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Identifying the Actors

Who Intervened and Why

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND social instability in Africa after the Cold War resulted in new waves of foreign intervention. Global, regional, and subregional state-based organizations were central to war-making and peace-building processes, and nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks played key roles in some conflicts. During the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, foreign states intervened in African affairs unilaterally or in collaboration with other states. Former imperial powers and new Cold War powers were the most significant sources of external intervention. After the Cold War, unilateral engagement continued. Onetime imperial and Cold War powers continued to intercede in their historical spheres of interest; Middle Eastern states and organizations took a special interest in North Africa; and African countries intervened in their neighbors’ affairs. However, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states (intergovernmental organizations) and transnational networks of nonstate actors grew increasingly important.

This chapter introduces the major foreign actors involved in African conflicts after the Cold War, including nation-states on other continents, neighboring African countries, multilateral state-based organizations, and nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks. It distinguishes the outside contestants in decolonization and Cold War conflicts from those involved in their aftermath, and it establishes a framework for understanding the interests and motivations of the foreign actors featured in the regional case studies.

During the post–Cold War period, Western nations continued to implicate themselves in African affairs. France and the United Kingdom intervened in their former colonies, while the United States focused on its former Cold War allies and on countries deemed strategic in the war on terror. In some instances, Western powers and their allies interceded under the auspices of intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, NATO, or the EU.¹ In other cases, they took unilateral action. Middle powers like the Nordic states also played significant roles in multilateral peace negotiations and peacekeeping operations, and they often engaged in independent diplomatic initiatives.²

The other former Cold War powers, China and Russia, ordinarily opposed political and military intervention in the internal affairs of other nations—their immediate neighbors excepted. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, they frequently challenged Western-sponsored initiatives focusing on human rights and governance issues. Like other industrial states, China was particularly interested in regions that were rich in strategic natural resources. In exchange for guaranteed access to such resources, China invested heavily in African industries and infrastructure and turned a blind eye to human rights abuses, political repression, and corruption. However, China, like the West, recognized that its economic interests would be best served by peace and stability. In consequence, Beijing expanded its involvement in multilateral disaster relief, antipiracy, and counterterrorism operations. In 2016, it contributed more military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations than any other permanent member of the Security Council. It engaged in mediation and peacekeeping efforts in Sudan and South Sudan, where it had significant investments in oil production and infrastructure, and also in Mali, where its primary interests lay in the oil and uranium of neighboring countries. China also joined France, the United States, Italy, and Japan in establishing a military facility in Djibouti, which overlooks one of the world’s most lucrative shipping lanes.

Russia, like China, viewed post–Cold War Africa as a new frontier of political and economic opportunity. Itself the target of Western economic sanctions, Moscow had no interest in critiquing its partners’ domestic human rights abuses or international transgressions. It offered goods and services to countries sidelined by Western restrictions and used its power on the Security Council to oppose robust military interventions that would encroach on national sovereignty and promote Western interests. Critical of Western influence over peacekeeping structures and initiatives, Moscow also recognized that its participation provided it with an avenue toward increased global prominence. Although its personnel contributions to African peacekeeping missions have been relatively small, Russia has trained African peacekeepers for both UN and AU missions, and it has sought leadership roles in the UN peacekeeping headquarters in New York and in missions on the ground. In Africa, Moscow’s military imprint is more evident in its substantive weapons trade: a major military supplier to African governments during the Cold War, Moscow has continued to expand its arms trade on the continent. It has also used its military connections to extend its influence in other arenas. Although Russia’s commerce with Africa is still small relative to that of China, Europe, and the United States, it has increased dramatically since 2000. Like China, Russia has focused its investments on the energy and mining sectors and on infrastructure development.

Middle Eastern powers also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. Historically, Middle Eastern countries maintained strong political and cultural ties with North Africa, which was commonly considered part of the Arab World. During the post–Cold War period, a number of Middle Eastern nations intervened in North Africa and the Horn of Africa, acting unilaterally or through the intergovernmental Arab League. Most significant for this study, the Gulf states and Turkey provided important political, economic, and military support to established governments and their opponents during the Arab Spring uprisings and their aftermath.³

