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Chapter 1

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND BEYOND

Welles’s entries on Lincoln’s decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation constitute one of the diary’s most important contributions to historical knowledge. In Section I of this chapter those entries are reproduced in their entirety. Section II consists of excerpts about a number of related topics, including the possible colonization of African Americans outside the United States, the enlistment in the army and navy of contrabands (slaves who fled to Union lines) and free-born blacks, the limits of the Emancipation Proclamation, the massacre of African American soldiers at Fort Pillow in Tennessee, and Congressional approval of the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery. ¹

I

As Welles points out in the following excerpt, Secretary of State Seward and he were the first cabinet members Lincoln sounded out about the possible issuance of a proclamation freeing the slaves in the rebellious states. This was probably no accident. Although virtually all Republicans were opposed to slavery in principle, opinions about how to eliminate the institution ranged across a broad spectrum from gradual, state-initiated, compensated emancipation followed by the forced deportation of the former slaves, to immediate, federally mandated, uncompensated emancipation coupled with citizenship and equal rights for the freed people. It is likely that Lincoln viewed Welles and Seward as the cabinet’s centrists – men who were generally less conservative than Interior Secretary Caleb Smith and the two border-state members, Attorney General Edward Bates and Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, but more conservative than Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. As a centrist himself, Lincoln may well have wanted to try out the idea on his fellow centrists before soliciting the views of other cabinet members.

Undated²: On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and his daughter in law Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence the house of a naval officer, I think Hazard, some two or three miles west, or northwest, of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc.

This was, he said, the first occasion when he had mentioned the subject to anyone, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to give it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject was adverted to, and before separating the President desired us to give the question special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject.³ This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local, domestic question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond,⁴ and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the Slave States, and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed by them.

On July 22nd Lincoln informed the entire cabinet of his intention to issue a proclamation of emancipation. Oddly, Welles made no diary entry on that date. But in his October 1st entry he discussed the July 22nd meeting (and a related one on July 21st). By the time that entry was written, Lincoln had issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (on September 22nd), giving the rebellious states 100 days (i.e., to January 1, 1863) to return to the Union, or else he would declare their slaves emancipated. The October 1st entry is reproduced below, followed by Welles’s September 22nd entry about the cabinet’s final discussion of the preliminary Proclamation preparatory to its issuance later that day. This departure from the chronological order of the diary is necessary in order to see the sequence of events as Welles observed them.

October 1, 1862: When it [Lincoln’s proposal for a proclamation of emancipation] was first brought forward [to the entire cabinet] some six or eight weeks ago,⁵ all assented to it. It was pretty fully discussed at two successive Cabinet-meetings, and the President consulted freely, I presume, with the members individually. He did with me. Mr. Bates [a Missourian] desired that deportation, by force if necessary, should go with emancipation. Born and educated among the negroes, having always lived with slaves, he dreaded any step which should be taken to bring about social equality between the two races. The effect, he said, would be to degrade the whites without elevating the blacks. Demoralization, vice, and misery would follow. Mr. Blair [from Maryland], at the second discussion, said that, while he was an emancipationist from principle, he had doubts of the expediency of such a movement as was contemplated. Stanton, after expressing himself earnestly in favor of the step proposed, said it was so important a measure that he hoped every member would give his opinion, whatever it might be, on the subject; two had not spoken – alluding to Chase and myself.

I briefly alluded to the strong exercise of power involved in the question, and the denial of Executive authority to do this act, but the Rebels themselves had invoked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to arms, and they must abide the consequences. It was an exercise of war powers, and I was willing to resort to extreme measures. The blow would fall heavy and severe on those loyal men in the Slave States who clung to the Union, but they must abide the results of a conflict which they had deplored, and unless they could persuade their fellow citizens to embrace the alternative presented [i.e., to end the rebellion forthwith], they must suffer with them. The slaves were now an element of strength to the Rebels – were laborers, producers, and army attendants; were considered as property by the Rebels, and, if property, were subject to confiscation; if not property, we should invite them as well as the [loyal southern] whites to unite with us in putting down the Rebellion. I had made known my views to the President and could say here I gave my approval of the Proclamation. Mr. Chase said it was going a step farther than he had proposed, but he was glad of it and went into a very full argument on the subject. I do not attempt to repeat it or any portion of it, nor that of others, farther than to define the position of each when this important question was before them. Something more than a Proclamation will be necessary, for this step will band the South together, and unite the Border States firmly with the Cotton States in resistance to the Government.

