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Notes
Оглавление1 1. Cited in “Sheila Watt-Clothier, Honorary Doctorate,” 2006, University of Winnipeg, https://www.uwinnipeg.ca/awards-distinctions/honorary-doctorate/cloutier.html.
2 2. See Kristina Spohr, “The Race to Conquer the Arctic—The World’s Final Frontier,” New Statesman, March 12, 2018, https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/03/race-conquer-arctic-world-s-final-frontier.
3 3. See Ibid.; Vincent-Gregor Schulze, “The Shadow of the Future: The Demand for an Arctic Regime,” Geopolitics and Security, March 16, 2017, https://polarconnection.org/arctic-future-regime/; Malgorzata Smieszek, “Informal International Regimes. A Case Study of the Arctic Council,” Academic dissertation, University of Lapland, December 11, 2019, https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/64024/Smieszek.Malgorzata9.12..pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
4 4. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafost in the Arctic (Oslo, 2017).
5 5. D.P. Stone, The Changing Arctic Environment: The Arctic Messenger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
6 6. See “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf; Smieszek, op. cit.; Oran R. Young, “Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times,” Ambio 41 (2012), pp. 75–84; M. Carson and G. Peterson, eds., for the Arctic Council, Arctic Resilience Report (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2016); M. Sommerkorn and S.J. Hassol, eds., Arctic Climate Feedbacks: Global Implications (Oslo: WWF International Arctic Programme, 2009).
7 7. Spohr, op. cit.; P. Oppenheimer and B. Israel, “The Arctic Region,” in R. Martella and B. Grosko, eds., International Environmental Law: The Practitioner’s Guide to the Laws of the Planet (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 2014), pp. 933–62.
8 8. Young, op. cit.; Spohr, op. cit; Congressional Research Service, op. cit.; Smieszek, op. cit.; Joshua Tallis, “As ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ Melts Away, the US Isn’t Sure What It Wants Next,” Defense One, Jan. 22, 2020; Timo Koivurova, “How US Policy Threatens Existing Arctic Governance,” Arctic Today, Jan. 17, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandria Hall, “The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment,” RAND Europe (PE-268RC), 2018.
9 9. Gary E. Weir, “Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘We don’t know how to do this’,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, 2 (2005), pp. 411–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500088635.
10 10. Spohr, op. cit.
11 11. Smieszek, op. cit.; Oppenheimer and Israel, op. cit.; M. Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); M. Durfee and R.L. Johnstone, Arctic Governance in a Changing World (London: Rowman & Littlefeld, 2019).
12 12. Smieszek, op. cit.; O.S. Stokke, Disaggregating International Regimes. A New Approach to Evaluation and Comparison (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2012).
13 13. See Young, op. cit.; E.C.H. Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region (New York: Routledge, 2004); J. English, Ice and Water. Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2013); E. Wilson Rowe, Arctic Governance: Power in Cross-Border Cooperation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018).
14 14. See Smieszek, op. cit.; O.S. Stokke and G. Hønneland, eds., International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building (London: Routledge, 2007); O. Rogne, V. Rachold, L. Hacquebord and R. Corell, IASC after 25 Years: Special Issue of the IASC Bulletin, http://iasc25.iasc.info.
15 15. Arctic Council, “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” updated September 13, 2018, https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us.
16 16. Juha Käpylä and Harri Mikkola, “On Arctic Exceptionalism,” FIIA Working Paper No. 85, April 2015, p. 5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/189844/wp85.pdf; Sergey Lavrov quoted in ITAR-TASS https://tass.com/russia/755311; see also Sam LaGrone, “Russian Foreign Minister: No Need for NATO in the Arctic,” USNI, Oct. 22, 2014
17 17. Young, op. cit.
18 18. Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International Organization 36, 2 (1982), pp. 185–205, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706520; Idem, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
19 19. Shulze, op. cit.; Smieszek, op. cit.
