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An adjective has been defined by most grammarians to be “that part of speech which signifies an accident, quality, or property of a thing.” This definition appears to me to be somewhat defective and incorrect: for the adjective does not express the quality simply, but the quality or property, as conjoined with a substance; or, as grammarians have termed it, in concreto. Thus, when we say “good man,” goodness is the name of the quality, and good is the adjective expressing that quality, as conjoined with the subject man. Accordingly, every adjective is resolvable into the name of the thing implied, and any term of reference or conjunction, as of, with. Thus “a prudent man” is equivalent to “a man with” or “having prudence” or to “a man of prudence.” An adjective, therefore, is that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as fool, foolish, wax, waxen. Sometimes no change is made; and the simple name of the substance, or attribute, is prefixed to the name of the subject, as sea fowl, race horse, corn field. In writing these, and similar expressions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as sea-fowl, river-fish, wine-vessel.

As every appellative denotes the whole of a genus or species, the intention and effect of the adjective is, by limiting the generic meaning of the substantive, to specify what part of the genus or species is the subject of discourse. If I say “man,” the term is universal: it embraces the species. If I say “a man,” the expression is indefinite, being applicable to any individual of the kind. If I say “a good man,” I confine the term to an individual distinguished by goodness. Here man expresses the substance; and good the quality in concreto. Sometimes, on the contrary, the substantive is the general name of the quality or property; and the adjective modifies or determines its degree, as, wisdom, little wisdom. Let us take another example. The word stone is applicable to a whole species of substances. If I say round stone, I confine the meaning of the substantive to that part of the genus which is distinguished by roundness. Here the substantive denotes the matter, or substance, in general, and the adjective limits its signification, by expressing the form. Sometimes the converse takes place, as golden globe. Here the substantive is the generic name of a certain figure; and the adjective, by expressing the matter, confines that figure to the substance of gold.

Some grammarians have denominated this part of speech by the name of adjective noun; to others this designation appears inadmissible. The latter observe, that neither is the adjective the name of anything, nor is it in English variable, like the substantive. They allow, that in Greek and Latin, the designation in question is, in some degree, justifiable, because, though the noun and adjective differ essentially in office, in these languages, they agree in form; but in our language they deem it a singular impropriety[35].

I have said that the adjective denotes a substance, quality, or property, “as pertaining,” or in concreto. Now, it is to be observed, that substances do not admit degrees of more or less, in regard to their essential character. “A wooden table” cannot be more or less wooden. “An iron bar” cannot be more or less such. In these cases, the adjective, as I have already remarked, by expressing the matter, limits the form to one species of substance. The same observation is applicable to the converse circumstance, in which the form strictly limits the matter, as “triangular board.” Here it is obvious, that the substance limited to one form by the term triangular, cannot be more or less triangular. But this is not the case with qualities or properties, which may exist in different substances in different degrees. And, as it is sometimes necessary to express the existence of a quality, as greater or less in one substance than another, hence arises the utility of some form of expression to denote these relative degrees of its existence. It is in this case only, that the termination of the adjective admits variation; and then it is said to be in a state of comparison.

In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite. Hardness, for example, gravity, magnitude, genius, wisdom, folly, are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it would elude the capacity of any language to discriminate. To denote these degrees, is, therefore, utterly impracticable, as it is wholly unnecessary.

In English, as in most other languages, we employ two variations: the one to denote simple excess, or a greater degree of the quality than that which is expressed by the adjective itself; and the other to denote the greatest excess. Thus, if I compare wood with stone, as possessing the quality of hardness, I say, “wood is hard,” “stone is harder.” If I compare these with iron, I say, “wood is hard,” “stone harder,” “iron the hardest.” Thus, in truth, there are only two degrees of comparison, viz. the comparative and the superlative, the positive expressing the quality simply and absolutely.

The comparative is formed by adding er to the positive, if it end with a consonant; or the letter r, if it end with a vowel; as, soft, softer; safe, safer.

The superlative is formed by adding est, or st, as, soft, softest; safe, safest[36].

Some adjectives are compared irregularly, as,

Pos.	Comp.	Super.
Good	Better	Best
Bad or Evil	Worse	Worst
Little	Less	Least
Much	More	Most
Many	More	Most
Near	Nearer	Nearest or next
Late	Later	Latest or last.

The comparative degree is frequently expressed by the word more, and the superlative by most, as,

Pos.	Comp.	Super.
Hard	More hard	Most hard.

Monosyllabic adjectives are generally compared by annexing r or er, st or est; adjectives of two or more syllables by more and most, as, strong, stronger, strongest; certain, more certain, most certain.

Dissyllabic adjectives in y form an exception to this rule, as happy, happier, happiest.

Adjectives of two syllables ending in le, after a mute, are also excepted, as, able, abler, ablest.

Euphony seems here to be generally consulted, and the ear may be allowed perhaps to furnish the best rule.

Some form their superlative by adding most to the comparative, as, nether, nethermost; lower, lowermost; under, undermost: others by adding most either to the positive or comparative, as, hind, hindmost, or hindermost; up, upmost or uppermost. From in, we have inmost and innermost[37].