An important outcome of the July 22nd meeting Welles does not mention was Lincoln’s acceptance of Seward’s recommendation that issuance of the preliminary Proclamation be deferred until the Union’s military situation improved, lest it be seen as an act of desperation. The Union victory at Antietam on September 17th cleared the way for Lincoln to issue it five days later.

September 22, 1862: A special Cabinet meeting. The subject was the Proclamation for emancipating the slaves after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the President says [it was] never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up the Proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided, the act and the consequences were his, but that he felt it due to us to make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticism on the paper which he had prepared. There were, he had found, some differences in the Cabinet, but he had, after consulting each and all, individually and collectively, formed his own conclusions and made his own decision. In the course of the discussion on this paper, which was long, earnest, and, on the general principle involved, harmonious, he remarked that he had made a vow, a covenant, that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle [at Antietam], he would consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was his duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal of matters when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right, was confirmed and strengthened in his action by the vow and the results. His mind was fixed, his decision made, but he wished his paper announcing his course [to be] as correct in terms as it could be made without any change in his determination. He read the document. One or two unimportant emendations suggested by Seward were approved. It was then handed to the Secretary of State to publish to-morrow. After this, Blair remarked that he did not concur in the expediency of the measure at this time, though he approved of the principle, and should therefore wish to file his objections. He stated at some length his views, which were that we ought not to put in greater jeopardy the patriotic element in the Border States, that the results of this Proclamation would be to carry over those States en masse to the Secessionists as soon as it was read, and that there was also a class of partisans in the Free States endeavoring to revive old parties, who would have a club put into their hands of which they would avail themselves to beat the Administration.

Alexander Hay Ritchie’s engraving of Francis Bicknell Carpenter’s 1864 painting First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation Before the Cabinet (1866). Left to right: seated, Stanton, Lincoln, Welles, Seward, Bates; standing, Chase, Smith, Blair. Source: The Library of Congress

The President said he had considered the danger apprehended from the first objection, which was undoubtedly serious, but the objection was certainly as great not to act; as regarded the last, it had not much weight with him. The question of power, authority, in the Government to set free the slaves was not much discussed at this meeting, but had been canvassed by the President in private conversation with the members individually. Some thought legislation advisable before the step was taken, but Congress was clothed with no authority on this subject, nor is the Executive, except under the war power – military necessity, martial law, when there can be no legislation. This was the view which I took when the President first presented the subject to Seward and myself last summer as we were returning from the funeral of Stanton’s child, a ride of two or three miles beyond Georgetown. Seward was at that time not at all communicative, and, I think, not willing to advise the movement. It is momentous both in its immediate and remote results, and an exercise of extraordinary power which cannot be justified on mere humanitarian principles, and would never have been attempted but to preserve the national existence. These were my convictions and this [was] the drift of the discussion. The effect which the Proclamation will have on the public mind is a matter of some uncertainty. In some respects it would, I think, have been better to have issued it when formerly first considered. There is an impression that Seward has opposed, and is opposed to, the measure. I have not been without that impression myself, chiefly from his hesitation to commit himself, and perhaps because action was suspended on his suggestion. But in the final discussion he has as cordially supported the measure as Chase.

