Читать книгу A Connecticut Yankee in Lincoln’s Cabinet - Gideon Welles - Страница 12

Chapter 2

CABINET PROBLEMS AND CABINET CRISIS

This chapter deals with two interrelated topics. Section I contains a selection of Welles’s numerous complaints that Lincoln failed to make fuller, more-regular use of the cabinet as a consultative and advisory body, a failing he usually blamed on Secretary of State Seward at least much as on the president. The second section reproduces Welles’s detailed account of the cabinet crisis of December 1862, when a caucus of Republican senators, believing Seward was reluctant about emancipation and a drag on the administration and the war effort, tried to force Lincoln to oust him from the cabinet.

I

In the following excerpt Welles discusses at length what he sees as the fundamental problem with the cabinet’s functioning and how the problem originated during the early weeks of the administration. He emphasizes Seward’s desire to be the administration’s dominant force – a kind of prime minister or premier. Viewed in the light of modern Lincoln scholarship, Welles can be faulted for overstating Seward’s influence on the president and failing to understand Lincoln’s skill at protecting his power and prerogatives.¹ (Significantly, in some of his post-war writings, Welles himself took issue with claims that Seward had dominated the administration.²) It is also possible that Welles’s criticisms of Seward, in both this and other chapters, reflect jealousy that Seward had established an unusually close personal relationship with the president – much closer than any other cabinet member.

September 16, 1862: At the Executive Mansion, the Secretary of State informed us there was to be no Cabinet meeting. He was authorized by the President to communicate the fact. Smith said it would be as well, perhaps, to postpone the Cabinet meetings indefinitely – there seemed no use latterly for our coming together. Others expressed corresponding opinions. Seward turned off, a little annoyed.

An unfavorable impression is getting abroad in regard to the President and the Administration, not without reason, perhaps, and which prompted Smith and others to express their minds freely. There is really very little of a government there at this time, so far as most of the Cabinet is concerned. Seward spends more or less of each day with the President, and absorbs his attention, and influences his action…. The President has, I believe, sincere respect and regard for each and every member of the Cabinet, but Seward seeks and has outstanding influence, which is not always wisely used. The President would do better without him, were he to follow his own instincts, and were he to consult all his advisers in council, he would find his own opinions confirmed. No one attempts to obtrude himself, or warn the President, or suggest to him that others than S. be consulted on some of the important measures of which they are not informed until they see them in operation, or hear of them from others. Chase is much chafed by these things, and endeavors, and to some extent succeeds, in also getting beside the President, and obtaining knowledge of what is going forward. But this only excites and stimulates Seward, who has the inside track and means to keep it. The President is unsuspicious – readily gives his confidence, but only one of his Cabinet has manifested a disposition to monopolize it. But important measures are sometimes checked almost as soon as introduced, and, without any consultation, or without being again brought forward, are disposed of, only the Secretary of State having had a view, or ear, or eye of the matter…. With greater leisure than most of the Cabinet officers, unless it be Smith of the Interior, he runs to the President two or three times a day, gets his ear, gives him his tongue, makes himself interesting, and artfully contrives to dispose of measures without [cabinet] action or give them direction independent of his associates….

I have administered the Navy Department almost entirely independent of Cabinet consultation, and I may say almost without direction of the President, who not only gives me his confidence but intrusts all naval matters to me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his confidence, I should prefer that every important naval movement should pass a Cabinet review. Today, for instance, [Charles] Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear Admiral, and I have sent him off to cruise in the West Indies [in quest of Confederate commerce raiders]. All this has been done without Cabinet consultation, or advice with anyone except Seward and the President…. My instructions to our naval officers – commanders of squadrons or single ships – cruising on our blockade duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I have communicated them freely to each [member]….

So in regard to each and all the Departments; if I have known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has not been in Cabinet consultations. Seward beyond any and all others is responsible for this state of things. It has given him individual power, but at the expense of good administration….

In the early days of the Administration all the Cabinet officers were absorbed by labors and efforts to make themselves familiar with their duties, so as rightly to discharge them. Those duties were more onerous and trying with the great rupture that was going on in the Government, avowedly to destroy it, than had ever been experienced by their predecessors.

Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were thus absorbed in preparing for impending disaster, the Secretary of State spent a considerable portion of every day with the President, instructing him, relating interesting details of occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his political notions. I think he has no very profound or sincere convictions. Cabinet meetings, which should, at that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were infrequent, irregular, and without system. The Secretary of State notified his associates when the President desired a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unadvisable to the Premier – as he liked to be called and considered – that the members should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little concerted action.

