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Outsiders and Africa

Political and Military Engagement on the Continent (1991–2017)

AFRICA IS A continent that is often misunderstood. Misleading stereotypes smooth over differences among the continent’s fifty-four countries, resulting in oversimplifications and distortions. During the periods of decolonization (1956–75) and the Cold War (1945–91), discussions of Africa evoked images of poverty, corruption, and communist subversion. African nationalists, who were viewed as threatening to Western interests, were dismissed by many as communists controlled by external powers. During the first post–Cold War decade (1991–2001), images of brutal civil wars, and their expansion into regional conflagrations, dominated media portrayals of the continent. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the presence of terrorists in Africa—real and imagined—became the new bogeyman.¹

As is the case with many stereotypes, there is a grain of truth in these simplistic understandings. Poverty, corruption, and violent conflicts have devastated many African countries. Less well known is the fact that many of the challenges facing the continent today are rooted in colonial political and economic practices, in Cold War alliances, and in attempts by outsiders to influence African political and economic systems during the decolonization and postindependence periods. Although conflicts in Africa emerged from local issues, external political and military interventions altered their dynamics and rendered them more lethal.

This book provides a new framework for thinking about foreign intervention in Africa, its purposes, and its consequences. It is not intended for specialists. It does not advance new theories, present the results of recent primary research, or provide a detailed survey of current literature. Its target audience includes policymakers, humanitarian and human rights workers, students, and the general reading public. Its purpose is pedagogical, and the main points are illustrated with case studies synthesized from previously published work. The book’s format minimizes footnoting in favor of Suggested Reading sections at the conclusion of each chapter. This approach allows readers to follow the outlines of the argument without the distraction of footnotes and yet benefit from the direction of bibliographic essays. The recommended readings are limited to sources in English; most of the articles, reports, and documents are readily available online.

This book is the companion to an earlier work, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Both volumes elucidate the role of outside powers in the political and economic crises that plague Africa today. The earlier volume focuses on foreign political and military intervention in Africa during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, when the most significant intervention came from outside the continent. Intervention during those periods involved the former colonial powers (France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and Portugal), as well as the Cold War powers (the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and Cuba).² External support for repressive regimes that served internal elites and outside interests and stole the people’s patrimony laid the foundations for numerous post–Cold War conflicts, which in turn attracted further foreign intervention. The present volume investigates external political and military intervention in Africa during the quarter century following the Cold War (1991–2017), when neighboring states and subregional, regional, and global organizations and networks joined extracontinental powers in support of diverse forces in the war-making and peace-building processes.³ During this period, the Cold War paradigm as justification for intervention was replaced by two new ones: response to instability, with the corollary of responsibility to protect, and the war on terror. These paradigms are developed more fully in chapter 2.

Historical Background: Decolonization and the Cold War

The following assessment of decolonization and the Cold War in Africa establishes the basis for understanding the conflicts that troubled the continent in their aftermath. During these overlapping periods, which spanned the years 1956 to 1991, European imperial powers and Cold War superpowers struggled to control African decolonization. As popular forces challenged the existing order, external powers intervened to impose or support African regimes that catered to their political and economic interests. Former colonial powers and the United States tended to support regimes that opposed communism and left colonial economic relationships intact. They often confused radical nationalism with communism, imagining Soviet manipulation where none existed. Western patronage was often based on the willingness of local actors to serve as Cold War allies and regional policemen, providing military bases for Western use and thwarting radical movements among their neighbors. With fewer means at its disposal and less intrinsic interest in the continent, the Soviet Union tended to increase its presence in response to escalated Western and, to a lesser extent, Chinese involvement. It supported movements and regimes that declared themselves in favor of scientific socialism and a Soviet-style model of development—regardless of their internal practices—as well as radical nationalist regimes that were shunned by the West. Although perceived by the United Sates to be following the Soviet lead, Cuba often took an independent route that was not always to the liking of its Soviet ally. China favored African political parties, movements, and regimes that opposed Soviet influence and ideology, which sometimes resulted in unofficial collaboration with the United States.

Serving outside interests and internal elites rather than popular majorities, many postcolonial African leaders were autocrats who used state resources to bind loyalists to them in a system called neopatrimonialism.⁴ Weakened by corruption and mismanagement, their governments clung to power through repression, co-optation, and fraud. Since colonial times, African countries had exported cheap primary commodities and imported expensive manufactured goods. Following the worldwide economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, they faced crushing debts. They turned to international financial institutions and foreign banks and governments for relief. Embracing a market-oriented economic model known as neoliberalism, these Western-dominated entities required African countries to reduce state involvement in the economy as a condition for loans.⁵ Such policies imposed the greatest burdens on the poor, provoking food and fuel shortages, inflation, and unemployment. Economic hardship, political repression, and widespread corruption, which exacerbated growing income gaps, led to a continentwide surge of prodemocracy movements in the early 1990s. Popular forces increasingly challenged repressive regimes, demanding fundamental political and economic reforms.