20 20. Piotr Graczyk and Timo Koivurova, “The Arctic Council,” in L. C. Jensen and G. Hønneland, eds., Handbook of the Politics of the Arctic (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2015), pp. 298–327; Paula Kankaanpää and Oran R. Young, “The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council,” Polar Research 31 (2012), pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3402/polar.v31i0.17176; Keskitalo, op. cit.; Congressional Research Service, op. cit.
21 21. See T. Koivurova and L. Heinämäki, “The Participation of Indigenous Peoples in International Norm-making in the Arctic,” Polar Record 42, 221 (2006), pp. 101–9, ; N. Sellheim, “The Arctic Council and the Advancement of Indigenous Rights,” in N. Sellheim, Y. V. Zaika, and I. Kelman, eds., Arctic Triumph. Northern Innovation and Persistence (Cham: Springer Switzerland Publishing, 2019), pp. 105–25.
22 22. Young, op. cit., Craczyk & Koivurova, op. cit.
23 23. Smieszek, op. cit.
24 24. E. J. Molenaar, “Governance of Arctic Shipping. Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States,” in R. C. Beckman, T. Henriksen, K. D. Kraabel, E. J. Molenaar, and J. A. Roach, eds., Governance of Arctic Shipping: Balancing Rights and Interests of Arctic States and User States (Boston: Brill Nijhof, 2017), pp. 24–67; Smieszek, op. cit.
25 25. Graczyk & Koivurova, op. cit.
26 26. D.L. Downie and T. Fenge, eds., Northern Lights against POPs: Combating Toxic Threats in the Arctic (Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003); Smieszek, op. cit.
27 27. See Congressional Research Service, op. cit.
28 28. For a review of these groups, see Smiezek, op. cit.
29 29. Smieszek, op. cit.
30 30. Schulze, op. cit.; By this means, diplomatic misunderstandings or (violent) conflicts are avertible through a current stream of reliable information among all regime actors, and institutionalized by a system of repeat consultations.
31 31. Schulze, op. cit.
32 32. Smieszek, op. cit.
33 33. Ibid.
34 34. See, for example, Timo Koivurova, “How US Policy Threatens Existing Arctic Governance,” Arctic Today, January 17, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandria Hall, The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment, RAND Europe (PE-268RC), 2018.
35 35. “Looking North: Sharpening America’s Arctic Focus,” Speech by Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, Rovaniemi, Finland, May 6, 2019, https:// www.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/.
36 36. China’s growing interest in the region has to be analyzed in the context of its aggressive behavior in maritime affairs elsewhere, namely in the South China Sea and its over-fishing activities in species rich waters such as those right on the edge of the Galápagos marine reserve. See “South China Sea: What’s China’s Plan for its ‘Great Wall of Sand’?” BBC, July 14, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-53344449; Morgan Otragus, US DoS Spokesperson, “China’s Empty Promises in the South China Sea,” September 27, 2020, https://www.state.gov/chinas-empty-promises-in-the-south-china-sea/; Dan Collyns, “Chinese Fishing Armada Plundered Waters around Galápagos, Data Shows,” The Guardian, September 17, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/17/chinese-fishing-arma-da-plundered-waters-around-galapagos-data-shows; Yuri Garcia, “Ecuador Says Some Chinese Vessels near Galapagos Have Cut Communications Systems,” Reuters, August 18, 2020, https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-environment-china/ecuador-says-some-chinese-vessels-near-galapagos-have-cut-communications-systems-idUKKCN25E2XI.
37 37. Somini Sengupta, United States Rattles Arctic Talks With a Sharp Warning to China and Russia,” New York Times, May 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/climate/pompeo-arctic-china-russia.html; Sengupta, “U.S. Pressure Blocks Declaration on Climate Change at Arctic Talks,” New York Times, May 7, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/climate/us-arctic-climate-change.html; Richard Milne, “US Provokes Fury after Blocking Arctic Council Statement,” Financial Times, May 7, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/f879ff9a-70ab-11e9-bf5c-6eeb837566c5; Coral Davenport, “Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” New York Times, October 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html.