Each head of a Department took up and managed the affairs which devolved upon him as he best could, without much knowledge of the transactions of his associates, but as each consulted with the President, the Premier, from daily, almost hourly, intercourse with him, continued to ascertain the doings of each and all, while imparting but little of his own course to any. Great events of a general character began to impel the members to assemble…. The conduct of affairs was awkward and embarrassing, and after a few weeks the members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be better advised on affairs of government for which they were measurably responsible to the country. They advised meetings on stated days for general and current affairs, and when there was occasion, special calls would be made. The Secretary of State alone dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it inexpedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare the time; but the President was pleased with the suggestion, and concurred with the rest of the Cabinet. [It was agreed that the cabinet would regularly meet at noon every Tuesday and Friday, with special meetings called at other times as needed.]

The form of proceeding was discussed. Mr. Seward thought that would take care of itself. Some suggestions were made in regard to important appointments which had been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of State taking the lead in selecting high officials without general consultation. There seemed an understanding between the Secretaries of State and Treasury, who had charge of the most important appointments, of which the President was perhaps cognizant. Chase had extensive patronage, Seward appointments of character. The two arranged that each should make his own selection of subordinates. These two men had political aspirations which did not extend to their associates…. Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this arrangement, but it was one of the mistakes of his life.

Without going farther into details, the effect of these proceedings in those early days was to dwarf the President and elevate the Secretary of State. The latter also belittled the sphere of his associates so far as he could. Many of the important measures, particularly of his own Department, he managed to predispose of, or contrived to have determined, independent of the Cabinet….

Between Seward and Chase there is perpetual rivalry and mutual dislike. Each is ambitious. Both had capacity. Seward is dexterous; Chase is strong. Seward makes constant mistakes, but recovers with a facility that is wonderful and often without injury to himself; Chase commits fewer blunders, but perseveres in them when made, often to his own serious detriment.

April 17, 1863: But little was before the Cabinet, which of late can hardly be called a council. Each Department conducts and manages its own affairs, informing the President to the extent it pleases. Seward encourages this state of things. He has less active duties than the rest of us, and watches and waits on the President daily, and gathers from him the doings of his associates and often influences indirectly their measures and movements, while he communicates very little, especially of that which he does not wish them to know.

June 30, 1863: The President did not join us to-day in Cabinet. He was with the Secretary of War and General [in Chief Henry] Halleck, and sent word there would be no meeting. This is wrong, but I know no remedy. At such a time as this, it would seem there should be free, full, and constant intercourse and interchange of views, and combined effort. The Government should not be carried on in the War or State Departments, nor ought there be an attempt of that kind.³

September 29, 1863: No matter of special importance; nothing but current business in Cabinet. Seward and Stanton were not present. The latter seems to make it a point recently not to attend. Others, therefore, run to him. I will not. Military operations are of late managed at the War Department, irrespective of the rest of the Cabinet…. The President spends much of his time there. Seward and Chase make daily visitations to Stanton, sometimes two or three times daily. I have not the time, nor do I want the privilege, though I doubtless could have it for Stanton treats me respectfully and with as much confidence as he does any one when I approach him, except Seward. But I cannot run to the War Department and pay court. Chase does this, complains because he is compelled to do it, and then … becomes reconciled.

December 31, 1863: The Cabinet, if a little discordant in some of its elements, has been united as regards him [Lincoln]. Chase has perhaps some aspirations for the place of Chief Executive. Seward has, I think, surrendered any expectation for the present, and shows wisdom in giving the President a fair support. Blair and Bates are earnest friends of the President, and so, I think, is Usher.⁴ Stanton is insincere, but will, I have no doubt, act with Seward under present circumstances.

March 25, 1864: Chase … remarked [at today’s cabinet meeting] that nothing could be expected where there were no Cabinet consultations and no concerted action. Stanton and the President were in consultation at the time in a corner of the room. This is no unfrequent occurrence between the two at our meetings, and is certainly inconsiderate and in exceeding bad taste.