For myself the subject has, from its magnitude and its consequences oppressed me, aside from the ethical features of the question. It is a step in the progress of this war which will extend into the distant future. The termination of this terrible conflict seems more remote with every movement, and unless the Rebels hasten to avail themselves of the alternative presented, of which I see little probability, the war can scarcely be other than one of subjugation. There is in the Free States a very general impression that this measure will insure a speedy peace. I cannot say that I so view it. No one in those States dare advocate peace as a means of prolonging slavery, if it is his honest opinion, and the pecuniary, industrial, and social sacrifice impending will intensify the struggle before us. While, however, these dark clouds are above and around us, I cannot see how the subject could be avoided. Perhaps it is not desirable it should be.

Apropos Welles’s statement that Seward supported issuance of the preliminary Proclamation as “cordially” as Chase did, it will be seen in Chapter 2 that just two weeks before he issued the final Proclamation, Lincoln confronted a crisis precipitated by the attempt of a caucus of Republican senators to force him to oust the secretary of state. This was in part because many of the senators had the erroneous impression that Seward was exerting a “conservative” influence on the president with respect to emancipation. Chase, who was Seward’s foremost rival for influence and power within the administration, had done much behind the scenes to give Republican senators this impression. There was even concern that if Seward had his way, Lincoln would not issue the final Proclamation on January 1st.

September 24, 1862: As I write, 9 P.M., a band of music strikes up on the opposite side of the square,⁶ a complimentary serenade to the President for the [preliminary] Emancipation Proclamation. The document has been in the main well received, but there is some violent opposition, and the friends of the measure have made this demonstration to show their approval.

December 29, 1862: At the meeting to-day, the President read the draft of his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and finally directed that copies should be furnished to each [cabinet member]. It is a good and well-prepared paper, but I suggested that part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted. Chase advised that fractional parts of States ought not be exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Practically, there would be difficulty in freeing parts of States and not freeing others – a clashing between central and local authorities.⁷

December 31, 1862: We had an early and special Cabinet-meeting, convened at 10 A.M. The subject was the Proclamation of to-morrow to emancipate the slaves in the Rebel States. Seward proposed two amendments, one including mine, and one enjoining upon, instead of appealing to, those emancipated, to forbear from tumult.⁸ Blair had, like Seward and myself, proposed the omission of a part of a sentence and made other suggestions which I thought improvements. Chase made some good criticisms and proposed a felicitous closing sentence.⁹ The President took the suggestions, written in order, and said he would complete the document.

January 1, 1863: The Emancipation Proclamation is published in this evening’s Star. This is a broad step, and will be a landmark in history. The immediate effect will not be all its friends anticipate or its opponents apprehend. Passing events are steadily accomplishing what is here proclaimed. The character of the country is in many respects undergoing a transformation. This must be obvious to all, and I am content to await the results of events, deep as they may plough their furrows in our once happy land. This great upheaval which is shaking our civil fabric was perhaps necessary to overthrow and subdue the mass of wrong and error which no trivial measure could eradicate. The seed which is being sown will germinate and bear fruit, and tares and weeds will also spring up under the new dispensation.¹⁰

II

The following two excerpts describe the efforts by a shady promoter, Ambrose Thompson, to colonize African Americans on the Chiriquí Strip, located on the Isthmus of Panama, which was then part of New Granada (now Colombia). The colonists would support themselves by mining the supposedly rich coal deposits located there. Welles resisted the scheme, despite the interest Lincoln took in it and the energetic support it received from Secretary of the Interior Smith.