As their economies went into a tailspin, neopatrimonial states could no longer perform their basic functions: monopolizing the means of coercion, safeguarding their territories, and providing protection and social services to their citizens. Weakened leaders lost the means to appease their loyalists with power and resources. Dictators once bolstered by outside powers were swept away as internal prodemocracy forces struggled with warlords and other strongmen to control the political process.⁶ The ensuing chaos provided fertile ground for a new wave of foreign intervention, both internal and external to the continent. Resource-rich countries were particularly vulnerable as outsiders fought to control the production and flow of oil, natural gas, and strategic minerals.

During the 1990s and the early twenty-first century, extracontinental powers, neighboring states, and subregional, regional, and global organizations became entangled in numerous African conflicts, supporting governments and rebel movements as well as war-making and peace-building processes. Although countries outside the continent continued to involve themselves in African affairs, the most consequential foreign intervention during this period was intracontinental. A number of African states, sometimes assisted by extracontinental powers, supported warlords, dictators, and dissident movements in neighboring countries and fought for control of their neighbors’ resources. The United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and various subregional organizations regularly intervened to broker, monitor, and enforce peace agreements.⁷ However, conflicting interests, corrupt practices, and human rights abuses by some member states at times worsened the strife.

The launch of the war on terror following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States brought new forms of intervention to Africa. Washington cultivated alliances with African governments and trained and equipped their militaries to assist in the US counterterrorism agenda. Some of these governments, like their Cold War predecessors, used US training and equipment to quash internal opposition. The United States also intensified unconventional military actions on the continent, deploying Special Operations Forces and utilizing unmanned drones outside of established war zones. US support for repressive regimes, warlords, and foreign occupiers sometimes intensified local support for antigovernment insurgencies. International terrorist networks often seized the opportunity to harness local grievances and expand into territories they previously had not penetrated.

The Arab Spring (2011–13) generated another wave of external involvement as prodemocracy demonstrators and rebel movements ousted repressive rulers across North Africa and the Middle East. Extracontinental organizations, political powers, and networks responded to the instability with both unilateral and multilateral actions, allying themselves with forces they hoped would protect their long-term interests. International terrorist networks led by al-Qaeda and its Iraqi offshoot, the Islamic State, took advantage of local grievances to support a wide range of violent extremists, including drug smugglers, human traffickers, and petty criminals, as well as indigenous groups fighting secular or supposedly impious Muslim governments.

The societal breakdown that characterized the late Cold War and early post–Cold War periods resulted in the emergence of two new rationales for foreign intervention: response to instability—with its corollary, responsibility to protect—and the war on terror. Military intervention in a number of African countries was justified on the grounds that their domestic instability threatened international peace and security. In some cases, where large numbers of civilians were at risk and population displacement exacerbated regional tensions, the response to instability was reinforced by claims of the responsibility to protect. A relatively new international legal norm, this standard holds nation-states accountable for securing their citizens against “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and grants the international community the right to intervene if governments fail to fulfill their “responsibility to protect.”⁸ Emerging from the post–World War II expansion of democratic values and concern for human rights, the principle gained support after the Cold War, when internal breakdown in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Africa forced the international community to rethink its allegiance to the seventeenth-century principle of state sovereignty. In 2005, UN member states concluded that a state’s failure to protect its citizens could warrant foreign intervention.

The war on terror, which is generally associated with the George W. Bush administration and the 9/11 attacks, had roots in the late Cold War period. During the Cold War, the United States often deployed religion in the struggle against communism. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) backed conservative Christian parties in Europe after World War II, hoping to undermine the appeal of communism to populations devastated by the war. In the Middle East, the CIA countered radical nationalism—which it erroneously conflated with communism—by supporting autocratic Muslim regimes that shared Western interests in opposing communism and in controlling the region’s enormous oil wealth. Where radical nationalists came to power, their secular regimes were frequently challenged by local Islamists, who believed that Islamic religious principles should serve as the basis of the social, political, and legal order.⁹ The secular regimes frequently responded with repression, arresting and imprisoning Islamists and forcing others to flee into exile. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to shore up its regional interests, the United States seized the opportunity to rally support from a Muslim minority who had turned to violence to achieve their ends. In collaboration with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other allies, the United States mobilized a multinational coalition that recruited, trained, armed, and financed Muslim militants from around the world to fight the 1979–89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After Soviet withdrawal, the militants dispersed, taking their weapons and terror tactics to new battlegrounds around the globe. Osama bin Laden, founder and patron of al-Qaeda, was among the most prominent of the Soviet-Afghan War veterans who spearheaded the emerging terrorist networks. In the 1990s, his organization was responsible for a number of attacks on US citizens and property, culminating in the September 11, 2001, strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The 9/11 attacks opened a new chapter in the war on terror and marked the beginning of another era of US military intervention, first in Central Asia and the Middle East, and subsequently in Africa. Cold War experiences had left a deep imprint on US attitudes and actions. Having mobilized violent extremists who claimed the mantle of Islam to counter the communist menace during the Cold War, the United States contributed to the globalization of terror in its aftermath. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, Soviet-Afghan War veterans and their acolytes turned their attention to the United States as the last remaining superpower and patron of what they perceived as impious Muslim regimes. During the Cold War, the United States had confounded radical African and Arab nationalism with communism and intervened in local conflicts, with disastrous results. After the Cold War, many in the US government viewed a wide range of Muslims with suspicion, failing to distinguish between nonviolent Muslims with conservative religious beliefs and a small minority with questionable religious credentials who used violence to achieve their ends. Officials in Washington often glossed over differences between those who targeted local regimes due to longstanding grievances and a much smaller segment who attacked Western countries that, in their view, supported impious rulers, oppressed Muslims, and defiled Muslim holy lands. As a result, the US war on terror, like the war on communism, had unintended consequences that sometimes intensified local support for violent opposition groups.