38 38. See also the chapters by Andreas Østhagen, Ernie Regehr, Mia Bennett, et al., Marc Lanteigne, and Nengye Liu in this volume.
39 39. Timothy M. Lenton et al., “Climate Tipping Points –Too Risky to Bet Against,” Nature, November 27, 2019 (correction April 9, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03595-0; Stephen Leahy,” Climate Change Driving Entire Planet to Dangerous ‘Tipping Point’,” National Geographic, November 27, 2019, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2019/11/ earth-tipping-point/; NASA, “The Study of Earth as an Integrated System,” https://climate.nasa.gov/nasa_science/science/; “More Bad News for the Arctic: The Laptev Sea Hasn’t Frozen,” The Economist, October 28, 2020, https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/28/more-bad-news-for-the-arctic-the-laptev-sea-hasnt-frozen; Flora Graham, “Alarming Delay in the Annual Freeze of Arctic Sea Ice,” Nature, October 23, 2020, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03010-z.
40 40. USGS Arctic Oil and Gas Report, Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet (July 2008); Raul Pedrozo, “Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea ,” International Law Studies 89 (2013), pp. 757–75, esp. pp. 763–4; https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=ils. See also, Spohr, op. cit.
41 41. See Arild Moe’s chapter in this volume. Cf. Moe, “China’s Exaggerated Arctic Interests,” Reconnecting Asia, April 18, 2017, https://reconnectingasia. csis.org/analysis/entries/chinas-exaggerated-arctic-interests/.
42 42. “Russia Gathers More Data for its North Pole Bid,” The Maritime Executive, October 27, 2019, https://maritime-executive.com/article/russia-gathers-more-data-for-its-north-pole-bid. Submission by the Russian Federation (2001–2009), https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_rus.htm. Cf. Russian Federation, 2001–2019, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/legislationandtreaties/statefiles/rus.htm.
43 43. See Submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, pursuant to article 76, paragraph 8, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, updated October 16, 2020, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. Cf. Jeffrey J. Smith, “Reach for the Top: Canada’s 2019 Extended Continental Shelf Claim in the Arctic,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Ocean Law and Policy 4, 2 (2019), pp. 246–52, https://doi.org/10.1163/24519391-00402008.
44 44. The environmental regulations allowed under the UNCLOS are not as robust as those allowed if the Northwest Passage is part of Canada’s internal waters.
45 45. “Inuit and Canada Share Northwest Passage Sovereignty—ICC Canada President,” May 2019, https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/press-releases/inuit-and-canada-share-northwest-passage-sovereignty-icc-canada-president/; Jane George, “Canadian Inuit challenge U.S. Stance on Northwest Passage,” Nunatsiaq News, May 9, 2019, https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/canadian-inuit-challenge-u-s-stance-on-northwest-passage/.
46 46. Aki Tonami, “The Arctic Policy of China and Japan: Multi-layered Economic and Strategic Motivations,” The Polar Journal 4,1 (2014), pp. 105–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2014.913931; Ian Storey, “The Arctic Novice: Singapore and the High North,” Asia Policy 18 (July 2014), pp. 66–72, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24905278; Hyun Jun Kim, “Success in Heading North? South Korea’s Master Plan for Arctic Policy,” Marine Policy 61 (Nov. 2015), pp. 264–72, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2015.08.002.
47 47. HM Government, Beyond the Ice: UK Policy towards the Arctic, FCO 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/697251/beyond-the-ice-uk-policy-towards-the-arctic.pdf; see also Dan Sabbagh, “China May Pose Threat to UK as Northern Sea Route Clears, Says Navy Chief,” The Guardian, October 8, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/oct/08/china-strategic-threat-to-uk-as-northern-sea-route-clears-says-royal-navy-chief. The Federal Government, Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines Assuming Responsibility, Creating Trust, Shaping the Future, August 2019, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2240002/eb0b681be9415118ca87bc8e215c0cf4/arktisleitlinien-data.pdf; Davina Basse, “Germany: A New (non-)Arctic Power?,” Arctic Yearbook 2019, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2019/Scholarly-Papers/17_AY2019_Basse.pdf.
