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(August 6th.)

Let us now turn to the events which occurred, on this same 6th of August, in another part of the theatre of war.

The IInd Army, its southern (left) flank covered by the IIIrd Army, had been moving to the westward, while the Corps it still lacked were being brought up by railway. Its leading Corps, having traversed unmolested the long defiles of the forest-belt of Kaiserslautern, reached on the 5th the line Neunkirchen-Zweibrücken. The cavalry, scouting into French territory, reported that the enemy was retreating. Everything seemed to indicate that the French would await the attack of the Germans in a strong defensive position. The nearest position of the kind that offered was that on the farther bank of the Moselle, of which Metz protected one flank, Thionville the other. It was decided that if the French were found in that position, the Ist Army should hold the enemy in front, while the IInd made a circuit south of Metz, and so the enemy be forced either to retire or to fight. In case of disaster the IInd Army was to fall back on the IIIrd, now advancing over the Vosges.

The protrusion to the south-westward[3] of the Ist Army towards the Saar, which had not been intended by the supreme Command, had brought its left wing in upon the line of march laid down for the IInd, and detachments of the two armies had to cross each other at Saarbrücken on the 6th. Thus there was indeed no lack of strength at that point; but as a battle on that day was neither expected nor probable, the synchronous arrival of troops had not been pre-arranged, and so detachments could only come up by quite unprescribed routes and arrive one after the other at different hours.

The 14th Division of the VIIth Corps was the first to reach Saarbrücken, towards noon on the 6th.

General Frossard, considering his position there very hazardous, had left the night before, without waiting for permission, and had fallen back with the IInd Corps on Spicheren, where it had entrenched itself. The IIIrd, IVth, and Vth Corps were behind, at distances of from nine to nineteen miles, and the Imperial Guard was about twenty-three miles rearward. The Emperor, therefore, had it in his power to collect five Corps for a battle in the vicinity of Cocheren, or, on the other hand, to support Frossard with at least four Divisions, if that General were confident that his position was strong enough to hold.

The range of heights which upheaves itself immediately behind Saarbrücken is capable of affording a serious obstacle to a hostile passage of the Saar. It was known that the French had evacuated those heights, but General von Kameke thought it prudent to seize them at once, in order to secure the debouche of the columns following him. When, in the forenoon, two squadrons of the 5th Cavalry Division showed themselves on the drill-ground on the ridge above the farther bank, they were greeted with a hot fire from the Spicheren heights. But as it seemed highly probable, from the previous behaviour of the French, that the force seen there was only the rear-guard of the retiring enemy, General von Kameke (commanding 14th Infantry Division) ordered an immediate attack, since he had the promise of reinforcements. General von Zastrow (commanding VIIth Corps), as soon as he recognized that the 14th Division had involved itself in a serious engagement, allowed the 13th to go forward. General von Alvensleben (its commander) also ordered up to Saarbrücken all the available troops of the IIIrd Corps, and with equal promptitude General von Goeben (commanding VIIIth Corps) hurried thither the entire 16th Division. Generals von Döring (commanding 9th Infantry Brigade) and von Barnekow (commanding 16th Infantry Division), belonging respectively to these two Corps (IIIrd and VIIIth), had besides already struck forward from Tudweiler and Fischbach in the direction of the cannon-thunder, even before receiving orders to that effect.

The position occupied by the French was one of exceptional advantage. In the centre projected the Red Hill (der Rothe Berg), a precipitous and almost inaccessible cliff; and the steep slopes on either side were densely wooded. On the left the massive buildings of the Stiering-Wendel ironworks furnished a separate defensive position.

Had the strength of the enemy been fully known the attack would certainly have been delayed until the whole of the 14th Division had arrived. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of the fight, about noon, only von François' Brigade (27th) had come up, and this force, in the effort to facilitate an attack on the naturally strong position held by the enemy's front, assailed in the first instance both his flanks.

At first it succeeded in making progress. On the left the 39th Regiment drove the swarms of hostile skirmishers out of the wood of Gifert, but then became exposed to the bitter fire of a French battalion lining the farther side of a deep hollow. On the right flank its 3rd Battalion, together with the 74th Regiment, seized the wood of Stiering. But the enemy's superior strength soon displayed itself in violent counter-attacks, and when Von Woyna's[4] Brigade (28th) reached the field it had to furnish reinforcements to both flanks. Thus, at an early stage, intermingling of battalions and companies began, which increased with every subsequent rush, and made the control of the combat a matter of extraordinary difficulty. Added to this was the circumstance that three Commanding Generals in succession came up to the scene of the conflict, and one after the other took the chief control.

At about one o'clock, simultaneously with the flanks, the Fusilier Battalion of the 74th Regiment pushed forward in front, under a severe fire across the open ground towards the Red Hill, and, under such trivial cover as offered, established itself at the foot of the cliff. When at about three o'clock the Prussian artillery compelled the foe to move his guns farther up the hill, the Fusiliers, with General von François at their head, began to climb the cliff. The French Chasseurs, evidently taken by surprise, were driven from the most advanced entrenchments with clubbed rifles and at the point of the bayonet. The 9th company of the 39th Regiment followed close, and the gallant General, charging farther forward along with it, fell pierced by five bullets. Nothing daunted, the small body of Fusiliers made good its grip of the narrow spur of the cliff.

