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FOREWORD

Peter N. Davies

The root cause of The Pacific War lay in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria and China for eventually this led the United Stated to restrict its exports of oil and scrap metal on which Japan was heavily reliant. This policy was intensified after Japan joined the Tripartite Pack with Germany and Italy and a total ban on all strategic materials was imposed by Britain, Holland and the USA after Japan had occupied parts of French Indo-China in 1940–41.

This development left Japan with only two real choices – to withdraw from China and Indo-China as a condition for the lifting of the sanctions or to make itself self-sufficient by seizing the remaining territories of the South-East Asia.¹⁴ The weakness of the Western powers following the German victories in 1940 then encouraged those who favoured what was thought would be a short war and on 7 December 1941 Japan launched her secret attack on the United States’ fleet based at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. This was largely successful so that although the American aircraft carriers escaped damage as they were out of port the Japanese established temporary superiority at sea. However, what was regarded as an act of treachery had the effect of uniting the American nation and it became grimly determined to defeat Japan and its European allies.¹⁵

At about the same time Japanese forces began landing in Thailand and were quickly able to advance down the Malayan Peninsula. Japanese tactics were then to prove so decisive that on 15 February 1942 Singapore itself had been captured. These victories were achieved at relatively little cost due to the weakness of the British armed forces which was partly due to most of their intended equipment – especially aircraft and tanks – being diverted to aid Russia.¹⁶ However, this very success created its own problems for the Japanese authorities. In Singapore these were caused by the very large numbers of troops taken prisoner for whom little or no preparation had been made.¹⁷ On the wider front other early victories resulted in Japan gaining control over the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Burma. Further attempts to cut communications between the United States and Australia by seizing Samoa, Fiji and New Caledonia and plans to secure the Aleutian Islands and Port Moresby in New Guinea were then to be frustrated by defeats in the Battles of Midway and the Coral Sea. These failures ensured that from May 1942 Japanese expansion in the Pacific was at an end but also meant that a defensive perimeter needed to be created to protect the vast area she had already occupied.¹⁸

The resulting lines of communication were of enormous length and placed huge burdens on the Japanese merchant marine. This was already finding it difficult to fulfil its prime task of bringing oil and other raw materials from the conquered territories to the homeland for it should be noted that in the last year of peace Japanese vessels had only been able to carry 65% of her imports.¹⁹ Although the production of cargo ships was to be greatly increased during the war their numbers and tonnage were never sufficient to offset those being sunk and this was to remain a major constraint on Japanese strategy.²⁰ The overall decline in available merchant vessels together with the ever increasing scale of attacks by American submarines and aircraft then obliged the Japanese to examine ways in which economies could be made. As part of this process it was decided that the supply of their forces in Burma should be via Bangkok instead of using the port at Rangoon.

This proposed re-arrangement of routes offered two specific advantages. In the first place it was appreciated that a saving of over 1,200 miles could be made if Rangoon could be replaced by Bangkok as the shipping terminus. Second, was also understood that the attacks from aircraft based in India which were already causing heavy losses to shipping approaching Rangoon were likely to intensify. Thus, a potentially safer and shorter route had much to commend it but the problem with implementing such a scheme was that there was no existing provision for the ongoing movement of cargo landed at Bangkok to be carried into Burma. For this to be resolved required the Thai and Burma rail networks to be connected which was, in fact, a matter which the Japanese had already examined in their pre-war planning. This had resulted in a feasibility study being commissioned in 1939 and 1940 which was completed by a civilian consultant named Kuwabara. His conclusion was that such a project could be finalized in a year if sufficient resources were availablebut given wartime constraints military engineers revised this estimate to five or six years.²¹

Japan had not ratified the Geneva Convention of 1929 but as it had signed The Hague Agreement of 1907 it was still legally committed to the principle that prisoners of war must not undertake work that would be helpful to their captors. In spite of this a decision was made to utilize the massive pool of labour which had become available after the fall of Singapore. It was, indeed, only the existence of this resource that convinced those in power that the construction of a rail link with Burma was a viable proposition. Thus, as early as March 1942 preliminary preparations were begun and British prisoners started to move to Thailand at the end of June 1942. At about the same time a large unit of Australian prisoners which had previously been employed to help repair the former British airfields in Burma was re-deployed to begin building the track towards the Thai frontier at the Three Pagodas Pass. Eventually, more than 60,000 British, Dutch, Australian and a few Americans were to be engaged in Thailand and Burma in constructing the rail link. It should be emphasized that all of this vast workforce were employed purely as unskilled labourers as all of the technical and skilled tasks were the responsibility of the estimated 12000 to 15000 Japanese who were allocated to the project.²² A further substantial number of labourers, perhaps over 150,000, were recruited locally and from the occupied territories but their high mortality due to tropical disease and the poor organization provided by their Japanese masters seems to have greatly limited their contribution to the work.

