Читать книгу The Etymology and Syntax of the English Language Explained and Illustrated - Alexander Crombie - Страница 9

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Language is chiefly composed of general terms, most substantives being the names of genera or species. When we find a number of substances resembling one another in their principal and most obvious qualities, we refer them to one species, to which we assign a name common to every individual of that species. In like manner, when we find several of these species resembling one another in their chief properties, we refer them to a higher order, to which also we assign a common and more general name than that which was affixed to the inferior class. Thus we assign the general name man to the human species, as possessing a common form, and distinguished by the common attributes of life, reason, and speech. If we consider man as possessed of life only, we perceive a resemblance in this respect between him and other beings. To this higher class or genus, the characteristic attribute of which is vitality, we affix the more generic name of animal[21]. Hence, when we use an appellative or common noun, it denotes the genus or class collectively, of which it is the name, as,

“The proper study of mankind is man,” i.e. not one man, not many men, but all men.

Not only, however, has this rule its limitations, though these seem governed by no fixed principle, but we frequently find the articles admitted when the whole genus or species is evidently implied. Thus we may say,

“Metal is specifically heavier than water;” i.e. not this or that metal, but all metals. But we cannot say, “Vegetable is specifically lighter than water;” or, “Mineral is specifically heavier than water.” Again; we say, “Man is born unto trouble;” but we cannot say, “Tiger is ferocious,” or, “Fox is cunning;” but, “The tiger, or a tiger, is ferocious;” “The fox, or a fox, is cunning;” the expressions being applicable to the whole species. It would appear, indeed, that when proper names assume the office of appellatives, the reverse of the rule takes place. Thus we say, “A Douglas braves the pointed steel;” the meaning being “every Douglas.” Suppress the indefinite article, and the general proposition becomes individual.

But, though our words are general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences; and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as ae man, ane ox. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unemphatical; and hence ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a, and ane be shortened into an. These words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, that they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c.; or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations for the repeated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms, a, an, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguishing whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence a and an cannot be joined with a plural noun.

Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted that in every example where a or an occurs, the term one may be substituted in its stead, without in the least degree injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this: If I say, “Will one man be able to carry this burden so far?” I evidently oppose one to more: and the answer might be, “No; but two men will.” Let us substitute the term a, and say, “Will a man be able to carry this burden?” Is the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is; for the answer might naturally be, “No; but a horse will.” I have here substituted a, for one; the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible, or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying, “A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse,” I should say, “One horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse,” the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded; but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea, “one kingdom for one horse.” In this respect, our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those languages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donnez-moi un livre means either “give me one book,” i.e. not two or more books; or “give me a book,” that is, “a book, not something else; a book, not a pen,” for example.

I acknowledge that, in oral language, emphasis may serve to discriminate the sentiments, and prevent ambiguity. But emphasis is addressed to the ear only, not to the eye; it can, therefore, be of no service in written language. It is true also, that by attending to the context, error may often be avoided; but let it be remembered, as Quintilian observes[22], that language should be, not such as the reader may understand if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend. When it is asserted, therefore, that one may in every case be substituted for a, without in the least degree injuring the expression, the position appears to me erroneous and false. Whatever creates ambiguity, whether with respect to the primary or secondary ideas annexed to words, in some degree, without question, violates the sense. Be it observed also, that, though a, an, ae, ane, one, may have been all etymologically the same, it does not follow, nor is it practically true, as has been now shown, that they are all precisely equivalent words. In Scotland, the distinction between a and ae is well known. “Give me a book,” means any book, in contradistinction to any other object, as “a chair,” “a pen,” “a knife;” “give me ae book,” is in contradistinction to one or more. Such also is the difference between a and one.