African states also implicated themselves in their neighbors’ affairs through the UN, the AU, and subregional organizations, as well as unilaterally. Like other outside powers, they often had mixed motives: they sought to engender peace and stability but also to further their own aims and interests. In some cases, they backed the governments in power. In others, they supported warlords or rebel movements.⁴ Somalia (chapter 4) was the subject of interference from Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, and Uganda, while the conflict in Sudan (chapter 5) sparked intervention by Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Libya, and Uganda. Uganda and Zaire implicated themselves in Rwandan affairs before and after the 1994 genocide (chapter 6), while wars in Zaire’s successor state, the Democratic Republic of Congo (chapter 7), engaged Angola, Burundi, Chad, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In West Africa’s Mano River region (chapters 8 and 9), the civil war in Liberia involved intervention by Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Libya; the related civil war in Sierra Leone implicated Liberia and Libya; and the ensuing civil war in Côte d’Ivoire involved Liberia and Burkina Faso. The Egyptian military intervened in Libya after the Arab Spring revolt (chapter 10). In Mali, the French-led intervention to counter a secessionist movement and jihadist insurgency was joined by Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, while the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was challenged by armies from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (chapter 11).

Some individual states played outsized roles in their own subregions and, in a few cases, wielded considerable influence continentwide. In particular, Nigeria in West Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa were notable for both their subregional and continental influence. In North, East, and Central Africa, no single nation could claim subregional dominance. However, Algeria and Egypt possessed considerable clout in North Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia carried significant weight in East African affairs, while Egypt also aspired to wider influence in the Greater Horn.⁵ In Central Africa, the DRC was large in size and rich in minerals, but internal conflicts prevented it from assuming a leadership role.

Several intergovernmental organizations and nonstate actors played key roles in shaping the post–Cold War order in Africa. The most consequential included one global organization, the United Nations; four regional bodies, the Organization of African Unity, the African Union, the European Union, and the Arab League; and five subregional organizations, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The most significant nonstate actors were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates. The composition, purpose, and interests of these organizations are described below.

Global Organization: The United Nations

Established in 1945 to promote international peace, security, and social progress, the United Nations is dominated by the nations that won World War II. The UN General Assembly includes representatives of all member states. However, its resolutions are not legally binding, and it possesses no enforcement powers. The UN Security Council comprises five veto-bearing permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) and ten rotating members that serve two-year terms and have no veto power. The Security Council can impose sanctions and authorize military intervention. The United States, which pays the largest share of the organization’s operating expenses, dominated UN structures throughout the Cold War, when the US agenda generally prevailed. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has continued to promote a Western agenda, although its powers have been limited by Russia and China, which historically have opposed UN intervention in the internal affairs of member nations.

Two chapters of the UN Charter spell out the organization’s role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and in peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Chapter VI permits the Security Council to investigate disputes that threaten international peace and security, to issue recommendations, and to monitor peace accords. The main parties to the dispute must consent to UN involvement. Under a Chapter VI mandate, a neutral UN force composed of troops from member states is stationed between warring parties that have endorsed a peace accord and empowered the UN to monitor it and maintain the peace. UN troops may use their weapons only if attacked or threatened with attack. They are not authorized to use force to protect civilians or to disarm parties to the dispute. They may not impose peace in the context of war. If war resumes, peacekeeping forces authorized under Chapter VI are generally withdrawn or their mandate is transformed into a Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for UN intervention to maintain or restore peace, even in cases in which the main parties to the conflict have not acceded to UN involvement. Under this more robust mandate, UN troops are permitted to use force to counter threats to international peace and security even when peacekeepers are not directly threatened. They also may be authorized to protect civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and relief convoys, and to disarm and demobilize warring parties.

Because the UN Security Council determines which peacekeeping operations will be authorized and funded, the five permanent members wield enormous power. They generally choose to fund only those operations that support their interests and to end operations that oppose or no longer serve their interests. The three Western members fund nearly half the peacekeeping budget.⁶ Therefore they exercise disproportionate control over the operations, using their financial clout to determine where UN missions are sent and for how long.

Because East and West often failed to agree, there were few UN peacekeeping missions during the Cold War. In its immediate aftermath, Western powers were more concerned about maintaining the peace in Europe—specifically in the Balkans—than in Africa, where Cold War dictators were left to fail and rival forces jockeyed for position in the resulting power vacuums. During the 1990s, the Security Council withdrew UN peacekeepers from Somalia in the face of a deepening crisis and from Rwanda in the midst of a genocide, while the growing conflict in Liberia was ignored. By the decade’s end, however, the Security Council had begun to work with African regional and subregional organizations to secure peace in Sudan, the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire—all countries of considerable interest to the West, and in the case of Sudan, also to China. The UN provided significant funds for these operations, which in turn enabled it to influence the substance of the peace agreements and, to a lesser extent, their implementation.

