Читать книгу The Franco-German War of 1870-71 - Graf von Helmuth Moltke - Страница 16

Table of Contents

(August 16th.)

In the Head-quarter of the IInd Army there was the belief that serious fighting with the French was no more to be anticipated on the Moselle, and therefore two Corps, the IIIrd and the Xth, were ordered to march on August 16th, northwards toward the road to Verdun by way of Gorze and Thiaucourt, while the other Corps were directed to advance by forced marches westwards towards the Meuse.

The French retreat from Metz was, however, not completely effected on this day. The trains blocked every road, and in the forenoon three Divisions still remained behind in the Moselle valley. The Emperor, however, escorted by two brigades of cavalry, had departed at an early hour by the road through Etain, which was still comparatively safe. As the right wing of the army could not yet follow, the prosecution of the retreat was postponed until the afternoon, and the left wing, which had already begun the march, was sent back again into its bivouacs. But so early as nine o'clock Prussian shells startled the troops from their rest.

Major Körber had advanced with four batteries close up to Vionville under cover of the cavalry, and the French troopers, surprised by their fire, fled in utter confusion through the camp of the infantry. The latter, however, briskly got under arms in good order, and the artillery opened a heavy fire. Destitute at first of infantry supports, the Prussian guns were withdrawn. Matters soon became serious.

General von Alvensleben, fearing lest he should fail to overtake the enemy, had started again with the IIIrd Corps after a short night's rest. The 6th Division marched on the left, by Onville; the 5th, on the right, followed the long forest valley on the way to Gorze. This valley so capable of defence was found unoccupied by the enemy, who indeed had taken very few precautions. The advanced-guard presently encountered Bergés' French Division on the open plateau south of Flavigny, and General von Stülpnagel (commanding 5th Infantry Division) soon discovered that he had before him an enemy whom it would take all his strength to beat. At ten o'clock he began operations by sending forward the 10th Brigade (commanded by General von Schwerin); and opened fire with twenty-four guns.

Both sides now assumed the offensive. The Prussians, on the right, fought their way with varying fortunes through the wood, often in hand-to-hand encounter, and, towards eleven o'clock, succeeded in reaching the spur of the wood of St. Arnould projecting in the direction of Flavigny. Their left wing, on the contrary, was repulsed; even the artillery was in danger; but the 52nd Regiment hurried forward and re-established the fight at the cost of bloody sacrifices. Its 1st Battalion lost every one of its officers, the colours passed from hand to hand as its bearers were successively shot down, and the commander of the 9th Brigade, General von Döring, fell mortally wounded. General von Stülpnagel rode up into the foremost line of fire, inspiriting the men with brave words, while General von Schwerin collected the remnants of troops bereft of their leaders, and, reinforced by a detachment of the Xth Corps from Novéant, carried the height in front of Flavigny, whence the French presently retired.

On the assumption that the French were already prosecuting the retreat, the 6th Division had been ordered forward towards Etain by way of Mars la Tour, to bar the enemy also from the northern road to Verdun. When it reached the height of Tronville, whence could be seen how things really stood, the brigades wheeled to the right in the direction of Vionville and Flavigny. The artillery going on in advance, formed a formidable line of batteries, the fire of which prepared the way for a farther advance, and by half-past eleven the 11th Brigade had taken possession of Vionville in spite of heavy losses. From thence, and from the south, in conjunction with the 10th Brigade, an attack was then directed on Flavigny, which had been set on fire by shell-fire. The different detachments were hereabouts very much mixed, but by skilfully taking advantage of every fold of the ground, the individual regimental officers succeeded in getting their men steadily forward, in spite of the heavy fire of the hostile infantry and artillery. Flavigny was taken by assault, and one cannon and a number of prisoners fell into the hands of the brave Brandenburgers.

Vionville, Flavigny and the northern end of the forest of St. Arnould constituted the points of support of the Prussian front now facing to the east; but this front was more than four miles long, and the whole infantry and artillery were engaged up to the hilt all in one line. The second line consisted only of the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions and half of the 37th Brigade near Tronville.

The position of the French was one of great advantage. Their left flank leaned on Metz, their right was protected by formidable batteries on the old Roman road and a strong force of cavalry; and so they could await with confidence a frontal attack on the part of a venturesome enemy.

The possibility of continuing the march to Verdun on this day, under the protection of a strong covering rearguard, was, no doubt, out of the question. Supposing the Marshal earnest above everything to effect his retreat, he could do so only by fighting hard for his right of way, and by so freeing himself from the enemy blocking his path.

