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Agarwal, M. and Pirzada, N. (2015). Sub-Saharan Experience of Growth: The Role of the least Developed and Fragile States, G. Kararach, H. Besada, and T. Shaw (eds.), Bristol: policy Press.

Barro, R. J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100, No. 2, pp. 223–251.

Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 112, No. 4, pp. 1203–1250.

Whitfield, L. (2012). How Countries Become Rich and Reduce Poverty: A Review of Heterodox Explanations of Economic Development, Development Policy Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 239–260.

¹Several studies have been undertaken by the World Bank to analyse the region’s performance.

²For instance, Easterly and Levine (1997) ascribe the poor performance of SSA to ethnic divisions, which leads to poor governance, conflict and also fragility.

³The list of LDCs is reviewed once in every 3 years by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), based on recommendations of the Committee for Development Policy (CDP). The UN classifies countries as “least developed” in terms of their low gross national income (GNI), their weak human assets and their high degree of economic vulnerability. See http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf.

⁴Since we are analysing growth of per capita income, demographics has nothing to do with the analysis. There is no theory or empirical evidence that ties rate of growth of per capita income with rate of population growth.

⁵For an analysis of convergence, see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). See also Whitfield (2012).

⁶The increase in the share of trade in GDP is also because of the increase in trade in intermediate goods. Intermediate goods are traded a number of times before they are incorporated in the final product. As a consequence, trade grows much faster than output.

⁷As we know in a two-good model, a reduction in import duties raises both exports and imports.

⁸As the performance of EAP shows, there is no particular number at which the share of XGS in GDP should remain. If exports grow rapidly, then income and employment in the export sector grow and this has a spillover effect on the rest of the economy. What is important is the change in the share and not the level of the share. The effect of exports can again perhaps be illustrated by the experience of India. India had periodic balance of payments problems with crises in 1966–1967, 1979–1980 and 1990–1991 because of poor export performance — the share of XGS in GDP was constant at about 5%. These crises disrupted the economic situation thereby lowering the growth rate. This has changed since the liberalisation started in 1991.

⁹A number of large-aid recipients are likely to graduate from IDA in the next few years. If the funds with IDA do not show a proportionate decrease, then more soft aid might be available for countries in SSA.

¹⁰But this hope seems to be belied as growth rates in LAC and SSA remain low.

¹¹Calculated by the authors from data available in the World Bank Data Bank on Development Indicators.

¹²The growth projections for the period 2011–2014 of the World Bank (2012) have LAC growing at 4% a year and SSA at 5% a year.

¹³This of course implies that for most groups performance in exports of goods is better than that for XGS. But it also implies that exports of manufactures themselves by the manufacturing exporting countries are very poor.