The net result of the activities of this diverse workforce was that in spite of appalling conditions including heavy rainfall, little medical provision and a complete lack of capital equipment the track was completed over a distance of 415 kilometres (262 miles) in just over eighteen months. This tremendous achievement owed much to Japanese ingenuity – many existing lines were cannibalized to obtain rails and machinery – and even more to a ruthless determination to ignore the human cost. Thus, it has been calculated that 20% of allied personnel died during the construction of the Railway. Over the same period only 4% of the Japanese engaged in the enterprise were lost – on the other hand at least 26% of the indigenous labourers failed to survive a single year²³ and it is estimated that over 90,000 were eventually to die working on the project.

The extent to which this massive cost in lives can be justified by the military situation should now be considered. The original plan was for the Railway to be able to carry 3,000 tons per day but by the time it was completed this had already been reduced to a target of 1,000 tons. This revised figure was due to a recognition of the poor quality of the track and rolling stock which was accepted as being the best that could be expected in the circumstances of the time. In practice, even this lower throughput was seldom possible on account of the rising severity of allied air raids which led to much disruption and thus by 1944 the daily average was seldom above 300 tons.²⁴ However, it should be appreciated that the Railway also transported large numbers of troops into Burma who would otherwise have had to march long distances with all their equipment. It is thought that these amounted to as many as seven divisions together with many Corps and Headquarters personnel. In addition, at least 10,000 casualties were evacuated via this route which later, after the abortive attack on India, was used by many units to withdraw into Thailand. The fact that these troops were able to retire in good order meant that they were soon able to set up a strong defensive position at the Three Pagodas Pass and had the war not been ended by events elsewhere they would undoubtedly have caused the British forces many problems.²⁵

The delivery of men and supplies to Burma on the Japanese side was paralleled by comparable events on the British side. Following their retreat from Burma British army formations established new defensive positions along the Indian frontier. The need to supply and reinforce these troops presented a major logistical problem given the fact that there was no through road from the nearest port at Calcutta some 600 miles away. At first, a combination of rail, river and road transport which had been used to service the Assam tea industry was utilized but this could only provide 600 tons per day. By 1943, this figure had been raised to 2,800 tons but this was still insufficient to cope with the rising scale of operations. This logistical problem was not finally overcome until 4,700 trained railwaymen were brought over from the United States together with many powerful new locomotives which enabled the daily throughput to rise to 7,300 tons.²⁶

When I mentioned these statistics to Yoshihiko Futamatsu in our correspondence²⁷ he immediately asked for further details and I referred him to the appropriate source.²⁸ He subsequently wrote to say that he now better understood the difficulties which needed to be overcome by the British in order to satisfy the needs of their forces which were similar to those faced by the Japanese. He also felt that while the British succeeded in raising their throughput to the desired level the Thai-Burma and internal Burmese railway systems were never able to meet the Japan’s military needs. This, he thought, was a major factor in Japan’s defeat at Imphal.²⁹

The roles of Futamatsu and his friend and colleague Renichi Sugano in these events will now be examined. The former, born in 1912, studied engineering at Kyoto University where he specialized in bridge construction. After graduating in 1935, Futamatsu was employed by Japan National Railways until 1940. He was then called up and became a gunzoku (a Japanese military auxiliary) with the rank of Captain and a role as a consultant civilian railway engineer. This led to him being attached to the HQ of the 9^th Railway Regiment where he met Sugano for the first time.³⁰ The latter, born in 1919, entered Military Academy in 1938 and graduated two years later. He was then appointed as a Company Commander in the 1^st Battalion of the Regiment with the rank of Captain.³¹

Subsequently, both officers took take part in the invasion of Malaya in December 1941. However, while Sugano landed directly on the Peninsular, Futamatsu arrived in French Indo-China prior to the start of the war and then moved into Malaya via Thailand when the fighting began.³² Sugano’s unit had the task of making temporary repairs to the track and bridges immediately behind the advancing troops while Futamatsu worked with the 4^th Special Bridging Group which followed up constructing more permanent structures. When the Malayan campaign ended both were at first involved in the renovation of the colony’s rail network. Futamatsu subsequently joined the Southern Field Railway Group based in Singapore and was soon to be concerned with planning various aspects of the proposed Thai-Burma Railway. At about the same time Sugano moved into Burma where his Battalion helped to restore the damaged railway track before being re-deployed to Banpong in Thailand.