48 48. For a list and timeline of updated Arctic strategies, see Hilde-Gun Bye, “Sweden Launches New Arctic Strategy,” High North News, October 2, 2020, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/sweden-launches-new-arctic-strategy.
49 49. But there are other actors too: the small Nordic states of Finland and Sweden, without access to the Northern seas, who see themselves on the forefront of environmental policies and socially and economically sustainable development, plus in the Finnish case, of digital connectivity in the Arctic space; and Iceland, which fancies itself as a potential shipping hub for the NWP and TSR, while keen to protect its fishing industries. In addition, non-Arctic European and Asian states push into the North, as geopolitics and geoeconomics are shifting. Thus, the subtheme of interaction of the Nordic regime (focused on peace and cooperation, prosperity and sustainability) with the impact of exogenous powers on intra-Arctic affairs and the regional power equilibrium is a central area of investigation.
50 50. Whitney Lackenbauer and Rob Huebert, “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20, 3 (2014), pp. 320–333, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.977313.
51 51. Dion quoted in NATO STRATCOM COE, Arctic Narratives and Political Values: Russia, China and Canada in the High North, Riga, September 2018, p. 11, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/canadas-arctic-strategy.
52 52. The Canadian Government 2017 as quoted in Ibid., p. 9.
53 53. “Canada Needs an Arctic Defence Strategy as Russia, China Eye the North,” Global News, September 25, 2020, https://www.sootoday.com/global-news/commentary-canada-needs-an-arctic-defence-strategy-as-russia-china-eye-the-north-2741803; Vipal Monga, “China’s Move to Buy Arctic Gold Mine Draws Fire in Canada,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-move-to-buy-arctic-gold-mine-draws-fire-in-canada-11595764801; Jessica Shadian, Erica Wallis, “When It Comes to Canada-China Relations, It Is Time to Look North,” Policy Options Politiques, July 7, 2020, https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2020/when-it-comes-to-canada-china-relations-it-is-time-to-look-north/. Cf. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “Chinese Mining Interests and the Arctic,” in D. A. Berry, N. Bowles, and H. Jones, eds., Governing the North American Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Institutions (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 74–99.
54 54. See Government of Canada, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework International chapter, October 22, 2019, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1562867415721/1562867459588. Note that, as regards the Inuit, the document speaks of supporting first nation “self-determination,” and revitalizing and strengthening the cultures of “Arctic and Northern Indigenous peoples, including their languages and knowledge systems.”
55 55. Submission of the Inuit Circumpolar Council Canada to the Special Senate Committee on the Arctic Regarding the Arctic Policy Framework and International Priorities, March 2019, https://sencanada.ca/content/sen/committee/421/ARCT/Briefs/InuitCircumpolarCouncilCanada_e.pdf.
56 56. Cf. Andreas Østhagen, Gregory Levi Sharp and Paal Sigurd Hilde, “At Opposite Poles: Canada’s and Norway’s Approaches to security in the Arctic,” The Polar Journal 8, 1 (2018), pp. 163–81, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154 896X.2018.1468625. See also Ken S. Coates and Carin Holroyd, “Europe’s North: The Arctic Policies of Sweden, Norway, and Finland,” in idem, eds., The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics (London: Palgrave, 2020), pp. 283–303.
57 57. On Norway’s High North Strategy, see https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/high-north/id1154/. Cf. Norwegian MFA, Norway’s Arctic Policy, 10/2014, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/indigenous-heritage/norway.phphttps://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/nord/nordkloden_en.pdf.