Besides this definite and direct kind of comparison, there is another, which may be termed indefinite or indirect, expressed by the intensive words too, very, exceedingly, &c., as, too good, very hard, exceedingly great.

When the word very, or any other of the same import, is put before the positive, it is called by some writers the superlative of eminence, to distinguish it from the other superlative, which has been already mentioned, and is called the superlative of comparison. Thus, very hard is termed the superlative of eminence; most hard, or hardest, the superlative of comparison.

I have said that the comparative denotes simple excess, and the superlative the greatest. It is not, however, to be hence inferred, that the comparative may not be employed in expressing the same pre-eminence or inferiority with the superlative. If I say, “Of all acquirements virtue is the most valuable,” I may also convey the same sentiment by saying, “Virtue is more valuable than every other acquirement.” If it be asked, what then is the difference between the comparative and superlative? I answer,

1st. That the superlative expresses the absolutely highest or lowest degree of the quality, as when we say, “O God most high;” or the greatest or least degree, in relation merely to the subjects of comparison, thus expressing a superiority of excess above the comparative, as when I say, “In estimating the worth of these human attainments, learning, prudence, and virtue, it cannot be denied that learning is valuable, that prudence is more valuable, but that virtue is the most valuable.” The comparative expresses merely simple excess, but never the highest or lowest degree of the quality. This distinction is, perhaps, the most precise, and the most worthy of attention.

I observe, however, that the sentiment in the last example may be expressed by the comparative, but not simply, or by itself; thus, “Learning is valuable, prudence more valuable, and virtue more valuable still,” the word still implying a continued gradation. Were this word suppressed, the sentence would imply that prudence and virtue are each more valuable than learning, but would assert no superiority of virtue to prudence. The same sentiment may likewise be expressed by combining the two first, and marking simply the excess of the third, thus, “virtue is better than both.”

2dly. When we express the superiority or inferiority of one of two things, or of two aggregates, we almost always use the comparative. Thus, speaking of Cæsar and Cato, I say, “Cato was the more virtuous, Cæsar the more eloquent;” or of two brothers, we say, “John was the elder.”

In such cases the superlative is sometimes employed, as, “the best of the two,” instead of “the better of the two.” The former phraseology, however, is more consonant to established usage, and is in every case to be preferred. “Whether is it easier to say, ‘take up thy bed and walk,’ or to say, ‘thy sins are forgiven thee?’” that is, which of the two is “easier,” not “easiest,” the simple excess of one thing above another being here denoted.

3dly. When we use the superlative, we always compare one thing, or an aggregate number of things, with the class to which they belong, or to which we refer them; whereas, when we use the comparative, except in the case just mentioned, the things compared either belong, or are conceived as belonging, to different classes, being placed in opposition to each other. Thus, in comparing Socrates, who was an Athenian, with the other Athenians, we say, “Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians;” that is, “of,” “out of,” or “of the class of Athenians.” Hence in Latin the superlative often takes the preposition ex (out of) to denote that the object compared belongs to the order of things with which it is compared; the comparative very rarely.

Now the same sentiment may be expressed by the comparative; but then the Athenians and Socrates, though belonging to one species, are conceived as mutually opposed, and referred to different places, whereas the superlative refers them to one common aggregate. Thus, if we employ the comparative, we say, “Socrates was wiser than any other Athenian.”

Agreeably to the observation now made, we cannot say, “Cicero was more eloquent than the Romans,” or “than any Roman;” because Cicero was himself a Roman, one of the class with which he is compared, and could not therefore be more eloquent than himself. As the objects compared belong, therefore, to one class, and are not two individuals, nor two aggregates, the comparative cannot be employed, unless by placing them in opposition, or referring them to different places, as, “Cicero was more eloquent than any other Roman.” Here the word other denotes that opposition, that diversity of place or species, which, in all cases but the one already mentioned, is essentially implied in the use of the comparative.

I have observed already, that when the superlative is employed, the things compared are referred to one aggregate; and that when the comparative is used, they are contradistinguished by a different reference. This distinction obtains uniformly, unless when we compare only two individuals, or two classes, both referred to one aggregate, as “the elder of the Catos,” “of these two nations (speaking of the Greeks and Romans), the latter were the more warlike.” In such examples as these, the comparative, while it retains its own distinctive character, denoting simple excess, partakes also of the nature of the superlative, the objects compared being referred by the preposition to one and the same aggregate. But as the superlative is always followed by of, and the comparative, in every case except the one now mentioned, followed by than, some writers say, “the eldest of the two,” “the latter were the most warlike.” This phraseology, however conformable to the generally distinguished usage of the comparative and superlative, is repugnant to the characteristic power of these degrees, by which one denotes simple excess, while the other heightens or lessens the quality to its highest or lowest degree.