It is not easy to discern, from a purely military standpoint, why this course was not resorted to. There was the full certainty that only part, and probably only a small part, of the German host could as yet have reached the left side of the Moselle, and when in the course of the day the Divisions detained about Metz arrived, the French had greatly the superiority in strength. But it seems that the Marshal's chief solicitude was lest he should be forced to relinquish his touch of Metz; and he gave almost his whole attention to his left wing. Constantly sending fresh reinforcements thither, he massed the whole Guard Corps and part of the VIth Corps opposite the Bois des Ognons, whence an attack was exceptionally improbable. One is tempted to assume that political reasons alone thus early actuated Bazaine in his resolve to cling to Metz.

Meanwhile the Prussians slowly but surely made their way beyond Flavigny and Vionville, and, assisted by a heavy fire from the artillery, compelled the right wing of the IInd French Corps to retire on Rezonville, a movement which became a flight when the French Generals Bataille and Valazé were killed.

To regain the lost ground the French Guard Cuirassier Regiment threw itself resolutely on the pursuers. But its attack was cut short by the rapid fire of two companies of the 52nd Regiment drawn up in line, which reserved their fire till the enemy were within 250 paces. The horsemen sweeping right and left rushed into the fire of more infantry behind; 243 horses strewed the field, and only the remnants of the regiment wheeled about in swift flight, pursued by two Hussar regiments which had dashed forward from Flavigny. A French battery in front of Rezonville had hardly time to discharge a few shots before it was surrounded. For want of teams the Prussians could not, indeed, carry off the captured guns; but the Commander-in-Chief of the French army, who had himself brought them up, was for several minutes in imminent danger of being taken prisoner.

The 6th Prussian Cavalry Division had also been ordered to the front. After passing through the line of artillery and deploying as well as the limited space permitted, it found itself face to face with fresh and completely formed troops. Marshal Bazaine had taken the precaution of substituting for the routed bodies of the IInd Corps the Guard Grenadier Division, which he had at last prevailed on himself to bring up from his unengaged left wing, but not without filling the vacancy by a Division of the IIIrd Corps. Thus the Prussian cavalry was received with such an overwhelming musketry and artillery fire that it halted, and deliberately retired, its retreat being covered by two squadrons of Uhlans, which time after time showed a front against the enemy. The cavalry had not actually engaged, but its advance had gained time and opportunity for the artillery to move further forward in one line from the spur of the wood to Flavigny.

It was now two o'clock. So far General von Alvensleben had deceived the enemy with regard to the slenderness of his force by acting incessantly on the offensive. But the battle was now at a standstill, the battalions were visibly thinned, their strength was sapped by four hours of hard fighting, and the ammunition of the infantry was almost exhausted. Not a battalion, not a battery remained in reserve behind the fighting line standing there in the fire. It was now required to conserve the success won with so much blood by acting thenceforth on the defensive.

The left wing was in especial danger, being under the fire of the powerful artillery deployed on the Roman road. Their greatly superior numbers enabled the French to extend farther and farther to the right, threatening thus completely to envelop the Prussian flank.

Marshal Canrobert, in the French centre, had discerned the right moment to press forward against Vionville with all his might. At this critical instant there was on the German side only a small detachment of the 5th Cavalry Division available to check this effort. Two brigades had necessarily been sent to strengthen the left flank, and of the 12th Brigade remaining in rear of Vionville two squadrons had been detached to the Tronville copses. The two regiments ordered to undertake the task of charging the advancing enemy—the Magdeburg Cuirassiers and the Altmark Uhlans—were consequently each but three squadrons strong, in all 800 horses.

General von Bredow, commanding the 12th Cavalry Brigade, first traversed in column the shallow hollow sinking down from Vionville, then wheeled to the right and mounted the slope to the eastward, both his regiments on one front. Received immediately with heavy artillery and infantry fire, he threw himself on the hostile ranks. The first line is ridden over, the line of guns is broken through, gunners and teams are put to the sword. The second French line is powerless to resist this vigorous onslaught, and even the more distant batteries limbered up to drive away.

But the rapture of victory and the impetuosity of the charge carried the handful of troopers too far, and after a gallop of 3000 paces they found themselves surrounded by the French cavalry, which attacked them from all sides. There was no scope for a second charge, and so after several encounters with the French horse the brigade was forced to cut its way back through the French infantry, whose bullets accompanied it home. Only one-half of the command returned to Flavigny, where it was reorganized into two squadrons. The devoted self-sacrifice of the two heroic regiments effected the result, that the French entirely discontinued their attack on Vionville.

