Читать книгу After Engagement - Группа авторов - Страница 16

1 1. See David Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing’s Responses,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 180–209; Joseph S. Nye, “China’s Re-Emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific,” Survival 39, no. 4 (1997), pp. 65–79; Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, editors, Engaging China (London and New York: Routledge, 1999); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015); Neil Thomas, “Matters of Record: Relitigating Engagement with China,” MacroPolo, September 3, 2019, https://macropolo.org/analysis/china-us-engagement-policy/.

2 2. See David M. Lampton, “The US and China: Sliding from Engagement to Coercive Diplomacy,” PacNet, no. 63, August 4, 2014, http://csis.org/publication/pacnet-63-us-and-china-sliding-engagement-coercive-diplomacy; John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” National Interest, October 25, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204; David M. Lampton, “A Tipping Point in US-China Relations Is Upon Us,” US-China Perception Monitor, May 11, 2015, www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/; Kevin Rudd, “US-China 21—The Future of US-China Relations under Xi Jinping: Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April, 2015, http://asiasociety.org/files/USChina21_English.pdf.

3 3. Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (March-April 2018), pp. 60–70; Wang Jisi and others, “Did America Get China Wrong? The Engagement Debate,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 4 (July-August 2018), pp. 183–95; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival 60, no. 3 (June-July 2018), pp. 7–64. See, also, Thomas, “Matters of Record: Relitigating Engagement with China”; Alastair Iain Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 (2019), p. 99.

4 4. For a view disputing claims that China has narrowed, or is likely to narrow, this gap, see Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 41–78; Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Cornell University Press, 2018).

5 5. See, for example, “National Security Agency Review Teams Briefing Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by President-elect Joe Biden in Wilmington, Delaware” (2020). (“As we compete with China and hold China’s government accountable for its abuses … our position will be much stronger when we build coalitions of like-minded partners.… On any issue that matters to the U.S.-China relationship … we are stronger and more effective when we are flanked by nations that share our vision.” https://buildbackbetter.gov/speeches/national-security-agency-review-teams-briefing-remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-by-president-elect-joe-biden-in-wilmington-delaware/).

6 6. See, generally, Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, editors, China Joins the World: Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).

7 7. See Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford University Press, 2005), chapter 5.

8 8. See Avery Goldstein, “Great Expectations: Interpreting China’s Arrival,” International Security 22, no. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36–73. See, also, Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for US Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001), pp. 5–40.

9 9. See Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace,” International Security 23, no. 81 (Spring 1999), pp. 81–118.

10 10. United States Census Bureau, “Trade in Goods with China,” www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html; Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China,” https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china; “Top U.S. Trade Partners,” www.trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg_ian/documents/webcontent/tg_ian_003364.pdf; Congressional Research Service, “U.S. Trade with Major Trading Partners,” December 18, 2018; Wayne M. Morrison, “China’s Economic Rise: History, Trends, Challenges, and Implications for the United States,” June 25, 2019, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33534.pdf.

11 11. See, generally, Robert S. Ross, editor, After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1998); David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (University of California Press, 2001), chapter 7; Erica S. Downs, “New Interest Groups in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2011, www.brookings.edu/testimonies/new-interest-groups-in-chinese-foreign-policy/; Ka Zeng, editor, China’s Foreign Trade Policy: The New Constituencies (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2007). On recent, adverse developments, see Daniel W. Drezner, “The Death of the China Lobby?” Foreign Policy, July 20, 2010. On domestic politics as determinants of foreign policy generally, see Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1997).

12 12. See, generally, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4th edition (London, UK: Pearson Longman, 2001); Quansheng Zhao and Guoli Liu, “Managing the Challenges of Complex Interdependence: China and the United States in the Era of Globalization,” Asian Politics and Policy 2, no. 1 (2010), pp. 1–23.

13 13. Robert Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility – Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations,” September 21, 2005, www.ncuscr.org/sites/default/files/migration/Zoellick_remarks_notes06_winter_spring.pdf.

14 14. See, generally, Martha Finnemore and Michael N. Barnett, Rules for the World: International Organization in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004); Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992), pp. 391–425. For a constructivist analysis of China’s interaction with international law and institutions, see, also, Alistair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton University Press, 2008).

15 15. “The President’s News Conference,” American Presidency Project, March 29, 2000, www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58305; “Full Text of Clinton’s Speech on China Trade Bill,” New York Times, March 9, 2000; “Premier Zhu Rongji Meets Powell: Cooperation between China, US Conducive to Both,” Xinhua, July 28, 2001.