A third chapter of the UN Charter provides for subregional and regional involvement in dispute settlement. Chapter VIII stipulates that if strife within or between countries threatens international peace and security, subregional and regional bodies are the most appropriate first responders. If one or more states cannot resolve a conflict or are not deemed neutral arbiters, the appropriate subregional organization is expected to respond. If those efforts fail, the continentwide regional organization is called upon. If the subregional or regional body lacks material resources or political will, the UN may intervene, often in collaboration with those organizations. No enforcement actions may be taken by subregional or regional bodies without UN Security Council authorization.

Regional Organizations

Organization of African Unity

During the first post–Cold War decade, the most important regional organization in Africa was the Organization of African Unity. Established in May 1963 by thirty-two independent African states, the OAU promoted national liberation in territories still under colonial or white minority rule and provided liberation movements with military, economic, and diplomatic support. For nearly four decades the organization served as an important voice for African emancipation. Many African states argued that the OAU should assume responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution on the continent, countering the great-power bias on the UN Security Council. However, the OAU Charter was the product of compromise, drafted under the conservative influence of Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie and sensitive to the political realities of a divided continent. It prohibited the organization’s interference in the internal affairs of member states. Moreover, unity among African states was both fragile and superficial. The OAU was marked by political, economic, religious, and personal rivalries, and the organization represented the interests of autocratic rulers more often than those of grassroots citizens. Because the organization did not possess enforcement powers, its resolutions had little effect beyond their moral appeal.

African Union

In July 2002 the OAU was succeeded by the African Union, an amalgam of the OAU and the African Economic Community, which was established in 1991 to promote African economic integration. Addressing deficiencies in the OAU mandate, the AU’s mission is to integrate Africa politically and economically and to promote peace, security, stability, and sustainable development on the continent. In contrast to the OAU Charter, which supported the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states, the AU’s Constitutive Act permits the organization to take punitive action against member states that violate principles of democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. It may authorize military intervention in a member state if it determines that “war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” are being committed or if the state’s actions threaten regional stability.⁷ However, even the AU’s strengthened mandate provides insufficient protection to victims of human rights abuses. The actions of corrupt or authoritarian regimes may fall outside the categories stipulated in the Constitutive Act, and governments that engage in human rights abuses are unlikely to support intervention in states with similar practices. The Constitutive Act authorizes the establishment of an African standby force composed of military, police, and civilian brigades from each of Africa’s five subregions, which would be capable of rapid deployment to crisis areas. However, such a force was still in the formative stages in 2017. Other factors that weaken AU effectiveness include rivalry between Nigeria and South Africa and AU dependence on outside sources for funding. Many of the organization’s peacekeeping missions are financed by extracontinental entities—most importantly, the UN, the EU, the United States, and France. Their financial clout gives these external powers undue control over AU missions and actions.

European Union

Established in 1958 to promote economic cooperation between European countries, the European Economic Community (EEC) was renamed the European Union in 1993, reflecting an expanded mission that embraced foreign policy and security, climate change and environment, and international development and migration. In 2017, the EU had twenty-eight members.⁸ Strong historical and geographic links and rich natural resources have made Africa central to European concerns. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy, endorsed in 2007 by eighty African and European heads of state, highlighted areas of common interest, including peace and security, international development and migration, and democracy, good governance, and human rights. The EU has provided substantial funds to strengthen African conflict resolution, security, and counterterrorism capacities and for African-led peacekeeping operations, such as the AU mission in Somalia. Its financial role gives the European organization significant influence over African affairs and establishes yet another kind of Northern dominance. The EU has also contributed considerable sums to develop African capacities to impede the flow of refugees and other migrants to Europe, an effort that serves European, rather than African, interests.

Arab League

Established in 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen, the League of Arab States, or Arab League, was a product of the pan-Arab nationalist movement that rose in response to Ottoman and European rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The League’s vision also harkened back to the Islamic caliphates established by Muhammad and his successors, which, during the seventh and eighth centuries, united all Muslims in a single political entity. The organization aspired to promote collaboration between its member states, to protect their independence and sovereignty, and to advance Arab interests more generally. It opposed the violent settlement of disputes between members and often mediated in regional conflicts. However, it had no mechanism to enforce compliance with its resolutions, and only member states that approved the resolutions were bound to adhere to them. As a result, actions taken in the name of the Arab League were often motivated by the interests of particular member states, which financed and spearheaded the operations. In fact, Arab unity was more a hope than a reality. The Arab world, like other invented communities, was torn by rivalries—political, economic, religious, and personal. Member states’ divergent interests often resulted in paralysis in the face of regional conflicts. Like the OAU, the Arab League has generally represented the interests of powerful autocratic regimes rather than those of its members’ citizens.⁹

