Читать книгу The Handbook of Solitude - Группа авторов - Страница 69

In a previous section I discussed the implications for the solitary self of Winnicott’s ideas on essential aloneness, noncommunicating self and going‐on‐being. However, the greatest contribution of his theory to the understanding of aloneness is the brilliant conception of the capacity to be alone (Winnicott, 1965). This conception is at the heart of his developmental and clinical theorization and at the center of psychoanalytic insight on solitude. The capacity to be alone arises from a paradox: “This experience is that of being alone, as an infant and small child, in the presence of mother” (p. 30). The mother identifies with her infant during the first months of life, a state called ego‐relatedness or object‐relating. Gradually, the infant introjects this supportive mother and becomes able to tolerate and enjoy solitude. Therefore, if all goes well, no one is ever truly alone, as there is always someone there; and only in this sophisticated aloneness can the child unfold his/her true self.

This facet of Winnicott’s conception can be regarded as the necessity of being alone, although he did not explicitly make the distinction between capacity and necessity (Schacht, 2001). The necessity of being alone is described in statements such as the following (Winnicott, 1965): “It is only when alone (that is to say, in the presence of someone) that the infant can discover his own personal life” (p. 34). The capacity to be alone is a major manifestation of emotional maturity and is not acquired by all individuals, whereas the necessity of being alone is universal.

Winnicott (1965) offered a comprehensive description of what we could call “solitude in the first years of life”: “The infant is able to become unintegrated, to flounder, to be in a state in which there is no orientation, to be able to exist for a time without being either a reactor to an external impingement or an active person with a direction of interest or movement” (p. 34). He also made the developmental claim that many individuals become able to enjoy solitude before the end of childhood and that some children “may even value solitude as a most precious possession” (Winnicott, 1965, p. 30). When discussing the noncommunicating self, he explicitly relates the ability for aloneness with the capacity to concentrate on a task, a major developmental aim during childhood (Winnicott, 1965).

The state I am alone passes through three developmental phases. The first one is the I, the phase of the integration or unit of the individual; “I includes ‘everything else is not me’” (Winnicott, 1965, p. 61). Next, comes I am, which signifies that the infant exists, is alive, although still vulnerable or even paranoid; he/she has a contact with reality (the not‐me) and is able to share with the use of the mechanisms of introjection and projection, which facilitate mutual enrichment. Sharing means, among other things, that his/her existence is recognized by others. And finally, comes I am alone, which stems from the infant’s awareness that a reliable mother exists for him/her. In this light, loneliness can be understood as arising in the I am phase (a close parallel to Klein’s [1975] depressive position). The infant, even under favorable circumstances, may experience failures in sharing, the main failure being that he/she is not seen or recognized to exist or is not understood by the mother. Therefore, loneliness is lessened by the acknowledgment of his/her existence, by sharing itself.

A precondition for the development of the capacity to be alone is the transition from object relating to object use. Winnicott (1971) regards this transition as perhaps the most difficult developmental task, in as much as he viewed the capacity to be alone as a major manifestation of emotional maturity. It requires that the subject places the object outside the subject’s omnipotent control. In other words, it presupposes the recognition of the object’s existence as a separate entity, as having a life of its own in the world of objects. For this procedure to be completed successfully, the object must survive from its destruction (i.e., expression of aggression) by the subject.

The infant’s capacity to be alone – a capacity that develops throughout life – depends largely on the mother’s capacity to be alone. Primary maternal preoccupation, in the sense of the mother’s complete devotion to her newborn baby, gradually subsides. Some failures of mother’s adaptation to her infant’s needs are inevitable, and this gradual disillusionment may be beneficial if it occurs according to the infant’s developing ability to cope with frustration. The mother’s past aloneness experiences, her own memories of time alone and of being cared for, contribute to this solitude à deux (shared aloneness), which is described by Winnicott (1965) as follows: “Ego‐relatedness refers to a relationship between two people, one of whom at any rate is alone; perhaps both are alone, yet the presence of each is important to the other” (p. 31).

Thus, a very useful distinction between withdrawal and benign aloneness can now be made. Withdrawal is a defense against persecution fear or anxiety and against a potential danger of losing identification with that from which one withdraws. Benign aloneness reflects the tolerance of ambivalence and the ability to share solitude, that is, the ability to be alone in the presence of another person who is also alone and perceived to be alone (see Rubin, Chapter 29 for the origins of social withdrawal in childhood).