16 16. Randall Peerenboom, China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest? (Oxford University Press, 2007); see, also, the discussion in Jacques deLisle, “Development without Democratization? China, Law and the East Asian Model,” in Democratizations: Comparisons, Confrontations and Contrasts, edited by Jose V. Ciprut (MIT Press, 2009), pp. 197–232.

17 17. See Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, nos. 3 and 4 (1983), pp. 205–35, 323–35; President William J. Clinton, “State of the Union Address” (“Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don’t attack each other. They make better trading partners and partners in diplomacy.”), January 25, 1994.

18 18. Johnston, “The Failures of the ‘Failure of Engagement’ with China”; Thomas, “Matters of Record: Relitigating Engagement with China.”

19 19. See National Security Strategy, May, 2010, http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf, p. 43, and “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,” June, 2015, www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf, p. 2.

20 20. See, generally, Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia (New York: Hachette, 2016). Although some saw this approach as compensating for the Bush administration’s inattention to East Asia, the US had remained engaged in regional affairs even when its top priority was the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015).

21 21. See “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin’s Regular Press Conference on November 17, 2011,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t879769.htm; Chris Buckley, “China Looks across Asia and Sees New Threats,” Reuters, November 10, 2011, www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/US-China-asia-idUSTRE7A91CY20111110; Keith B. Richburg, “US Pivot to Asia Makes China Nervous,” Washington Post, November 16, 2011; Barbara Demick, “China’s Fury Building over Obama’s New Asia Policy,” Los Angeles Times, November 21, 2011.

22 22. See Jacques deLisle, “Political Implications of the July 2016 Arbitration Decision in the Philippines-PRC Case Concerning the South China Sea: The United States, China, and International Law,” Asian Yearbook of International Law 21 (2017), pp. 49–82.

23 23. See Bonnie S. Glaser, Daniel G. Sofio, and David A. Parker, “Snapshot – The Good, the THAAD, and the Ugly: China’s Campaign against Deployment, and What to Do About It,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2017, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-15/good-thaad-and-ugly; Bonnie S. Glaser and Lisa Collins, “Snapshot – China’s Rapprochement with South Korea: Who Won the THAAD Dispute?” Foreign Affairs, November 7, 2017, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-07/chinas-rapprochement-south-korea. On China’s concerns, see Li Bin, “The Security Dilemma and THAAD Deployment in the ROK,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 3, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/08/03/security-dilemma-and-thaad-deployment-in-rok-pub-64279. On the vulnerability of China’s nuclear arsenal to US counterforce strikes, see Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and US Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49–98.

24 24. President Obama, “Writing the Rules for 21st Century Trade” (“We have to make sure the United States—and not countries like China—is the one writing this century’s rules for the world’s economy.”), White House, February 18, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/18/president-obama-writingrules-21st-century-trade.

25 25. See Guoyu Song and Wen Jin Yuan, “China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies” (“Most Chinese scholars claim its implementation will have a negative impact on China”), Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 107–19; Mei Xinyu, “TPP No Better than ‘Imperial Preference’ ” (“Be it launching the negotiations on the TPP, or reaching agreement on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with Europe, all the US’ moves have the intention of maintaining its hegemony in international trade rulemaking while excluding China.”), China Daily, October 12, 2015.

26 26. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, “The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/united-states-trans-pacific-partnership; Xue Litai, “The Role that US Plays in Asia, “China Daily, November 24, 2011, www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-11/24/content_14151883.htm; John Ross, “Realities behind the TransPacific Partnership,” China.org.cn, November 18, 2011, www.china.org.cn/opinion/2011-11/18/content_23953374_2.htm; Natalie G. Lichtenstein, editor, A Comparative Guide to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 1st edition (Oxford University Press, 2018).

27 27. “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” 2018, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf, p. 2; See, also, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December, 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; Kate O’Keeffe and Siobhan Hughes, “US Defense Bill Aims to Counter China as Rivalry Deepens,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2018. US strategic assessments prior to 2017 expressed concerns about China’s growing power and the need for the US and its partners to respond but indicated that the US continued to welcome China’s rise as a responsible power. The 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy express no such hope.

28 28. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” October 18, 2017; “Speech Delivered by Xi Jinping at the First Session of the 13th NPC,” China Daily, March 21, 2018.

29 29. See Chad P. Brown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 13, 2020, www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide.