By 1958, the League included four newly independent North African nations: Libya, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 2017 it comprised twenty-two member states, ten of which were African.¹⁰ Although it remained on the sidelines in many African conflicts, the Arab League or its members played significant roles in some. Acting unilaterally or through the League, Egypt, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen intervened in Somalia’s affairs after the Cold War. The Council of the Arab League endorsed the UN-imposed no-fly zone in Libya in 2011, and member states Qatar and the United Arab Emirates participated in the NATO-led military operation that paved the way for regime change in that country. During the Arab Spring and its aftermath, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates supported opposing sides in Libya’s civil war and in Egypt, where an elected Islamist-led government was ousted in a military coup.

Subregional Organizations

A number of African subregional organizations were established in the 1970s and 1980s to deal with common economic, environmental, and political problems. Several of these organizations assumed important roles in conflict mediation, peace negotiations, and peacekeeping processes after the Cold War. Especially significant for their diplomatic and military efforts were the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which had been central to struggles against white minority rule during the periods of decolonization and the Cold War, was a less significant political and economic actor in later decades. Like the global and regional organizations described earlier, the subregional organizations also suffered from internal conflicts that reduced their effectiveness.

Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS was established in 1975 by sixteen West African states whose leaders hoped to promote subregional economic cooperation and development.¹¹ Some members imagined ECOWAS as an instrument for undermining French influence in a subregion where the former imperial power maintained close political, economic, and military ties to its onetime colonies and intervened frequently in their affairs. Nigeria, the anglophone subregional powerhouse, hoped to use the organization as a launching pad for its own political and economic ambitions, which included weakening the francophone powers and establishing a common market with Nigeria as the linchpin.

Although ECOWAS was not conceived as a security organization, it increasingly assumed that role, especially after the Cold War, when external interest in Africa diminished. A 1981 protocol provided for mutual assistance against external aggression and for the establishment of an ECOWAS military force to protect member states from such aggression. The ECOWAS force was permitted to intervene in an internal conflict in a member state at the request of that state’s government if the conflict was promoted by external forces and if it jeopardized subregional peace and stability. The 1999 “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security” elaborated on the force’s function. It could assist in conflict prevention, humanitarian intervention to thwart subregional instability, sanctions enforcement, peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilization, and peace building, and in the policing of gun running, drug smuggling, and other transterritorial crimes. The protocol was to be applied in cases of threatened or actual external aggression or conflict in a member state, conflict between two or more member states, internal conflict that could provoke humanitarian disaster or threaten subregional peace and security, serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law, the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government, and other situations as determined by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council.

Although ECOWAS members agreed to cooperate on subregional security issues, francophone and anglophone states often maintained uneasy relationships. Even when the organization was charged with the purportedly neutral task of peacekeeping, its constituent members sometimes supported opposing sides of a conflict—as was the case in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, larger, wealthier states often wielded undue influence over the organization’s actions. As the largest financial contributor to ECOWAS, for instance, Nigeria ensured that its own interests were protected and promoted. Because the AU funds many ECOWAS operations, powerful AU members states have had disproportionate influence over West African affairs.

Economic Community of Central African States

ECCAS was established in October 1983 by member states of the Central African Customs and Economic Union and of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes States. In 2017, ECCAS included eleven member states.¹² The organization’s goal was to establish a wider economic community and to promote peaceful resolution of political disputes. Notably, in July 2015, the UN Security Council asked ECCAS to work with ECOWAS and the AU to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon—the latter an ECCAS member state. Like other multinational bodies, ECCAS was sometimes weakened by internal disagreements. Conflicts in the DRC, the geographic linchpin of the subregion, split the organization, with Angola and Chad supporting the DRC government and Burundi opposing it.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