At three o'clock four of their Divisions advanced towards the Tronville copses. Barby's cavalry brigade (11th), watching the western verge, had to retire before the enemy's fire, and the German infantry occupying the wood also had to yield to a strength so superior; the batteries which were in action between Vionville and the copses were assailed in rear from the west through the glades of the copses, and were likewise forced to retire. But not until the lapse of an hour did the French succeed in overcoming the obstinate resistance of four staunch battalions.

At the subsequent roll-call near Tronville, it was ascertained that the 24th Regiment had lost 1000 men and 52 officers, and that the 2nd Battalion of the 20th Regiment had lost all its officers. The 37th demi-Brigade, which of its own accord had been fighting valiantly in support since noon, took possession of the village of Tronville and prepared it for an obstinate defence.

It was not till after three that the IIIrd Corps, which had been fighting for seven[9] hours almost single-handed, received effective assistance.

While the Xth Corps was on the march through Thiaucourt, its advanced guard heard cannon-fire from the direction of Vionville. The Corps Commander, General von Voigts-Rhetz, immediately set out for the battle-field, and having personally ascertained how matters stood, he sent back the requisite orders to his approaching troops.

In this instance again it was the artillery which, hurrying on in advance, masterfully struck into the conflict. Its fire, in conjunction with that of the promptly further advancing batteries of the IIIrd Corps, checked the French rush made on both sides of the Tronville copses simultaneously. At half-past three the head of von Woyna's Brigade (39th) fell on, drove the enemy back into the wood, and finally, supported by Diringshofen's Brigade (40th), took possession of its northern outskirts.

The right wing of the IIIrd Corps had also received some reinforcement.

The 32nd Brigade of the VIIIth Corps, on being called upon to assist the 5th Division, fatigued though it was by a long march, immediately advanced from the Moselle by Arry. The 11th Regiment joined it, and three batteries were sent ahead to commence operations; this force emerged at five o'clock from the forest of St. Arnould. It at once made an assault on the heights in front of Maison Blanche, but, though it made three strenuous efforts in succession, failed to carry them, since Marshal Bazaine had greatly strengthened his position in front of Rezonville. Then the French, in their turn, took the offensive there; but were equally unable to establish themselves firmly on the heights, swept as they were by the well-directed fire of the Prussian artillery; and they had to withdraw from the attempt. Petty struggles for this position were renewed later on both sides, but those spurts came to nothing because of the fire of the respective artillery; and the fighting on the German right became in the main stationary.

That on the German left two French Divisions had retired before a few newly-arrived battalions, and had evacuated the Tronville copses, can only be explained by a report having reached Bazaine's head-quarters that the enemy was coming in upon his right flank in the vicinity of Hannonville.

The enemy referred to was Wedell's Brigade (38th), which, while on the march in the direction of Etain according to its original orders, had received counter-instructions while halted at St. Hilaire at noon, to hurry to the field of battle. General von Schwartzkoppen (commanding 19th Infantry Division) decided to march by the highway to Mars la Tour, in the hope of falling on the enemy either in flank or in rear. But the French meanwhile had extended their reinforced right wing to the sunken valley west of Bruville, where three Divisions of their cavalry were massed in position.

Thus when General von Wedell advanced to the attack on both sides of Tronville, which the French themselves had fired, his brigade—only five battalions strong—found itself in face of the long deployed front of the 4th French Corps. The two Westphalian regiments advanced steadily under the storm of shell and mitrailleuse fire till they suddenly reached the edge of a deep ravine hitherto unseen. This, however, they soon traversed, and were climbing the farther ascent, when they were met by a murderous shower of bullets from the French infantry which hemmed them in closely on every side. After almost every one of the commanders and regimental officers had fallen, the wreck of the battalions fell back into the ravine; 300 men were taken prisoners, having no strength left to ascend the steep southern rise after the fatigue of a twenty-eight miles march. The remainder rallied at Tronville under the shot-torn colours which Colonel von Cranach, the only officer who still had a horse under him, had brought back in his own hand. Seventy-two officers and 2542 men were missing out of 95 officers and 4546 men—more than half. The French followed up their success, but were checked on the right by the headlong charge of the 1st Guard Dragoons, which cost that regiment 250 horses and nearly all its officers; and on the left by the 4th squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, which attacked three times its strength of Chasseurs d'Afrique.