April 22, 1864: Neither Seward nor Chase nor Stanton was at the Cabinet meeting to-day. For some time Chase has been disinclined to be present and evidently for a purpose. When sometimes with him, he takes occasion to allude to the Administration as departmental – as not having council, not acting in concert. There is much truth in it, and his example and conduct contribute to it. Seward is more responsible than any one, however, although he is generally present. Stanton does not care usually to come, for the President is much of his time at the War Department, and what is said or done is communicated by the President, who is fond of telling as well as of hearing what is new. Three or four times daily the President goes to the War Department and into the telegraph office to look over communications.

April 26, 1864: Neither Chase nor Blair were at the Cabinet to-day, nor was Stanton. The course of these men is reprehensible, and yet the President, I am sorry to say, does not reprove but rather encourages it by bringing forward no important measure connected with either.

July 25, 1864: Blair is sore and vexed because the President makes a confidant and adviser of Seward, without consulting the rest of the Cabinet. I told him this had been the policy from the beginning. Seward and Chase had each striven for the position of Special Executive Counsel; that it had apparently been divided between them, but Seward had outgeneraled or outintrigued Chase. The latter was often consulted when others were not, but often he was not aware of things which were intrusted to Seward and managed by him.

August 2, 1864: Stanton dislikes to meet Blair in council, knowing that B. dislikes and really despises him. Seward and Stanton move together in all matters…. Both mouse about the President, who, in his intense curiosity, interest and inquisitiveness, spends much of his time at the War Department, watching the telegraph. Of course, opportunities like these are not lost by Stanton.

II

Pessimism pervaded Washington, and much of the Union, as 1862 neared its end. The war effort seemed to be stalled. Then on December 13th, the Army of the Potomac suffered a devastating defeat at Fredericksburg, Virginia, sustaining some 12,600 casualties to the Confederates’ approximately 5300. A perception was widespread that the Lincoln administration lacked energy and a sense of direction and was so riven by internal strife as to be virtually paralyzed. Treasury Secretary Chase had done much to foster this perception by privately telling various Republican senators that the administration was weak and confused, that Lincoln rarely consulted the cabinet about important issues, and that the cabinet was too divided to agree on important policy questions. Chase placed most of the blame on Seward, portraying him as only halfhearted in his support of the war effort and as a conservative who was hostile to emancipation and exercised an excessive, even controlling influence on Lincoln. It was against this backdrop that the cabinet crisis of December 1862 played out. Welles’s diary entries for December 19th through the 23rd provide a detailed, generally accurate account of the crisis. They also reveal the help Welles gave Lincoln in resolving the crisis.

This episode was a critical moment in Lincoln’s presidency. If the caucus of Republican senators had succeeded in forcing him to remove Seward, it would have made him appear weak in the eyes of supporters and opponents alike, encouraged additional legislative encroachments on his executive authority, and upset the balance in the cabinet between conservative, moderate, and radical Republicans.

December 19, 1862: Soon after reaching the Department this A.M., I received a note from Nicolay, the President’s secretary, requesting me to attend a special Cabinet meeting at half-past ten. All the members were punctually there except Seward.

The President desired that what he had to communicate should not be the subject of conversation elsewhere, and proceeded to inform us that on Wednesday evening [December 17th], about six o’clock, Senator Preston King [of New York] and F. W. Seward [Seward’s son, who was the assistant secretary of state] came into his room, each bearing a communication. That which Mr. King presented was the resignation of the Secretary of State, and Mr. F. W. Seward handed in his own. Mr. King then informed the President that at a Republican caucus held that day a pointed and positive opposition had shown itself against the Secretary of State, which terminated in a unanimous expression, with one exception, against him and a wish for his removal. The feeling finally shaped itself into resolutions of a general character, and the appointment of a committee of nine to bear them to the President, and to communicate to him the sentiments of the Republican Senators. Mr. King, the former colleague and the friend of Mr. Seward, being also from the same State, felt it to be a duty to inform the Secretary at once of what had occurred. On receiving this information, Mr. Seward immediately tendered his resignation. Mr. King suggested it would be well for the committee to wait upon the President at an early moment, and, the President agreeing with him, Mr. King on Wednesday morning notified Judge [Jacob] Collamer [senator from Vermont], the chairman, who sent word to the President that they would call at the Executive Mansion at any hour after six that evening, and the President sent word he would receive them at seven.⁵

The committee came at the time specified, and the President says the evening was spent in a pretty free and animated conversation. No opposition was manifested towards any other member of the Cabinet than Mr. Seward. Some not very friendly feelings were shown towards one or two others, but no wish that any one should leave but the Secretary of State. Him they charged, if not with infidelity, with indifference, with want of earnestness in the War, with want of sympathy with the country in this great struggle, and with many things objectionable, and especially with a too great ascendency and control of the President and measures of administration. This, he said, was the point and pith of their complaint.