30 30. See, for example, Minxin Pei, “COVID 19 is Finishing Off the Sino-American Relationship,” Project Syndicate, April 29, 2020, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-america-relations-after-covid19-pandemic-by-minxin-pei-2020-04; see, also, Evan Osnos, “The Folly of Trump’s Blame-Beijing Coronavirus Strategy,” New Yorker, May 10, 2020; but see Robert S. Ross, “It’s Not a Cold War: Competition and Cooperation in U.S.-China Relations,” China International Strategy Review, June 19, 2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s42533-020-00038-8.

31 31. Although arguments based in international relations theory and pointing to structural forces and long-term trends do much to explain the end of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union, considering the roles played by Mikhail Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and others is also necessary to understanding what happened and why. For general discussion, see Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 107–46.

32 32. Øystein Tunsjø argues that a bipolar order does not require equivalence in the capabilities of its two leading states. It requires only a wide gap between their capabilities and those of the next tier of powerful states. By this standard, China in the mid-2010s had drawn close enough to the US to create the conditions of a bipolar order akin to that which existed with the US and the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Moreover, Tunsjø argues, there is little likelihood for powers to approach China’s capabilities and usher in a multipolar world. Whether or not one agrees with Tunsjø’s assessments of the current situation, the broad trends he identifies are evident and have consequences for US-China relations. By 2015, nominal exchange rate calculations of GDP placed China’s economy at roughly two-thirds the US economy and three times the size of the next largest economy, Japan’s. By purchasing power parity measures, China’s economy is substantially larger relative to that of the US and other developed countries. See Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism (Columbia University Press, 2018); see, also, Yan Xuetong, “Why a Bipolar World Is More Likely than a Unipolar or Multipolar One,” New Perspectives Quarterly 32, no. 3 (July 2015), pp. 52–56; Yan Xuetong, Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers (Princeton University Press, 2019).

33 33. Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor 35 (Summer 2011), pp. 1–34; Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, “An ‘Assertive’ China? Insights from Interviews,” Asian Security 9, no. 2 (May 1 2013), pp. 111–31; Jacques deLisle, “Troubled Waters: China’s Claims and the South China Sea,” Orbis 56, no. 4 (Fall 2012), pp. 608–42; “Stirring up the South China Sea (I),” Asia Report, no. 223 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 23, 2012), www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/223-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-i.pdf; “Stirring up the South China Sea (II): Regional Responses,” Asia Report, no. 229 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 24, 2012), www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/229-stirring-up-the-south-china-sea-ii-regional-responses. For a view that questions these claims, see Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 7–48.

34 34. Some assessments went further, seeing not just the prospect of a bipolar order but a potentially more disruptive power transition. Power transitions theory emphasizes the attention a rising challenger and a dominant power pay to one another, although it mainly addresses motivations for launching a war by the dominant power (to forestall the arrival of a competitor) or the challenger (to overcome the dominant power’s resistance to its rise). See A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (University of Chicago Press, 1980); Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Cornell University Press, 2000); Ronald L. Tammen, Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century (London: Chatham House Publishers, 2000); Graham T. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017); cf. Lawrence Freedman, “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?” Prism 7, no. 1 (2017), pp. 175–78, http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_7-1/15-BR_Freedman.pdf?ver=2017-09-14-133601-573.

35 35. As during the Cold War, allies are neither necessary nor sufficient for dealing with a rival top-tier power in a bipolar system. China’s support of the Soviet Union early in the Cold War augmented Moscow’s international role, but Soviet security depended on the Soviet regime’s military might. China’s shift to supporting the US in confronting the Soviets after 1970 augmented the US’s ability to deter Soviet adventurism in Europe (as did the contributions of America’s NATO allies), but the US’s capacity to secure its vital interests ultimately depended on the outsized American military contribution.

36 36. See Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics, especially chapter 4.

37 37. See Avery Goldstein, “US-China Interactions in Asia,” in Tangled Titans: The United States and China, edited by David L. Shambaugh (Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), pp. 263–91.

38 38. See Wei Fenghe, “Speech at the 18th Shangri-La Dialogue by Gen. Wei Fenghe, State Councilor and Minister of National Defense, PRC,” PLA Daily, June 2, 2019, http://english.pladaily.com.cn/view/2019-06/02/content_9520790.htm.

39 39. Richard C. Bush, “A One-China Policy Primer,” Brookings Institution, March, 2017, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/one-china-policy-primer-web-final.pdf; Jacques deLisle, “United States-Taiwan Relations: Tsai’s Presidency and Washington’s Policy,” China Review 18, no. 3 (2018), pp. 13–59.