By then the HQ of the Southern Field Railway Group had been moved to Thailand where Futamatsu and Sugano were able to renew their friendship. However, now promoted to Major, Futamatsu was largely engaged at a strategic level. Likewise, Sugano, now also a Major in command of the 1^st Battalion, was involved in the more practical work of constructing the track. Thus, the extent of their contact is not clear but certainly became less once the line had been completed. By this time, Sugano was permanently based in Burma, while Futamatsu enjoyed a much wider brief. His exact status – although always senior – is not known until March 1943 when he was made personal adviser to Colonel Imai who was in charge of a new gunzoku formation with special responsibility for bridge-building.³³ This is partly explained by the peculiar nature of the Japanese military system: the need to always maintain ‘face’ and the complex relationship between engineers and regular soldiers. This is well illustrated by the impractical suggestions made by one visiting Staff Officer which were initially agreed but later quietly circumvented.³⁴ These were tactics which Futamatsu was reluctantly obliged to accept and he also understood the need for the Railway to be built to replace the dangerous shipping route to Rangoon.³⁵ He seems less sure about the concept of employing POWs to help construction for he does not fully agree with the suggestion that their dispersal from Singapore would help the Japanese administration to provide an enhanced level of food and other supplies.³⁶ However, he does consider that it was both legal and proper for prisoners to be made to work and felt that it was differences between Western and Japanese cultures and attitudes that made the imposition of physical punishment such a bone of contention between the two sides.³⁷

This reluctance to condemn Japanese policy may be thought to be compounded by his criticism of many POWs who were accused of being ‘negligent’ and thus excuses the engineers who ‘scolded’ them.³⁸ Futamatsu also points out that Japanese discipline was traditionally physical with inferiors being customarily punished by kicks and blows from their superiors. The fact that this system was applied to prisoners as well as Japanese troops was, he felt, quite understandable.³⁹ This view, not shared by many prisoners, is further undermined by his belief that their Korean guards were ‘good-natured people’ which was not the experience of many of their captives.⁴⁰ The lot of those he describes as ‘coolies’ was, he admits, much worse than that of the POWs. This was because they were frequently provided with only very small rations of what were often the wrong foods for their difference religions and virtually no systematic medical attention. In Futamatsu’s words: ‘...one was forced to divide them within their huts: at times it was no different from driving them into their graves.’⁴¹

Both prisoners and local labourers suffered in varying degrees from a wide variety of diseases including malaria, dysentery, cholera, bubonic plague and beriberi.⁴² These problems were made worse by the heavy rainfall – one of the highest in the world⁴³ – and paradoxically at times by a shortage of drinking water for much was contaminated by mud, rotting vegetation and excrement. This meant that all water needed to be boiled which, in the circumstances, was frequently very difficult.⁴⁴

The combination of heavy rainfall, contagious diseases, malnutrition and mountainous, jungle terrain made the building of the Railway exceptionally difficult. Nevertheless, Japanese determination and ingenuity, plus their ability to ignore the cost in human lives, ensured that it was completed in a particularly short time. On the other hand these massive problems, allied to a significant shortage of equipment and materials, meant that, ‘...we ended up with an imperfectly-constructed railway with no prospect of maintaining transport viability’.⁴⁵ These technical deficiencies were then to be exacerbated by the growing scale of Allied bombing and even though a system of rapid repairs was successfully introduced throughput failed to keep up with demand.⁴⁶ Futamatsu later learned, perhaps with some envy, the progress of the Indian Railways (and availability of transport aircraft) and concluded that their success in carrying and supplying British forces was a major factor in the battle for Burma.⁴⁷

Any attempt at assessing the writing and beliefs of Futamatsu must take into account his upbringing and the fact that for most of his life he only had access to Japanese sources. While this changed in the post-war years his knowledge was constrained in many ways and his contact with former POWs only came about when he was approached by Geoffrey Pharaoh Adams (at my suggestion) during his visit to Japan in 1981. This led to a subsequent introduction to James Bradley and Futamatsu was then given copies of their works which he has quoted extensively in his biography.⁴⁸ However, in spite of these links he still does not seem to have been aware of the immense literature in English and it was only through my intervention that he learned of the existence of such a relevant study as Slim’s Defeat into Victory.⁴⁹