September 26, 1862: At several [cabinet] meetings of late the subject of deporting the colored race has been discussed. Indeed for months, almost from the commencement of this administration, it has been at times considered. More than a year ago it was thrust on me by Thompson and others in connection with the Chiriquí Grant. Speculators used it as a means of disposing of that grant to our Government. The President, encouraged by Blair and Smith, was disposed to favor it. Blair is honest and disinterested; perhaps Smith is so, yet I have not been favorably impressed with his zeal in behalf of the Chiriquí Association. As early as May, 1861, a great pressure was made upon me to enter into a coal contract with this company. The President was earnest in the matter. Smith, with the Thompsons [Ambrose and his son], urged and stimulated him, and they were as importunate with me as the President. I spent two or three hours on different days looking over the papers – titles, maps, reports, and evidence – and came to the conclusion that there was fraud and cheat in the affair. It appeared to be a swindling speculation. Told the President I had no confidence in it, and asked to be excused from its further consideration. The papers were then referred to Smith to investigate and report. After a month or two he reported strongly in favor of the scheme, and advised that the Navy Department should make an immediate contract for the coal before foreign governments got hold of it…. The President was quite earnest in its favor, but I objected and desired to be excused from any participation in it. Two or three times it has been revived, but I have crowded off action. Chase gave me assistance on one occasion, and the scheme was dropped until this question of deporting colored persons came up, when Smith again brought forward Thompson’s Chiriquí Grant. He made a skillful and taking report, embracing both coal and negroes. Each was to assist the other. The negroes were to be transported to Chiriquí to mine coal for the Navy, and the Secretary of the Navy was to make an immediate advance of $50,000 for coal not yet mined – nor laborers obtained to mine it, nor any satisfactory information or proof that there was decent coal to be mined.¹¹ I respectfully declined adopting his views. Chase and Stanton sustained me, and Mr. Bates to an extent. Blair, who first favored it, cooled off, as the question was discussed, but the President and Smith were persistent.

It came out that the governments and rival parties in Central America denied the legality of the Chiriquí Grant – declared it was a bogus sale. The President concluded he ought to be better satisfied on this point, and would send out [an] agent. At this stage of the case Senator [Samuel C.] Pomeroy [a Kansas Republican] appeared and took upon himself a negro emigrating colonization scheme. Would himself go out and take with him a cargo of negroes, and hunt up a place for them – all professedly in the cause of humanity.

On Tuesday last the President brought forward the subject and desired the members of the Cabinet to each take it into serious consideration. He thought a treaty could be made to advantage, and territory secured to which the negroes could be sent. Several governments had signified their willingness to receive them. Mr. Seward said some were willing to take them without expense to us.

Mr. Blair made a long argumentative statement in favor of deportation. It would be necessary to rid the country of its black population, and some place must be found for them. He is strongly for deportation, has given the subject much thought, but yet seems to have no matured system which he can recommend. Mr. Bates was for compulsory deportation. The negro would not go voluntarily, had great local attachments and no enterprise. The President objected unequivocally to compulsion. Their emigration must be voluntary and without expense to themselves. Great Britain, Denmark, and perhaps other powers would take them [in their western hemisphere colonies]. I remarked there was no necessity for a treaty. Any person who desired to leave the country could do so now, whether white or black, and it was best to leave it so – a voluntary system; the emigrant who chose to leave our shores could and would go where there were the best inducements.

These remarks seemed to strike Seward, who, I perceive, has been in consultation with the President and some of the foreign ministers, and on his motion the subject was postponed, with an understanding it would be taken up to-day. Mr. Bates had a very well prepared paper which he read, expressing his views. Little was said by any one else except Seward, who followed up my suggestions. But the President is not satisfied; says he wants a treaty. Smith says the Senate would never ratify a treaty conferring any power, and advised that Seward should make a contract.

October 7, 1862: There was an indisposition to press the subject of negro emigration to Chiriquí at the meeting of the Cabinet, against the wishes and remonstrances of the States of Central America.

Thus ended the Chiriquí colonization scheme. It did not, however, end Lincoln’s interest in colonization, although Welles does not mention it in his diary. On December 31, 1862 (the day before the final Emancipation Proclamation was issued), he contracted with another promoter, Bernard Kock, to colonize up to 5,000 African Americans on the Île á Vache, a small island off the coast of Haiti. Using funds provided by two New York investors, Kock in April 1863 transported some 450 black men, women, and children to the island, where they supposedly would raise Sea Island cotton. Conditions on the island were wretched, however, and within a few months many of the colonists had died of deprivation or disease, and some others had fled to the Haitian mainland. In February 1864, the administration sent a ship to return the surviving colonists to the United States.¹²