Central Propositions

The impact of foreign political and military intervention in Africa after the Cold War is illuminated by a series of subregional case studies, described at the end of this chapter. They provide evidence to support the book’s four central propositions.

First, free market austerity policies, imposed by international financial institutions acting through weak postcolonial states during decolonization and the Cold War, contributed to deadly struggles over power and resources in the post–Cold War period. As dictators were driven from power, indigenous strongmen, and in some cases neighboring states, intervened to further their own interests. Other international actors interceded in an attempt to restore regional stability or protect civilian lives. However, they tended to engage selectively, choosing conflict zones that impinged on their own political, economic, and strategic interests, while ignoring other conflicts and casualties. Although some interventions benefited civilian populations, others harmed them. The failure to intervene when strategic interests were not at stake also had dire consequences.

Second, the war on terror, like its Cold War antecedent, increased foreign military presence on the African continent and generated new external support for repressive governments. Expanded US involvement was particularly noteworthy. Concerned about US energy and physical security, Washington focused on countries rich in energy resources and those considered vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. US military aid, combined with commercial military sales and arms left over from the Cold War, contributed to an escalation of violence in many parts of Africa. Rather than promoting security, US military and covert operations often intensified strife and undermined prospects for peace.

Third, although US counterterrorism initiatives cast a long shadow, they were not the only foreign interventions in Africa during this period. After the Cold War, the UN, the AU, and African subregional organizations played a growing role in diplomacy and peacekeeping initiatives, sometimes leading to multilateral military action. France, a former colonial power, maintained a strong military presence on the continent and intervened in numerous conflicts. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf states, which were heavily invested in African oil, minerals, and agricultural land, exerted new political influence.¹⁰ While these countries often reinforced the powers of repressive regimes, in some instances they used their authority to promote peace and security efforts. The success of externally brokered agreements was largely determined by the degree to which all parties to the conflict and representative civil society organizations were engaged in the process. Accords imposed from above or outside, with little buy-in from relevant groups on the ground, were least likely to succeed. Public pressure for humanitarian intervention in response to African crises also contributed to new waves of foreign involvement. Activist groups in Western countries put the spotlight on mass atrocities and mobilized support for action to protect African civilians. However, they often oversimplified complex issues and sometimes proposed the kinds of military solutions that historically have harmed civilian populations.

The fourth proposition suggests that during the period under consideration, foreign political and military intervention in Africa often did more harm than good. External involvement motivated by the war on terror tended to intensify conflicts, and foreign response to instability often rendered local conflagrations more lethal. In addition, the emphasis on quick military action diverted attention from the political, economic, and social grievances that lay at the root of the conflicts. Even humanitarian missions, which were premised on the responsibility to protect, sometimes hurt the people they were intended to help. They were often weakened by inadequate mandates and funding and undermined by conflicting interests.

In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the merits and demerits of foreign intervention remained hotly contested, while the impact of failures to intervene was also the subject of much debate. The voices of African civil societies were not yet central to the discussions, nor were the concerns of affected populations foremost on the agenda. The prioritization of these constituencies is critical to the long-term success of any peace initiative.

Scope and Limitations

For the purposes of this study, foreign political and military intervention refers to the involvement of external powers or organizations in the internal affairs of an African country. These entities may be based on other continents, or they may be neighboring African states or subregional or regional organizations. The term “intervention” implies an unequal power relationship. It occurs when a dominant country or organization uses force or pressure to exert power over a weaker sovereign entity or when a weaker entity requests external assistance to restore order, monitor a peace accord, or end a humanitarian crisis. Intervention can be viewed in a positive light, such as when powerful nations intervene to halt a genocide or enforce peace agreements. However, when outsiders have intervened to enslave, conquer, colonize, overthrow or install governments, or plunder resources, intervention has had extremely negative ramifications.

