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China and the United States have a spectrum of conflicting interests. They have conflicting interests over Taiwan, which China views as a vital interest. They also have a second major conflict of interests if China is determined to achieve regional hegemony. As a result of one or both of these two conflicting interests, the two countries have a significant derivative conflict of interest—control of the East Asian sea lines of communications (SLOC). Finally, there is a fourth issue—maritime disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea—which are, or at least should be, minor disputes but have taken on major importance.²³

There is disagreement among US experts about these conflicts of interest. The exception is Taiwan—all agree that it is a vital Chinese interest. But experts disagree about the extent of China’s interests—some believe China is determined to become the dominate global power, while others question whether it even places significant value on achieving regional hegemony. And, while some experts believe China is driven largely by insecurity, others believe China is greedy and willing to eventually pay a high price to achieve these goals.

Taiwan has a population of 23 million, and is now a multiparty democracy and a de facto independent state. It has an advanced industrial economy with per capita gross domestic product a few times larger than China’s. Taiwan is a particularly complicated issue because the United States and China view the status quo differently. China considers Taiwan to be an essential part of its homeland and a core or vital interest that it is determined to bring under full sovereign control.²⁴ China has made clear its willingness to go to war to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent,²⁵ while showing restraint as long as Taipei has avoided actions that Beijing considers provocative moves toward independence. Whether China will wait indefinitely to gain full control of Taiwan, however, is unclear. In a 2019 speech, President Xi Jinping stated that the Taiwan situation reflected China’s weakness and, therefore, reunification must be part of China’s rejuvenation, observing “That the two sides of the strait are still not fully unified is a wound to the Chinese history” and the political divisions “cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”²⁶

In contrast, the United States has emphasized the process by which changes to the status quo are achieved, insisting they not be achieved via coercion or the actual use of force. The official US position is that it will accept any resolution achieved peacefully. The United States retains a commitment to defend Taiwan. Its policy has evolved from “strategic ambiguity” in the 1990s to a form of “dual deterrence,” in which “the United States implicitly warned Beijing that it would defend Taiwan in the event of an unprovoked attack and implicitly warned Taipei that U.S. support would be in doubt if Taiwan provoked the conflict.”²⁷ The United States continues to sell Taiwan arms, as specified by the Taiwan Relations Act.²⁸

Although the United States does not take a position on the eventual resolution of Taiwan’s status, US policies are at odds with China’s interests, and China has long viewed them this way.²⁹ While US policy allows for outcomes consistent with China’s preferences, the United States and China do not fully agree on acceptable outcomes for Taiwan, and the United States is committed to supporting a status quo that China views as unacceptable. The result is that the United States and China have a direct conflict of interests, albeit not as complete as if the United States rejected the possibility of unification. The nature of the disagreement is deepened because many US policies are threatening to China. US opposition to the use of force to resolve the conflict runs counter to China’s understanding of the Taiwan issue as an internal dispute and reduces China’s options for dealing with it. China worries that US policies that enhance Taiwan’s ability to defend itself increase the probability that Taiwan will move toward independence. Similarly, increases in the ability of the United States and its allies to come to the aid of Taiwan reduce China’s ability to coerce Taiwan.

The United States has few policy options that China does not see as threatening, because the United States is defending territory that China considers its own. The United States finds the status quo acceptable, arguably into the indefinite future; China finds the status quo unacceptable, though it has refrained from using force to change it. In this complex situation, Taiwanese, US, and allied capabilities for defending Taiwan threaten China’s interests in Taiwan.

The situation is not a security dilemma, at least not as usually understood. In a standard security dilemma situation, both countries would be satisfied and the problem could be solved if each country could be made confident that the other would not use its military forces to attack.³⁰ But this would be unsatisfactory to China, both because it would mean that Taiwan could declare independence and China could not respond, and because it would prevent China from using force to change the status quo if waiting longer for Taiwan to agree to unification became unacceptable.