40 40. See Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Fundamentals of US-China Relations,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 3 (2019), pp. 93–119; Michal Kranz, “The Director of the FBI Says the Whole of Chinese Society Is a Threat to the US – and that Americans Must Step up to Defend Themselves,” Business Insider, February 13, 2018, www.businessinsider.com/china-threat-to-america-fbi-director-warns-2018-2; “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China,” White House, October 4, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-pence-administrations-policy-toward-china/; “Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces New Initiative to Combat Chinese Economic Espionage,” US Department of Justice, November 1, 2018, www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-combat-chinese-economic-espionage.

41 41. The emergence of technology as a key arena of US-China rivalry is reflected in institutional adjustments on both sides, including the growing importance of US Cyber Command; restrictions on US companies selling technology and software to China; China’s establishment of a Strategic Support Force in the PLA to prepare for electronic, space, and cyberwarfare; and enhanced moves by party and state bodies to control the civilian internet.

42 42. These features of technology’s role in military capacity reinforce institutional preferences in the military for offensive warfighting doctrines, in part by fostering beliefs in the initial advantages of the offense, and aggravates security dilemmas. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Cornell University Press, 1984).

43 43. See Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 66–68.

44 44. See “IP Commission Report: The Theft of American Intellectual Property: Reassessment of the Challenge and United States Policy,” National Bureau of Asian Research, February, 2017, www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf; “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World,” White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf; Kathrin Hille and Richard Waters, “Washington Unnerved by China’s ‘Military-Civil Fusion,’ ” Financial Times, November 8, 2018, www.ft.com/content/8dcb534c-dbaf-11e8-9f04-38d397e6661c?kbc=8b82f4f1-6fdf-4fe1-91db-99cac1802016; “Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States,” US Department of Defense, September 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF.

45 45. Incipient concerns of this type led the US Congress to create the US-China Security Economic Review Commission in 2000, with a mandate to consider whether engagement with China might be jeopardizing American security interests. See www.uscc.gov/about. But the effects of such concerns on the US’s China policy were limited when the top US strategic priority was the global war on terrorism. A growing push in the US for reciprocity in all areas of the US-China economic relationship also reflected the perception that China was benefiting disproportionately. See Elizabeth C. Economy, “China’s New Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 3 (May/June 2018), pp. 60–74. See, also, Jennifer M. Harris, “Writing New Rules for the US-China Investment Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2017, www.cfr.org/report/writing-new-rules-US-China-investment-relationship; Brock Erdahl, “Restoring Reciprocity to US-China Relations,” International Policy Digest, April 15, 2018, https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/04/15/restoring-reciprocity-to-u-s-china-relations/.

46 46. See S.2098 – Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018: 115th Congress (2017–2018), May 22, 2018, www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2098; Demetri Sevastopulo, Kiran Stacey, and Nian Liu, “Donald Trump Issues Executive Order Laying Ground for Huawei Ban,” Financial Times, May 16, 2019.

47 Tellingly, arguments in the US concerning principal Chinese player in 5G Huawei focused not on competition for market share but on whether security concerns dictated that Huawei should not be permitted in the US market at all and should be allowed access to key US-produced components. Huawei responded defiantly that it posed no threat, and the Chinese government retaliated by creating its own entities list to target US companies with big stakes in China. See “Addition of Entities to the Entity List: A Rule by the Industry and Security Bureau,” Federal Register, May 21, 2019, www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/05/21/2019-10616/addition-of-entities-to-the-entity-list; Celia Chen, “Huawei among More than 140 Chinese Entities on US Trade Blacklist,” South China Morning Post, May 30, 2019; Teng Jing Xuan, “China to Set up Own ‘Unreliable Entity’ List for Foreign Firms,” Caixin Global, May 3, 2019, www.caixinglobal.com/2019-05-31/china-to-set-up-own-unreliable-entity-list-for-foreign-firms-101422286.html. See also US Department of Commerce, “Commerce Department Adds 24 Chinese Companies to the Entity List for Helping Build Military Islands in the South China Sea,” August 26, 2020, www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/08/commerce-department-adds-24-chinese-companies-entity-list-helping-build; US Department of Commerce, “Commerce Department Prohibits WeChat and TikTok Transactions to Protect the National Security of the United States,” September 18, 2020, www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/09/commerce-department-prohibits-wechat-and-tiktok-transactions-protect; Jeanne Whalen and Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Bans Technology Exports to Chinese Semiconductor and Drone Companies, Calling Them Security Threats,” Washington Post, December 18, 2020.