It seems, therefore, undeniable that the word a, termed the indefinite article, was originally identical with the name of unity, expressing either one of any species, as opposed to more of that species, or one of this kind, as opposed to one of that. Whether the distinction of its noting one or unity, with less emphasis than the appropriate name of unity, should entitle it to be referred to a different class of words from the numeral one, and called an article, it is unimportant to inquire. To me, however, I must acknowledge the distinctive name of article assigned to this word appears to be useless. Were emphasis to be admitted as the principle of classification, (and I see no other distinction between a and one,) the parts of speech might be multiplied beyond number.

Besides the words a and an, termed indefinite articles, as not defining which of the species is signified, we have also another word, the, named the definite article, because it is said to point out the individual object. This word, I doubt not, proceeded from the word this or that, much in the same manner as a and an from ae and ane. To what class of words this and that should be referred has been a subject of controversy[23]. That they are not pronouns, as some have asserted, seems abundantly evident; for they never represent a noun. By some they have been called definitives; and, though this designation be not strictly consonant with their import, it is perhaps the least exceptionable. When opposed to each other, they appear to be reducible to that species of words termed adjectives of order; the only difference between them and ordinary numerals being this, that the former express the arrangement in relation to two objects, the latter in relation to a series. This means “the nearer,” “the latter,” or “the second;” that, “the more remote,” “the former,” or “the first.” Their office, in general, seems to be emphatically to individuate some particular object whose character was either previously known, or is then described; hence they have also been named demonstratives. Under which of the generally received parts of speech they should be comprehended it may be difficult to determine. As, like simple attributives they accord with nouns, frequently denoting the accident of place, they may be grammatically referred to the class of adjectives. Their import will appear from a few examples.

“That kind Being who is a father to the fatherless, will recompense thee for this.”

Here a species is referred to, distinguished by benevolence. Of this species one individual is emphatically particularized: “That kind being.” Who? his distinctive character follows, “is a father to the fatherless.” The concluding word this, points to something previously described.

“—— ’T was idly done

To tell him of another world; for wits

Knew better; and the only good on earth

Was pleasure; not to follow that was sin.”

Here the word that refers with emphasis to a thing previously specified, namely, pleasure.

“It is no uncommon thing to find a man who laughs at everything sacred, yet is a slave to superstitious fears. I would not be that man, were a crown to tempt me.” Here one indefinitely of a species is mentioned, a man. The subject is afterwards limited by description to one of a certain character, “who laughs at things sacred, and is a slave to superstitious fears.” The word that selects and demonstrates the person thus described. The word the has nearly the same import; but is less emphatical. It seems to bear the same analogy to that, which a does to one. Hence in many cases they may be used indifferently.

“Happy the man whose cautious feet shun the broad way that sinners go.”

Here, “happy that man” would express the same idea. The Latins accordingly employed the demonstrative word ille; beatus ille, “happy the man.”

What, then, is the difference between the and that? To ascertain this, let us inquire, in what cases the is employed, and whether that can be substituted in its stead.

The word the is employed,

1st, When we express an object of eminence or notoriety, or the only one of a kind in which we are interested, as, “the king,” when we mean “the king of England.” “He was concerned in bringing about the revolution,” when we mean the revolution in this country. “Virgil copied the Grecian bard,” or “Homer.” “I am going to the city,” when I mean “London.” In none of these cases can we substitute that for the, without laying a particular emphasis on the subject, and implying that its character is there described in contradistinction to some other of the same species. Thus, “he was concerned in that revolution, which was accomplished by the English barons.” “He copied that Grecian bard, who disputes the claim of antiquity with Homer.”

2dly, We employ it in expressing objects of repeated perception, or subjects of previous conversation. I borrow an example from Harris. If I see, for the first time, a man with a long beard, I say, “there goes a man with a long beard.” If I see him again, I say, “there goes the man with the long beard.” Were the word that substituted for the, the same observation would be applicable as in the preceding examples.

