Читать книгу The Herodotus Encyclopedia - Группа авторов - Страница 683

JOHN W. I. LEE

University of California Santa Barbara

Herodotus provides valuable evidence for the military institutions of ATHENS, SPARTA, and other Greek states, along with information on non‐Greek armies including the ACHAEMENID Persian military.

The war bands and aristocratic retinues of early Greece developed into formal armies during the eighth to sixth centuries BCE, though privately raised forces never entirely disappeared (5.47; 8.17). Greeks who went abroad as MERCENARIES (2.152–54, 163; 3.11) during this time may have brought home innovations in military organization, tactics, and equipment.

At Athens, evidence for a formal army before the DEMOCRACY installed by CLEISTHENES is scant (Frost 1984). Warriors may have grouped in four tribes (5.66), with property qualifications for HOPLITE service perhaps introduced c. 600 (van Wees 2004, 96). Personal bodyguards (1.59), foreign mercenaries (1.61, 64), and private networks of armed supporters (1.62) were important in PEISISTRATUS’ takeovers during the 540s, and probably also in Athens’ wars involving MEGARA (1.59), SIGEIUM (5.64, 94), and AEGINA (5.82–84). From the late 500s, the Athenian army consisted of ten hoplite regiments (taxeis), one for each of the new Cleisthenic tribes (5.66). A 300–strong detachment of picked troops (logades) appears at PLATAEA (9.21).

Athens’ elected polemarch or war leader (6.109) traditionally led from the position of HONOR on the right wing (6.111). The district chiefs mentioned (5.71) in connection with CYLON’s attempted coup c. 630 perhaps helped assemble troops and ships. Herodotus says (1.59) Peisistratus held a generalship in the war against Megara c. 561; whether this was a formal office is uncertain (Rhodes 1993, 264). From c. 501/0 each tribe elected a general (stratēgos, 6.103) and possibly also a separate regimental commander (taxiarchos; Rhodes 1993, 684–85). At MARATHON, the ten generals deliberated as a group, with each general taking a daily turn in charge, though the polemarch CALLIMACHUS retained some authority (6.109–11). Herodotus says Callimachus was chosen by LOT, while other sources say polemarchs were elected until 487/6 (Scott 2005, 378–86).

Herodotus claims (5.78) the Athenians became better fighters after overthrowing the TYRANTS. Their hoplite army grew from perhaps 1–2,000 under the PEISISTRATIDAE (Singor 2013, 592) to some 8,000 at Plataea (9.28), including 4,000 military settlers (CLERUCHS) given land on EUBOEA after the Athenian victory there in 506 (5.77; 6.100). The army also included ARCHERS (9.22) and other light infantry. Both hoplites and light troops served as marines (8.83).

The Spartan army underwent several organizational changes over time, the specifics of which remain debated (for a summary see van Wees 2004, 97–99, 243–49). Herodotus credits (1.65) LYCURGUS OF SPARTA with establishing Sparta’s military institutions including units of thirty (triakades), sworn bands (enomotiai), and common messes (syssitia). Sworn bands and common messes persisted in Spartan socio‐military organization for centuries.

In 480–479 the Spartans were probably organized into regiments (lochoi, 9.53), subdivided into sworn bands each comprising several common messes (van Wees 2004, 243–44; cf. Lazenby 1985, 67). Regiments may have mustered geographically, for Herodotus mentions (9.53.2) a lochos named after the Spartan village of PITANE. THUCYDIDES denied such a lochos existed (Thuc. 1.20; Hornblower 1991, 57–58), and the number of regiments in the army is debated (Kennell 2010, 148; Lazenby 1985, 66; van Wees 2004, 97).

An officer called a lochagos (9.53) or a taxiarchos (9.57) led each Spartan regiment. Officers called polemarchs appear once (7.173); their function at this time is uncertain. Normally one of Sparta’s two kings led the army in the field (5.75). Herodotus mentions a 100‐strong royal bodyguard (6.56) but also describes LEONIDAS’ picked detachment of 300 men with living sons (7.205; on the text see Wilson 2015, 150). A 300‐strong escort of Knights (Hippeis) appears in a non‐battle context (8.124). In later Spartan armies the 300 Hippeis fought on foot next to the king (e.g., Thuc. 5.72); either Herodotus made mistakes or the discrepancies reflect changes over time.

The Spartans took pride in martial traditions such as long HAIR (1.82; 7.209). Herodotus emphasizes their discipline and honor (7.104, 229–31) but also highlights cases of insubordination (9.53–56) and reputation‐seeking (9.71).

In 480 there were about 8,000 full Spartiates (7.234), of whom 5,000 took the field at Plataea (9.28). Five thousand picked PERIOECI joined them as hoplites (9.11). Perioeci may also have fought at THERMOPYLAE (van Wees 2004, 83–84; cf. Lazenby 1985, 107). Helots served as attendants and light troops (7.229; 8.25; 9.10, 28, 85).

Herodotus mentions other Greek militaries including the troops of POLYCRATES of SAMOS (3.39, 45), the 8,000‐strong Naxian army (5.30), and GELON of SYRACUSE’s combined arms force (7.158). The allied Ionian army (5.99–100, 112; 6.15) had city generals (5.99, 102) who may have become part of a joint Ionian command (5.109). Picked troops (logades) of Tegeans (1.82), Thebans (9.67), and others appear. Herodotus points out Greek discipline problems (1.63; 6.12–14) and disputes over positions of honor (9.26–28), but also notes the Greek coalition’s ability to organize long‐distance supply convoys at Plataea (9.39).

As for non‐Greeks, Herodotus gives no details on the Assyrian army (1.95, 102; 2.141). He says (1.103) CYAXARES the Mede was the first to organize the troops of ASIA into units and to separate spearmen, archers, and CAVALRY, and praises the Lydian army for its horsemen (1.79). His account of EGYPT’s warriors (2.141, 164–68) contains a number of inaccuracies (Fischer‐Bovet 2013, 210–19).

Herodotus emphasizes the size (4.87; 7.184–87) and diversity of Achaemenid PERSIA’s military forces. His CATALOGUE (7.60–88) of XERXES’ invasion force might draw upon an authentic troop roster, although more likely it reflects a parade or review army (Briant 1999, 118–20; Cawkwell 2005, 241–43). The Persian IMMORTALS and other picked units (8.113; 9.63) formed the core of the actual fighting force. The Persian army at Plataea included some 50,000 Greek infantry (9.32), with Thebans playing a key role (9.67–68).

Elements of the decimal unit organization Herodotus describes (7.81) appear in imperial records from PERSEPOLIS and Egypt (Briant 2002, 342, 431). On the other hand, Herodotus gives little inkling of the recruitment, maintenance, and mobilization practices known from Achaemenid documents (see Kuhrt 2007, 720–23).

Herodotus reveals Achaemenid logistical prowess, including water pipes and convoys (3.9), prepared depots (7.25), requisition procedures (7.118–20), BRIDGES (4.83–88, 97–98; 7.36), CANALS (7.22–24, 37), and support personnel (7.187). ARCHAEOLOGY corroborates some of his descriptions of Achaemenid SIEGE craft (1.162; 4.200; 6.18) and field FORTIFICATIONS (4.124; 9.15, 65, 97).

SEE ALSO: Engineering; Generals and Generalship; Warfare; Weapons and Armor