But there now imminently threatened the charge of a great mass of French cavalry, which disclosed itself on the open plateau of Ville sur Yron. This consisted of Legrand's Division and de France's Guard Brigade in four compact echelons, overlapping each other to the right. On the German side, all the still disposable cavalry joined Barby's brigade, and the body thus made up, consisting only of sixteen squadrons, was formed for action in two lines west of Mars la Tour. Farther in advance stood the 13th Dragoons, halted to receive the Guard-squadron on its return from its recent charge. The 13th galloped forward to meet the charge of Montaigu's Hussar Brigade, which constituted the first line of the French cavalry mass, and which broke through the (over-wide) intervals of the Prussian squadrons. But General von Barby promptly appeared with the other regiments on the upland of Ville sur Yron, where at a quarter to seven the cavalry masses came into collision.

A mighty cloud of dust concealed the varying phases of the hand-to-hand encounter of 5000 horsemen which gradually declared itself in favour of the Prussians. General Montaigu, severely wounded, was taken prisoner, and General Legrand fell while leading his Dragoons to the assistance of the Hussars.

De France's Brigade allowed the enemy to approach within 150 paces, and then its Lancer regiment rushed impetuously upon the Hanoverian Uhlans; but the latter outflanked it, and received unexpected assistance from the 5th squadron of the 2nd Guard Dragoons, which, returning from a reconnaissance, plunged forward over fences and ditches and fell upon the enemy in flank, while the Westphalian Cuirassiers at the same time broke his front. The Chasseurs d'Afrique strove in vain to hinder the enveloping tactics of the Hanoverian Dragoons; the clouds of dust drifted farther and farther northward, and the whole mass of French horse drew away towards the wooded slopes of Bruville, behind which there were still five regiments of Clérembault's Cavalry Division. Clérembault permitted one of his brigades to cross the valley, but the fleeing Hussars and some misunderstood signals threw it into confusion. It was borne back, and not until the French infantry confronted the Prussian pursuers in the covering valley did the latter desist from the pursuit.

The Prussian regiments quietly re-formed and then withdrew at a walk to Mars la Tour, followed at a great distance by part of Clérembault's Division.

This, the greatest cavalry combat of the war, had the effect of making the French right wing give up all further attempts to act on the offensive. The Germans mourned the loss of many superior officers, who always, at the head of their men, had set them a glorious example.

Prince Frederick Charles had hastened to the field of battle. The day was nearly at an end, darkness approaching, and the battle won. The Prussians in the evening stood on the ground which in the morning had been occupied by the French. Though General von Alvensleben had in the first instance been under the impression that he would have only the French rear-guard to deal with, he did not hesitate for a moment to become the assailant when he found the entire French Army before him. With his single Corps he maintained the fight till the afternoon, and drove back the enemy from Flavigny to Rezonville, a distance of more than two miles. This was one of the most brilliant achievements of all the war.

Thanks to the valuable assistance of the Xth Corps it was possible to carry on the battle through the afternoon on the defensive, but only by most resolute counter-attacks by the cavalry, and by the unflinching tenacity of the artillery.

It was clearly most unadvisable to challenge by renewed attacks an enemy who still outnumbered the Germans; which action, since no further reinforcements could be hoped for, could not but jeopardize the success so dearly bought. The troops were exhausted, most of their ammunition was spent, the horses had been under the saddle for fifteen hours without fodder; some of the batteries could only move at a walk, and the nearest Army Corps on the left bank of the Moselle, the XIIth,[10] was distant more than a day's march.

Notwithstanding all these considerations, an order from Prince Frederick Charles's Head-quarter issued at seven o'clock, commanded a renewed and general attack on the enemy's positions. The Xth Corps was quite incapable of answering this demand; and only part of the artillery went forward on the right followed by some infantry. The batteries indeed reached the much-disputed plateau south of Rezonville, but only to be exposed on two sides to the fire of infantry and artillery. Fifty-four guns of the French Guard alone, in position on the farther side of the valley, were taking them in flank. The Prussian batteries were compelled to retreat to their previous position, but two brigades of the 6th Cavalry Division still pressed forward. Scarcely able to discern in the increasing darkness where lay their proper line of attack, they came under very sharp infantry fire, and withdrew with great loss.