3dly, Mr. Harris has said, that the article a is used to express objects of primary perception, and the employed to denote those only of secondary perception. This opinion is controverted by the author of the article Grammar in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Ed. 3d. who gives the following example to disprove its truth. “I am in company, and finding the room warm, I say to the servant, Request the gentleman in the window seat (to whom I am an entire stranger) to draw down the sash.” The example is apposite, and is sufficient to overturn the hypothesis of Mr. Harris. There can be no question but the is frequently employed to denote objects of primary perception; and merely particularizes, by some discriminating circumstance, an individual whose character, person, or distinctive qualities, were previously unknown. In the example now quoted, that may be substituted for the, if we say, “who is in the window seat.”

4thly, The definite article is used to distinguish the explicative from the determinative sense. In the former case it is rarely employed: in the latter it should never be omitted, unless when something still more definite supplies its place. “Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days, and full of trouble.” Here the relative clause is explicative, and not restrictive; all men being “born of a woman;” the definite article therefore is not employed. “The man” would imply that all men are not thus born; and would confine the predicating clause to those who are. In the latter sense, that may, without any alteration in the phraseology, be substituted for the article; for the man, and that man, are in this instance equivalent.

5thly, The definite article is often used to denote the measure of excess. “The more you study, the more learned you will become;” that is, “by how much the more you study, by so much the more learned you will become.” “The wiser, the better;” “that (by that) wiser, that (by that) better.” There also that and the may be considered as equivalent; and the Latins accordingly said “eo melior.”

From the preceding examples and observations it must appear, that the definite article, and the word that, though not strictly synonymous, are words nearly of the same import.

Their difference seems to be,

1st, That the article the, like a, must have a substantive conjoined with it; whereas that, like one, may have it understood. Speaking of books, I may select one and say, “give me that,” but not “give me the;” “give me one,” but not “give me a.” Here the analogy holds between a and one, the and that.

2dly, As the difference between a and one seems to be, that one denotes unity in contradistinction to more, with greater emphasis than a, so the distinction in general between the and that is, that the latter marks the object more emphatically than the former, being indirectly opposed to this. I cannot say, “there goes that man with that long beard,” without implying a contrast with “this man with this long beard,” the word that being always emphatical and discriminative.

The opinion here offered, respecting these words, receives some corroboration from the following circumstances.

In Latin ille frequently supplies the place of our definite article. “Thou art the man.” Tu es ille (iste) homo.

The le in French is clearly a derivative from ille, of which the former syllable il expresses he, and the latter denotes that unemphatically, serving as the definite article. From the same source also proceed the Italian articles il, lo, la.

In Hebrew, in like manner, our definite article is expressed by the prefix of the pronoun ille; thus, aretz, terra, “earth;”[24] ha’aretz, illa seu hæc terra, “the earth,” the letter he abbreviated from hou, ille, expressing the;—ashri, haish[25], beatus ille vir, “happy the man,” or “that man,” the he in like manner signifying the or that.

It appears to me, then, that as ae, ane, when not opposed to more, and therefore unemphatical, by celerity of pronunciation were changed into a, an; so that, when not opposed to this, or when it was unemphatical, was shortened to the. Hence, the words termed articles seem to be the name of unity, and the demonstrative word that abbreviated.

Besides the words a, an, the, there are others which may be considered as reducible to the same class with these; such as this, that, any, other, same, all, one, none. This and that I have already considered. That they are not pronouns is evident, for they are never used as the representatives of a noun, and always require to be associated with a substantive. If ever they appear without this accompaniment, it will invariably be found that the expression is elliptical, some substantive or other being necessarily understood. If I say, “This was a noble action.” This what? “This action.” “This is true virtue.” This what? “This practice,” “this habit,” “this temper.” To what class of words I conceive them to belong has been already mentioned.

One is a word significant of unity, and cannot, without manifest impropriety, be called a pronominal adjective; unless, by an abuse of all language, we be disposed to name two, three, four, pronominal adjectives.

Some is reducible to the same class, denoting an indefinite, but, comparatively to many, a small number.

Many, few, several, are words of the same order, significant of number indefinitely.

None, or not one, implies the negation of all number, exclusive even of unity itself.