ICGLR was established in 2000 by eleven African states to promote subregional cooperation for international peace and security, political stability, and sustainable development in the Great Lakes subregion.¹³ The organization aspired to address the structural causes of enduring conflicts and underdevelopment. Like other subregional bodies, ICGLR was sometimes compromised by internal rivalries. Conflicts in the DRC pitted ICGLR member states Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda against the DRC government, which was supported by Angola as well as by several non-ICGLR states. ICGLR mediation efforts were occasionally led by interested parties. Some questioned the organization’s ability to engage impartially in the South Sudan conflict, noting Uganda’s military support for the government, which along with rebel forces had been accused of massive human rights violations.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development was established in 1986 by six East African countries to cooperate on problems resulting from the severe drought, environmental degradation, and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. In 1996 the organization was superseded by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which expanded the areas of subregional cooperation to include the promotion of subregional peace and stability and the creation of mechanisms to prevent, manage, and resolve intra- and interstate conflicts through dialogue.¹⁴ As was the case for other subregional organizations, IGAD was weakened by internal rivalries, and member states sometimes pursued parochial interests rather than promoting broader regional benefits. Ethiopia and Kenya struggled to assert subregional dominance, while Sudan and Uganda also jockeyed for influence. Operating within these constraints, IGAD helped broker an accord that established a transitional federal government in Somalia; it also provided a military force to protect that government and train its security forces. However, the foreign-backed regime, beholden to powerful warlords and their external patrons, had scant support inside Somalia. IGAD also played a key role in mediating an end to Sudan’s civil war in 2005 and in attempting to resolve subsequent conflicts in South Sudan in 2014–17. However, the competing interests of IGAD member states and the continued support of some states for rival factions seriously undermined the resulting agreements.

Southern African Development Community

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980 by nine Southern African states to build new networks of trade, transportation, communications, and energy and to promote agricultural and industrial alternatives that would break apartheid South Africa’s economic stranglehold on the subregion. In 1992, SADCC was reformulated as the Southern African Development Community, or SADC, which aimed to promote subregional integration, economic growth, development, peace, and security in the aftermath of white minority rule. SADC eventually broadened its membership to include fifteen African countries.¹⁵

Although SADCC had played a pivotal role in the struggles for majority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa in the 1980s, its successor organization was less significant in the 1990s and 2000s. Member states sometimes promoted opposing strategies. In the DRC, for instance, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe supported the Congolese government militarily, while South Africa attempted to mediate a negotiated solution to the conflict. In 2013, SADC as an entity became more directly involved in the DRC when it joined ICGLR in promoting a regional peace and security framework and contributed soldiers to the UN intervention brigade that was intended to enforce the agreement. South Africa also played an independent role outside SADC and the subregion, helping to broker peace agreements in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan.

Although the political, economic, and military destabilization associated with apartheid ended in 1994, South Africa continued to dominate the subregion and played a growing role on the continent and in the global arena. South African mining, construction, retail, and media and telecommunications companies invested heavily in the Southern African subregion and across the continent. Pretoria’s economic clout was accompanied by growing political influence. After apartheid’s demise, South Africa became the unofficial African voice in key international organizations. It played a prominent role in organizations that promote alternative visions in the Global South, including the AU, in which it was a prime mover, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and BRICS, an association that champions the interests of the major emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

An advocate for populations in the southern hemisphere, South Africa also supported initiatives that strengthened the position of the Global North. It encouraged participation in the AU-led New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which embraces the neoliberal economic policies of international financial institutions and the Northern industrialized countries—particularly those of the powerful Group of Seven (G7), an organization that aims to build consensus on economics, energy, security, and terrorism.¹⁶ In 2017, South Africa was the only African member of the Northern-dominated Group of 20 (G20), which included nineteen of the world’s largest industrialized and emerging economies, plus the EU.¹⁷ South Africa’s prominence was also evident in its designation as one of the EU’s strategic partners and its election to two terms on the UN Security Council (2007–8 and 2011–12), where it had a voice, if not a veto, on matters relating to foreign intervention in Africa. As a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, South Africa was susceptible to external pressure. It sometimes broke with AU positions to support those of the Western powers, as it did when it voted to establish a no-fly zone in Libya in 2011. However, it endorsed the AU’s call for UN reforms that would grant African countries two permanent and five rotating seats on the Security Council. South Africa, like Nigeria, aspired to assume a veto-wielding position.

Pretoria’s increasingly forceful presence in Africa and on the world stage was embraced by some on the continent as an example of Africans finding solutions for African problems. However, others charged that South Africa subordinated subregional and regional interests to its own interests—or to those of global capital. While Northern powers looked to Pretoria to protect their interests, Nigeria resisted South Africa’s heightened continental profile, and neighboring states remained wary of the subregional giant, which, no longer fettered by international sanctions, aggressively expanded its economic reach. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Kenya—with their growing economies and strong ties to the West—joined Nigeria in challenging South Africa’s presumed right to represent the continent in global bodies.

