Читать книгу The Franco-German War of 1870-71 - Graf von Helmuth Moltke - Страница 18

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(August 18th.)

Marshal Bazaine had not thought it advisable to prosecute the march to Verdun now that the Germans were so close on the flank of such a movement. He preferred to concentrate his forces near Metz, in a position which he rightly considered as almost impregnable.

Such an one was afforded him by the range of heights stretching along the western verge of the valley of Chatel. Their face looking toward the enemy sloped away like a glacis, while the short and steep decline in the rear afforded cover for the reserves. Along the flat crown of the heights from Roncourt to Rozerieulles, a distance of about seven miles, were posted the VIth, IVth, IIIrd, and IInd Corps in succession from the north; for which distance there were available from eight to ten men to the pace (Schritt). A brigade of the Vth Corps stood near Ste. Ruffine in the valley of the Moselle; the cavalry was in rear of both flanks. In front of the IInd and IIIrd Corps shelter-trenches had been thrown up, battery emplacements and covered ways of communication constructed, and the farmsteads lying out to the front converted into little forts. To approach this (left) wing from the west it was necessary to cross the deep ravine of the Mance. The VIth Corps on the other hand was wholly without an engineer park; and it is indicative of the general ill-equipment of the French that, for the transport of the wounded to the rear, in spite of the enormous trains, provision waggons had to be unloaded and their contents burnt. This Corps was therefore unable to construct fortified flank defences toward the forest of Jaumont, such as would have given to the right wing the character of formidable strength. This would undoubtedly have been the place for the Guard, but in his apprehension of an attack from the south the Marshal held that Corps in reserve at Plappeville.

The King returned to Flavigny at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th. All commanding officers were instructed to send their reports thither, and officers of the General Staff belonging to the Royal Head-quarter were besides sent out in different directions to report information as to the progress of the engagement.

The following were the initial dispositions. The VIIth Army Corps, which was to form the pivot for the eventual wheel to the right, occupied the Bois de Vaux and Bois des Ognons; the VIIIth, which the King had reserved at his own disposition, stood halted near Rezonville ready to march to the north or to the east, as might be required. The IXth Corps, on its left, advanced towards St. Marcel, while the IIIrd and Xth followed in second line. The Guard and XIIth Corps moved in a northerly direction.

In consequence of the Head-quarter of the IInd Army having ordered the XIIth Corps, although it stood on the right,[11] to form the extreme left, a serious delay occurred from the crossing of the respective lines of march. The Saxon troops had not entirely passed through Mars-la-Tour until nine o'clock, and till then the Guard Corps could not follow.

Meanwhile the advanced guard of the XIIth Corps had already reached Jarny, and pursued its march as far as Briey without encountering the enemy.

Before information to this effect came in, the conviction had been reached in the Royal Head-quarter that at all events the main forces of the enemy still remained before Metz; there was, however, a difference of opinion as to the extension of the French front, which it was assumed did not reach beyond Montigny. The Head-quarter of the IInd Army was therefore instructed not to extend further northward, but to attack the enemy's right wing with the IXth Corps, and push in the direction of Batilly with the Guard and the XIIth Corps. The Ist Army was not to begin its frontal attack until the IInd should be ready to co-operate.

In obedience to those instructions Prince Frederick Charles ordered the IXth Corps to march towards Verneville, and, in case the French right wing should be found there, to begin the action by promptly bringing a large force of artillery into action. The Guard was to continue its advance by way of Doncourt to support the IXth as soon as possible. The XIIth was to remain at Jarny for the present.

A little later fresh reports came in, which indicated that the IXth Corps, should it proceed in the manner ordered, would not strike the enemy on his flank, but full on his front. The Prince, in the discretion of his high position, therefore determined that the Corps should postpone its attack till the Guard Corps should have been brought to bear upon Amanvillers. At the same time the XIIth Corps was to push on to Ste. Marie aux Chênes.

But while these orders were being expedited, there was heard from Verneville at twelve o'clock the roar of the first cannon shots.

The two Corps of the left wing had, moreover, of their own accord, taken an easterly direction, and the IIIrd Corps moved up in rear of the IXth to the Caulre farm.

General von Manstein, the commander of the IXth Corps, had observed from Verneville a French camp at Amanvillers, which apparently lay in negligent repose. From his standpoint it could not be discerned that to his left about St. Privat great masses of troops were in position. Thinking that in this camp he had the enemy's right wing before him, he determined to act on his original orders and at once take the foe by surprise. Eight of his batteries at once opened fire.