These omissions in Futamatsu’s background knowledge appear to have made it difficult for him to make informed, impartial judgements and he remained convinced that the United States and Britain started the Pacific War. As a consequence he continued to believe that the Geneva Convention – even if it had been signed – would not have been relevant to the employment of POWs in Thailand. However, he makes no comment on the suggestion that following the deaths of a number of Japanese prisoners at Featherston Camp in New Zealand in February 1943 the Military Authorities felt justified in adopting an even harsher regime for its work-force building the Railway.⁵⁰ He also seems to have been equally content for the prisoners at Selerang Barracks to be forced to sign a declaration that they would not attempt to escape even though this was later used to justify the execution of those who were captured after seeking freedom.⁵¹ While he argues these points with some force his only comment on the execution of Chinese Merchants without trial after the fall of Singapore was that it was: ‘..a well justified necessity’.⁵²

Many of the items outlined above are further expanded in Futamatsu’s account of his war service which follows. Apart from considerable additional material this provides a distinctly Japanese point of view, free from the Western preconceptions, which may have inadvertently distorted this Preface and other studies. Futamatsu was, of course, originally writing for a Japanese readership and had no wish to offend, but I am convinced that his work accurately reflects his recollections and genuinely-held opinions. At only one point can I detect a deliberate distortion and this appears to be for personal or prudish not political reasons. This item concerns the setting up of a ‘field hospital recuperation centre’ at Hin Dat Hot Springs in which he fails to mention that its real purpose was to provide a ‘comfort station’ for the benefit of Japanese troops and Korean auxiliaries.⁵³ With this minor exception Futamatsu’s study not only gives much insight into the construction of the Railway from one at the very centre of events but it also supplies a unique counterweight to the many and varied publications produced by Western authors.

The defeat at Imphal and the subsequent retreat of the Japanese army placed great strains on the Railway which was intensified by the increasing level of Allied air attacks. As many locomotives were destroyed by this bombing campaign more were ordered from Japan and in the Summer of 1945 Futamatsu was sent to Saigon to arrange for those just landed to be moved to Thailand.⁵⁴ He was still there when on 15 August 1945 he heard the Emperor announce his decision to surrender.⁵⁵ Soon afterwards he was able to return to his unit in Bangkok and was then to share their internment in a number of different camps.⁵⁶ Western readers may be interested to learn that these new prisoners then occupied themselves much as British POWs had done in Germany and Italy though not in Japan. These activities included educational and occupational courses: the manufacture of many articles from local materials and numerous theatrical productions which ranged from serious drama to song-and-dance concerts.⁵⁷ It is not clear to what extent Futamatsu joined in these events – he seems to have been mainly concerned with studying English in private; he was fortunate in being released after less than a year in captivity.

Following the Japanese surrender a system had been created whereby any individual suspected of a war crime could be nominated by the persons involved or their friends. In this event potential witnesses would be asked for their opinion and a case would be prepared if a consensus seemed certain. Thus, when Teruo Saitoh, second in command at the Bridge Camp, was accused of minor infractions by some former prisoners at Tamarkan he was exonerated by evidence provided by Philip Toosey and his adjutant David Boyle.⁵⁸ In fact, neither Futamatsu or Sugano were named as offenders in any respect so were repatriated to Japan on schedule – Futamatsu in July 1946 and Sugano in January 1947.⁵⁹

Following his return Futamatsu settled in Tokyo and resumed his career as an engineer with Japan National Railways. In 1961, he took early retirement and moved back to his family’s Tokugawa built home in Kyoto and then joined the High Speed Railway Company for whom he helped to design the new Kobe rail network. At a later stage, in 1974, he set up Central Consultants Inc. in Meguro-Ku, Tokyo, and continued to advise on many engineering projects until the late 1980s.⁶⁰ Sugano’s post-war career was quite straightforward. After his repatriation he moved to Shinjuku-Ku in Tokyo and there established a photographic business which was to occupy him for the remainder of his working life. Over this period he also maintained a great interest in his wartime experiences and played an active part in the 9^th Railway Regiment’s post-war association,. This he represented on at least four occasions when visiting Thailand and Burma;⁶¹ he was also a key figure in arranging for Locomotive C5631 to be returned to Japan. This was the first engine to travel the completed Thai-Burma Railway and is now preserved at the Yasukuni-Shrine in Tokyo.⁶²

This brief outline and analysis of the life and work of Yoshihiko Futamatsu is based on a number of sources including his written works, our mutual correspondence and a series of interviews undertaken when I was teaching at a number of Japanese Universities. Of these the most important by far was his account of his wartime experiences published originally in Japanese, and now in English, under the title: Across the Three Pagodas Pass: The Story of the Thai-Burma Railway.⁶³ This would not, of course, have been of any significance but for the efforts of Ewart Escritt. His translation of this memoir into English now makes it available to a wider range of readers around the world who would otherwise have had little opportunity of evaluating the non-Western viewpoint for, as noted earlier, there are few comparable works in English to which interested parties could refer. Thus, for the first time, posterity has been given the opportunity of reaching a balanced judgement on a highly controversial subject.