In the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln, invoking discretionary authority Congress had given him in July 1862, announced that blacks would henceforth be enlisted as soldiers. About 180,000 of them served in the army – nine percent of all Union enlisted men. In contrast, as early as October 1861, Welles, with Lincoln’s tacit approval, was authorizing some naval officers to enlist African American sailors. Ultimately, they accounted for about 15 percent of all the enlisted men who served in the navy during the war. ¹³

January 10, 1863: The President sent for Stanton and myself; wished us to consult and do what we could for the employment of the contrabands, and as the Rebels threatened to kill all caught with arms in their hands, to employ them where they would not be liable to be captured. On the ships he thought they were well cared for, and suggested to Stanton that they could perform garrison duty at Memphis, Columbus [Kentucky], and other places and let the [white] soldiers go on more active service.

May 26, 1863: There was a sharp controversy between Chase and Blair on the subject of the Fugitive Slave Law, as attempted to be executed on one Hall here in the district. Both were earnest, Blair for executing the law, Chase for permitting the man to enter the service of the United States instead of being remanded into slavery. The President said this was one of those questions that always embarrassed him. It reminded him of a man in Illinois who was in debt and terribly annoyed by a pressing creditor, until finally the debtor assumed [i.e., pretended] to be crazy whenever the creditor broached the subject. “I,” said the President, “have on more than one occasion, in this room, when beset by extremists on this question, been compelled to appear to be very mad. I think,” he continued, “none of you will ever dispose of this subject without getting mad.”

June 6, 1863: The Irish element is dissatisfied with the service, and there is an unconquerable prejudice on the part of many whites against black soldiers. But all our increased military strength now comes from the negroes.¹⁴

August 13, 1863: [In a conversation with Chase] I said that no slave who had left his Rebel master could be restored, but that an immediate, universal, unconditional sweep, were the Rebellion crushed, might be injurious to both the slave and his owner, involving industrial and social difficulties and disturbances and that these embarrassments required deliberate, wise thought and consideration. The Proclamation of Emancipation was justifiable as a military necessity against Rebel enemies, who were making use of these slaves to destroy our national existence; it was in self-defense and for our own preservation, the first law of nature. But were the Rebellion suppressed, the disposition of the slavery question was, in my view, one of the most delicate and important that had ever devolved on those who administrated the government. Were all the Slave States involved in the Rebellion, the case would be different, for then all would fare alike. The only solution which I could perceive was for the Border States to pass emancipation laws. The Federal Government could not interfere with them; it had and could with the rebellious States. They had made war for slavery, had appealed to arms, and must abide the result. But we must be careful, in our zeal on this subject, not to destroy the great framework of our governmental system. The States had rights which must be respected, the General Government limitations beyond which it must not pass.

August 19, 1863: What is to be done with the slaves and slavery? Were slavery out of the way, there would seem to be no serious obstacle to the reestablishment of the Union. But the cause which was made the pretext of the Civil War will not be readily given up by the [southern] masses, who have been duped and misled by their leaders, and who have so large an interest at stake, without a further struggle.

August 22, 1863: Slavery has received its death-blow. The seeds which have been sown by this war will germinate, were peace restored to-morrow and the States reunited with the rotten institution in each of them. What is to be the effect of the Proclamation, and what will be the exact status of the slaves and the slaveowners, were the States now to resume their position, I am not prepared to say. The courts would adjudicate the questions; there would be legislative action in Congress and in the States also; there would be sense and practical wisdom on the part of intelligent and candid men who are not carried away by prejudice, fanaticism, and wild theories. No slave who has left a Rebel master, or has served under the flag, can ever be forced into involuntary servitude.

The constitutional relations of the States have not been changed by the Rebellion, but the personal condition of every Rebel is affected. The two are not identical. The rights of the States are unimpaired; the rights of those who have participated in the Rebellion have been forfeited.