Although this book focuses on political and military intervention, the enormous problems that afflict Africa today cannot properly be understood without taking into account the impact of foreign intrusion into African economies, externally induced climate change, and environmental destruction and plunder of resources by outside forces. These factors, which have contributed to many African conflicts, are beyond the purview of this book, as is the growing presence of China. However, their significance should not be underestimated, as noted briefly below.

Foreign Intrusion into African Economies

Although outside powers had attempted to control the lucrative African trades in gold, ivory, and slaves for centuries before the Industrial Revolution, it was rapid industrialization in nineteenth-century Europe that sparked the continentwide scramble for African resources, labor, and markets. The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 devised rules to legitimate European claims, and imperial powers rushed to establish “effective occupation” that would entitle them to a share of what Belgian King Leopold II termed “this magnificent African cake.”¹¹ The ensuing “scramble for Africa” unleashed a wave of foreign intervention that brought most of the continent under European authority within a few decades. France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and Spain established regimes to extract African wealth—especially rubber, minerals, cotton, and plant oils—and to force African people to provide the labor and taxes necessary to keep the system afloat.

Political independence, beginning in the 1950s, did little to alter the unequal economic relationships established during the colonial era. Former imperial powers sustained governments that perpetuated the status quo. Resource extraction, primarily for the benefit of outsiders and small groups of indigenous elites, continued, along with political repression to guarantee access. The Cold War exacerbated tensions in new African states as rival powers, seeking to protect their own economic and strategic interests, supported repressive regimes.

The colonial legacy of unequal exchange between African commodity producers and industrialized countries has contributed to the deep impoverishment of African populations. When African colonies achieved political independence in the mid- to late twentieth century, the inequality inherent in these economic relationships persisted in a system dubbed neocolonialism. In the words of pan-African leader Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonial states had “all the outward trappings of international sovereignty,” but their economies and political programs were “directed from outside.”¹² Deeply rooted economic inequalities were exacerbated by the steep rise in oil prices in the early 1970s and the worldwide collapse in commodity prices at the end of that decade. African political economies, which had been structured to export primary products and import manufactured goods, suffered severe balance of trade deficits. The economic crisis stemming from structural inequalities was aggravated by inflated military budgets, corruption, and economic mismanagement. With their economies crumbling, many African countries turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and Western commercial banks and governments for help.

Foreign assistance came with strings attached. Embracing free market ideologies that promote global capitalism, the Western-dominated international financial institutions required governments to implement draconian stabilization and structural adjustment programs as a condition for foreign loans. Private banks usually required the IMF’s seal of approval before granting commercial loans. Western development agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) refused assistance to projects that did not conform to neoliberal free market norms. The result was the imposition of economic development models in which African populations had no voice. The Washington Consensus, named for the power hub of the IMF, the World Bank, and the US government, limited government involvement in the economy, requiring an end to subsidies, price controls, and protective tariffs. The mandated government cutbacks undermined health and education systems and destroyed social safety nets. Obligatory currency devaluations brought about soaring inflation and import shortages. Enforced privatization resulted in widespread retrenchment, higher unemployment, and an upsurge in crony capitalism as state-owned assets were transferred to government loyalists. These measures were particularly damaging to women, children, the elderly, and the poor. Imposed from above, the structural adjustment programs were inherently undemocratic. In many countries, the new balance of power favored governments with the means to impose unpopular measures. Foreign intervention in African economies thus resulted in widespread economic hardship and increased political repression, constituting a fundamental denial of African sovereignty.

Massive foreign debts incurred by African governments in the 1970s and 1980s continued to take their toll in the decades that followed. In many cases the borrowed money was spent on extravagant showcase projects, or on military rather than economic development; or it was lost to corruption. Successor governments were forced to service the debts with scarce foreign currency, which exhausted export earnings and resulted in further borrowing. Debt service to foreign governments, banks, and international financial institutions consumed a large percentage of government revenues that might otherwise have been allocated to essential services and economic development. Externally imposed economic policies thus laid the foundations for the political crises of the 1980s and 1990s.

When the Cold War ended, Western powers cut ties to repressive regimes they had once cultivated as Cold War allies and regional policemen. Aid pipelines were shut down, and bank loans were no longer forthcoming. Neoliberal reforms, which promoted the privatization of assets previously controlled by the state, failed to strengthen state institutions as intended. Instead, they laid the groundwork for new kinds of patronage networks that enriched loyal political and military officials, who benefited from the privatization schemes, and marginalized others, who were laid off. Some of those who were sidelined, along with others who sought a greater share of the spoils, abandoned established political and economic structures and began to operate as warlords. The warlords mobilized loyalists from the ranks of downsized functionaries and established militias of unpaid former soldiers, unemployed youth, and press-ganged children. The economic crises and externally imposed reforms thus sparked new political turmoil, which in turn stimulated further waves of political and military intervention.

