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ОглавлениеThe question of religion in its connections with civil government was first discussed in the convention on December 4. At issue was the test oath—a declaration of belief in the Christian religion—required of all elective officials. The select committee on this chapter of the constitution called for abolition of the oath. Daniel Webster, the chairman, opened the debate with a justification of the change on grounds of expediency rather than of right. The thirty-eight-year-old Webster, though a native of Massachusetts, had not yet embarked on his distinguished political career in that state. He had moved to Boston to practice law in 1816, having served for several years in Washington as a New Hampshire Congressman. He apparently held no firm convictions on the question before the convention.
The speakers who followed him did, however, James Prince, of Boston, condemned the test oath on the principles of religious liberty. Joseph Tuckerman, a Unitarian minister who later became famous for his ministry to the poor of Boston, held that a Christian people had a right to demand Christian rulers. James T. Austin, a prominent Boston attorney, Republican, and legislator, concisely and cogently defended the resolution.
MR. WEBSTER. It is obvious that the principal alteration, proposed by the first resolution, is the omission of the declaration of belief in the Christian religion, as a qualification for office, in the cases of the governor, lieutenant governor, counsellors and members of the Legislature. I shall content myself on this occasion with stating, shortly and generally, the sentiments of the select committee as I understand them on the subject of this resolution. Two questions naturally present themselves. In the first place; have the people a right, if in their judgment the security of their government and its due administration demand it, to require a declaration of belief in the Christian religion as a qualification or condition of office? On this question, a majority of the committee held a decided opinion. They thought the people had such a right. By the fundamental principle of popular and elective governments, all office is in the free gift of the people. They may grant, or they may withhold it at pleasure; and if it be for them, and them only, to decide whether they will grant office, it is for them to decide, also, on what terms, and with what conditions, they will grant it. Nothing is more unfounded than the notion that any man has a right to an office. This must depend on the choice of others, and consequently upon the opinions of others, in relation to his fitness and qualification for office. No man can be said to have a right to that, which others may withhold from him, at pleasure. There are certain rights, no doubt, which the whole people—or the government as representing the whole people—owe to each individual, in return for that obedience, and personal service, and proportionate contributions to the public burdens which each individual owes to the government. These rights are stated with sufficient accuracy in the tenth article of the bill of rights in this constitution: “Each individual in society has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to the standing laws.” Here is no right of office enumerated; no right of governing others, or of bearing rule in the State. All bestowment of office remaining in the discretion of the people, they have, of course, a right to regulate it, by any rules which they may deem expedient. Hence the people, by their constitution, prescribe certain qualifications for office, respecting age, property, residence, &c. But if office, merely as such, were a right, which each individual under the social compact was entitled to claim, all these qualifications would be indefensible. The acknowledged rights are not subject, and ought not to be subject to any such limitation. The right of being protected in life, liberty, and estate, is due to all, and cannot be justly denied to any, whatever be their age, property, or residence in the State. These qualifications, then, can only be made requisite as qualifications for office, on the ground that office is not what any man can demand as matter of right, but rests in the confidence and good will of those who are to bestow it. In short, it seems to me too plain to be questioned, that the right of office is a matter of discretion, and option, and can never be claimed by any man, on the ground of obligation… . However clear the right be, (and I can hardly suppose any gentleman will dispute it) the expediency of retaining the declaration is a more difficult question. It is said not to be necessary, because in this Commonwealth, ninety-nine out of every hundred of the inhabitants profess to believe in the Christian religion. It is sufficiently certain, therefore, that persons of this description, and none others, will ordinarily be chosen to places of public trust. There is as much security, it is said, on this subject, as the necessity of the case requires. And as there is a sort of opprobrium—a marking out for observation and censorious remark, a single individual, or a very few individuals, who may not be able to make the declaration, it is an act, if not of injustice, yet of unkindness, and of unnecessary rigor to call on such individuals to make the declaration. There is, also, another class of objections which has been stated. It has been said that there are many very devout and serious persons—persons who esteem the Christian religion to be above all price—to whom, nevertheless, the terms of this declaration seem somewhat too strong and intense. They seem, to these persons, to require the declaration of that faith which is deemed essential to personal salvation; and therefore not at all fit to be adopted by those who profess a belief in Christianity, merely in a more popular and general sense. It certainly appears to me that this is a mistaken interpretation of the terms; that they imply only a general assent to the truth of the Christian revelation, and, at most, to the supernatural occurrences which establish its authenticity. There may, however, and there appears to be, conscience in this objection; and all conscience ought to be respected. I was not aware, before I attended the discussions in the committee, of the extent to which this objection prevailed… . For my own part, finding this declaration in the constitution, and hearing of no practical evil resulting from it, I should have been willing to retain it; unless considerable objection had been expressed to it. If others were satisfied with it, I should be. I do not consider it, however, essential to retain it, as there is another part of the constitution which recognizes in the fullest manner the benefits which civil society derives from those Christian institutions which cherish piety, morality and religion. I am conscious, that we should not strike out of the constitution all recognition of the Christian religion. I am desirous, in so solemn a transaction as the establishment of a constitution, that we should keep in it an expression of our respect and attachment to Christianity;—not, indeed, to any of its peculiar forms, but to its general principles.