Fighting did not entirely cease until ten o'clock. On either side 16,000 men had fallen. On either side pursuit was out of the question. The Germans reaped the fruits of this victory solely in its results. The troops, worn out by a twelve hours' struggle, bivouacked on the victorious but bloody field, immediately opposite the French position.

Those Corps of the IInd Army which had not taken part in the battle, were on that day on march towards the Meuse. The advanced guard of the IVth Corps on the left wing was heading towards Toul. This fortress, commanding a railway-line of importance to the further progress of the German Army, was reported to be but feebly held, and it was resolved to attempt its capture by a coup de main. But the bombardment of it by field-artillery proved quite ineffective. Bastions of masonry and wide wet ditches made a storm impossible. An attempt to batter down the gates by shot and thus gain an entrance proved a failure. Finally the undertaking was given up, and not without some loss on the part of the Germans.

At the Royal Head-quarter in Pont à Mousson it had become known by about noon on the 16th that the IIIrd Corps was engaged in serious conflict, and that the Xth and IXth were hastening up to its support. The far-reaching consequences of this information were recognized at once.

The French were arrested in their withdrawal from Metz, but it was to be presumed as a certainty that they would again make strenuous efforts to force open their interrupted line of retreat. The XIIth Corps was therefore ordered to set out for Mars la Tour as early as three o'clock next morning; the VIIth and VIIIth Corps to stand in readiness at Corny and Arry. The bridging operations were to be pushed with the utmost vigour during the night. The Head-quarter of the IInd Army sent from Gorze the order to the Guard Corps to make a forced march to Mars la Tour, and there take up a position on the left of the XIIth Corps. The execution of these orders was facilitated by the foresight of the Commanders, who had in the course of the day received news of the battle which was being fought. Prince George of Saxony at once placed his Division on the march to Thiaucourt, and the Prince of Würtemberg assembled the Infantry of the Guard in its cantonments farther northward in readiness for an early march.

August 17th.—On this morning, at sunrise, the French outposts were observed still occupying the sweep of front from Bruville to Rezonville. Behind them were noticed a stir and much noise of signalling, which might be the indications equally of an attack or of a retirement.

The King arrived from Pont à Mousson at Flavigny as early as six o'clock. The reports sent in to headquarters until noon by the reconnoitring cavalry were somewhat contradictory; they left it uncertain whether the French were concentrating towards Metz, or were pursuing their retreat by the two still open roads through Etain and Briey. Preparations for the offensive were nowhere observed. By one o'clock, after a skirmish on the way, the head of the VIIth Corps had reached the northern skirt of the Bois des Ognons, over against which the French subsequently abandoned Gravelotte. The VIIIth Corps stood ready at Gorze, the IXth, IIIrd, and Xth remained in their positions, the XIIth and the Guard Corps were on the march. Seven Corps and three Cavalry Divisions could be counted on for the following day; for to-day all attacks were forbidden.

In making the dispositions for the impending battle of August 18th, two possible contingencies were foreseen and had to be provided for. To meet both the left wing was to be sent forward in a northerly direction through Doncourt towards the nearest of the routes still open for the retreat of the French. If the enemy were already retiring, he was to be at once attacked and detained while the right wing was hurrying up in support.

In case the enemy should be remaining about Metz, the German left wing was to swing eastwards and out-flank his farthest north position, while the right was to hold his left closely engaged until this movement was accomplished. The battle, under these circumstances, probably could not be decided until late in the day, owing to the wide-sweeping movement of a portion of the army. A peculiar feature of the situation was that both parties had to fight with inverted front, and sacrifice for the time their respective lines of communication. The consequences of victory or defeat would thus be greatly enhanced or aggravated, but the French had the advantage of having as their base a large place of arms with its resources.

A decision having been arrived at, by two o'clock orders were published at Flavigny for an advance by echelons from the left wing. The guidance of individual Corps during the battle was to turn on the reports which should be brought in. The King then returned to Pont à Mousson.

As early as nine o'clock in the morning the Saxon Cavalry Division had reached the Etain road to the west of Conflans, and had reported no enemy visible except a few stragglers. Still, this only proved that on the 17th the French had not yet taken up their retreat.

In rear of its cavalry the XIIth Corps arrived during the day in the vicinity of Mars la Tour and Puxieux, and left of it the Guard bivouacked in the evening at Hannonville sur Yron, in accordance with order. The IInd Corps, which ever since it left the railway had followed close on the IInd Army, reached Pont à Mousson, and was ordered to march forward by Buxières at four next morning.