Читать книгу Critical Decade, A: China's Foreign Policy (2008-2018) - Zhiqun Zhu - Страница 15
New Thinking on Chinese Foreign Policy
Оглавление“The world thought it could change China, and in many ways it has. But China’s success has been so spectacular that it has just as often changed the world — and the American understanding of how the world works,” remarks The New York Times’ Asia Editor Philip P. Pan (2018). China is widely seen as a major power today that is heavily involved in global affairs. As veteran China scholar David Shambaugh points out, Xi Jinping has taken a personal interest in global governance. Consequently, China is contributing much more to the United Nations operating budget, global peacekeeping, overseas development assistance and the Millennium Development Goals, and it is more active in a range of areas, from combating public health pandemics to disaster relief, energy and sea lane security, counterterrorism, and anti-piracy operations. While the BRI is encountering criticism of late, it is nonetheless illustrative of China’s new foreign policy activism under Xi (Shambaugh, 2018).
China’s expanded interests and enhanced capabilities call for new policies at home and added responsibilities abroad. New thinking is required for understanding the transformations in Chinese politics and foreign policy. International relations and foreign policy studies have long been dominated and shaped by Western scholars and Western theories. Among major international relations theories, realism and its variants still dominate international politics today with emphasis on conflict of national interests. The Chinese, however, believe countries with differences can live harmoniously (和而不同). In recent years, some scholars in China have been attempting to develop a “Chinese school of thought” in international relations. Qin Yaqing, a leading scholar at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing, defines “China’s central question” as “how to peacefully integrate into international society” (Qin, 2005). According to Qin, a Chinese international relations theory is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformations that China has been experiencing. The Tianxia (天下) worldview and Tributary System in the two millennia of China’s history, the radical thinking and revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries, and the reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of China’s ideational and practical development and therefore could provide rich fodder for a Chinese international relations theory (Qin, 2007). Other Chinese scholars such as Zhao Tingyang, Ren Xiao, Yan Xuetong, Wang Yizhou, Tang Shiping, Yu Xiaofeng, and Guo Shuyong have also attempted to propose innovative Chinese perspectives of the world and international politics.15 Daniel A. Bell, Dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University and professor at Tsinghua University (Schwarzman College and Department of Philosophy), suggests that China should promote Confucianism in its interactions with the outside world, especially meritocracy and a harmonious world view (Bell, 2010). In international political economy, it appears that the Chinese model of state-guided capitalism plus political meritocracy has some appeal, but whether it is sustainable is highly debatable.
Managing the complex U.S.–China relationship remains a most challenging diplomatic undertaking for both China and the United States. Many scholars have applied Western international relations theories, including variants of the power transition theory such as the “Thucydides’ Trap,” to analyze U.S.–China relations. Wang Jisi, a top U.S.–China relations scholar at Beijing University, proposes the “two orders” concept to examine the inherent U.S.–China conflict. He argues that Chinese leaders are most concerned with keeping the U.S. from upsetting their country’s internal order under the Communist Party leadership. The U.S., however, sees the relationship mainly in terms of the challenge that China poses to the international order, which the U.S. has been leading. This contradiction between the “two orders” or “two supremacies” lies at the heart of the fraught relationship between the two nations (Wang, 2015). It’s essential that the two countries respect each other’s key concerns and avoid actions that will trigger strong reactions. New perspectives such as Wang’s are very helpful to understand Chinese foreign policy and U.S.–China relations.
More than 40 years after China rebuilt its social sciences at the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese scholars in international relations are sophisticated enough to propose unique Chinese perspectives on international relations. The study of Chinese foreign policy must and can be raised to a higher level, with a more vigorous theoretical development. As Chinese society becomes more diverse, new actors will be shaping Chinese politics and foreign policy. China will continue to adapt to rapidly changing international and domestic environments. The real challenge is creating a parsimonious model to account for an ever-evolving policy.
One basic tenet of Chinese foreign policy remains unchanged as China continues to commit to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and insists on a narrative of “peaceful rise,” no matter how the West and China’s neighbors feel about its ascendancy. Amid concerns about growing Chinese power, the Chinese government has painstakingly reiterated that China is still a large developing country, and China’s development benefits the rest of the world. Since China’s “Reform and Opening up” started in the late 1970s, the twin themes of peace and development have guided Chinese domestic and foreign policies. In Deng Xiaoping’s words: Development is the absolute principle (发展才是硬道理). Western experiences have yielded the so-called liberal or democratic peace model. The Chinese do not necessarily reject the Western model, but are becoming increasingly confident that China’s “developmental peace” or “development for stability” model is a viable alternative for developing countries.
It is important for China to have a clear sense of self-identity: Is China a large developing nation or already a global superpower? Is China punching above its weight by ditching “Tao Guang Yang Hui” too early? Is China suffering from imperial overstretch? Through various initiatives and programs, China is attempting to create a new identity as a peaceful, inclusive, caring and responsible great power whose development contributes to the international community as a whole. How can China successfully form, consolidate and project such an identity? Will it be accepted by the international community? In this regard, some modified version of social constructivism could help us understand the changes and continuities in Chinese foreign policy.16 Eventually, perhaps some fusion of Western and Chinese philosophies may emerge as a distinct Chinese theory of international relations. China’s domestic transformations and its evolving foreign policy are already shaping the global landscape of the 21st century. For this reason alone, extra efforts are needed to study China’s foreign policy — its rationale, implementation, contradictions, major challenges, and significant impact on the world.