Читать книгу After Engagement - Группа авторов - Страница 25

For helpful comments on an earlier draft, the author thanks Avery Goldstein, David Kang, Alex Yu-Ting Lin, Michael Mastanduno, Caitlin Talmadge, and the participants in CSCC conference “Security and US China Relations: Differences, Dangers, and Dilemmas.”

1 1. National Security Strategy of the United States of America (December 2017), p. 25, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

2 2. The paper does not engage the more basic international relations (IR) theory debate over whether China can rise peacefully; for a useful survey, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45. For a variety of perspectives, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition (New York, Norton, 2014), chapter 10; David C. Kang, American Grand Strategy and East Asian Security in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2017); Charles Glaser, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 80–91.

3 3. AirSea Battle has been officially renamed “Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC)” but is still commonly referred to by its original name.

4 4. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Department of Defense, 2018), p. 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

5 5. On peaceful rise, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford University Press, 2005).

6 6. Eric Heginbotham and others, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (RAND Corporation, 2015); China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win (Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019), www.dia.mil/Military-Power-Publications. Growth in China’s defense spending slowed to between 5 and 7 percent during 2017 and 2018 (p. 20) and to 1.2 to 1.4 percent of GDP. If including funding for US operations overseas, the US 2018 defense budget approached $700 billion.

7 7. Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 7–48. For earlier assessments of the Taiwan scenario, see Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 125–60; and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 51–86.

8 8. Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49–98; and Brendan Rittenhouse Green and others, “Correspondence: The Limits of Damage Limitation, International Security 42, no. 1 (Summer 2017), pp. 193–207.

9 9. There is debate about how assertive China has actually been. For example, careful analysis through 2011 finds that many of these fears were exaggerated: although China was acting more assertively, it had not expanded its maritime claims, and much of China’s policy was in reaction to more assertive policies adopted by other claimants; see Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” China Leadership Monitor (Summer 2011), pp. 1–29. There has also been debate over whether China has elevated the nature of its interests in the SCS up to a core interest; see Shai Oster and others, “What’s Really at the Core of China’s ‘Core Interests’? A ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile, April 30, 2013, www.chinafile.com/what-s-really-core-china-s-core-interests; and Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Susan Shirk, and Wang Yizhou, “Does Promoting ‘Core Interests’ Do China More Harm than Good? Part Two of a ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile, May 2, 2013, www.chinafile.com/does-promoting-core-interests-do-china-more-harm-good. Reports in 2010 that China declared the South China Sea a core interest were probably incorrect. See M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (December 2011), p. 296; and Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 17–20.

10 10. M. Taylor Fravel, “Growing Competition in the South China Sea,” in The Long Littoral Project: South China Sea, by Michael A. McDevitt, Fravel, and Lewis M. Stern (Center for Naval Analysis, March 2013), pp. 51–58.

11 11. Austin Ramzy, “A View from the Sea, as China Flexes Muscle,” New York Times, August 10, 2014.

12 12. Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ECS ADIA),” China Leadership Monitor (Spring 2013), pp. 1–54.

13 13. For helpful summaries of China’s activities, see Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Actions in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 31, 2019); and Michael McDevitt, The South China Sea: Assessing U.S. Policy and Options for the Future (Arlington, VA: CNA, November 2014).

14 14. Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, chapters 2 and 3.

15 15. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 279.

16 16. Adam P. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” China Quarterly, no. 233 (March 2018), pp. 145–48.

17 17. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” pp. 142–45; Robert S. Ross, “The Problem with the Pivot: Obama’s New Asia Policy is Unnecessary and Counterproductive,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 6 (November/December 2012), pp. 70–82.

18 18. These arguments are presented more fully in Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton University Press, 2010), chapters 2 through 4.

19 19. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171–201.

20 20. In many ways, the challenge is similar to that posed by an adversary that is simultaneously insecure and greedy.

21 21. This actually is not true if the adversary knows the state is a security seeker and the state knows that the adversary knows but holds other conditions.

22 22. Andrew Kydd, “Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective,” American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 2 (April 2000), pp. 228–44; Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1999).

23 23. These paragraphs draw from Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015).

24 24. M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton University Press, 2008), chapter 5.

25 25. See, for example, Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing’s World-View,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 45–52; and Michael D. Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/April 2014), pp. 39–49.

26 26. Chris Buckley and Chris Horton, “Unification Plan from China Finds Few Takers in Taiwan,” New York Times, January 3, 2019, p. 4. On growing domestic pressure to make progress on Taiwan, see Jia Qingguo and Alan D. Romberg, “Taiwan and Tibet,” in Debating China: The U.S.-China Relationship in Ten Conversations, edited by Nina Hachigian (Oxford University Press, 2014).

27 27. Richard C. Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations (Brookings Institution, 2013), p. 215.

28 28. On China’s view that the United States has failed to meet agreed limitations on arms sales, see Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search for Security, pp. 99–105.

29 29. Alan M. Wachman, Why Taiwan: Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity (Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 110–17.

30 30. In this sense, at its core, the security dilemma is a commitment problem.

31 31. For a full discussion of this point in the context of the US-Japan alliance, see Thomas J. Christensen, “China, The U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49–80.

32 32. Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), p. 4.