But the French troops showed great alacrity in moving up into their prepared positions. The isolated initiative of the single Corps naturally drew upon it not only the fire of the troops opposite to it, but also that of the hostile Corps to right and left.

In the effort to find a location affording something of shelter, the Prussian batteries had taken position in a fold of the slope looking towards Amanvillers, and facing to the south-east, where, however, they were exposed from the north, on the flank and even in the rear, to the fire of the enemy's artillery, as well as to the massed fire of his infantry.

To meet this, it was necessary to send forward the infantry battalions nearest at hand. They took possession of the eastern point of the Bois de la Cusse on the left, and on the right seized the farmhouses of L'Envie and Chantrenne, and forced their way into the Bois des Genivaux. Thus the front of the 18th Division in action extended along a distance of 4000 paces.

It had to endure very heavy loss from the circumstance that the French with their long-range Chassepôt rifles could afford to keep out of the effective range of the needle-gun; the artillery suffered exceptionally severely. One of the batteries had already lost forty-five gunners when the enemy's sharpshooters swarmed forward on it. Infantry protection was not available at the moment, and two guns were lost. By two o'clock the batteries still remaining in position were almost unserviceable, and no relief arrived till the Hessian Division reached Habonville, and brought up on the left of the distressed batteries, five batteries on either side of the railway, which diverted on themselves to a considerable extent the concentrated fire of the enemy. The batteries of the 18th Division, which had suffered most, could now be withdrawn in succession, but even in the act of retreat they had to drive off the pursuers by grape-shot.

The artillery of the IIIrd Corps and the Guard also came to the aid of the IXth, and those of the damaged guns of the last, which were still at all fit for service, were at once brought up again into the fighting line. Thus there was formed in front of Verneville and as far as St. Ail an artillery front of 130 pieces, whose fire now opposed the enemy's artillery with conspicuous success. Now that the IIIrd Corps was approaching Verneville and the 3rd Guard Brigade had reached Habonville, it was no longer to be apprehended that the French would succeed in piercing this line.

The main body of the Guard Corps reached St. Ail so early as two o'clock. General von Pape (commanding Ist Guard Division) at once recognized that by wheeling to the east he would not only not strike the enemy on that right flank of his which had to be turned, but would expose his own left flank to the hostile force occupying Ste. Marie aux Chênes. This town-like village, in itself extremely strong, and also strongly flanked by the main stronghold of the enemy's right, it was necessary to gain before making any further advance; but, in obedience to superior orders, the General had to await the co-operation of the Saxon Corps.

The foremost troops of this Corps had already reached the vicinity of Batilly, but it was still distant from Ste. Marie more than two miles, so that its batteries could not be pushed forward into position west of that place until three o'clock. But as the Guard had sent most of its own artillery to the support of the IXth Corps the Saxon batteries were of essential service. Ten batteries now directed their fire upon Ste. Marie, and by the time its effect was discernible, the 47th Brigade of the XIIth Corps came up. At half-past three the Prussian and Saxon battalions hurled themselves on the town from the south, the west, and the north, with loud hurrahs and without returning the fire of the enemy. The French were driven from it with the loss of several hundred men taken prisoners.

The Saxons eagerly followed up, and north of Ste. Marie there ensued a lively infantry fight, which masked the fire of the artillery. The brigade having obeyed the order to retire, the batteries immediately re-opened fire, and the repeated efforts of the French to recover the lost position were frustrated.

Soon afterwards the IXth Corps succeeded in storming and firmly holding the farm of Champenois, but all further attempts by isolated battalions or companies to force their way forward against the broad and compact front of the French were then manifestly futile. Thus, towards five o'clock, the infantry fire altogether died out, and the artillery fired only an occasional shot. The exhaustion of both sides caused for the time an almost total suspension of hostilities in this part of the field.

The Royal Head-quarter had firmly maintained the resolution, that the Ist Army should not commit itself to a serious offensive until the IInd had grappled with the enemy. But when the day was half-spent and when about noon heavy firing was heard from Vionville,[12] it was to be assumed that the moment for action had arrived; still, for the present, permission was only given to the Ist Army to engage in the artillery preparation.

Sixteen batteries of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps accordingly drew up right and left of Gravelotte on the highway passing through that village. Their fire was ineffective, because they were too far distant from the enemy; and furthermore they suffered from the fire of the French tirailleurs nestling in the opposite woods. It became necessary to drive those out, and thus there occurred here a premature infantry fight. The French were cleared out from the eastern declivity of the Mance ravine, and the artillery line, now increased to twenty batteries, was able to advance closer up to the western brink and now direct the strength of its fire against the main position of the enemy.