International Jihadist Organizations and Their African Branches and Affiliates

Nonstate actors also intervened in Africa after the Cold War. The most significant of these were the international jihadist networks, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, along with their African branches and affiliates.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda’s origins can be traced to the Cold War and to the intervention of outside powers in Afghanistan (see chapter 2). In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to assert control over a weak Afghan government that had failed to quash a Sunni insurgency that challenged Moscow’s hegemony in Central Asia. During the ensuing Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89), the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and their allies recruited, trained, and financed tens of thousands of Sunni militants from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America to topple the Soviet-backed Afghan regime. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the militants dispersed, fortified by sophisticated weaponry and new training in terror tactics. In the decades that followed, they established terrorist organizations and networks on several continents. Among the most significant was al-Qaeda, a Salafi jihadist organization that had established training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the war.¹⁸ In 1991 al-Qaeda moved its headquarters to Sudan, where it initiated a network of cells and allied organizations that operated in the Greater Horn.

AL-QAEDA’S AFRICAN AFFILIATES

In 2017, al-Qaeda had two important African branches: al-Shabaab (The Youth), which was based in Somalia and launched attacks in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda; and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which operated in North Africa and the Western Sahel.¹⁹ Al-Qaeda also claimed a number of local affiliates and associated organizations. Some of these had splintered from AQIM because of internal disputes; others were the result of mergers between AQIM and groups that were indigenous to the region. Most of the African entities emerged from local conditions and turned to al-Qaeda for political, material, and propaganda aid after they were established. The following list, organized by country, is based on data collected in 2017. It is subject to change as allegiances fluctuate, existing organizations dissolve, and new ones form.

Algeria: Al-Mulathameen (Masked Brigade)—also known as al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam (Those Who Sign with Blood Brigade)—was founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, an Algerian veteran of the Soviet-Afghan and Algerian wars and a former AQIM leader. The organization cut ties to AQIM in December 2012 and reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership.

Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of the Holy House) was established in the Sinai Peninsula after the 2011 ouster of the Mubarak regime. Although the organization’s ideology was influenced by al-Qaeda, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis’s focus was primarily local, and it was not a formal al-Qaeda affiliate. The group’s activities intensified following the 2013 military coup that removed a democratically elected Islamist president and led to a brutal crackdown on Islamists and other opponents of the new regime. In 2014, the organization split when numerous members in the Nile Valley retained links to al-Qaeda, while many in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. Another al-Qaeda associate, Jund al-Islam (Army of Islam), was established in Sinai in 2013. After initial activity and a four-year hiatus, it reemerged in 2017. The same year, Ansar al-Islam (Followers of Islam), a new al-Qaeda-linked organization, began operating in the desert southwest of Cairo.²⁰

Libya: The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was founded in 1995 by Libyan veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War. Al-Qaeda members have held prominent leadership positions in the organization. Al-Qaeda-linked groups that emerged in Libya after the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi include Ansar al-Shari’a (Followers of Islamic Law) in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte, and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade. The Derna Mujahideen Shura Council was formed in 2015 by Ansar al-Shari’a in Derna and the Abu Salim Martyrs’ Brigade to counter the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna, which supported the Islamic State.

Mali: Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) was established in 2011 and gained AQIM support after its founding. Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) splintered from AQIM in 2011 but continued to collaborate with it. Al-Mourabitoun (The Sentinels), which reported directly to the al-Qaeda leadership, was formed in August 2013 as a merger of the Algerian-based al-Mulathameen and a MUJWA faction. Al-Mourabitoun fractured in 2015, with some members maintaining their ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. In late 2015, al-Mourabitoun’s al-Qaeda faction affiliated with AQIM. The Macina Liberation Front, which aspires to reinstate the nineteenth-century Macina Empire in modern Mali, originated among Fulanis in central Mali in 2015. Although it was led by a fundamentalist cleric and collaborated with AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine, the organization presented itself as a liberation movement rather than a jihadist organization. In March 2017, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).

Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), established in 2002, is commonly known as Boko Haram (Western Education Is Forbidden). In 2014, the UN Security Council listed the organization as an associate of AQIM. However, in 2015 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru, splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. In 2014, the UN Security Council listed Ansaru as an associate of AQIM.