MR. PRINCE… . There are, said Mr. P., two distinct rights belonging to man—UNALIENABLE and NATURAL—among those of the first class are the rights of conscience in all matters of religion. Now I hold that religion is a matter exclusively between God and the individual; and “the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason or conviction; and thus, I repeat it, this right is in its nature an unalienable right, because it depends on the evidence as it strikes his mind; and consequently the result is what is his duty towards his Creator.” And therefore, as man owes supreme allegiance to God, as the Creator, and as the undivided governor of the universe, he cannot absolve himself, nor can others absolve him from this supreme allegiance; and hence, on entering into a social compact, the rights he gives up, and the powers he delegates must be tributary to, and in subordination to this high and first allegiance—and among the first enumeration of rights and duties in the present constitution of the Commonwealth, this principle is recognized: “It is the duty and the right of all men (says the constitution) to worship the Supreme Being, the great Creator and preserver of the universe, and none shall be molested or restrained for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, nor for his religious professions or sentiments.” This is reasonable, wise and just. In forming or revising the social compact, let us then take heed, that we do not insert or retain any principle, which by possible construction may interfere with, or abridge such sacred, such inestimable rights by an inquiry into opinions for which man is only accountable to his God. Social duties are between man and man. Religious duties are between God and the individual. While we are solicitous to “render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s”—take heed, I beseech you, that “you leave unto God, the things that are God’s.” Nor will the argument hold good that because during the forty years the test has been engrafted into and been in force under the present constitution, no extensive evils have presented themselves, and therefore it is inexpedient to expunge it from the constitution, lest it might be construed as an indirect abandonment of the cause of Christianity. On revising the constitution, every unnecessary point, even the most trivial, ought to be stricken out, and every possible evil guarded against. The American revolution fully recognizes this principle;—it was not the pressure of evils actually existing which induced the patriots of the revolution to resist the encroachments of Great Britain, but it was a dread of the consequences which they believed would result from submitting to the doctrines advanced by the mother country—hence, I repeat it, it is not from the multiplicity of cases which have occurred, whereby men of sterling integrity, pure morals and great strength of intellect may have been precluded from participating either in the advantages of office, or assisting in the public councils, but it is that by continuing this principle in the constitution you may preclude them… . I submit then the following positions, first, admitting the right, (which, however, I do not) of the citizens when forming a social compact to prescribe such terms as a majority may deem expedient and proper, yet I hold it to be unjust to introduce a principle into the compact which, while it provides that the individual shall afford his personal aid, and risk his life for the common defence and yield up all his property (if need be) for the maintenance of the government and its laws, yet virtually precludes him from participating in any of the advantages resulting from offices, or from any share in the administration of the government, because he differs on a subject with which society has but a doubtful right to interfere; although in point of morality and strength of intellect he shines as “a star of the first magnitude.” Secondly—I hold that this act of injustice toward the individual is neither politic nor expedient; first, because as before observed, it may deprive society of talent and moral excellence, which should always be secured and cherished as one of the best means of preserving the prosperity of the Commonwealth; and secondly, while it may thus exclude men possessing such useful and amiable qualification, yet it is no effectual safeguard whereby to keep out ambitious, unprincipled men from office, or a seat in the public councils. And, I moreover hold, that the cause of Christianity doth not require such a qualification to support it. This religion is founded on a rock and supported by a power which humanity cannot affect—it does not want the secular arm to defend it—its divine origin, and its own intrinsic merit, ever have been, and ever will be, its firmest support. What have the powers of the world to do with such a religion? Experience has demonstrated that when left to the umpire of reason and of argument, it has triumphed the most brilliantly over the attacks of infidelity. Inquisitions, test acts and fanaticism, with their gibbets—their racks—and their faggots, may produce martyrs and hypocrites, but such writers as Watson1 and Paley have displayed its true character by arguments, which have put infidelity in the entire back ground. And may I not add from experience that in those countries where there are religious tests, they have not been productive of any advantage; even in that nation from whom many of us derived our origin, and where, in addition to a test act, the most solemn of the Christian ordinances are obliged to be adhered to as an additional qualification for office—there is either an almost total evasion, or the compliance is often made under circumstances which, while it gives pain to many a serious Christian, excites mirth in the breast of every infidel. I also believe the qualifications of candidates ought to be confided to the electors, who generally take them from the neighborhood, and will therefore be the best judges of their moral and mental powers, and should it unfortunately happen that an unfit citizen has been introduced into office—the electors, so long as virtue, patriotism and Christianity predominate, will avail themselves of the frequency of elections to obtain a remedy by a change of character; and that the evil will be much sooner remedied than if it is left to be done through the crucible of a test act. I moreover think, that while the scriptures seem to reprobate the presumption of demanding, and the fallacy of trusting, to mere professions of faith, they plainly point to the policy of preferring a trust in moral worth and excellence… . In making the aforegoing observations, I hope it will not be considered as in any manner intending to weaken the cause of Christianity or of aiding the cause of infidelity. I make them because I verily believe, in forming or revising the social compact, we ought wholly to exclude every principle which by possible construction may interfere with the consciences of men, thereby leaving them and their religious opinions where alone they ought to be left, “to Him who searcheth the heart and knows our inmost thoughts.”2 Whether the individual has or has not formed a correct religious opinion is nothing to us, as civilians.