After the Cold War, countries with emerging economies in the Global South joined former colonial and Cold War powers in taking a new interest in Africa. Foreign powers and corporations focused their attention on countries that were rich in crude oil, natural gas, and strategic minerals.¹³ They also paid attention to those that offered access to arable land, markets for manufactured goods, and lucrative infrastructure contracts. However, economic interests were rarely the primary motives for military intervention, and the relationship between the two was varied and complex. Three points should be borne in mind. First, the interests of foreign governments and corporations were not always in sync, although critics frequently conflate them. Governments sometimes protected private interests with military might; however, they also compromised those interests for broader political gains. Second, external actors made deals with African governments and local strongmen that gave them direct access to desired commodities, and they acquired rule-making powers that tipped the system in their favor. They generally prized stability, and only when political mechanisms failed did they consider military means. Third, although competition for strategic minerals figured in many conflicts, control over those resources was not always the source of the conflict. Rather, disputes with diverse origins sometimes expanded to include struggles for control over resources that in turn fueled the war efforts.

Externally Induced Climate Change

Like foreign intrusion into African economies, climate change, caused primarily by greenhouse gases generated by industrialized countries, has contributed to a growing number of the continent’s conflicts.¹⁴ As the gases trap heat in the earth’s atmosphere, glaciers have melted and oceans have warmed, causing sea levels to rise, water to evaporate, and ocean storms to intensify. These factors have resulted in increased rainfall over the oceans and less over adjacent land, provoking both severe flooding and extreme drought in many parts of the African continent. The warming of the Indian Ocean has contributed to the intensification of droughts from the Horn of Africa to the Cape and across the Eastern Sahel, while the warming of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Guinea have exacerbated droughts in the Western Sahel. Climate change has dried up lakes and rivers and destroyed crops, herds, fish, and game. It has threatened food production, drinking water, and hydroelectric capabilities. Residents in drought-ravaged areas, in search of fuel, have denuded hills of trees; when rains finally come, they wash away the topsoil. Malnutrition and tropical diseases associated with high temperatures and humidity have grown more severe. The rapidly expanding desert has encroached on arable land. All of these factors have led to human migration on an unprecedented scale.¹⁵ Massive population displacements caused by climate change have resulted in competition for increasingly scarce arable land and water, which in turn has generated conflict between farmers and herders and between members of different ethnic groups, clans, and lineages.¹⁶ The confluence of these factors has provided fertile ground for extremist ideologies that have harnessed local discontent and mobilized populations with few alternatives for channeling their grievances.

Environmental Destruction and Plunder of Resources by Outsiders

Environmental destruction resulting from climate change has contributed to several of the regional conflicts investigated in this study. Foreign interest in African resources to mitigate the effects of climate change and population growth on other continents may be an important factor in future conflicts. The global food crisis and the search for new sources of fuel have led to substantial African land grabs by emerging economic powers, which are producing food and biofuels in Africa for consumption elsewhere. Former imperial powers that continue to hold land in their old colonies have been joined by China, India, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Malaysia, which have taken over major land assets in Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Morocco, the Republic of Congo, Sudan, Tanzania, and elsewhere. Foreign investors, primarily from Singapore and Malaysia, control virtually all of Liberia’s arable land, while 86 percent of Gabon’s arable land is under foreign contract, most of it held by Singapore. African citizens have had little if any say in these arrangements, which include no provisions for African food security or for environmental controls to protect the land, water, and air from pollution. Competition for arable land and clean water, already a factor in contemporary conflicts, is likely to contribute to future conflicts as well.

Environmental destruction as a by-product of foreign ventures is also the source of considerable conflict in Africa. Pollution of land, water, and air by foreign oil and gas companies, deforestation by foreign timber interests, and the destruction of wildlife habitats and toxic waste dumping by other external interests have jeopardized lives and livelihoods across the continent. Pollution by foreign oil companies has destroyed the fishing and agricultural industries of the Niger Delta and led to civil unrest, military crackdowns, and the emergence of criminal gangs that engage in illegal oil tapping, piracy, and kidnapping for ransom as alternative sources of subsistence. Similarly, unauthorized fishing and toxic waste dumping by foreign concerns have devastated the local fishing industry in northeastern Somalia, while climate change–induced droughts have decimated food crops and pastureland. Unemployed men have turned to piracy, first demanding fees from South Korean, Indian, and Taiwanese fishing fleets, then attacking oil tankers and container ships and holding their crews for ransom. Individual ventures have been transformed into sophisticated criminal rackets led by warlords who at times have controlled thousands of gunmen.

Economic growth and technological development outside of Africa have sparked a new scramble for African resources, which has fueled repressive governments, separatist movements, and broader regional conflicts. Corrupt politicians, military personnel, and warlords have contracted with foreign interests to extract and export valuable resources for enormous profits. “Conflict diamonds” were the object of wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and also helped fund those wars. In the DRC, control over coltan, tin, tungsten, gold, and cobalt was also at stake, while the Liberian war was financed by timber as well as diamonds, and cocoa bankrolled the war in Côte d’Ivoire. Competition for Africa’s vast and largely unexploited oil and natural gas reserves is likely to be at the root of future conflicts involving both internal and external interests.