At the same time, the Taiwan situation does have some flavor of a security dilemma because China does not fully accept the current status quo, believing that Taiwan is part of its homeland, which makes unification a correction to the status quo that is required simply to restore its territorial integrity. In other words, from China’s perspective, changing the status quo is about achieving security. Thus, both the United States and China see themselves pursuing policies designed to preserve legitimate territorial integrity, but they disagree on what is being protected. Each country sees itself as acting with defensive motives, yet one’s policies threaten the other. Unlike a true security dilemma, however, the problem cannot be solved either by entirely defensive forces or by deep confidence that the other side will not employ its forces to coerce or attack, because the two countries have a fundamental disagreement.³¹

Second, the United States and China may disagree about the future of US military presence and alliances in Northeast Asia—with the United States determined to preserve the status quo, while China increasingly appears to want to change it. The US National Defense Strategy states that China “will continue to pursue military modernization programs that seek Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”³² If this is the case, then China and the United States face a deep conflict of interests, because US commitments to Japan and South Korea are a long-standing pillar of its grand strategy. The United States will likely remain determined to preserve these alliances, which will fuel continuing military and diplomatic competition with China.³³

China may have both security and non-security (greedy) motives for wanting the United States to terminate its alliance commitments to Japan. The key Chinese security concern is directly related to Taiwan. (For the remainder of this chapter, the word “security” is used to refer to China’s pursuit of its territorial integrity, even though this requires changing the status quo.) US forces deployed in Japan would play a critical role in a Taiwan scenario. In addition, Japan is now expected to provide support to US forces fighting in this scenario. Thus, given the importance China places on Taiwan, China could reasonably see the US-Japan alliance posing a significant security threat. Consequently, China has a security-driven interest in having the United States exit Northeast Asia. Terminating the US commitment to Taiwan could, therefore, reduce China’s interest in having the United States leave Northeast Asia. Yet, this might well be insufficient to eliminate China’s security-driven concern about the US-Japan alliance because China could still worry that, even without a commitment, the United States would come to Taiwan’s aid.

These security concerns are evidenced in Chinese views of the US-Japan alliance. Whereas Chinese experts once viewed the US-Japan alliance positively, this position has become increasingly rare. Over the past couple of decades, China has shifted from favoring the US-Japan alliance due to its silver lining—US prevention of a return of Japanese militarism and, specifically, Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons—to believing that the alliance is part of the US plan for containing and encircling China.³⁴

In addition, China may have non-security motives for pursuing regional hegemony—including ideational rationales for wanting to be the region’s dominant power.³⁵ These rationales could include the belief that China’s status as a superpower is incompatible with the deployment of American forces in East Asia, and that China’s national rejuvenation cannot be fully accomplished if US alliances persist. These ideational motives would reinforce China’s security motives, increasing the price China was willing to pay to push the United States out of the region. However, if China has these non-security motives, then even if the Taiwan problem were somehow solved, China would still desire regional hegemony.

The US debate over China’s goals partly mirrors these shifts, although there is not a consensus among scholars. Aaron Friedberg argues that, although China’s long-term goals remain uncertain, “what China’s current rulers appear to want and what their successors will almost certainly want as well, is to see their country become the dominant or predominant power in East Asia … despite repeated claims to the contrary, it does seek a form of regional hegemony.”³⁶ Based on analysis of official Chinese documents, Timothy Heath concluded that “over time, China will likely view the US presence as having outlived its usefulness in providing the regional stability so vital to China’s success to date. A tipping point may come in which the US security presence will be seen as more of an obstacle than a benefit, especially if China continues to feel frustrated on issues such as Taiwan and other disputed claims.”³⁷ John Mearsheimer argues, based on broad theoretical arguments, that once its power has increased sufficiently China will be determined to drive the United States from the region, because China will view achieving regional hegemony as necessary for its security.³⁸

Other scholars disagree, or at least put different weights on the possibilities. Michael Swaine concludes that “neither China’s existing grand strategy nor public PRC (People’s Republic of China) documents, statements, and formal policy actions provide conclusive evidence of … [a] commitment to undermine or replace U.S. power.”³⁹ More recently, Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim find that “there is little evidence of a concerted effort to drive the U.S. military out of Asia. Chinese analysts still grudgingly recognize that the U.S. presence can serve as a restraint on U.S. allies in the region.”⁴⁰

In the end, the disagreement may be primarily over the magnitude of China’s regional interests, with some scholars holding that achieving regional hegemony is or will be a vital interest, whereas others hold that even if China prefers the termination of US alliances, it would be unwilling to pay or risk a great deal to achieve this outcome. Which of these perspectives turns out to be correct will largely determine the implications of this conflict of interests for the intensity of US-China competition.

If China’s interest in regional hegemony is driven at least partly by security interests, the United States and China face a security dilemma over this issue. The United States believes that protecting its security requires maintaining its alliances in Northeast Asia. Policies it develops to strengthen and preserve these alliances will appear threatening to China; policies China designs to weaken US alliances and push the United States out of the region will appear threatening to the United States. The intensity of this security dilemma will depend on the value the United States and China place on preserving or eliminating these alliances. Analysts who believe China places a high value on this goal will see a severe security dilemma, while those that believe China places relatively little value on achieving this outcome will see a mild dilemma. If China is interested in regional hegemony for non-security reasons, then the situation is even more complicated. The United States will still face a security dilemma, but this mix of China’s security and greedy motives makes any possible US cooperation still riskier.