But the battalions of the 29th Brigade pushed the attack further. They pressed on leftward into the southern section of the Bois des Genivaux, but were unable to obtain touch of the IXth Corps in possession of the northern portion of the forest, since the French firmly held the intervening ground. On the right sundry detachments took possession of the quarries and gravel-pits near St. Hubert.

The artillery meanwhile had gained the mastery over that of the enemy, several of whose batteries were silenced, and others prevented from coming into position. The French fire was in part directed on the farm-steading of St. Hubert, to the vicinity of which portions of the 30th Brigade had spurted forward. These formidable premises close under the face of the enemy's main position, and in spite of a very heavy fire therefrom, were stormed at three o'clock. The 31st Brigade also now promptly crossed the ravine, but a further advance against the farms of Moscou and Leipzig, over a bare stretch of ground encompassed by the enemy on its wooded edges, did not succeed, and resulted only in heavy loss. On the extreme right, the 26th Brigade had taken possession of Jussy, thus securing the connection of the German army towards Metz, but found it impossible to cross the deep valley of Rozerieulles.

Everywhere the advanced positions of the French had been driven in, the farms in their front were blazing, their artillery appeared to be crushed, and, as the situation was viewed from Gravelotte, there needed nothing but to follow up the success. General von Steinmetz therefore, at four o'clock, ordered a renewed attack with fresh forces.

While the VIIth Corps occupied the border of the woodland, four batteries, backed by the 1st Cavalry Division, moved at a trot through the ravine, about 1500 paces across, which lies east of Gravelotte. But as soon as the head of the deep column came in sight of the enemy he redoubled his rifle and artillery fire, which had till now been kept under. One battery lost in a twinkling the men serving four of its guns, and it was only by an extreme effort that it was withdrawn to the border of the wood; another never succeeded in deploying. On the other hand, Hasse's battery remained in action, in spite of the loss of seventy-five horses, and Gnügge's battery stood fast near St. Hubert, regardless of the return fire from the quarries.

The foremost regiment of cavalry bent to the right at a gallop on leaving the hollow way, and advanced towards Point du Jour, but the enemy, being completely under cover, offered no mark for an attack. Clearly there was no field here for the utilization of this arm, so the regiments withdrew across the Mance ravine under a heavy fire from all sides.

The result of the ill-success of this attempt was that swarms of French tirailleurs now poured down from Point du Jour, and drove the Prussian detachments still remaining on the bare plateau backward to the skirts of the wood. Chassepôt bullets even reached the position of the Royal Commander-in-Chief and his personal staff, and Prince Adalbert's horse was shot under him.

Fresh forces pushed forward and drove the enemy back into his main position. St. Hubert remained in German possession, though the gunners of the battery in post there were equal to the service of but one gun. But all partial attempts to advance over the exposed plateau proved a failure; and here also at about five o'clock in the afternoon there occurred a lull in the fighting, during which the weary troops on both sides reorganized themselves and took breath.

About this time King William and his staff rode forward to the swell south of Malmaison. But from there nothing could be discerned of the situation of the left flank of the army, at a distance as it was of more than four miles. The French artillery had almost entirely ceased along the whole front from La Folie to Point du Jour; but to the northward the thunder of the cannon fire roared louder than ever. It was six o'clock, the day was nearly at an end, and it was imperative that the decisive result should be precipitated. The King therefore ordered the Ist Army to make a renewed advance in support of which he placed the IInd Corps, just arrived after a long march, at the disposal of General von Steinmetz.

The battalions of the VIIth Corps which were still serviceable, except five which remained in reserve, were again sent across the Mance ravine, and in support of them the battalions holding the Bois de Vaux advanced in the direction of Point du Jour and the quarries.

The IInd Corps of the French Army thus assailed was now reinforced by the Guard Voltigeur Division. All the reserves were hurried up into the foremost line. The artillery burst into redoubled fire, and a crushing musketry fire was concentrated on the advancing enemy. Then the French themselves took the offensive with a huge swarm of tirailleurs, which hurled backward upon the wood-fringes the small leaderless bodies of German troops that had been lying in the shallow folds of the plateau.

There, however, the sally found its limit; and there still remained at disposition a fresh Army Corps in full strength.