58 58. James Black, Stephen J. Flanagan, Gene Germanovich, Ruth Harris, David Ochmanek, Marina Favaro, Katerina Galai, and Emily Ryen Gloinson, Enhancing Deterrence and Defence on NATO’s Northern Flank: Allied Perspectives on Strategic Options for Norway (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4381.html. See also Stephen J. Flanagan and James Black, “Norway’s Allies Share Their Views on the Country’s New Defense Plan,” Defense News, April 16, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/16/allies-share-views-on-enhancing-defense-of-norway-and-the-high-north/. See also Peter Bakkemo Danilov, “The Security Situation in Northern Norway is Significantly Different from That in the South,” High North News, October 23, 2020, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/security-situation-northern-norway-significantly-different-south.
59 59. Kåre Storvik, “The Future is in the North,” Offshore Engineer, January 13, 2020, https://www.oedigital.com/news/474542-the-future-is-in-the-north.
60 60. Altogether, some 100,000 Sámi live in Northern Europe—the majority of which are in North Norway. Library of Congress, Legal Report by Elin Hofverberg, “Protection of Indigenous Heritage: Norway,” March 2019, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/indigenous-heritage/norway.phphttps://www.loc.gov/law/help/indigenous-heritage/norway.php.
61 61. Amy Martin, “The Arctic’s Sámi People Push For a Sustainable Norway,” The World, November 5, 2018, https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-11-05/arctics-s-mi-people-look-sustainable-norway.
62 62. Christian Volk, “The Problem of Sovereignty in Globalized Times,” Law, Culture and the Humanities (Feb. 2019), https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872119828010; Hent Kalmo and Quentin Skinner, eds., Sovereignty in Fragments - The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); Hannes Gerhardt, Philip E. Steinberg, Jeremy Tasch, Sandra J. Fabiano and Rob Shields, “Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100, 4 [Climate Change] (Oct. 2010), pp. 992–1002. Cf. Corine Wood-Donnelly, Contested Sovereignty in a Changing Arctic 1494–2013, PhD Dissertation, Brunel University, 2014.
63 63. Marc Jacobsen, Greenland’s Arctic Advantage: Articulations, Acts and appearances of Sovereignty Games,” Cooperation and Conflict 55, 2 (2020), pp. 170–192, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836719882476.
64 64. China has expressed interest in Greenland’s deposits of uranian, thorium, earth oxide, zinc, lead, nickel, copper, and molybdenum as well as valuable deposits of ruby, sapphires, gold, silver and platinum. Bjorn Schionning, “As the Ice Melts, Greenland Considers Its Future,” BBC, January 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-51014148; “All Eyes on the Arctic: US, China and Russia Race to Control Far North,” Euronews/AP, July 23, 2020, https://www.euronews.com/2020/07/23/all-eyes-on-the-arctic-us-china-and-russia-race-to-control-far-north.
65 65. See Laurence Peter, “Danes See Greenland Security Risk amid Arctic Tensions,” BBC, November 29, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-50598898. Cf. Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 https://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Departments/Udenrigsanliggende/Kongerigets-Arktiske-Strategi.
66 66. Jacob Gronholt-Pedersen, “As the Arctic’s Attractions Mount, Greenland is a Security Black Hole, “Reuters, October 20, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-greenland-security-ins-idUSKBN2750J6.
67 67. Katrina Manson and Richard Mine, “US Financial Aid for Greenland Sparks Outrage in Denmark,” April 23, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/6d5e20cd-8af5-484d-9fb2-249cd83eeea8.
68 68. United Nations, “The Climate Crisis—A Race We Can Win, “ https://www.un.org/en/un75/climate-crisis-race-we-can-win; UN SG António Guterres “ Remarks at 2019 Climate Action Summit,” September 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-09-23/remarks-2019-climate-action-summit. Alec Luhn, “Freezing Cold War: Militaries Move in as Arctic Ice Retreats—Photo Essay,” The Guardian, October 16, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/oct/16/arctic-ice-retreats-climate-us-russian-canadian-chinese-military.