Ewart Escritt produced his translation during the 1980s. He and his proposed publisher at that time – The Athlone Press – then agreed that while this was a literal (word for word) study which faithfully reflected the Japanese original it required suitable annotation, revision and editing to make it more understandable to potential readers. The precise nature of these changes would inevitably have been a matter of some discussion but Escritt’s death in 1991 ended this possibility so it has fallen to me to make any necessary amendments. It should be stressed, however, that this final version is fundamentally that created by Escritt more than twenty years ago and that these alterations are essentially of a minor character. In addition, the passage of time has seen much more information becoming available and it is hoped that its inclusion will add further value to the translation. As a result of these modifications it is believed that this revised edition will place Futamatsu’s writing in a better perspective and be a fitting tribute to Ewart Escritt’s scholarship and memory and at the same time make the text attractive to a wider readership.

Following his work on Futamastu’s text Ewart Escritt felt it would be useful to provide a personal Introduction which would aid the readers’ understanding of his study. In his opinion this required an outline of many background topics as well as details of Futamatsu’s career, views and philosophy. The most important of these concerned the planning and construction of the Railway and Escritt was anxious to point out the limitations which Futamatsu experienced in his choice of route. Escritt also wished to refer to certain aspects of Japanese culture, mentioning good and bad individual behaviour and the nation’s constitution which gave critical power to the military authorities. It was they, rather than any parliamentary body, which then made the decision to employ prisoners-of-war irrespective of the legal niceties if it would assist the Japanese war effort. This was, of course, against the provisions of the Geneva Convention – which are included in full⁶⁴ – not signed by Japan but also in breach of the earlier Hague Agreement which she had.

Escritt then provides some details of the labour that was utilized in the building programme and comments on the Japanese lack of medical care for their own troops as well as for prisoners and locally recruited men. He continued by emphasizing the value of discipline, loyalty and personal relationships in the difficult circumstances of the construction process and how secret radios brought hope and comfort to many in near despair. These were banned by their captors and discovery would have led to severe punishment. Escritt mentions a numbers of cases which involved the kempeitai but many brave individuals were never deterred. A further danger arose from the growing number of bombing raids made on the Railway: the details of several of these are included: one of which records the death of Major Paddy Sykes at Nong Pladuk.⁶⁵ Those prisoners who survived their work on the track as well as these other perils were then to face a final challenge as the Japanese guards planned their elimination if Allied forces were thought to be approaching.⁶⁶

In his Introduction Escritt also provides a brief account of his own wartime career and of the parts played by many individuals. Amongst these was Boon Pong,⁶⁷ Pharaoh Adams,⁶⁸ Jim Bradley⁶⁹ and C.H.D. Wild (whose eloquence saved Bradley from execution)⁷⁰ and, inevitably, Philip Toosey under whom he served in many camps. However, it was Escritt’s relationship with Futamatsu which forms the most important aspect of his Introduction. This is typified by an exchange of Haiku (a three-part poem of seventeen syllables) which demonstrated their mutual regard.⁷¹ Although not an essential prerequisite to the reading of Escritt’s translation this background information will undoubtedly provide the general reader with a better appreciation of the role and achievements of the Thai-Burma Railway. It may also help to increase their understanding of Japanese attitudes and resulting policies as well as more fully explaining the background to the suffering of those who worked and died during its construction.

In my revision of this translation I have followed Ewart Escritt’s decisions in a number of ways. Futamatsu’s English is somewhat archaic and in places it may be difficult to understand his exact meaning. Nevertheless on balance I, like the translator, felt that retaining his style more accurately reflects the Japanese text so I have made only marginal changes. It would also appear that Futamatsu wrote a number of his chapters as separate entities so that some contain a degree of repetition. While these could have been omitted or limited both Ewart Escritt and I believed that this would seriously disturb the flow of the narrative so we agreed to leave the text as the author intended. A final point concerned the number of substantial quotations from the writings of ex-POWs Adams and Bradley and of the American pilot, Carl Fritsche, which were included in the Japanese original. These were employed by Futamatsu to supplement his own impressions of events so although they may be thought to be too extensive they have also been retained in full.

With these minor comments, criticisms and reservations I commend Ewart Escritt’s translation of Futamatsu’s work in the belief that it will make a significant contribution to our knowledge of the real events and consequences of the building of the Thai-Burma Railway during the Second World War.

Peter N. Davies

School of History

University of Liverpool

December 2012