Third, China and the United States have conflicting derivative interests over wartime control of the SLOC that run from the Strait of Malacca through the South China Sea to Chinese and Japanese ports. China relies heavily on seaborne trade, especially in oil, as do key US allies, including Japan and South Korea. Because oil imported to Northeast Asia comes primarily from the Persian Gulf, the relevant SLOC reach across the Indian Ocean.

“Derivative interest” here refers to an interest or goal that, once achieved, will increase a state’s prospects for achieving a fundamental interest. The derivative interest is not valued for its own sake but, instead, because its achievement contributes to attaining a fundamental interest. Distinguishing fundamental interests—for example, security and prosperity—from derivative interests is important because the latter depend on a theoretical or other analytic link between the fundamental and derivative interest. If that link is itself contentious, then so is the derivative interest.⁴¹ For example, if it turned out that seaborne trade could reach Japan via other routes when the South China Sea was impassible, then US interest in control of this SLOC would be significantly reduced.

There is little, if any, conflict of interest during peacetime, as continuing trade serves all states’ interests. In a crisis or war, however, interruption of the SLOC could be used coercively. If a Taiwan scenario lasted for an extended period, the United States could inflict substantial economic and, eventually, strategic costs on China by interrupting the flow of seaborne commerce.⁴² Although a Taiwan scenario seems by far the most worrisome from China’s perspective, if US-China relations become still more competitive, China could see the vulnerability of its SLOC posing a more general security vulnerability.

The United States currently controls a substantial portion of these SLOC, which China views as threatening; China’s military buildup is beginning to challenge US dominance in Northeast Asia, which the United States sees as threatening, among other reasons because this would enable China to impose a coercive blockade of Taiwan. The emerging equilibrium is likely to be a condition in which either country can deny the other the ability to sustain seaborne traffic within the first island chain.⁴³ Because both countries view control of these SLOC as important for their security, the two countries face a security dilemma without a feasible military solution.

Finally, the United States and China face disagreements over maritime claims and over interpretations of international law that applies to the South China and East China Seas. The United States is linked to the maritime claims via its commitments to allies and friends in the region. In the South China Sea, China is involved in disputes with a number of countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam. Conflicting claims include ownership of small islands and smaller features in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. In addition, China maintains an ambiguous claim—represented by the nine-dash line—to much of the South China Sea, pitting it against other countries in the region. In the East China Sea, China has disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and over the maritime boundary that divides the East China Sea.⁴⁴

The material stakes in these disputes are likely to be minor. For starters, the amount of territory in question in these disputes is strikingly small.⁴⁵ The South China Sea may have large oil and gas reserves, though there are substantial uncertainties about their size.⁴⁶ Control over this area is important because it influences which country (or countries) owns these resources. But the resources could be shared and hardly seem worth the political costs and risks that China’s actions, previously sketched, have generated.

More important to this judgment, and controversial, is whether Chinese control of the islands and rocks in question, especially once expanded by China’s island-building, could significantly increase China’s ability to control the South China Sea SLOC. Ronald O’Rourke identities a long list of capabilities that Chinese South China Sea (SCS) bases could support, including helping to create a bastion for China’s SSBN force and tying down for “a time at least” US forces attacking in the South China Sea.⁴⁷ The extent and value of these capabilities, however, requires extensive evaluation. At first glance, their value appears to be quite limited. Chinese SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) cannot reach the United States from the SCS, which greatly reduces the value of a bastion, though next-generation SLBMs might have sufficient range.⁴⁸ Military bases in the SCS may be too distant from the center of battle to require the United States to attack them or too vulnerable to tie down large amounts of US forces.

If this is correct, then the more convincing explanations for China’s South China Sea policy are likely ideational, which raises the possibility that China places high value on these interests. Along these lines, Heath argues that the CPC has staked its legitimacy on national rejuvenation, which appears “to require regional preeminence, unification with Taiwan, reform of the world order to more fairly reflect PRC power.”⁴⁹ Andrew Chubb concludes that “the political-symbolic significance of the South China Sea dispute is probably sufficient to explain China’s consistent refusal to compromise on any of its claims to sovereignty over disputed territories, as well as its dogged insistence on the nine-dash line map.”⁵⁰