The IInd Corps, the last to come up by rail into the theatre of war, had hitherto followed in the wake of the army by forced marches, and had not been able to take part in any engagement. It had started from Pont à Mousson at 2 a.m. and, taking the road by Buxières and Rezonville, arrived south of Gravelotte towards evening. The Pomeranians expressed their eager desire to get at the enemy before the day should end.

It would have been more proper if the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, who was personally on the spot at the time, had not permitted this movement at so late an hour of the evening. A body of troops, still completely intact, might have been of great value the next day; but it could hardly be expected on this evening to effect a decisive reversal of the situation.

Hurrying through Gravelotte, the foremost battalions of the IInd Corps pushed forward to the quarries, and up to within a few hundred paces of Point du Jour; but those following soon found themselves involved in the throng of the broken detachments remaining under fire south of St. Hubert, and the further advance towards Moscou was arrested. In the growing darkness friend became indistinguishable from foe, and the firing had to be broken off. Not, however, until ten o'clock did it entirely cease.

It was, to be sure, an advantage that the fresh troops of the IInd Corps were available to hold the foremost fighting-line for the night, behind which the intermixed detachments of the VIIth and VIIIth Corps were enabled to reorganize themselves.

The whole course of the struggle had conclusively proved that the French left flank, almost impregnable as it was by nature and art, could not be forced even by the most devoted bravery and the greatest sacrifices. Both sides were now facing each other in threatening proximity, and both in attitude to renew the battle on the following morning. The result of the day turned on the events evolving themselves on the opposite flank.

The Prince of Würtemberg,[13] then in St. Ail, had judged at a quarter-past five that the moment was come for an attack on the French right wing; but that wing extended considerably further north than the front of the Guard Corps reached; further, indeed, than the French Commander-in-Chief himself was aware. The Saxons had, indeed, participated in the seizure of Ste. Marie aux Chênes, but after that event the Crown Prince[14] deemed it necessary to assemble his Corps in front of the Bois d'Auboué, before proceeding to attack the enemy in flank. One of his brigades had to come up from Jarny, another from Ste. Marie; and, since the Corps had been delayed in getting away from Mars la Tour, its direct attack could not be expected at the earliest for an hour to come.

The 4th Infantry Brigade of the Guard Corps, in accordance with orders received, proceeded in the prescribed direction of Jerusalem, immediately south of St. Privat. As soon as General von Manstein observed this movement, he ordered the 3rd Guard Brigade, which had been placed at his orders, immediately to advance from Habonville direct upon Amanvillers. Between and abreast of these two brigades marched Hessian battalions. It was not till half-an-hour later that the 1st Guard Division leftward of the 2nd moved forward from Ste. Marie against St. Privat. This combined offensive movement was directed against the broad front of the French VIth and IVth Corps. Their respective strongholds of St. Privat and Amanvillers had as yet hardly felt the fire of the German batteries, which had hitherto found enough to do in combating the enemy's artillery outside the villages.

In front of the French main position on the crown of the height had been prepared on the slope behind the hedges and low walls, which rose terrace-wise backward, tier on tier of shelter trenches. Behind these defences towered the village named St. Privat, castle-like with its massive houses, which were garrisoned to the very roofs. The bare slope stretching in its front was thus exposed to an overwhelming storm of projectiles.

The losses of the Guard Corps marching forward to attack a front so formidable were simply enormous. In the course of half an hour five battalions lost all, the others the greater part of their officers, especially those of the higher grades. Thousands of dead and wounded marked the track of the battalions pressing valiantly forward in spite of their cruel losses. The ranks as fast as they were thinned constantly closed up again, and their cohesion was not lost even under the leadership of young lieutenants and ensigns. As they drew nearer to the enemy the needle-gun came into full utility. The French were driven from all their foremost positions, in which, for the most part, they did not await the final struggle. By a quarter-past six the battalions had advanced to within 600 to 800 paces of Amanvillers and St. Privat. The troops, weary from the strained exertion, halted under the steeper slopes offering some, though small, protection, and in the shelter trenches abandoned by the enemy. Only four battalions now remained in reserve at Ste. Marie, behind the line which now extended to a length of 4000 paces. Every charge of the French cavalry and of de Cissey's Division had been steadily repelled with the aid of twelve batteries of the Guard Corps which had hastened up; but detachments commingled under stress of untold losses, had to show a resolute front against two French Corps in close proximity for more than half-an-hour, before relief came to them.

It was nearly seven o'clock when on the left of the Guard, two brigades of Saxon infantry reached the scene of strife; the other two were still assembling in the forest of Auboué; their artillery, however, had for a considerable time been maintaining a lively fire on Roncourt.

