Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
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Оглавление
Balmes Jaime Luciano. Fundamental Philosophy, Vol. 2 (of 2)
BOOK FOURTH. ON IDEAS
CHAPTER I. CURSORY VIEW OF SENSISM
CHAPTER II. CONDILLAC'S STATUE
CHAPTER III. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GEOMETRICAL IDEAS AND THE SENSIBLE REPRESENTATIONS WHICH ACCOMPANY THEM
CHAPTER IV. THE IDEA AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT
CHAPTER V. COMPARISON OF GEOMETRICAL WITH NON-GEOMETRICAL IDEAS
CHAPTER VI. IN WHAT THE GEOMETRICAL IDEA CONSISTS; AND WHAT ARE ITS RELATIONS WITH SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER VII. THE ACTING INTELLECT OF THE ARISTOTELIANS
CHAPTER VIII. KANT AND THE ARISTOTELIANS
CHAPTER IX. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE VALUE OF PURE IDEAS
CHAPTER X. SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER XI. TWO COGNITIONS: INTUITIVE AND DISCURSIVE
CHAPTER XII. THE SENSISM OF KANT
CHAPTER XIII. EXISTENCE OF PURE INTELLECTUAL INTUITION
CHAPTER XIV. VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS. – ABSTRACTION MADE FROM INTELLECTUAL INTUITION
CHAPTER XV. ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE VALUE OF GENERAL CONCEPTIONS
CHAPTER XVI. VALUE OF PRINCIPLES, INDEPENDENTLY OF SENSIBLE INTUITION
CHAPTER XVII. RELATIONS OF INTUITION WITH THE RANK OF THE PERCEPTIVE BEING
CHAPTER XVIII. ASPIRATIONS OF THE HUMAN SOUL
CHAPTER XIX. ELEMENTS AND VARIETY OF THE CHARACTERS OF SENSIBLE REPRESENTATION
CHAPTER XX. INTERMEDIATE REPRESENTATIONS BETWEEN SENSIBLE INTUITION AND THE INTELLECTUAL ACT
CHAPTER XXI. DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE IDEAS
CHAPTER XXII. LIMITS OF OUR INTUITION
CHAPTER XXIII. OF THE NECESSITY INVOLVED IN IDEAS
CHAPTER XXIV. EXISTENCE OF UNIVERSAL REASON
CHAPTER XXV. IN WHAT DOES UNIVERSAL REASON CONSIST?
CHAPTER XXVI. REMARKS ON THE REAL FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY
CHAPTER XXVII. INDIVIDUAL AND INTELLECTUAL PHENOMENA EXPLAINED BY THE UNIVERSAL SUBSISTING REASON
CHAPTER XXVIII. OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE TO IDEAS
CHAPTER XXIX. ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE RELATION BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND IDEAS
CHAPTER XXX. INNATE IDEAS
BOOK FIFTH. IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER I. IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER II. SIMPLICITY AND INDETERMINATENESS OF THE IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER III. SUBSTANTIVE AND COPULATIVE BEING
CHAPTER IV. BEING, THE OBJECT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, IS NOT THE POSSIBLE, INASMUCH AS POSSIBLE
CHAPTER V. A DIFFICULTY SOLVED
CHAPTER VI. IN WHAT SENSE THE IDEA OF BEING IS THE FORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING
CHAPTER VII. ALL SCIENCE IS FOUNDED IN THE POSTULATE OF EXISTENCE
CHAPTER VIII. THE FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY, AND THE CONDITION OF ITS EXISTENCE
CHAPTER IX. IDEA OF NEGATION
CHAPTER X. IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY
CHAPTER XI. ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING
CHAPTER XII. DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE
CHAPTER XIII. KANT'S OPINION OF REALITY AND NEGATION
CHAPTER XIV. RECAPITULATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE IDEA OF BEING
BOOK SIXTH. UNITY AND NUMBER
CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA OF UNITY
CHAPTER II. WHAT IS UNITY
CHAPTER III. UNITY AND SIMPLICITY
CHAPTER IV. ORIGIN OF THE TENDENCY OF OUR MIND TO UNITY
CHAPTER V. GENERATION OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER
CHAPTER VI. CONNECTION OF THE IDEAS OF NUMBER WITH THEIR SIGNS
CHAPTER VII. ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF NUMBER IN ITSELF AND IN ITS RELATIONS WITH SIGNS
BOOK SEVENTH. ON TIME
CHAPTER I. IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF THE SUBJECT
CHAPTER II. IS TIME THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT?