“For modes of faith, let graceless zealots fight,
His can’t be wrong whose life is in the right.”3
Indeed, sir, I think that so far from injuring of the Christian cause, I am aiding it—when doubting men are left to the freedom of their own wills, they will be the more apt to listen to the arguments in support of Christianity than when shackled by test acts, or any other interference of the civil government… . Believing then sir, as I verily do, that to retain any religious test, however liberal, is neither required for the safety of religion, nor for the safety of the Commonwealth; that it is unjust in principle—fallacious as to the effect to be produced—pernicious in its consequences—and an unwarrantable assumption of the unalienable rights of a citizen, and also that it is repugnant to one of the most essential moral precepts of Christianity which inculcates, “that whatsoever I would that men should do unto me, this I ought to do unto them”; I hope the principle to which I have alluded will be left out of the constitution, now that we are called to revise it… .
… MR. TUCKERMAN of Chelsea observed that he supposed the question now before the committee to be, whether the religious test in the constitution of 1780, shall be retained, or whether the resolutions now proposed by the select committee shall be adopted. He observed that, at the hazard of being accused of bigotry, and narrowness of mind, he must take the ground of defence of the constitution on this subject, as it now stands. He said that, in reflecting upon the test, he had not anticipated the suggestion of any doubt concerning the right, should this Convention have the disposition, to retain it. The constitution declares every man to be eligible to all the high offices of the State, on the condition of certain prescribed qualifications. Yet if there was any probability that any people of color would be elected to fill either of these offices, he presumed that no doubt would be felt, either as to the right, or the propriety, of their exclusion. There would, without doubt, be a provision in the constitution for their exclusion; or, it would be required, that these offices should be holden only by the white inhabitants of the Commonwealth. And if, as is without doubt a fact, ninety-nine out of a hundred of the people of this Commonwealth are in their faith Christians, it seems to be as unquestionable as any one of the rights of a people, to require that their rulers shall, in their faith, be Christians… . He would say no more on the subject of the right. He thought that, on no good ground, it could be contested. The great questions then on the subject regard the expediency of abolishing the existing test, and the propriety of the substitution proposed in the resolution. On the question of giving up the test, he remarked, that an argument for its abolition was, that the State would thus obtain, in its high and important offices, the talents of a few men, who do not believe the Christian religion. He replied, that during forty years in which this test has stood in our constitution, we have never wanted men, in sufficient abundance, for all the offices in which it is required. And that no apprehension can be felt, whether we shall continue to have candidates enough, who will not shrink from the test, for every department of government which they can be called to fill. The test is so very broad, that it excludes no one of all the denominations of Christians. He remarked, that we should be exposed to much confusion and error on this subject, if we should consider the test now required, as having any relation to the very objectionable tests which have sometimes been required. The test established by the English constitution, for example, required a belief of the thirty-nine articles of the church of England. He would resist, with all the energy of the small powers that he possessed, any definition in the constitution, of what Christianity is, as a faith to be required of those who may be elected to office; and had he not heard the suggestion of the honorable chairman of the select committee, that there were gentlemen in that committee who thought that a solemn declaration of belief of the Christian religion could be made by those only, who were assured also of an eternal interest in the promises of our religion, he should have thought that every man, who had been convinced by evidence of the truth of this religion, and who felt the divine authority of its doctrines and precepts, would conscientiously have made this declaration. He respected the opinions of gentlemen, who gave this construction to the language of the test; though he could not think the language to be fairly susceptible of this import. As he understood the declaration, it implied only that belief, which is a security to the people, that their rulers receive the great fundamental principles, which are the best security of good laws, and of a good administration of government. He said that, in his view, the most beautiful feature of those parts of our present constitution, which concern religion, is, that it recognizes Christianity as the religion of the State, in the great principles in which its various sects agree; leaving unnoticed those in which they differ. Any man therefore, he thought, who believes that Christianity is a divine revelation, can make the declaration now required, and comprehend in that declaration, all that it is intended to embrace.