China’s Growing Presence

The expanding role of China on the African continent has been the focus of considerable attention, both in Africa and in the West. The United States and Western Europe have seen their African trade and investments eclipsed by those of the Asian giant. Their leaders have warned that Beijing is exploiting African resources, taking African jobs, supporting African dictators, and demonstrating disregard for human rights, good governance, and sound environmental practices on the continent. African civil society organizations have frequently leveled the same criticisms—although many note the irony in the concerns of former imperial and Cold War powers, which historically have engaged in similar practices. Chinese involvement is primarily economic, rather than political or military, and thus falls outside the scope of this study. However, because Beijing’s practices may be laying the groundwork for future conflicts, a brief description of China’s impact on the continent is warranted.

The People’s Republic of China developed an interest in Africa during the Cold War, when it supported African liberation movements and governments that strove to build socialist societies—as well as others that opposed Beijing’s Cold War rivals. Seeking allies in the global arena, China was motivated principally by politics rather than economics. Its attitude shifted in the mid-1990s, after a massive program of industrialization and economic development transformed the Chinese economy into one of the world’s most powerful. Africa was no longer viewed as an ideological proving ground, but rather as a source of raw materials and a market for Chinese manufactured goods. By the first decade of the twenty-first century, China had surpassed the United States as Africa’s largest trading partner, and it had become the third-largest source of the continent’s direct foreign investment. In exchange for guaranteed access to energy resources, agricultural land, and other strategic materials, China spent billions of dollars on African infrastructure—developing and rehabilitating roads, railroads, dams, bridges, ports, oil pipelines and refineries, power plants, water systems, and telecommunications networks. Chinese concerns also constructed hospitals and schools and invested in clothing and food processing industries, agriculture, fisheries, commercial real estate, retail, and tourism.

Unlike the Western powers and the international financial institutions they dominated, Beijing did not impose political and economic prescriptions as conditions for its loans, investments, aid, and trade. Although it mandated that infrastructure contracts be awarded to Chinese companies and that Chinese supplies be used, the agreements did not require economic restructuring, adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights, or the implementation of labor and environmental protections. While Beijing’s noninterference policies were often popular in ruling circles, civil society organizations frequently criticized them. African labor, business, civic, and human rights organizations noted that Chinese firms drove African-owned enterprises out of business and often employed Chinese workers rather than providing local populations with jobs. When they hired African labor, Chinese concerns paid poverty-level wages and engaged in practices that endangered worker health and safety. Most importantly, Beijing backed corrupt African elites in exchange for unfettered access to resources and markets, strengthening regimes that stole the people’s patrimony, engaged in domestic repression, and waged wars of aggression against neighboring states. Like the Western-backed autocrats who preceded them, China’s clients are likely to face popular discontent in the future.

Although China’s involvement in Africa is principally economic, the country’s economic clout has been accompanied by growing political and military influence. Beijing’s decades-long policy of noninterference in host country affairs has shifted noticeably in recent years, motivated by its desire to protect Chinese economic interests and citizens living abroad. In the early 2000s, Beijing joined multinational mediation efforts and UN peacekeeping operations for the first time, focusing on countries and regions where it had valuable investments and export markets. In 2006, for instance, China pressed Sudan, an important oil partner, to accept an AU-UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, and in 2015 it worked with an East African subregional organization and Western powers to mediate peace in South Sudan. Initially, China refrained from military involvement, preferring to contribute medical workers and engineers. It provided a 315-member engineering unit to the peacekeeping mission in Darfur, but no troops. However, as Beijing’s global stature and interests grew, so too did its military engagement. In 2013, Beijing supplied some 400 engineers, medical personnel, police, and combat troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, marking the first time Chinese combat forces had joined a UN operation. Similarly, in 2015, Beijing assigned 350 engineers, medical personnel, and other noncombatants to the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan. However, it also contributed an infantry battalion composed of 700 armed peacekeepers—the first Chinese infantry battalion ever deployed in a UN peacekeeping mission. Chinese military presence was also notable in UN peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2004–6) and the Central African Republic (2014–).

The trend toward heightened Chinese political and military engagement in Africa culminated in a 2016 agreement that permitted China to construct a military base in Djibouti—its first permanent military facility overseas. Strategically located on the Gulf of Aden near the mouth of the Red Sea, the base will allow Beijing to resupply Chinese vessels involved in UN antipiracy operations and to protect Chinese nationals living in the region. It will also enable China to monitor commercial traffic along its evolving 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will link maritime countries from Oceania to the Mediterranean in a vast production and trading network.¹⁷ It will allow China to safeguard its supply of oil, half of which originates in the Middle East and transits through the Red Sea and Djibouti’s Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Gulf of Aden. Most of China’s exports to Europe follow the same route. Because China’s growing economic interests in Africa have led to greater concern about the continent’s political stability, the projection of Chinese military power in Africa is likely to intensify in the future. Such developments will have significant implications in Africa. However, they are a topic for another book.