When Bazaine received word that the Germans were stretching out in constantly increasing extension with intent to outflank his right, he at three p.m. ordered Picard's Guard Grenadier Division posted at Plappeville, to march towards the threatened flank. Though the distance to be covered was little more than four miles, this all-important reinforcement, having diverged to rightward from the direct road through the woodland, had not yet arrived; and Marshal Canrobert, who was fending off with all his might the converging masses of Prussian assailants, decided to concentrate his troops more closely about the strong position of St. Privat. The retreat from Roncourt would be adequately covered by a small rearguard, since the border of the Bois de Jaumont was being held.

Thus it happened that the Saxons did not find the strong resistance at Roncourt which they had expected, and after a slight skirmish entered the village together with the companies of the extreme left of the Guard; a body of Saxon infantry had previously been diverted to the right from the road to Roncourt and marched direct on St. Privat to the support of the Guard.

The fire of twenty-four batteries of the two German Corps wrought awful havoc there. Many houses were set on fire, or crumbled under the concentrated crash of the shells. But the French were determined to hold to the last extremity this point, decisive as it was of the fate of the day. The batteries of their right flank were hurried into position between St. Privat and the Bois de Jaumont, whence their fire would enfilade the further advance of the Saxons on the former place. Other batteries went southward to confront the Prussians, and the simultaneous final rush of the German battalions was met by a rattling fire from the French riflemen under cover in their lines of shelter trenches.

All those obstacles were gradually overcome in the course of the assault, although again with heavy loss; some detachments halting occasionally for a moment to pour in a volley, others again never firing a shot. By sundown the attack had swept up to within 300 paces of St. Privat. Some detachments of the Xth Corps, which had reached St. Ail, closed up, and now the final onset was made from every side at once. The French still defended the burning houses and the church with great obstinacy, till, finding themselves completely surrounded, they surrendered at about eight o'clock. More than 2000 men were here taken prisoners, and the wounded were rescued from the burning houses.

The defeated troops of the VIth French Corps hurriedly retired into the valley of the Moselle, their retreat covered by the brigade holding the Bois de Jaumont and by the cavalry. Only then did the Guard Grenadier Division make its first appearance, and the Reserve Artillery of the French Army deployed east of Amanvillers. The German batteries at once took up the fight, which lasted till late in the night, and in the course of which Amanvillers was burned.

In that quarter the retirement of the IVth French Corps had also already commenced, masked, however, by repeated heavy attacks to the front. In the course of these there occurred a hand-to-hand encounter with the charging battalions of the right wing of the Guard and the left of the IXth Corps. Amanvillers, however, remained in the hands of the French for the night. Not until three o'clock on the morning of the 19th did the IIIrd French Corps evacuate its position about Moscou; and the IInd Corps held its ground until five o'clock, engaged in constant sharp frays with the outposts of the Pomeranians, who on its withdrawal took possession of the plateaus of Moscou and Point du Jour.

The results attained on the 18th of August had been made possible only by the battles of the 14th and 16th.

The French estimate their losses at 13,000 men. In October 173,000 were still in Metz, consequently it is certain that the enemy had at disposition in the battle of the 18th of August more than 180,000 men. The exact strength of the seven[15] German Corps on that day amounted to 178,818 men. Thus with the forces on either side of approximately equal strength, the French had been driven out of a position of almost unrivalled natural advantage.

Naturally the loss of the assailants was much heavier than that of the defence; it amounted to 20,584 men, among them 899 officers.

Whereas by the war-establishment the average is one officer to every forty men, in this battle one officer fell to every twenty-three men; glorious testimony to the example set by their leaders to their brave men, but also a loss which could not be restored during the course of the war. Altogether the six battles fought in the first fourteen days of August had cost the German army 50,000 men.[16] It was naturally impossible immediately to call out at home a sufficient levy in substitution for the losses; but reinforcements drawn from the time-expired cadres were already bespoken.

First of all that same evening the earliest instalment of the trains and the Field-Hospitals had to be brought up from the right bank of the Moselle; and the ammunition had to be replenished throughout. In Rezonville, thronged as it was with the wounded, it was with difficulty that a little garret for the King and shelter for his General Staff were found. Its members were engrossed throughout the night in preparing the dispositions which the new phase of the situation created by the victory rendered immediately necessary. This exertion enabled all those orders to be laid before his Majesty for approval on the morning of the 19th.