Somalia: Al-Shabaab (The Youth), inspired by Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, originated as a youth militia linked to the Islamic Courts Union. It established ties to al-Qaeda following a US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and became an official branch of al-Qaeda in 2012. Its focus was primarily local. However, it also attacked Ethiopia and countries that contributed to an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, established in 2011, had strong links to al-Qaeda. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which drew much of its membership from Ansar al-Shari’a, described itself as an AQIM battalion. In 2014 some members of both groups switched their allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

The Islamic State

The Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).²¹ In contrast to local Salafi jihadist groups that focus on establishing or purifying a Muslim state in a single country, the Islamic State aims to establish a caliphate that would unite Muslims worldwide in one political entity—a phenomenon last achieved in the eighth century. The origins of the modern Islamic State can be traced to the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which precipitated the Second Gulf War (2003–11). The invasion and occupation sparked a Sunni insurgency led by the Jordanian-Palestinian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who transformed his organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which targeted US military and international coalition forces as well as local collaborators. After Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, his successors began to refer to the al-Qaeda branch and associated organizations as the Islamic State in Iraq. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State expanded its reach into that country, and by 2013 it was calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who honed his ideas and mobilizing skills in an US internment camp, the Islamic State recruited followers from among the Sunni minority that had been favored under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized politically after his ouster by US and coalition forces. In February 2014, al-Qaeda severed its ties to the Islamic State, criticizing its persistent aggression against Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, as well as its brutal treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, particularly Shi’as.²² Noted for its ruthless methods, the Islamic State attracted international jihadis who felt that al-Qaeda was too moderate. However, both Muslims and non-Muslims widely condemned the organization for its harsh practices and attacks on civilians.

A number of African entities have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader. Like those that developed links to al-Qaeda, these groups emerged from local conditions and only later established ties to the international jihadist organization.

AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE

Algeria: Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria split from AQIM in 2014 and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, established in 2011, was influenced by al-Qaeda ideology but was not a formal affiliate. The organization fractured in 2014 when many Nile Valley members retained links to al-Qaeda, while others in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and named their faction Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) or Islamic State–Sinai Province.

Libya: A brigade of fighters from eastern Libya, who had fought on behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, returned home in 2014 and reconstituted themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna. They declared eastern Libya to be a province of the Islamic State, which they called Cyrenaica Province. Two other Islamic State provinces were established in Libya in 2015: Tripolitania Province in the west and Fezzan Province in the south. In early 2015, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte split into two factions, with some members retaining ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

Mali: Although most Malian jihadist organizations retained their ties to al-Qaeda, some al-Mourabitoun members left the organization in 2015 to form the Islamic State in Mali, subsequently renamed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (sometimes translated as the Islamic State in the Sahel).

Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, switched its allegiance from AQIM to the Islamic State in 2015 and adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province.

Somalia: Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), based in Puntland, broke from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab in 2015. Another al-Shabaab splinter, Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (also known as Jahba East Africa or the East African Front) emerged in early 2016.

Tunisia: Following a government crackdown, some remnants of Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, previously associated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2014. Some members of the AQIM-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade also switched allegiances in 2014 and established a new organization, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, which aligned with the Islamic State. The Tunisian jihadist group Mujahidin of Kairouan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2015.

Conclusion

Sustaining a pattern established during decolonization and the Cold War, foreign governments and other entities intervened in African affairs in the decades that followed. Although individual states continued to intercede unilaterally, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states and by nonstate actors became more frequent than previously. In some cases, the presence of nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks provoked intervention by foreign states or institutions. In other cases, intrusion by foreign entities stimulated local insurgencies that in turn attracted international terrorist support. State-based actors justified their involvement as a response to instability, an effort to protect civilian lives, and a necessity for advancing the war on terror. However, they also promoted their own more parochial interests. Conflicting agendas often weakened multilateral efforts, and the priorities of the most powerful countries generally took precedence. While African political and military leaders participated in war-making and peace-building processes, African civil society representatives remained in the background. These deficiencies undermined the prospects for a lasting peace, as the following case studies demonstrate.

Chapter 4, which focuses on Somalia, is the first of two chapters that explore post–Cold War intervention in East Africa. When foreign powers withdrew their support for the Somali government after the Cold War, insurgent forces overthrew the authoritarian regime. Concerned about the humanitarian crisis inside the country as well as the potential for regional destabilization, multilateral organizations, extracontinental powers, and neighboring countries intervened. Their motivations were varied, often at odds, and subject to change over time. Although some of the initial outcomes were positive, the long-term effects were largely negative, contributing to increased human suffering and instability.

Suggested Reading

African international relations are explored in a number of recent works. Two recommended volumes investigate the role of extracontinental powers in Africa after the Cold War, including the major Western powers along with Russia, China, Japan, India, the UN, the EU, and international financial institutions. See Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, eds., Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum, 2010). John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing World Order, 5th ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013), explores interstate conflict, the impact of outside investment and externally induced political reforms, and the role of international peacekeeping forces. Errol A. Henderson, African Realism? International Relations Theory and Africa’s Wars in the Postcolonial Era (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little-field, 2015), challenges the applicability of Eurocentric international relations theories to African cases and explores the relationship between Africa’s domestic and international conflicts.

