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Does enforcement differ depending on the nature of the debtor? The Member States facilitate the enforcement of bank loans most against corporate debtors, somewhat less against entrepreneurs organised as sole traders and partnerships and least against consumers. In the bigger picture, the differences in the ease of enforcement against different groups of debtors are rather minor. As shown in Chart 1, the averages of all Member States together vary between 0.67 for corporate debtors, 0.64 for sole traders and partnerships and 0.59 for consumers.

Chart 1: Average value of all “Yes”/“No” answers by type of debtor:

Differences in the ease of enforcement concerning different types of debtors are potentially relevant for the pricing of credit. The more legal systems support enforcement, the higher the expected payout in enforcement and, as a consequence, the more attractive the credit conditions a bank can offer23. If a legal system prefers enforcement against a certain type of debtor A over another type of debtor B, then type of debtor A may expect more favourable borrowing conditions. To begin with, all debtors should be treated equally in terms of enforcement in order to avoid distortions of the credit market. However, specific features relevant for enforcement, for example limited liability, which applies to companies, but not to sole traders and consumers, may justify different enforcement rules. In addition, arguments can be made for distinguishing enforcement against traders (companies, partnerships, sole traders) on the one hand, from enforcement against consumers on the other hand. Such arguments are based on the differences in negotiation power and commercial capabilities between traders and consumers24.