From the preceding remarks will appear the impropriety of saying, “Jacob loved Joseph more than all his children.”[38] Joseph being one of his children, the sentiment expressed involves an absurdity: it should be “more than all his other children.” “In the beginning of the 16th century, Spain is said to have possessed a thousand merchant ships, a number probably far superior to that of any nation in Europe in that age.” (Robertson’s America.) It should be, “that of any other nation in Europe:” for, Spain being one of the European nations, she could not possess a number superior to her own. The comparative required the terms to be contrasted by the word other.

“Adam

The comeliest of men since born

His sons. The fairest of her daughters Eve.”—Milton.

“Adam,” the antecedent subject of comparison, is here improperly referred to the aggregate of “men since born.” To this aggregate he cannot be said to belong, not having been “born,” nor being reducible to the class of “his own sons.” Eve also is referred to a species of which she was no part. In neither of these comparisons can the second term include the first; yet the preposition refers them to one class. Such phraseologies as these, though not ungrammatical, involve an absurdity, and should therefore be dismissed.

Adjectives, whose signification does not admit intension or remission, cannot be compared. Among these are to be reckoned, 1st, All words expressive of figure, as circular, square, triangular, perpendicular, straight; for it is obvious, that if a body or figure be triangular, or square, or circular, it cannot be more or less so. It is either circular, or not circular; triangular, or not triangular; straight, or not straight. If the affirmative be the case, gradation from more or less, or conversely, is impossible; if the negative be true, then the attributes denoted by these adjectives do not belong to it; and therefore the epithets circular, triangular, straight, &c., are inapplicable. Hence such expressions as these, “place the staff more erect,” “make the field more triangular,” are highly improper. We should say, “set the staff erect,” “make the field triangular.”

2dly. All adjectives whose signification, in their simple form, implies the highest or lowest possible degree, admit not comparison, as, chief, supreme, universal, perfect, extreme, &c. Hume, speaking of enthusiasm, says (Essays, vol. i. p. 72), “it begets the most extreme resolutions.” Extreme implies the farthest, or the greatest possible, and cannot admit intension.

I am aware that usage may be pleaded in favour of “more and most universal, more and most perfect.” This usage, however, is not such as will sanction the former of these phraseologies; for good writers generally avoid it. Besides, there is no necessity for resorting to this mode of expression, as we have an attributive appropriate to the idea intended: thus, instead of saying, “Literature is more universal in England than America,” we should say, “Literature is more general.” It is almost unnecessary to observe, that literature in England is either universal, or it is not; if the former be true, it cannot be more than universal; if the latter, the term is inapplicable. The word general does not comprise the whole; it admits intension and remission: the adjective universal implies totality. A general rule admits exceptions; a universal rule embraces every particular.

The expression “more perfect” is, in strictness of speech, equally exceptionable; usage, however, has given it a sanction which we dare hardly controvert. It has been proposed, indeed, to avoid this and similar improprieties, by giving the phraseology a negative, or indirect form. Thus, instead of saying, “A time-keeper is a more perfect machine than a watch,” it has been proposed to say, “A time-keeper is a less imperfect machine than a watch.” This phraseology is logically correct, perfection being predicable of neither the one thing nor the other; it might likewise, in many cases, be adopted with propriety. In the language of passion, however, and in the colourings of imagination, such expressions would be exanimate and intolerable. A lover, expatiating with rapture on the beauty and perfection of his mistress, would hardly call her, “the least imperfect of her sex.”

In all languages, indeed, examples are to be found of adjectives being compared whose signification admits neither intension nor remission. It would be easy to assign several reasons for this, did the discussion belong to the province of the grammarian[39]. Suffice it to say, that such phraseologies should never be admitted where the language will furnish correct, and equally apposite, expressions.

I observe also, that as those adjectives whose signification cannot be heightened or lessened admit not comparison, so, for the same reason, they exclude all intensive words. The expressions, so universal, so extreme, and such like, are therefore improper. The former is indeed common enough; but it is easy to see, as it has been already remarked, that whatever is universal cannot be increased or diminished; and that what is less than universal, cannot be characterized by that epithet. The phrase so universal implies a gradation in universality, and that something is less so than an another; which is evidently impossible.

It has been questioned, whether prior, superior, ulterior, exterior, and several others, which have the form of the Latin comparative, should be deemed comparatives. I am inclined to think, they ought not, for these reasons; 1st, They have not the form of the English comparative; 2dly, They are never followed by than, which uniformly accompanies the English comparative, when the subjects are opposed to each other, or referred to different classes; 3dly, It is not to be conceived, that every adjective, which implies comparison, is therefore a comparative or superlative, otherwise preferable (better than), previous (prior to), might be deemed comparatives; 4thly, Many of these have truly a positive meaning, not implying an excess of the quality, but merely the quality, as opposed to its contrary. The interior means simply the inside, as opposed to the exterior or outside; the anterior, “the one before,” opposed to posterior, “the one behind.”

I dismiss this article with observing, that the signification of the positive is sometimes lessened by the termination ish; as, white, whitish; black, blackish. Johnson remarks, that the adjective in this form may be considered as in a state of comparison; it may properly be called a diminutive.