On the question of the propriety of abolishing the test, he said, his objections were still more solemn. Either the religion of Jesus Christ is from God or it is not. Either we are accountable to God for all our means and opportunities of advancing the interests of this religion, or we are not. If our religion be from God, and if it be our duty, by all means which are consistent with its spirit, to promote its progress, it is a question on which we ought to pause, whether we shall open the door of office indiscriminately to those who believe, and to those who reject, this revelation of God’s will. We all know the descending influence of example. If men should be elevated to high and responsible stations, who are enemies of Christianity, may we not look with some apprehension to the consequences? Sir, if this test had not been established in 1780, I am not certain that I should now have been disposed to advocate it; I might have felt a sufficient security in the election of Christian magistrates without it. But it has now become associated with the sentiments, and habits, and feelings of forty years; and if you now remove it, you declare to the people, and they will not misunderstand the declaration,—that you do not deem it to be of importance that our magistrates should be Christians. Changes which affect long established associations should be made very cautiously. The gentleman from Boston cites to us the words of our Lord, render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; I hope that we shall feel the importance of the precept. But my New Testament does not add, “leave to God the things that are God’s.” I am told to render to God the things that are God’s. And, sir, we owe it to God, to Christ, and to our own souls, to do what we may for the extension and security of our faith as Christians; and to give our influence, whatever it may be, to the election of magistrates, who will make laws, and administer justice, in the spirit of Christianity. On these grounds I am opposed to the resolutions of the committee; and wish that the test, from which no inconvenience has yet been experienced, may be retained in the constitution… .
… MR. AUSTIN… . He did not agree with the chairman of the select committee who reported the resolution, that we had a right to demand this qualification. On the contrary he held that we had no right to demand it—that every one who contributes to the expenses of government and bears his share of the public burthens, has a right to be a candidate for popular favor. This was the general rule. He admitted there were exceptions. We have the right to demand the qualifications of age, property and residence, because they are necessary to insure the proper performance of the duties of the office. But this qualification related to opinions which do not bear upon the duties of government and are not connected with the public safety. This was the distinction—if we pass this line there is no place to stop. No one would say that a belief in Christianity was indispensable in legislators. If the laws would not be well made—if the government could not be carried on—if society would be in danger without a declaration of belief in the doctrines of Christianity, then this would be within the exceptions to the general rule. But it is argued that although it is not necessary for the preservation of civil society, it is necessary to show our respect for the institutions of Christianity. The first is a legitimate purpose, the other an unlawful one. If it was agreed that it was proper that all those who held public offices should believe in the Christian religion, he was willing to say that he held in little respect the judgment of any one who in the present enlightened state of society, and with the present means of information, should not be satisfied with the evidences of Christianity, and still less the integrity of any one who should disbelieve without examination. But this was merely his opinion as an individual. And who should judge the people—it is their right—let them judge—give them means of information. But place him who believes, and him who sneers at religion, side by side as candidates for office, and let the people decide between them. They may be trusted to decide correctly. This is the theory of our government. He proceeded to the question of expediency. Has the test a good tendency? The test was relied upon as a security, and the people have sometimes been imposed upon, because they supposed that the government would look to the object. But the test was evaded, and the laws brought into contempt. The Christian religion needs not oaths and tests to protect it any more than it does force. Its empire will be maintained and extended by neither the one nor the other, but the only aid which can be given to secure its triumph, is the diffusion of knowledge. It was argued that the test being a part of the present constitution, it ought not to be taken out. By taking it from the constitution we no more violate the principles adopted by the framers of this instrument, than they violated principles previously established. In 1631, it was ordained that no one should be a freeman, and have the right of voting, who was not a church member. This he contended was the true theory if we would have a religious test. We should go to the source—stand at the ballot box, and as each individual came with his vote in his left hand, require him to hold up his right, and swear to his belief in the Christian religion. This was the system of our ancestors, but it was afterwards abolished, and in 1651 they adopted a stricter rule of exclusion. They required that the voter should not only be a member of the church, but should believe in the Christian religion, as it was proclaimed by the orthodox writers of the day. At the time the constitution was adopted, by a belief in the Christian religion was meant an adherence to the orthodox church of the day. This interpretation would exclude very many whom at the present day gentlemen would not exclude. By taking out this provision of the constitution, we adopt the spirit of those who framed that instrument. It was not very discreditable to them, if, after forty years’ experience of the test, it should be found inapplicable to our present condition, and he did not think that in rejecting it we should show any disrespect to them or to religion itself. We only say it is unnecessary to mix the affairs of church and state… .