On April 12, 1864, a 1500-man Confederate cavalry force commanded by General Nathan Bedford Forrest attacked the Union garrison at Fort Pillow on the Mississippi River about 50 miles north of Memphis. It was defended by fewer than 600 troops, half of them African Americans, the other half white Tennessee loyalists. Shortly after the fort fell, northern press reports, citing interviews with survivors, stated that the victorious rebels had shot and killed a large number of black soldiers who had surrendered or had thrown down their weapons and were trying to surrender. The Fort Pillow massacre, as it came to be called, aroused outrage in the North – outrage not diminished when Forrest publicly denied that his men had killed any Union soldiers except in combat. In response to the public furor, two cabinet meetings were devoted to discussing how the Lincoln administration should respond. ¹⁵

May 3, 1864: At the Cabinet meeting the President requested each member to give him an opinion as to what course the Government should pursue in relation to the recent massacre at Fort Pillow. The committee from Congress who have visited the scene returned yesterday and will soon report. All the reported horrors are said to be verified. The President wishes to be prepared to act as soon as the subject is brought to his notice officially and hence [seeks] Cabinet advice in advance.

The subject is one of great responsibility and great embarrassment, especially before we are in possession of the facts and evidence of the committee. There must be something in these terrible reports, but I distrust Congressional committees. They exaggerate.

May 5, 1864: I have written a letter to the President in relation to the Fort Pillow massacre, but it is not satisfactory to me, nor can I make it so without the evidence of what was done, nor am I certain that even then I could come to a conclusion on so grave and important a question. The idea of retaliation – killing man for man – which is the popular noisy demand, is barbarous, and I cannot assent to or advise it. The leading officers should be held accountable and punished, but how? The policy of killing negro soldiers after they have surrendered must not be permitted, and the Rebel leaders should be called upon to avow or disavow it. But how is this to be done? Shall we go to Jeff Davis and his government, or apply to General Lee? If they will give us no answer, or declare they will kill the negroes, or justify Forrest, shall we take innocent Rebel officers as hostages? The whole subject is beset with difficulties. I cannot yield to any inhuman scheme of retaliation. Must wait the publication of the testimony.

May 6, 1864: At the Cabinet-meeting each of the members read his opinion. There had, I think, been some concert between Seward and Stanton and probably Chase; that is, they had talked on the subject, although there was no coincidence of views on all respects. Although I was dissatisfied with my own, it was as well as most others.

Between Mr. Bates and Mr. Blair a suggestion came out that met my views better than anything that had previously been offered. It is that the President should by proclamation declare the officers who had command at the massacre outlaws, and require any of our officers who may capture them, to detain them in custody and not exchange them, but hold them to punishment. The thought was not very distinctly enunciated. In a conversation that followed the reading of our papers, I expressed myself favorable to this new suggestion, which relieved the subject of much of the difficulty. It avoids communication with the Rebel authorities. Takes the matter in our own hands. We get rid of the barbarity of retaliation.

Stanton fell in with my suggestion, so far as to propose that, should Forrest, or [General James] Chalmers [Forrest’s second in command], or any officer conspicuous in this butchery be captured, he should be turned over for trial for the murders at Fort Pillow. I sat beside Chase and mentioned to him some of the advantages of this course, and he said it made a favorable impression. I urged him to say so, for it appeared to me that the President and Seward did not appreciate it.

Neither during nor after the war was any Confederate officer or enlisted man charged with a crime in connection with the Fort Pillow massacre.

January 31, 1865: The vote was taken to-day in the House on the Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery, which was carried 119 to 56.¹⁶ It is a step towards the reestablishment of the Union in its integrity, yet it will be a shock to the framework of Southern society. But that has already been sadly shattered by their own inconsiderate and calamitous course. When, however, the cause, or assignable cause for the Rebellion is utterly extinguished, the States can and will resume their original position, acting each for itself. How soon the people in those States will arrive at right conclusions on this subject cannot now be determined.

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¹ Although most historians still employ the customary term “slaves,” in recent years some scholars have advocated the use instead of “enslaved persons,” a phrase they favor because it recognizes that those held in bondage were human beings, not simply property, which is how the laws of the slave states primarily defined them.