Nevertheless, a crisis was imminent. The 14th Division was extended over a distance of about three and a half miles, its left wing had been repulsed by greatly superior forces in the wood of Gifert, its right wing was hard pressed at Stiering. But now, at four o'clock, the heads of the 5th and 16th Divisions simultaneously struck in, shortly after their batteries, which had been sent on ahead, had come into action.

The left wing, strongly reinforced, now again pressed forward. General von Barnekow[5] led trusty succours up on to the Red Hill, where the Fusiliers had almost entirely exhausted their ammunition, and drove the French out from all their entrenchments. As the result of a fierce struggle the Germans also succeeded in taking possession of the western part of the wood of Gifert. The right wing with sharp fighting had pressed on to Alt Stiering and was approaching the enemy's line of retreat, the Forbach highway. General Frossard had, however, recognized the danger threatened at this point, and reinforced his left wing to the strength of a Division and a half. This force advanced to the attack at five o'clock. On the German side there was no formed force to oppose to it, so all the previously gained advantages were lost.

If the 13th Division[6] had here struck in with a resolute attack, the battle would have ended. This Division after, indeed, a march of nearly nineteen miles had reached Puttlingen at one o'clock, where it was little more than four miles distant from Stiering. When the fighting about Saarbrücken was heard it is true that at four p.m. the advanced guard moved forward to Rossel. It would seem that the roar of the cannon was not audible in that wooded region; the impression was that the combat was over, and the Division bivouacked at Völkingen, which place had been previously named as the end of its march by the Corps Commander at a time when he was, of course, unable to foresee the change in the situation.

The French offensive movement had meanwhile been brought to a stand by the seven batteries in position on the Folster height; the infantry then succeeded in making fresh progress, under the personal leadership of General von Zastrow.

The nature of the ground entirely prohibited the twenty-nine squadrons of cavalry which had arrived from all directions and were drawn up out of the range of fire, from taking part in the action. The Hussars tried in vain to ride up the Red Hill, but in spite of incredible difficulties Major von Lyncker finally gained the summit with eight guns, amid the loud cheering of the hard-pressed infantry. The guns, as each one came up, at once came into action against three French batteries; but quite half of the gunners were shot down by sheltered French tirailleurs, at a range of about 800 paces. A small strip of ground in front was indeed won, but the narrow space allowed of no deployment against the wide front of the enemy.

But effective assistance was coming from the right. General von Goeben had despatched all the battalions of the 16th Division not yet engaged, in the decisive direction toward Stiering. While one part of these troops made a frontal attack on the village, the rest climbed from the high-road up the defiles of the Spicheren woods, in a hand-to-hand encounter drove the French from the saddle leading to the Red Hill, and pushed them farther and farther back towards the Forbach height.

Even as late as seven o'clock on the French right wing Laveaucoupet's Division, supported by part of Bataille's, advanced to the attack and once more penetrated into the oft-contested Gifert wood, but the danger threatening the French left wing from the Spicheren wood paralyzed this effort. By nightfall the French were falling back over the whole plateau.

At nine o'clock, when their "Retreat" call was sounding from the heights, General von Schwerin (commanding 10th Infantry Brigade) made sure of night quarters by occupying Stiering, where resistance was only quelled, at many points, after a hand-to-hand fight. The advanced guard of the 13th Division advanced on Forbach, but did not occupy it, having allowed itself to be hoodwinked by some French Dragoons in possession.

Apart from this, General Frossard had abandoned the line of retreat by the so seriously threatened Forbach-St. Avold road, and fell back with all his three divisions on Oetingen. The darkness, and the impossibility of handling large bodies of cavalry in such a country, saved him from further pursuit.

General von Steinmetz ordered the reorganization of the dislocated bodies of troops that same night. Some of them had marched more than twenty-eight miles; two batteries, arriving from Königsberg by rail, had immediately set out for the battle-field. But it remains that the Germans at no time of the day attained the numerical strength of the enemy in this engagement, which had been begun with insufficient forces. Only thirteen batteries could be brought into action in the limited space, and the cavalry remained excluded from all participation. It was only natural, under the circumstances, that the losses of the assailants were greater than those of the defence. The Prussians lost 4871, the French 4078 men. The fact was significant that a considerable number of unwounded French prisoners were taken in this early action.

In strong contrast to the comradeship and mutual helpfulness displayed by the Prussian Generals, and the eagerness of their troops to hurry into the fight, was the strange vacillation of the Divisions in General Frossard's rear; of which three, indeed, were sent forward to his support, but only two came up, and that when the fight was already ended.

It has been vehemently asserted that the battle of Spicheren was fought in an ill-judged locality, and that it interfered with more important plans. It certainly had not been anticipated. But, generally speaking, a tactical victory rarely fails to fit in with a strategic design. Success in battle has always been thankfully accepted, and turned to account. By the battle of Spicheren the IInd French Corps was prevented from withdrawing unharmed; touch of the enemy's main force was obtained, and to the supreme Direction of the armies was afforded a basis for further resolutions.