CHAPTER III. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TIME AND SPACE
CHAPTER IV. DEFINITION OF TIME
CHAPTER V. TIME IS NOTHING ABSOLUTE
CHAPTER VI. DIFFICULTIES IN THE EXPLANATION OF VELOCITY
CHAPTER VII. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF SUCCESSION
CHAPTER VIII. WHAT IS CO-EXISTENCE?
CHAPTER IX. PRESENT, PAST, AND FUTURE
CHAPTER X. APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING DOCTRINE TO SEVERAL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS
CHAPTER XI. THE ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF TIME CONFIRMS ITS RESEMBLANCE TO THE IDEA OF SPACE
CHAPTER XII. RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME TO EXPERIENCE
CHAPTER XIII. KANT'S OPINION
CHAPTER XIV. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITY AND OF THE NECESSITY OF THE IDEA OF TIME
CHAPTER XV. IMPORTANT COROLLARIES
CHAPTER XVI. PURE IDEAL TIME AND EMPYRICAL TIME
CHAPTER XVII. RELATIONS OF THE IDEA OF TIME AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION
CHAPTER XVIII. SUMMING UP
CHAPTER XIX. A GLANCE AT THE IDEAS OF SPACE, NUMBER, AND TIME
BOOK EIGHTH. THE INFINITE
CHAPTER I. TRANSITORY VIEW OF THE ACTUAL STATE OF PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER II. IMPORTANCE AND ANOMALY OF THE QUESTIONS ON THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER III. HAVE WE THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE?
CHAPTER IV. THE LIMIT
CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE TO CONTINUOUS QUANTITIES, AND TO DISCRETE QUANTITIES, IN SO FAR AS THESE LAST ARE EXPRESSED IN SERIES
CHAPTER VI. ORIGIN OF THE VAGUENESS AND APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER VII. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ABSTRACT IDEA OF THE INFINITE
CHAPTER VIII. THE DEFINITION OF INFINITY CONFIRMED BY APPLICATION TO EXTENSION
CHAPTER IX. CONCEPTION OF AN INFINITE NUMBER
CHAPTER X. CONCEPTION OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XI. POSSIBILITY OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XII. SOLUTION OF VARIOUS OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XIII. EXISTENCE OF INFINITE EXTENSION
CHAPTER XIV. POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTUAL INFINITE NUMBER
CHAPTER XV. IDEA OF ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING
CHAPTER XVI. ALL THE REALITY CONTAINED IN INDETERMINATE CONCEPTIONS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD
CHAPTER XVII. ALL THAT IS NOT CONTRADICTORY IN INTUITIVE IDEAS IS AFFIRMED OF GOD
CHAPTER XVIII. INTELLIGENCE AND THE ABSOLUTELY INFINITE BEING
CHAPTER XIX. SUMMING UP
BOOK NINTH. ON SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER I. NAME AND GENERAL IDEA OF SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER II. APPLICATION OF THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE TO CORPOREAL OBJECTS
CHAPTER III. DEFINITION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE
CHAPTER IV. RELATION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE TO ITS ACCIDENTS
CHAPTER V. CONSIDERATIONS ON CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE IN ITSELF
CHAPTER VI. SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE HUMAN ME
CHAPTER VII. RELATION OF THE PROPOSITION, I THINK, TO THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE ME
CHAPTER VIII. REMARKS ON THE SOUL'S INTUITION OF ITSELF
CHAPTER IX. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENTS PROVING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER X. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT WHICH HE CALLS PARALOGISM OF PERSONALITY
CHAPTER XI. SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER XII. KANT'S OPINION OF THE ARGUMENT PROVING THE SIMPLICITY OF THE SOUL