33 33. One school of thought in the ongoing debate over US grand strategy calls for ending US alliances in Europe and Asia. If this perspective were to prevail, the conflict of interests would be eliminated; but this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Even so-called offshore balancers have called for preserving US alliances in Asia; see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2016). These US interests are derivative, in that they reflect judgments about the requirements for protecting the security of the US homeland and US prosperity, which are fundamental interests.

34 34. Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” pp. 139, 143. For earlier discussion of this shift, see Wu Xinbo, “The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japanese Alliance,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005), pp. 119–30.

35 35. On status concerns as a potential driver of international competition, see T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth, editors, Status in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2014). More specifically on China, see Xiaoyu Pu, Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order (Stanford University Press, 2019).

36 36. Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011), p. 157. Friedberg identifies security and non-security reasons for this assessment, including China’s national security, its historical identity as the region’s predominant power, and the desire of China’s ruling regime to retain power.

37 37. Timothy R. Heath, “What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC’s National Strategy,” Asian Security 8, no. 1 (2012), p. 69.

38 38. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chapter 10.

39 39. Swaine, America’s Challenge, p. 339.

40 40. Thomas Christensen and Patricia Kim, “Don’t Abandon the Ship,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2018).

41 41. On this distinction, see Charles L. Glaser, “Rational Analysis of Grand Strategy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Grand Strategy, edited by Thierry Balzacq and Ronald R. Krebs (Oxford University Press, 2021, forthcoming). Regarding China’s possible interest in regional dominance, this is a derivative interest if reflecting China’s security concerns and a fundamental interest if it reflects status or other ideational concerns, and could be both.

42 42. Questioning the importance of imported oil is Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (Fall 2009), pp. 46–81. In effect, he is contesting the extent to which the SLOC are a derivative interest. For a persuasive rejoinder, see Michael A. Glosny and Phillip C. Saunders, “Correspondence: Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 161–69, who explain: “Although imported oil represents only 10 percent of China’s total energy consumption, its transportation and some industrial sectors are completely dependent on it. China’s growing demand for energy is projected to increase the country’s dependence on imported oil from approximately 50 percent today to 75 percent by 2030.”

43 43. Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.”

44 44. Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Brookings Institution Press, 2010), especially chapter 6; Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian Perspective 31, no. 1 (2007), pp. 127–67.

45 45. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are approximately seven square kilometers in area and the Spratlys’s 230 so-called features cover about five square kilometers, although Chinese land reclamation has significantly increased their overall size.

46 46. US Energy Information Administration (EIA), “South China Sea,” February 7, 2013, www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/South_China_Sea/south_china_sea.pdf. The East China Sea also contains potentially large oil and gas reserves, with estimates varying substantially; most currently identified reserves are in uncontested areas. EIA, “East China Sea,” September 25, 2012, www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/east_china_sea/east_china_sea.pdf.

47 47. O’Rourke, China’s Actions in South and East China Seas, p. 2. On the possible attractions and challenges of using the SCS for a bastion, see Tong Zhao, Tides of Change: China’s Ballistic Missile Submarines and Strategic Stability (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018), pp. 30–33.

48 48. The next-generation Chinese SLBM, the JL-3, is estimated to have a range of 9,000+ kilometers; this would enable it to target northwestern parts of the United States, but not the rest of the country; Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79 (2019), pp. 171–78, www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019.1628511?scroll=top&needAccess=true. The value for China of an effective bastion strategy will be greater if the United States can destroy most or all of China’s other nuclear forces; most important, its mobile ICBMs. The US interest in preventing China from developing an effective bastion will depend on whether the United States wants a damage-limitation capability and can achieve its other components.

49 49. Heath, “What Does China Want?” p. 69.

50 50. Andrew Chubb, Chinese Popular Nationalism and the PRC Policy in the South China Sea (University of Western Australia, Dissertation, 2016), pp. 53–54.

51 51. Heginbotham and others, The U.S.-China Military Scorecard.

52 52. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Cornell University Press, 1987).

53 53. Jeffrey Bader, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael McDevitt, “Keeping the South China Sea in Perspective,” Foreign Policy Brief, Brookings, August 2014, p. 3.

54 54. McDevitt, The South China Sea, p. 66.

55 55. On a variety of escalatory dangers in a US-China crisis, see Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations,” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), pp. 48–89.

56 56. M. Taylor Fravel and Kacie Miura, “Stormy Seas: The South China Sea in US-China Relations,” in this volume.

57 57. Gerrit van der Wees, “How President Xi Is Misreading Taiwan,” The Diplomat, January 3, 2019, employs this logic.

58 58. See J. Stapleton Roy, “Trumps Incredibly Risky Taiwan Policy,” ChinaFile, April 2018, www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/trumps-incredibly-risky-taiwan-policy; and Lindsay Maizland, “U.S. Military Support for Taiwan: What’s Changed Under Trump?” CFR, April 3, 2019, www.cfr.org/article/us-military-support-taiwan-whats-changed-under-trump.

59 59. Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Rattner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2018).

60 60. National Defense Strategy, p. 9, emphasis added.

61 61. For analysis of this issue, see Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?”; and Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging US-China Rivalry (Georgetown University Press, 2015).

62 62. See citations in note 8.

63 63. Comparing conventional strategies is Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2012). On possible pressures for nuclear escalation during a large conventional war, see Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017), pp. 50–92.