² This was the first entry in the manuscript of the diary. It apparently was written sometime between July 14 and August 11, 1862.

³ In March 1862, however, Lincoln had secured a pledge from Congress to provide monetary assistance to any slave state that voluntarily initiated gradual emancipation.

⁴ This is a reference to the failure of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign to take the Confederate capital (see Chapter 5).

⁵ It was closer to 10 weeks.

⁶ Welles’s home in Washington was located on the northern side of Lafayette Square, a short walk from the White House.

⁷ Citing his war powers as commander in chief of the armed services, Lincoln justified the Proclamation constitutionally as an act of military necessity. He believed it would undercut that rationale if he applied the Proclamation to areas of the Confederacy where the Union army was in firm control and thus there was no compelling military necessity. This is why, contrary to Chase’s advice, which Welles endorsed, Lincoln expressly exempted from the Proclamation certain parishes in southern Louisiana, together with the city of New Orleans, and certain counties in Virginia, together with the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth. Since he did not include Tennessee on the list of rebellious states to which the Proclamation applied, it was also in effect exempted, but more for political than for constitutional reasons.

⁸ Critics, both at home and abroad, had construed some ambiguous language in the preliminary Proclamation as serving to encourage a massive slave rebellion. The revision to the text of the final Proclamation to which Welles refers was designed to make clear that the administration wanted no such thing.

⁹ This sentence, which provided a rhetorical lift to a document that was otherwise and by intent dryly legalistic, read: “And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.”

¹⁰ For an exceptionally illuminating account of the lead-up to the issuance of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, the interval between it and the final Proclamation’s promulgation on January 1, 1863, and the varied reactions to both measures, see Louis P. Masur, Lincoln’s Hundred Days: The Emancipation Proclamation and the War for the Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).

¹¹ A subsequent investigation found that Chiriquí Strip coal, if placed in a confined space such as the hold of a ship, was prone to ignite by spontaneous combustion.

¹² Historians differ over whether the primary motive for Lincoln’s interest in colonization was political expediency, racial prejudice, or a humanitarian belief that black Americans could never attain equality in the U.S. and thus would be better off somewhere that was free of the intense racism pervading American society. For an insightful analysis of this complex issue, see Eric Foner, “Lincoln and Colonization,” in Eric Foner, ed., Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), pp. 135 – 166. Although Lincoln never mentioned colonization in public after issuing the final Emancipation Proclamation, recent scholarship has shown that he continued to pursue the idea for at least another year, and perhaps longer. See Phillip W. Magness and Sebastian N. Page, Colonization After Emancipation: Lincoln and the Movement for Black Resettlement (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2011).

¹³ Symonds, Lincoln and His Admirals, p. 165.

¹⁴ By early 1863, voluntary enlistments in the Union army by whites had fallen sharply, prompting Congress to enact a conscription law in March that took effect in July. During this period, the large number of black volunteers helped make up the slack.

¹⁵ For the remainder of the war and long thereafter debate raged, largely along North-South lines, about whether there had indeed been a massacre at Fort Pillow. Today, most historians believe there was a massacre, but it is uncertain whether Forrest ordered it or rebel soldiers, outraged at the sight of blacks in uniform, acted on their own initiative. John Cimprich, “The Fort Pillow Massacre: Assessing the Evidence,” in John David Smith, ed., Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 150 – 168, provides a careful analysis of the conflicting claims about what occurred. Also see Cimprich, Fort Pillow, A Civil War Massacre, and Public Memory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005).

¹⁶ The Senate had approved the amendment by the required two-thirds vote in April of 1864, but two months later a vote in the House fell short of two-thirds. When the House reconsidered the measure in the second session of the 38^th Congress, the two-thirds margin was attained, with two votes to spare, because enough Democrats and conservative border-state Unionists either switched their vote to “aye” or absented themselves from the balloting. Ratification of the amendment by the requisite three-fourths of the states was completed in December 1865.