69 69. See Sen. Roger Wicker and Sen. Dan Sullivan, “Polar Icebreakers Are Key to America’s National Interest,” Defense News, October 20, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/10/19/polar-icebreakers-are-key-to-americas-national-interest/.
70 70. Larry Luxner, “As Arctic Warms Up, US Air Force Launches Department’s First Strategy for Confronting Threats,” New Atlanticist, July 22, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/as-arctic-warms-up-us-air-force-launches-departments-first-strategy-for-confronting/; C. Todd Lopez, Air Force Reveals Cold Facts on New Arctic Strategy,” DoD News, July 21, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2281961/air-force-reveals-cold-facts-on-new-arctic-strategy/; Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, “Department of the Air Force introduces Arctic Strategy,” July 21, 2020, https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2281305/department-of-the-air-force-introduces-arctic-strategy/. See also Richard Weitz, “US Policy Towards the Arctic: Adapting to a Changing Environment,” October 24, 2019, https://icds.ee/en/us-policy-towards-the-arctic-adapting-to-a-changing-environment/.
71 71. In 2009, in the government’s National Security Strategy 2020 it was proclaimed that to transform Russia into a “world power” was a national interest and strategic priority. See http://interkomitet.com/foreign-policy/basic-documents/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020/. Cf. Marlene Laruelle, Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (London: Routledge, 2013), chapters 1 and 6.
72 72. AFP, “Russian Rocket Fuel Leak Likely Cause of Marine Animal Deaths,” The Guardian, October 5, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/05/marine-poisoning-in-kamchatka-russia-may-be-rocket-fuel-leak; “95% of Marine Life on Sea Floor Killed in Kamchatka Eco-Disaster, Scientists Say,” The Moscow Times, October 8, 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/10/06/95-of-marine-life-on-sea-floor-killed-in-kamchatka-eco-disaster-scientists-say-a71672.
73 73. Andrew Osborn, “Putin’s Russia in Biggest Arctic Military Push since Soviet Fall,” Reuters, January 30, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-russia-arctic-insight-idUSKBN15E0W0.
74 74. “Shipbuilders to Deliver Two Mmissile Corvettes to Russian Navy,” TASS, August 25, 2002, https://tass.com/defense/1193533; “Russian Navy Project 21631 Buyan-M Class Corvette Zelyony Dol Arrives at Northern Fleet Base,” Navy Recognition, August 22, 2020, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2020/august/8880-russian-navy-project-21631-buyan-m-class-corvette-zelyony-dol-arrives-at-northern-fleet-base.html.
75 75. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia Launches New Nuclear-Powered Ice-breaker,” The Diplomat, May 27, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russia-launches-new-nuclear-powered-icebreaker/; USCG Office of Waterways and Ocean Policy, “Major Icebreakers of the World,” 2017, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/Office%20of%20Waterways%20and%20Ocean%20Policy/20170501%20major%20icebreaker%20chart.pdf?ver=2017-06-08-091723-907. Cf. Paul C. Avey, “The Icebreaker Gap Doesn’t Mean America is Losing in the Arctic,” War on the Rocks, November 28, 2919, https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/the-icebreaker-gap-doesnt-mean-america-is-losing-in-the-arctic/.
76 76. Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Top General Indirectly Confirms Arctic Deployment of the Unstoppable Kinzhal Missile,” The Barents Observer, December 19, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/12/russias-top-general-indirectly-confirms-arctic-deployment-unstoppable-missile; Zachary Cohen, “Satellite Images Indicate Russia is Preparing to Resume Testing its Nuclear-powered Cruise Missile,” CNN, October 20, 2020, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/20/politics/russia-nuclear-powered-cruise-missile-test-satellite-images/index.html; J. M. Doyle, “Cruise Missiles in the Arctic Seen as Another Outcome of Great Power Competition,” Seapower, September 10, 2020, https://seapowermagazine.org/cruise-missiles-in-the-arctic-seen-as-another-outcome-of-great-power-competition/.