48 47. Elizabeth Redden, “Stealing Innovation: FBI Director Addresses Efforts by China to Steal Academic Research and Technology,” Inside Higher Ed, April 29, 2019, www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/04/29/fbi-director-discusses-chinese-espionage-threat-us-academic-research; see, also, “Director Addresses Council on Foreign Relations: Wray Says China Is ‘Stealing Its Way up the Economic Ladder,’ ” FBI News, April 26, 2019, www.fbi.gov/news/stories/director-addresses-council-on-foreign-relations-042619; Lucy Hornby and Archie Zhang, “China Warns of Growing Difficulties Facing Students in US,” Financial Times, June 4, 2019.

49 48. See, for example, “China’s Position on the China-US Economic and Trade Consultation,” White Paper, State Council Information Office, People’s Republic of China. June 2019; Anna Fifield, “As China Settles in for Trade War, Leader Xi Emphasized ‘Self Reliance,’ ” Washington Post, November 2, 2018; “Trade War, a Turning Point for China’s Technology Innovation,” Xinhua, May 28, 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/28/c_138097374.htm.

50 49. See “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World,” White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, June 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf; “Statement of the United States Regarding China Talks,” White House, January 31, 2019, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-united-states-regarding-china-talks/.

51 50. Donald J. Trump, @realDonaldTrump, Twitter, March 2, 2018, https://twitter.com/i/moments/969519906097106944?lang=en; Chad P. Brown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 20, 2019, www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide.

52 51. “China Wants to End Trade War but ‘U.S. Position Keeps Changing,’ Ambassador Says,” NPR, October 3, 2018, www.npr.org/2018/10/03/654084691/china-wants-to-end-trade-war-but-u-s-position-keeps-changing-ambassador-says; Victoria Guida, “Chinese Leaders ‘Absolutely Confused’ by Trump’s Demands on Trade,” Politico, June 23, 2018, www.politico.com/story/2018/06/23/trump-china-trade-confusion-635865; Ana Swanson, “Trump Undermines Top Trade Adviser as He Pushes for China Deal,” New York Times, February 26, 2019; Chad P. Brown and Douglas Irwin, “Trump’s Assault on the Global Trading System,” Foreign Affairs 98, no. 5 (September/October 2019); “Escalations in the U.S.-China Trade War,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2019, www.cfr.org/conference-calls/escalations-US-China-trade-war.

53 52. Mark Green, “China’s Debt Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/; “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China”; “Chinese Ambassador to U.S. Denounce Claims BRI is Debt Trap,” Xinhua, April 24, 2019, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/24/c_138004514.htm.

54 53. See, for example, Shawn Donnan, Jenny Leonard, and Steven Yang, “China Doubts Long-Term Trade Deal Possible with Trump,” Bloomberg, October 31, 2019, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-31/china-said-to-doubt-long-term-trade-deal-possible-with-trump; Melinda Liu, “Trump’s Credibility with China Plummets,” Foreign Policy, October 7, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/07/donald-trumps-credibility-with-china-plummets-joe-biden/.

55 54. See, for example, “The Biden Plan to Ensure the Future Is ‘Made in All of America’ by All of America’s Workers” (2020), https://joebiden.com/made-in-america/; “The Biden Plan to Rebuild U.S. Supply Chains and Ensure the U.S. Does Not Face Future Shortages of Critical Equipment” (2020), https://joebiden.com/supplychains/.

56 55. See Alex Isenstadt, “GOP Memo Urges Anti-China Assault over Coronavirus,” Politico, April 24, 2020, www.politico.com/news/2020/04/24/gop-memo-anti-china-coronavirus-207244; Michael Martina and Trevor Hunnicutt, “Biden Says Trump Failed to Hold China Accountable on Coronavirus,” Reuters, April 17, 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-china/biden-says-trump-failed-to-hold-china-accountable-on-coronavirus-idUSKBN21Z3DZ; Hal Brands and Jake Sullivan, “China Has Two Paths to Global Domination” Foreign Policy, May 22, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/china-superpower-two-paths-global-domination-cold-war/; Ana Swanson, “Biden’s China Policy? A Balancing Act for a Toxic Relationship,” New York Times, November 16, 2020; Warren P. Strobel and Sabrina Siddiqui, “Biden Aims to Out-Tough Trump on China while Invoking His Obama Experience,” Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2020.