CHAPTER XIII. IN WHAT MANNER THE IDEA OF SUBSTANCE MAY BE APPLIED TO GOD
CHAPTER XIV. AN IMPORTANT REMARK, AND SUMMARY
CHAPTER XV. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF IDEAS
CHAPTER XVI. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF EXTERNAL FACTS
CHAPTER XVII. PANTHEISM EXAMINED IN THE ORDER OF INTERNAL FACTS
CHAPTER XVIII. FICHTE'S PANTHEISTIC SYSTEM
CHAPTER XIX. RELATIONS OF FICHTE'S SYSTEM TO THE DOCTRINES OF KANT
CHAPTER XX. CONTRADICTION OF PANTHEISM TO THE PRIMARY FACTS OF THE HUMAN MIND
CHAPTER XXI. RAPID GLANCES AT THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS OF PANTHEISTS
BOOK TENTH. NECESSITY AND CAUSALITY
CHAPTER I. NECESSITY
CHAPTER II. THE UNCONDITIONED
CHAPTER III. IMMUTABILITY OF NECESSARY AND UNCONDITIONED BEING
CHAPTER IV. IDEAS OF CAUSE AND EFFECT
CHAPTER V. ORIGIN OF THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY
CHAPTER VI. FORMULA AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY
CHAPTER VII. THE PRINCIPLE OF PRECEDENCY
CHAPTER VIII. CAUSALITY IN ITSELF. – INSUFFICIENCY AND ERROR OF SOME EXPLANATIONS
CHAPTER IX. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS OF TRUE ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY
CHAPTER X. SECONDARY CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XI. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE OBSCURITY OF IDEAS IN WHAT RELATES TO CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XII. CAUSALITY OF PURE FORCE OF THE WILL
CHAPTER XIII. ACTIVITY
CHAPTER XIV. POSSIBILITY OF THE ACTIVITY OF BODIES
CHAPTER XV. CONJECTURES AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF CORPOREAL ACTIVITY
CHAPTER XVI. INTERNAL CAUSALITY
CHAPTER XVII. REMARKS ON SPONTANEITY
CHAPTER XVIII. FINAL CAUSALITY; – MORALITY
CHAPTER XIX. VARIOUS EXPLANATIONS OF MORALITY
CHAPTER XX. FUNDAMENTAL EXPLANATION OF THE MORAL ORDER
CHAPTER XXI. A GLANCE AT THE WORK
NOTES TO BOOK SEVENTH
ON CHAPTER I
ON CHAPTER IV
NOTE TO BOOK EIGHTH
NOTE TO BOOK NINTH
Отрывок из книги
1. Having spoken of sensations, we come now to ideas. We must, however, before making this transition, inquire if there be in our mind ought else than sensation, if all the inward phenomena which we experience be ought else than sensations transformed.
Man, when he rises from the sphere of sensations, from those phenomena which place him in relation with the external world, meets a new order of phenomena, of whose presence he is equally conscious. He cannot reflect upon sensations without being conscious of something more than sensation; nor on the recollection or the inward representation of sensations, without discovering something distinct both from the recollection and from the representation.
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16. This system, by reason of its philosophical meagerness, is fatal to all moral ideas. What becomes of morality if there are no ideas, except sensations? What becomes of duty if every thing is reduced to sensible necessity, to pleasure or pain? And what becomes of God, and of all man's relations to God?
Kant uses the words conception, and to conceive, to denote the intellectual act, form, or whatever it may be, by which the understanding, making use of sensible intuitions, combines the materials offered by sensibility conformably to the laws of the intellectual order. The scholastics likewise taught that the intelligible species, called also species impressed, fecundated the understanding by producing in it an intellectual conception, whence resulted the word, internal locution, or species expressed, which they also styled conception.
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