77 77. Spohr, op. cit.; Holly Ellyatt, “Russia Drops Out of Top 5 Global Military Spenders While US and China Up the Ante,” CNBC, April 29, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/29/russia-drops-out-of-top-5-global-military-spenders.html.
78 78. It is noteworthy, that, with the clear intention of setting geopolitical signals, joint Sino-Russian sea maneuvers began in 2012. Michael Paul, “Partnership on the High Seas: China and Russia’s Joint Naval Manoeuvres,” SWP Comment, no. 26, June 2019, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C26_pau.pdf. Sergey Sukhankin, “The Northeastern Dimension of Russia’s ‘Ocean Shield 2020’ Naval Exercises,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 125, September 11, 2020 (Part 1), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-one/; Ibid., Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, 127, September 15, 2020 (Part 2), https://jamestown.org/program/the-northeastern-dimension-of-russias-ocean-shield-2020-naval-exercises-part-two/. Spohr, op. cit.
79 79. Sukhankin, op. cit.
80 80. Spohr, op. cit.
81 81. “Other Developing Nations Can Adopt China’s Growth Model: President Xi Jinping,” The Economic Times (India), October 18, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/other-developing-nations-can-adopt-chinas-growth-model-president-xi-jinping/articleshow/61134034.cms; Mengjie, “President Xi Delivers New Year Speech Vowing Resolute Reform in 2018,” Xinhuanet, December 31, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-12/31/c_136863397.htm.
82 82. Spohr, op. cit. See also Marc Lanteigne, “The Twists and Turns of the Polar Silk Road,” Over the Circle, March 15, 2020, https://overthecircle.com/2020/03/15/the-twists-and-turns-of-the-polar-silk-road/.
83 83. Ryan Hass and John L. Thornton, “The Trajectory of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Reactive Assertiveness to Opportunistic Activism,” Brookings Institution 3/2018, p. 7, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/fp_20171104_hass_the_trajectory_of_chinese_foreign_policy.pdf.
84 84. Thomas Nilsen, “Major Step Towards a Europe-Asia Arctic Cable Link,” The Barents Observer, June 6, 2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2019/06/mou-signed-set-arctic-telecom-cable-company; Frank Jüris, “Handing Over Infrastructure for China’s Strategic Objectives: ‘Arctic Connect’ and the Digital Silk Road in the Arctic,” SINOPSIS, March 7, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/arctic-digital-silk-road/#fn4.
85 85. Jüriis, op. cit.
86 86. Ibid.; and Clayton Cheyney, “China’s Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition and Exporting Political Illiberalism,” ISSUES & INSIGHTS 19—Working Paper #8, Pacific Forum, July 2019, https://web.archive.org/web/20200226180229/https://www.pacforum.org/sites/default/files/issuesinsights_Vol19%20WP8FINAL.pdf.
87 87. The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy. January 2018 (First Edition), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. Cf. Mariia Kobzeva, “China’s Arctic Policy: Present and Future,” The Polar Journal 9, 1 (2019), pp. 94–112, https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2019.1618558; Martin Kossa, “China’s Arctic Engagement: Domestic Actors and Foreign Policy,” Global Change, Peace & Security 32, 1 (2020), pp. 19–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/14781158.2019.1648406; Idem, Marina Lomaeva and Juha Saunavaara, “East Asian Subnational Government Involvement in the Arctic: A Case for Paradiplomacy?,” The Pacific Review (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020. 1729843.
88 88. Adam Vaughan, “How the Coronavirus Has Impacted Climate Change—For Good and Bad,” New Scientist, October 14, 2020, https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg24833040-900-how-the-coronavirus-has-impacted-climate-change-for-good-and-bad/#ixzz6cZFZ9XB4; Bill Gates, “COVID-19 Is Awful: Climate Change Could Be Worse,” Gates Notes, August 4, 2020, https://www.gatesnotes.com/Energy/Climate-and-COVID-19.