Several books examine the role of the UN in the post–World War II international order. Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), argues that the UN was created to protect the interests of empire but was reshaped by formerly colonized states and transformed into an instrument for ending the old imperial order. David L. Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), explores the role of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council in shaping the post–Cold War world. A number of works investigate UN humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in Africa, elucidating the reasons for their success or failure. See Andrzej Sitkowski, UN Peacekeeping: Myth and Reality (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006); Norrie MacQueen, Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011); Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Pearson Education, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa: From the Suez Crisis to the Sudan Conflicts (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011); and Adekeye Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin: Africa after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

Other books examine international peacekeeping in Africa. Two wide-ranging studies are particularly useful: Adebajo, UN Peacekeeping in Africa (mentioned previously); and Marco Wyss and Thierry Tardy, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Structure (New York: Routledge, 2014), which considers UN, AU, EU, and ECOWAS operations, as well as unilateral actions by outside powers. For the role of African regional organizations and peacekeeping forces, see David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); and Abou Jeng, Peacebuilding in the African Union: Law, Philosophy and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

A number of recommended works consider the role of subregional peacekeeping forces. The strengths and weaknesses of ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in West Africa are investigated in Adekeye Abebajo, ed., Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid, eds., West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Adekeye Adebajo, Liberia’s Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); and Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998). SADC’s efforts in Southern Africa are considered in Laurie Nathan, Community of Insecurity: SADC’s Struggle for Peace and Security in Southern Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).

Other studies examine the hegemonic influence of particular countries on the African continent. Adebajo, The Curse of Berlin (mentioned previously), considers South Africa, Nigeria, China, France, and the United States. Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing American Peace-Building Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), written by a diplomatic insider, focuses on the role of the United States in postconflict peace building. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), investigates the impact of French security and cooperation policies in postindependence Africa and argues that French intervention denied Africans political freedom and sustained their political, economic, and social domination by outsiders. The growing role of China in Africa is considered in Deborah Bräutigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008); David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, China and Africa: A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); and Howard W. French, China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa (New York: Knopf, 2014). Ian Taylor, Africa Rising? BRICS—Diversifying Dependency (Martlesham, UK: James Currey, 2014), provides a critical examination of the roles of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa in post–Cold War Africa, arguing that the emerging economies of the Global South, like the Western powers before them, have an interest in perpetuating an unequal system that consigns Africa to the bottom rung.

The emergence of South Africa as both a regional and continental player is considered in several works. Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman explore South Africa’s growing economic involvement in Africa and its expanding political role on the continent and the global stage. See Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa in the Company of Giants: The Search for Leadership in a Transforming Global Order,” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): 111–29; and Chris Alden and Maxi Schoeman, “South Africa’s Symbolic Hegemony in Africa,” International Politics 52, no. 2 (2015): 239–54. William G. Martin, South Africa and the World Economy (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2013), examines the transformation of South African political and economic power from the era of colonialism and white minority rule to the present, marked by its recent alliances with Northern industrialized powers and new challenges from Asia. Chris Alden and Miles Soko, “South Africa’s Economic Relations with Africa: Hegemony and Its Discontents,” Journal of Modern African Studies 43, no. 3 (September 2005): 367–92, differentiates between the roles played by the regional bodies, SADC and the Southern African Customs Union, on the one hand, and by South Africa’s private and parastatal corporations, on the other. Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan examine the impact of South African trade, investment, and infrastructure and telecommunications developments in Africa in a two-part article: Fred Ahwireng-Obeng and Patrick J. McGowan, “Partner or Hegemon: South Africa in Africa, Part I,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 16, no. 1 (January 1998): 5–38; and Patrick J. McGowan and Fred Ahwireng-Obeng, “Partner or Hegemon: South Africa in Africa, Part II,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 16, no. 2 (July 1998): 165–95. Recent developments in South African foreign policy are explored in Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Renewal? Adelphi Paper 362 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003); and Laurie Nathan, “Consistencies and Inconsistencies in South Africa Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 81, no. 2 (March 2005): 361–72. Pretoria’s role in conflict mediation in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Sudan are assessed in Kurt Shillinger, Africa’s Peacemaker? Lessons from South African Conflict Mediation (Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2009).

For the role of warlords in post–Cold War African conflicts, see two important books by William Reno: Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), and Warfare in Independent Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

For the role of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Africa, see the Suggested Reading for chapter 2.

Map 4.1. Horn of Africa, 2018. (Map by Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping, Minneapolis.)