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By Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky

When I was Bill Clinton's chief trade negotiator, the United States Trade Representative, we negotiated over 300 market-opening trade and investment agreements across the globe. And as a private practitioner, I've negotiated countless agreements for both U.S. and foreign clients. Over the years, Ron Shapiro and I would always compare notes. His were more valuable.

I have been a Shapiro disciple for a very long time. The Power of Nice reminds us that negotiations are as much psychology and human interaction as substance and deal points. Understanding the other side's needs, concerns, and limitations, watching carefully, listening actively, and being agile enough to act as problem solver for both sides, is easily as critical as preparing your own substantive position and game plan. The goal is to bring home a great deal – a durable deal – for your clients or your business, not no deal because you couldn't get along with the other side. And it is not making a deal that looks good on paper but will never be implemented because you played “gotcha” once too often. Parents are often fond of reminding their kids that “what goes around comes around.” Good advice. “Purposeful” and “nice” can and ought to coexist. Ron's very success is a testament to that.

The lessons contained in The Power of Nice, whether big or small, are invaluable. Take, for example, one of Ron's tactical tips on the pitfalls of restating your position. One of my earliest negotiations with the Japanese concerned telecommunications infrastructure. I explained the U.S. position, my Japanese counterparts listened intently, and were…silent. Thinking that they did not fully understand our concerns, I slowly repeated what I had said. They listened carefully, more time went by…and again, silence. I was just about to give it a third try, when a young staffer passed me a note of four words: “Ambassador Barshefsky – Stop talking.” Why? Because Ron is right. Almost nothing is ever said precisely the same way twice, let alone three times. In fact, as The Power of Nice predicted, I had unintentionally altered my pitch, and telegraphed to the Japanese negotiators valuable clues as to my real position. The upshot? I never gave the third iteration, and waited, silently. After about 15 minutes of uncharacteristic American quiet, they began to talk – a lot. We got back on track, and I never made the same mistake again.

Or take Ron's points about forming relationships and not letting emotion overwhelm the talks. I was negotiating an intellectual property agreement with the Chinese, which went on for months on end, but during which my counterparts and I developed a very good relationship. The talks were sometimes tense or acrimonious, but never personal.

Late one night, the Chinese negotiator became highly agitated. I knew that he was under considerable pressure to conclude the talks without further movement on the Chinese side. In an uncharacteristic display, he lunged across the table (fortunately, it was a wide table and he was not particularly tall), and said, “That's it. No more. We are done.” I could have yelled, “No we aren't,” but I didn't. I knew that if I took the bait, we would be done, and I still had one final bit of ground to cover. So I weighed how best to defuse the situation, continue the negotiation for that last little bit, and not do anything that would result in the loss of face for my counterpart. I replied, calmly, “Mr. Minister. I am so sorry, but apparently, there has been a miscommunication. We are both tired. Let me suggest that we adjourn for the evening and resume early in the morning.” With that, I stood, left the room, and returned the next day with essentially the same proposal. After a brief discussion, the deal was done.

Then there is the situation where your counterpart agrees to something that is too good to be true, and where Ron rightly counsels, no deal may be the best option. This almost happened in the case of a large trade agreement with Vietnam – principally because we did not fully appreciate their priorities (another Ron “must do”).

By the early 2000s, the United States and Vietnam had yet to fully normalize relations, despite the decades earlier end to the Vietnam War. Our proposed trade agreement had a twofold purpose: to slowly reform and open the Vietnamese market, and to serve as the last step in the normalization process – something both sides sought.

One day, after months of negotiation, my lead staffer called me from Hanoi so excited he could barely speak. “Today…well…it's incredible. We are nearly done. What should I do?” This astonished me, because there is no way on earth the negotiation was nearly done. As we talked further, it became clear that the other side had simply decided to accept whatever we put forward. That would lead to an agreement that was never going to be fully implemented. I stopped the negotiation, called our team back, and invited the Minister from Vietnam to Washington. It was better to have no deal than to make a deal that wasn't good or wouldn't work.

Then I employed another Ron-ism: Preparation. Or, in this case, further preparation. We had prepared thoroughly for our negotiations in Vietnam. But as Ron teaches, preparation is not an end; it is an ongoing process, changing as the deal, the players, or the circumstances change. So we prepped again for the Minister's visit, analyzing his likely position, his needs and wants – empathizing, and determining our own true priorities, where we could give and where we could not.

When he arrived, we were ready for a heart-to-heart. As our preparation had indicated, for Vietnam, normalization was the overarching goal. For the United States, normalization was important, but so, too, was a strong, realistic agreement that could and would be implemented. So we simplified a number of our proposals, and revamped the agreement by phasing in various reforms over time. The United States and Vietnam normalized relations, and the agreement was fully implemented. No deal led to a better deal.

I could give countless additional examples of putting The Power of Nice to work – both as a systematic approach and an ethos. I was once told that as a negotiator I am tough, but reasonable, and funny – “purposeful” and “nice.” This is, I am convinced, the best and most effective combination of winning, both in the short term and long. The proof is in The Power of Nice.