The President in reply to the committee stated how this movement shocked and grieved him; that the Cabinet he had selected in view of impending difficulties and of all the responsibilities upon him; that the members and himself had gone on harmoniously, whatever had been their previous party feelings and associations; that there had never been serious disagreements, though there had been differences; that in the overwhelming troubles of the country, which had borne heavily upon him, he had been sustained and consoled by the good feeling and the mutual and unselfish confidence and zeal that pervaded the Cabinet….

[Lincoln] said this movement was uncalled for, that there was no such charge, admitting all that was said, as should break up or overthrow a Cabinet, nor was it possible for him to go on with a total abandonment of old friends….

The President requested that we should, with him, meet the committee. This did not receive the approval of Mr. Chase, who said he had no knowledge whatever of the movement, or the resignation, until since he had entered the room. Mr. Bates knew of no good that would come of an interview. I stated that I could see no harm in it, and if the President wished it, I thought it a duty for us to attend. Mr. Blair thought it would be well for us to be present, and finally all acquiesced. The President named half-past seven this evening.

December 20, 1862: At the meeting last evening there were present of the committee Senators Collamer, Fessenden, Harris, Trumbull, Grimes, Howard, Sumner, and Pomeroy. Wade was absent. The President and all the Cabinet but Seward were present. The subject was opened by the President, who read the [Senate caucus’s] resolutions and stated the substance of his interviews with the committee – their object and purpose. He spoke of the unity of his Cabinet, and how, though they could not be expected to think and speak alike on all subjects, all had acquiesced in measures when once decided. The necessities of the times, he said, had prevented frequent and long sessions of the Cabinet, and the submission of every question at the meetings.

Secretary Chase indorsed the President’s statement fully and entirely, but regretted that there was not a more full and thorough consideration and canvass of every important measure in open Cabinet.⁶

Senator Collamer … succeeded the President and calmly and fairly presented the views of the committee and of those whom they represented. They wanted united counsels, combined wisdom, and energetic action. If there is truth in the maxim that in a multitude of counselors there is safety, it might be well that those advisers who were near the President and selected by him, and all of whom were more or less responsible, should be consulted on the great questions which affected the national welfare, and that the ear of the Executive should be open to all and that he should have the minds of all.

Senator Fessenden [of Maine] was skillful but not a little tart; felt, it could be seen, more than he cared to say; wanted the whole Cabinet to consider and decide great questions, and that no one should absorb the whole Executive. Spoke of a remark which he had heard from J.Q. Adams on the floor of Congress in regard to a measure of his administration. Mr. Adams said the measure was adopted against his wishes and opinion, but he was outvoted by Mr. Clay and others [in his cabinet]. He wished an administration so conducted.

Grimes [of Iowa], Sumner [of Massachusetts], and Trumbull [of Illinois] were pointed, emphatic, and unequivocal in their hostility to Mr. Seward; each was unrelenting and unforgiving. Blair spoke earnestly and well. Sustained the President, and dissented most decidedly from the idea of a plural Executive; claimed that the President was accountable for his administration, might ask opinions or not of either and as many as he pleased, of all or none, of his Cabinet. Mr. Bates took much the same view.

The President managed his own case, speaking freely, and showed great tact and ability, provided such a subject were a proper one for such a meeting and discussion. I have no doubt he considered it most judicious to conciliate the Senators with respectful deference, whatever may have been his opinion of their interference. When he closed his remarks, he said it would be a gratification to him if each member of the committee would state whether he now thought it advisable to dismiss Mr. Seward, and whether his exclusion would strengthen or weaken the Administration and the Union cause in their respective States. Grimes, Trumbull, and Sumner, who had expressed themselves decidedly against the continuance of Mr. Seward in the Cabinet, indicated no change of opinion. Collamer and Fessenden declined committing themselves on the subject – were not prepared to answer the questions. Senator Harris [of New York] felt it a duty to say that while many of the friends of the Administration would be gratified, others would feel deeply wounded, and the effect of Mr. Seward’s retirement would, on the whole, be calamitous in the State of New York. Pomeroy of Kansas said, personally, he believed the withdrawal of Mr. Seward would be a good movement and he sincerely wished it might take place. Howard of Michigan declined answering the question.