57 56. See Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in Foreign Relations (Oxford University Press, 2014).

58 57. See, for example, Justine Coleman, “Pompeo: China ‘Did All that It Could to Make Sure the World Didn’t Learn in a Timely Fashion’ about Coronavirus,” The Hill, May 3, 2020, https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/public-global-health/495859-pompeo-china-did-all-that-it-could-to-make-sure-the; David E. Sanger, “Pompeo Ties Coronavirus to China Lab, Despite Spy Agencies’ Uncertainty,” New York Times, May 7, 2020; Alexandra Stevenson, “Senator Tom Cotton Repeats Fringe Theory of Coronavirus Origins,” New York Times, February 18, 2020; “US Army Might Have Brought Epidemic to China, Says Chinese FM Spokesman in Tweet, March 13, 2020 (tweets by Zhao Lijian), http://en.people.cn/n3/2020/0313/c90000-9668143.html. See also Jacques deLisle, “When Rivalry Goes Viral: COVID-19, U.S.-China Relations, and East Asia,” Orbis 65, no. 1 (2021), 46–74.

59 58. See Patrick Tyler, “US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop,” New York Times, March 8, 1992, www.nytimes.com/1992/03/08/world/us-strategy-plan-calls-for-insuring-no-rivals-develop.html; Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” September 21, 1993, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html; Rasmus Sinding Søndergaard, “Bill Clinton’s ‘Democratic Enlargement’ and the Securitisation of Democracy Promotion,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 26, no. 3 (September 2015), pp. 534–51.

60 59. General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, “Communique on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” April 22, 2013, translation at www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation; Chris Buckley, “China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,” New York Times, August 19, 2013; Russell Ong, “ ‘Peaceful Evolution,’ ‘Regime Change’ and China’s Political Security,” Journal of Contemporary China 16, no. 53 (2007), pp. 717–27.

61 60. Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society”; Suisheng Zhao, “Whither the China Model: Revisiting the Debate,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 103 (January 2017), pp. 1–17; Kerry Brown, “Lessons from Belt and Road,” Beijing Review, March 14, 2019, www.bjreview.com/Special_Reports/2019/Second_Belt_and_Road_Forum_for_International_Cooperation/Opinion/201903/t20190319_800162472.html.

62 61. See “Clinton: Chinese Human Rights Can’t Interfere with Other Crises” (“Our pressing on those issues can’t interfere with the global economic crisis, the global climate change crisis, and the security crisis.”), CNN Politics, February 22, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/21/clinton.china.asia/. Remarks by Rex W. Tillerson (“If we condition too heavily that others must adopt this value that we’ve come to over a long history of our own, it really creates obstacles to our ability to advance our national security interests, our economic interests.”), Secretary of State, May 3, 2017, https://nl.usembassy.gov/secretary-tillerson-addresses-state-department-employees-washington/.

63 62. “Remarks by Vice President Pence on the Administration’s Policy toward China.”

64 63. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again,” Foreign Affairs, 99, no. 2 (March–April 2020), pp. 64–76; “The Power of America’s Example: The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century” (2020), https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/.

65 64. “Remarks by Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger to the Miller Center at the University of Virginia,” May 4, 2020, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-deputy-national-security-advisor-matt-pottinger-miller-center-university-virginia/; “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo with Maria Bartiromo of Fox News Sunday Morning Futures,” Department of State, May 31, 2020, www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-maria-bartiromo-of-fox-news-sunday-morning-futures/; “Rubio, Gardner, Romney Urge Creation of Taskforce to Counter CCP Propaganda,” Office of Senator Rubio, March 23, 2020, www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/3/rubio-gardner-romney-urge-creation-of-taskforce-to-counter-ccp-propaganda.

66 65. The crises that punctuated the first fifteen years of the Cold War effectively chastened leaders in Moscow and Washington, leading them to accept a relationship as adversaries rather than enemies. See Goldstein, “First Things First,” pp. 58, 62–63.

67 66. See, for example, Kingsley Edney, Stanley Rosen, and Ying Zhu, editors, Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Campaign for Hearts and Minds (London and New York: Routledge, 2020); Jacques deLisle, “The Chinese Model of Law, China’s Agenda in International Law, and Implications for Democracy in Asia and Beyond,” Asan Forum 8, no. 4 (July-August 2020); William A. Callahan, “Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream,” Politics 35, nos. 3 and 4 (2015), pp. 216–29.