the Indians to the control of well-disposed Spaniards; with a proviso that any who wished for freedom and showed fitness for it should be emancipated. A tone of sadness but of sincerity pervaded the report in which he made this recommendation. The King accepted it and approved it, doubtless with the same reluctance and regret which Rojas must have had in making it; and that chapter of Cuban history was ended.

Not one of all the early governors of Cuba deserves more grateful memory than Rojas. Not one of them surpassed him in ability, in statesmanship, in executive efficiency, in breadth and penetration of vision in discerning the needs and the possibilities of the island. Not one, certainly, surpassed if indeed any rivalled him in integrity, benevolence, and self-sacrificing devotion to duty. Velasquez, indeed, occupied the governorship for a longer period, and was associated with more striking events; naturally, being the first and the founder of the line. But not even he had as true a public spirit or as just a conception of the ways and means by which a substantial and prosperous commonwealth was to be developed, as had Manuel de Rojas.

Yet no other governor in those times was more shabbily and ungratefully treated than he, both during and after his administration. A wise, just judge, an indefatigable administrator, above all an honest man, he devoted himself to the task of promoting the interests of the island, of its people, with a sincerity and a whole-heartedness unfortunately uncommon in those days or in any days. It is true that he failed to solve the problem of saving the Indian natives, and some others which confronted him. But that was not for lack of noble effort or high purpose. It was because he was either honestly misled by those upon whom it was necessary for him to rely, or because he found himself confronted with difficulties too great for a man to overcome alone, and at the same time abandoned if not actually betrayed and antagonized by those who should have aided him and with whose aid he might have been triumphant.

He labored at the cost of great self-sacrifice. The salary which was paid to him by the Crown was insufficient, and his personal fortune was not large. He was, moreover, too busy with public affairs to engage in gainful occupations of any kind while governor, and he was too honest to enrich himself in any devious ways. He spent his own private means freely for public purposes, not only in official tours of the island, but in paying the expenses of suppressing Indian outbreaks and apprehending criminals. The result was that he found himself becoming impoverished. Nor did he have so much as the consolation of appreciation. Doubtless the King did appreciate, theoretically, his loyalty, efficiency and integrity; but he altogether neglected to manifest his appreciation in a practical manner by giving Rojas the encouragement and support which he deserved and which he greatly needed. So far as the people of Cuba were concerned, they showed still less regard for him, while the majority of their political and social leaders were openly hostile to him. Guzman and his relatives and friends, who were numerous and powerful, in particular neglected no opportunity to thwart, annoy or discredit him.

In these circumstances it was not to be wondered at that Rojas grew weary of his discouraging and ungrateful task, in which he had not even the satisfaction of feeling that he was accomplishing something, and consequently begged to be relieved of it. He had too high a sense of duty to abandon his place without the permission of the King, and that for some time was withheld. But at last his increasingly importunate appeals had their effect. In October, 1535, the King accepted his resignation, and, it is pleasant to record, paid him a tribute which was unique and which must have been peculiarly gratifying to Rojas. That was, that the examination of his accounts should be of an altogether perfunctory and formal character. There was to be no such inquest as all other governors had been compelled to endure. There was really no need of any, but in order to maintain the custom one must be held. But there were no charges, no investigations, no trials. This was the more noteworthy because of the hostility of so many of the people, and above all of Rojas's successor.

But this exemption from inquest was his sole reward. He had asked to be relieved not merely of the governorship of Cuba but also of all public duties, in order that he might give his undivided attention to his own personal and private interests. But this was denied him. The King accepted his resignation of the governorship, but refused to grant him permission to join his brother in Peru, where he had hoped to recoup his fortunes. Instead, he sent him to Jamaica, as a royal auditor of accounts, an arduous and somewhat invidious duty, which Rojas accepted doubtless with much reluctance. Still more distasteful was the task which followed it, which was to return to Cuba to conduct a judicial investigation into the conduct of the royal officials there, including the governor himself, and to try those who seemed deserving of prosecution. To some this would have been a welcome undertaking, since it involved the prosecution for serious misdemeanors of those politicians who had been most hostile to him and had given him the greatest annoyance; and even bringing his arch-enemy, the governor, Guzman, under scrutiny. But it was a repugnant task to Rojas, who had no vindictiveness in his nature, and who wished above all to get away and remain away from the scenes of his unsuccessful labors and agonizing ordeals. He bore himself, however, with the same firmness, integrity and high spirit that had marked his former services, and at the end departed, with the royal permission, from Cuba, not to visit it again.