Читать книгу Critical Decade, A: China's Foreign Policy (2008-2018) - Zhiqun Zhu - Страница 14

Contrary to the common perception that the Chinese state is monolithically controlled by the CCP, China has become an increasingly diverse and dynamic society, in which many players are competing for influence in national politics. While the Standing Committee of the CCP’s Politburo still has the final say in Chinese politics and foreign policy decisions are made by the Leading Small Group on foreign affairs, a growing number of players — from high ranking government officials and military officers to scholars, researchers, businesspeople, media, large state companies, and Internet users — are increasingly involved in China’s policy discussions.

Various government departments and offices compete for power and influence in foreign affairs. The Foreign Ministry is now perceived as just one of the government agencies, and not necessarily a very powerful one, while other key government agencies such as the CCP Central Committee’s International Department, the People’s Bank of China, and the Ministry of Commerce are also active in dealing with political, financial, and economic relations with other countries. The CCP’s Policy Research Office, the National Development and Reform Commission, and the PLA are some of the other powerful official actors vying to influence top leadership’s decisions (Jakobson and Knox, 2010). The players that help ensure China’s domestic stability, such as the PLA, People’s Armed Police and Ministry of Public Security, often speak with a stronger voice in policy debate. The successful hosting of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo, as well as the need to maintain control in ethnic minority regions, particularly Xinjiang and Tibet, have led to more funds and prestige to these more hardline actors.

The PLA has always been a major force in Chinese politics. In fact, the PLA, together with the CCP and the state bureaucracy, is part of the powerful tripod of Chinese state apparatus. Mao Zedong cautioned that the Party must always control the gun. However, it does not mean the PLA will not attempt to influence the Party’s decision-making. On issues regarding territory and national security, PLA generals tend to be more outspoken and hawkish than civilian leaders. In recent years, a few retired PLA generals such as Wang Hongguang and Luo Yuan have become very vocal and often appear in national media to comment on current affairs and discuss China’s strategies and policy options.

China’s foreign policy-related think tanks are also active in policy debate. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China Institute of Strategy and Management, China Center for International Economic Exchanges, Institute for Strategic Studies of National Defense University, China Institute of International Studies, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Center for China and Globalization, and Pangoal Institution are just some of such prominent think tanks. In addition, scholars at foreign policy and international affairs research centers at major universities are already actively involved in policy debate. Other actors that influence China’s foreign policy include state-owned enterprises which have become part of China’s “zou chu qu” (走出去 going out) strategy by investing and purchasing abroad, state financial institutions such as the China Development Bank, large energy companies such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and local regions with booming economies or strategically important locations.¹²

On one hand, it is healthy to have diverse views on foreign affairs. China’s foreign policies have become more calculated today, taking into account various options. On the other hand, these different views may complicate the policymaking process and send mixed messages to the outside world. The debate over what China can do with its growing power is a case in point. Some Chinese scholars take a neoliberal approach, advocating further integration with the world and more cooperation with the West, while others prefer a neorealist policy of aggressively defending China’s national interests, especially in its trade or territorial disputes with other countries.

Public interest in world affairs is always high in China. As a joke goes, any taxi driver in Beijing could be a sharp current affairs analyst. The Chinese netizen population had reached over 800 million by the end of 2010s, creating the largest pool of online discussions and opinions. Chinese officials reportedly often surf the Internet to get a feeling of the public’s sentiments and concerns. They need to carefully manage growing nationalism as a result of China’s patriotic education in the 1990s and its remarkable economic performance in the past 40 years. While Chinese handling of disputed territories with Japan, India and in the South China Sea may be viewed as “assertive” or even “aggressive” by foreign media and observers, Chinese netizens tend to blame Chinese leaders for not being tough enough to stand up against foreign governments. This perception gap highlights a dilemma Chinese leaders face in making foreign policy decisions.

Sometimes Chinese policy may be hijacked by the public opinion. Anger over perceived affronts to China’s national honor or encroachment on vital Chinese interests often quickly turns to criticism of the Chinese government’s failure to defend the country’s interests. For instance, in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing boat collided with Japanese patrol boats in the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku area, the Chinese public got extremely agitated and nationalistic, which made the government’s calm handling of the case very difficult. Partially under heavy pressure from the Chinese public, the Chinese government took a strong approach to Japan, who was forced to release the Chinese fishing boat captain without formal charges. China also briefly imposed a ban on shipments to Japan of rare-earth metals that are crucial for Japan’s economy. Although Chinese netizens might think that China won, China’s relations with Japan and its efforts to become a peacefully rising power suffered since the international media sympathized with Japan and considered Chinese behavior to be overbearing.¹³

In the future, China will have to maintain a balanced foreign policy without succumbing to public pressures at home. As Asia-Pacific security expert Denny Roy comments, the greatest single foreign policy challenge for the Chinese government is to balance two objectives that easily clash: to build a reputation as a responsible, principled great power that will be a force for peace rather than a regional bully, and to satisfy demands from the Chinese public and some Chinese elites that China begin to act like a powerful country and stand up more strongly for what they see as China’s interests (Roy, 2010).

It must be pointed out that under President Xi Jinping’s forceful leadership, decision-making in China seemed to be more centralized once again after the 18th Party Congress in 2012. Xi is an assertive and ambitious leader with a strong sense of historical mission. He introduced some new concepts in China’s foreign policy such as “a new type of great power relations” and “a community with a shared future for mankind.” He ushered in a “new era” in China. If Mao made China independent (zhan qi lai), and Deng made it prosperous (fu qi lai), Xi will make it powerful (qiang qi lai). Chinese domestic and foreign policies experienced some significant transformations since Xi took power. While Deng loosened the Party’s control on China’s economy and society, Xi has resumed and strengthened the Party’s dominance and leadership over all tasks. On May 15, 2018 at the first meeting of the newly established Central Foreign Affairs Committee, Xi emphasized the central leadership role of the Party in China’s foreign affairs. At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs on June 22, 2018, Xi reminded Chinese diplomats that they were first and foremost “Party cadres.”

At the National Security Forum on February 17, 2017, Xi suggested that China should “guide the international community to jointly shape a fairer and more just new international order” and “guide the international community to jointly maintain international security.” The “two guides” (两个引导) were clearest indication that Xi was no longer content with Deng Xiaoping’s “Tao Guang Yang Hui” policy and intended to push China to the center stage of international affairs. “What we are seeing is the slow, steady emergence of a more integrated Chinese worldview which links China’s domestic vision with its international vision — and a vision which very much reflects the deep views of China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping.”¹⁴ As veteran journalist Cary Huang observed, “No Chinese leader, ancient or contemporary, has been as active as Xi in diplomacy (Huang, 2018).” No Chinese leader has done more globetrotting within such a short time: in his first 5-year term, Xi went on 28 overseas trips that took him to 56 countries across five continents. During his first term, Xi also hosted five major world summits. Chinese foreign policy will continue to be constrained by changing domestic and international conditions. The role of key internal and external factors, particularly that of President Xi, must he underscored in understanding China’s foreign policy since 2012.