Other, which is improperly considered by some as a pronoun, is the Saxon oðer coming from oððe. The Arabic ahd, the Hebrew had, or ahad, the Saxon oððe, the Teutonic odo, and the Swedish udda, with our English word odd, seem all to have sprung from the same origin, the etymon expressing “one separately,” or “one by itself,” answering nearly to the Latin singulus. The English word odd plainly indicates its affinity to these words. We say, “He is an odd character,” or “singular character.” “He had some odd ones,” that is, “some separate from the rest,” not paired, or connected with them, “single.”[26]

“As he in soueraine dignity is odde,

So will he in loue no parting fellowes have.”

Sir T. More’s Works.

The same idea of singularity and separation is expressed by other; which is now generally used as a comparative, and followed by than.

Other is sometimes used substantively, and has then a plural number, as, “Let others serve whom they will; as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.” The word one has a plural number when an assemblage of units is expressed, not in the aggregate, but individually; and then it is used as a substantive, as, “I saw a great many fine ones.” It is also used indefinitely, in the same sense with the French on, as, “One would imagine these to be expressions of a man blessed with ease.”—Atterbury. And, in using it in this sense, it may be observed, in passing, that an error is often committed by employing the personal pronouns as referring to one; thus, “One is apt to exaggerate his own injuries,” instead of “one’s own injuries.” It is sometimes, though rarely, used as referring to a plural noun. “The Romans and the Carthaginians now took the field; the one ambitious of conquest, and the others in self-defence.” This mode of expression is objectionable. We should rather say, “the former,” and “the latter.”

Any, an, a, one, seem all to be nearly equivalent words, and derived from one origin, I mean from ane, the name of unity. Hence a, or an, and any, are frequently synonymous. “A considerate man would have acted differently;” that is, “any considerate man.” Hence also, like one, it is opposed to none, as, “Have you a book (any book) which you can lend me?” “None; my books are in the country; nor, if they were here, have I any (or one) which would suit you.” From expressing one indefinitely, like a or an, it came, by an easy and natural transition, to denote “whatever it be,” “what you please.” “Give me one (ane), any, no matter which.” In this sense it corresponds to the Latin quivis or quilibet[27] in affirmative sentences; whereas, in interrogative or negative sentences, it corresponds to quisquam, quispiam, or ullus. The preceding observations it may be useful to recapitulate.

Nouns are names of genera, and not of individuals; our perceptions are, on the contrary, all individual, not general. Hence, to denote one or more individuals of a species, numerals, or words significant of number, were invented. Some express a precise number, as one, two, three; others number indefinitely, as some, few, many, several. Our perceptions being all individual, and one being the basis of all number, the term significant of unity must frequently recur in expressing our sentiments. To denote this idea our forefathers employed ae, ane. In the progress of language, where unity was not to be expressed, as opposed to two or more, the terms, thus becoming unemphatical, would naturally be abbreviated into a, an. These latter, therefore, are the offspring of the names of unity, and belong to the class of words named cardinal numerals. To what part of speech these are reducible (if they can be reduced to any) it is difficult to determine. In some languages they have the form of adjectives; but, if their meaning be considered, it is clear that they have no claim to this appellation, as they express no accident, quality, or property whatever. In fact, they appear to be a species of words totally different in character from any of the parts of speech generally received; all of them, except the first of the series, being abbreviations for the name of unity repeated.

It being necessary not only to express an individual indefinitely of any species, but also to specify and select some particular one, which at first would probably be done by pointing to the object, if in sight, the words this and that, hence called demonstratives, were employed; the one to express the nearer, the other the more distant object. From one of these proceeded the word the, having the same relation to its original as a or an has to the name of unity. Hence the words synonymous with this and that, in those languages which have no definite article, are frequently employed to supply its place.

The use of these terms being to express any individual whatever of a class, and likewise some certain or particular object; we have also the words few, some, many, several, to denote a number indefinitely, and the cardinal numerals two, three, four, &c., a precise number of individuals.