The Book’s Architecture and Case Studies

This book explores foreign political and military intervention in Africa after the Cold War through the lens of case studies from East, Central, West, and North Africa. Southern Africa is not a primary focus. Although that subregion was the site of significant foreign intervention during the Cold War, it was largely exempt from external political and military interference during the first two and a half decades that followed.¹⁸ However, South Africa, the subregion’s leading power, wielded continental and global influence and played an important role in international peace initiatives on the continent. Its efforts are discussed in case studies focusing on the other subregions.

Chapters 1 through 3 establish the book’s framework. This first chapter introduces the book’s purpose, historical and chronological context, and central propositions, and explains the book’s scope and limitations. Chapter 2 begins with a portrait of Africa at the end of the Cold War, when political and economic crises attracted a new wave of outside engagement. It develops the two paradigms that were used to justify foreign intervention after the Cold War—response to instability and the war on terror—and examines common Western misconceptions about Islam and its history, which have influenced the trajectory of the war on terror. Chapter 3 introduces the key international actors that intervened in Africa after the Cold War and explores their motivations and rationales for intervention.

At the heart of the book, chapters 4–11 present a series of subregional case studies, illustrating the two paradigms that were used to justify foreign intervention. Some cases exemplify foreign intervention as a response to instability and its corollary, responsibility to protect. Others typify external action as a component of the war on terror, a justification that was especially prevalent after the September 2001 attacks on the United States. Some cases are characterized by a single paradigm, while others bridge the two. Together the case studies offer evidence that supports the book’s four central propositions. Although the political, economic, and social components of each conflict are described, the case studies emphasize the impact of foreign intervention rather than the internal dynamics of the struggles. They offer overviews of each conflict and do not attempt to evaluate the relative importance of internal and external factors. For readers interested in other aspects of the conflicts, Suggested Reading sections are appended to each chapter.

Chapters 12 and 13 look more closely at the role of the United States. Chapter 12 investigates US involvement in Africa after the Cold War, from the Clinton through Obama administrations. Concerns about political and economic instability and international terrorism shaped US policies and had a significant impact on outcomes in Africa. Chapter 13 offers a window on US Africa policy during the first year of the Trump administration, exploring continuities and discontinuities with previous administrations. The Conclusion summarizes the pitfalls of foreign political and military intervention in Africa during the first quarter century after the Cold War and suggests some requirements for the establishment of lasting peace.

The sections below briefly summarize the case studies featured in chapters 4–11, grouped by subregion, and the elements of US Africa policy discussed in chapters 12–13, noting how they illustrate the paradigms used to justify foreign intervention after the Cold War.

East Africa: Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan

Chapter 4 focuses on foreign intervention in Somalia from 1991 through 2017. After the central state collapsed in 1991, warlords and Islamists vied for control. The UN, the United States, the AU, and neighboring countries interceded, initially motivated by the response to instability and the responsibility to protect, but increasingly galvanized by the war on terror as a jihadist insurgency emerged in response to outside intervention. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable to Somalia for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant to the period before September 2001, but it took on greater urgency in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Chapter 5 examines foreign intervention in Sudan (1991–2017) and South Sudan (2011–17). In Sudan, civil war, local insurgencies, ethnic cleansing, and terrorist networks generated enormous instability inside the country and across its borders. Neighboring states supported rival factions in the north-south civil war (1983–2005), while the UN, the United States, European countries, and African subregional organizations mediated problematic peace accords that ended the war but laid the groundwork for future conflicts. The AU and the UN staged inventions to prevent ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region of western Sudan from 2003, but they failed to sustain the operations until peace was restored. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm is applicable to Sudan for the entire period. The war on terror paradigm is relevant to much of the 1990s; however, by the end of the decade Khartoum had begun to collaborate in the US-led war on terror in the hope that its cooperation would lead to the lifting of sanctions.

Central Africa: Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Chapter 6 investigates foreign involvement in Rwanda before and during the 1994 genocide, and chapter 7 examines foreign intervention in neighboring Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo from 1994 to 2017.¹⁹ In both cases, France exercised its presumed right as the world’s dominant francophone power, intervening unilaterally or pushing the UN Security Council to act. Neighboring states also promoted their own interests, sometimes backing existing governments and at other times supporting rebel movements. UN peacekeeping missions, weakened by conflicts inside the Security Council, were ineffectual and marred by controversy. In Rwanda, France sustained the genocidal regime, while Uganda supported the rebel movement that ousted it. As the genocide unfolded, powerful members of the Security Council terminated a peacekeeping operation and refused to authorize an intervention to halt the killing. When Rwandan refugees streamed into Zaire, that country became a new battleground. Regional powers took sides, with some supporting the ruling regime and others backing rebel proxies. All parties fought over Zaire’s riches, while the UN made futile efforts to reestablish peace. The response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm applies to both Rwanda and the DRC during the period under consideration. The war on terror did not play a role in international response to the crisis in either country.

West Africa, Part 1: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire

Chapter 8 explores foreign intervention in the West African countries of Liberia (1990–2003) and Sierra Leone (1991–2002), while chapter 9 considers external involvement in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–11). In each case, war and plunder took an enormous toll after the Cold War. A West African subregional body interceded in all three conflicts, purportedly to reestablish peace and security, but sometimes to further member states’ political and economic interests. Liberia promoted a proxy war in Sierra Leone, and this in turn stimulated intervention by the UN, foreign mercenaries, and the UK, which asserted its prerogative as the former colonial power. France claimed a similar prerogative in Côte d’Ivoire. Neighboring states meanwhile pursued their own interests, either through the subregional body or unilaterally. The AU provided mediators, and the UN sent a peacekeeping mission. In all three cases, the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm was paramount; the war on terror was not a factor.

North Africa: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya

Chapter 10 considers the role of foreign intervention in North Africa from 2011 to 2017. This period encompasses the Arab Spring (2011–13), a series of popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian regimes and transformed the political landscape in North Africa and the Middle East. It also considers the uprisings’ aftermath (2013–17), when old regime remnants and other armed groups vied with prodemocracy forces for control. The chapter gives special consideration to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya—the three African countries involved in the movement for social and political change. France, the United States, the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates were the most consequential foreign actors. They intervened first in response to instability and, in the case of Libya, to protect civilian lives. In Libya, regime change was also the goal of several external powers. After the old regimes fell and international terrorist networks joined the fight, the war on terror paradigm was used to justify further foreign involvement.

West Africa, Part 2: Mali, Nigeria, and the Western Sahel

Chapter 11 examines foreign intervention in the Western Sahel states of Mali and Nigeria during the period 2009 to 2017.²⁰ Regime change in Libya provoked an influx of fighters and weapons into the Western Sahel, where they destabilized weak governments. In Mali, these developments bolstered a secessionist movement and stimulated a military coup, an insurgency linked to al-Qaeda, and another round of foreign intervention that had ripple effects across the region. The most significant external actors included the UN, the AU, the EU, a West African subregional body, France, and the United States. In Nigeria, militants who had trained in Mali’s al-Qaeda-linked camps returned home with weapons from Libyan arsenals, which they used to strengthen a growing insurgency in the northeast. The Nigerian conflict spilled into neighboring Niger and Cameroon and attracted fighters from Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria. It also garnered support from the Islamic State and sparked another wave of intervention by foreign governments and institutions. Neighboring states joined forces with the Nigerian military to respond to regional instability, while Western nations, worried by the presence of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and motivated by the war on terror, provided military training, technical, and financial support.

The United States and Africa

Chapter 12 investigates the evolution of US Africa policy from 1991 through 2017, focusing especially on the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations. As the dominant world actor after the Cold War, the United States used its political, economic, and military clout to sway international bodies and influence world events. In Africa, the United States supported initiatives that improved health and promoted economic development—prerequisites for social stability. It also strengthened the military capabilities of African states and intervened with force when its perceived interests were deemed threatened. During the 1990s, US actions were most often justified by the response to instability/responsibility to protect paradigm. However, after the September 2001 attacks, the US counterterrorism agenda took increasing precedence. Washington provided money, training, hardware, and equipment to dozens of countries that were considered vulnerable to terrorist activity. It provided air support in conventional military actions and engaged in a growing number of covert military operations. The increasing securitization of US Africa policy shifted attention and resources from health and development to counterterrorism and favored countries that were rich in resources or strategically located over other countries that may have had more pressing needs.

Chapter 13, focusing on 2017, surveys the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency and suggests how his administration’s policies and perspectives are likely to affect Africa. Based on statements made during the presidential campaign and evidence from Trump’s first year in office, the chapter explores continuities and discontinuities with policies of past administrations. It foresees the continued militarization of US Africa policy and a diminished emphasis on public health, economic development, good governance, and human rights. Although the counterterrorism agenda gained precedence in the Bush and Obama administrations, officials in those administrations regarded physical well-being, economic prosperity, and accountable governance as critical components of the counterterrorism toolkit. Trump, in contrast, sees little value in diplomacy and foreign aid. He opposes US support for UN peacekeeping efforts and for postconflict nation building. Although early renditions of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy hinted at a rollback of US intervention, his subsequent actions in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia suggest an intensification of US military involvement in global trouble spots. In Africa, such interventions are likely to be justified by the war on terror paradigm.

THE NEXT CHAPTER advances the book’s agenda in three ways. First, it offers an overview of Africa in the 1990s, when political and economic crises opened the door to a new round of external involvement. Second, it develops more fully the paradigms used to justify foreign invention, providing historical context for the constituent ideas and examining their evolution. Finally, the chapter discusses common misunderstandings about Islam that have influenced the execution of the Western war on terror and that continue to influence government actions.