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ОглавлениеNot until December 20 was the report of the committee on the bill of rights taken up in committee of the whole. Debate immediately centered on the aggravating third article. After the delegates endorsed the recommendation to strike the antiquated provision empowering the legislature to enjoin attendance at religious worship, Leverett Saltonstall moved that except for two further amendments of a minor nature the third article be left undisturbed. The Salem attorney and legislator with an old Massachusetts name was a prominent member of the small eastern conservative group that dominated the convention. So too was Samuel Hoar, Jr., of Concord, who spoke in favor of Saltonstall’s motion. Enoch Mudge, a delegate from the incipient industrial center of Lynn, in Essex County, then explained why he opposed the motion.
The next day the motion was passed over in favor of Childs’s resolution, which would more clearly test the opinion of the convention on the basic issue. Henry Halsey Childs came from the Berkshire town of Pittsfield, long a center of religious liberalism and Republicanism. A physician by profession, he also served in the legislature from 1816 to 1827. The debate lasted two days. Many delegates spoke for the substitute. The remarks of a dissenting minister from Beverly, N. W. Williams, were particularly pointed. Saltonstall delivered the longest and most forthright speech against the motion. Soon after he finished, the question was called, the motion defeated.
MR. SALTONSTALL moved to amend the report by striking out the third and fourth resolutions, and substituting a resolution declaring that it is not expedient to make any further amendment to the third article of the declaration of rights than to substitute the word “Christian” for “Protestant,” and also to provide that real estate shall be taxed for the support of public worship in the town, parish or precinct in which it shall be situated.
MR. HOAR of Concord said it appeared to him, that the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Salem, must necessarily bring the whole subject of the third article into discussion. If it should be adopted, it would show that the committee were in favor of the article as it now stands, in preference to the substitution proposed by the select committee, or by the gentleman from Chester [Mr. Phelps], or from Pittsfield [Mr. Childs], and to any other which may be off ered. He was desirous that the present amendment might be adopted. He was on the select committee, but did not vote with the majority in reporting these resolutions. If they were wrong, therefore, he was not responsible for their defects, and if right, he was entitled to no part of the credit. He considered the alteration proposed by the report of the committee to be in substance pernicious. It was going to change one of the fundamental principles of our government. If there was in our constitution one principle more than another on which the public happiness and welfare depended, and which was entitled to greater favor, he thought it was this; and it was here peculiarly proper to call on gentlemen for an application of the rule so often brought forward, that before any principle in the constitution was changed, it ought to be shown clearly and decisively that experience had proved it capable of producing an ill effect on the community. If this was acknowledged to be an important and an operative principle and not a dead letter, and if the effect produced by it was not a bad one, but the contrary, it ought to be retained. He was unwilling to destroy the effect of this principle. We had had experience of its beneficial operation, not for forty years only, but for more than a century; and he would not exchange this experience for any theory however wise in appearance. Theory might deceive, but experience could not. And if any experience was useful, that of the particular community for which the constitution was intended, was to be preferred. Although other countries may have been able to do without this principle, it by no means followed that it would do no good here. He knew that a distinguished individual in Great Britain had professed his ability to make constitutions and laws for all latitudes, and all habits and manners that could be named; he should however give more credit to our own experience. If gentlemen who wish a change should show the operation of the third article to be prejudicial to this country, he should cheerfully vote with them; otherwise he should think it ought to be retained. He said it had been judicially determined that by the law of 1811, real estate, belonging to non-resident proprietors of a different sect or denomination, cannot be taxed for the support of public worship in the town where it is situated. This report proposes to extend to all Christians, the rights which were peculiar to persons of a different denomination from Congregationalists. It gives power to a Congregationalist, for any reason, to change his religious instructor, and prevents his being taxed in any place except where he attends public worship; the consequence will be, that all lands of non-resident proprietors will be exempted from taxation for the support of religious worship in any place. Was not this a great evil? He could name towns in which one third part of the land was owned by citizens of different towns, and was assessed for the support of public worship in the towns where it was situated. Deduct this portion of the taxes, and in many towns it would in a great degree derange their system of supporting public worship. It might be supposed that this evil would be remedied on account of tenants being liable to be taxed. But there were a great many towns to which he referred, where the lands were not occupied by tenants, but used by the non-resident owners merely as pastures for cattle. Another inconvenience and injustice would arise from adopting the report that these lands would escape all taxation, as the assessors in the towns where the owners lived would not know of lands so situated, or would be ignorant of their value. For this reason alone, the report ought not to be accepted, and it was incumbent on those in favor of it, to show something equivalent to the derangement to the system of taxation. But although this inequality would be created by the report, yet this was but the dust of the balance, compared with the rest of the consequences… . Mr. H. spoke of the detriment which would happen to that class of society who depend for their religious instruction on public worship. He spoke only as a citizen and not as a divine. He considered religious instruction, in a political point of view, to be as necessary as literary instruction. It might be said that religion would be supported voluntarily. He wished for better evidence of the fact than he had had; and if true now, it might not be hereafter. Much had been said about inalienable rights; he asked if this meant that society could not do what was most for its good? If a man could not give up any rights for his greatest benefit? No interference with the rights of conscience was intended or felt from the first article. To say that the Legislature shall not regulate anything relating to religion, was to say that they shall not encourage any virtues or punish any vices or crimes. If we could trust to anything in history, it was to this, that our prosperity, and what most distinguishes Massachusetts, is owing to our provision for the support of religion and morality. He considered these a great support of civil society. He believed the only alternative was, to support it by religion and morality, or by a standing army. The proposition of the gentleman from Salem, was only to leave the constitution where it was before. It was not to repeal the law of 1811, which he considered as a bad law, but only to leave the Legislature the power, if necessary, instead of tying up their hands for all future time. He compared the provision for religious worship to that for town schools: those who have no children pay as great a tax as if they had; and if any person, having children, is not satisfied with the schoolmaster appointed by the town, he takes away his children, but never thinks of withholding his money from the support of the town schools; and yet the principle is the same; it is in fact a stronger case; for a man may withdraw to any religious society, and pay his money where he pleases, only he must pay somewhere… .
MR. MUDGE was opposed to the adoption of the amendment of the gentleman from Salem [Mr. Saltonstall], because it would tend to introduce great confusion and evil. It proposed to give power to societies to tax real estate. Persons of all denominations have made that provision for the support of public worship which they think necessary. They do not wish to incur the trouble and expense of assessing taxes, that they may draw them out for the support of religious worship which they have already provided for in other modes. The arguments which the gentleman who had last spoke had used were precisely those which he would have used, to show that the provisions of the constitution ought not to be retained. He could show in every part of the Commonwealth instances in which great injustice and oppression had been suffered by individuals; he could point to an individual on the floor who had had his property taken from him to the amount of 300 dollars for the support of public worship in a form which he did not approve. But who shall be entitled to the right of taxing the whole property of the Commonwealth? In the town to which he belonged there were five distinct religious societies. Which of them should have the right to impose this tax? Some of the denominations of Christians were conscientiously opposed to the right of imposing any tax for the support of religion. The right therefore of taxing would operate unequally. The Episcopalians, the Baptists, the Friends, had never exercised the right. None he believed but the Congregational denomination had exercised the right. It was therefore granting to them an exclusive right. It had been contended that it was necessary for the support of religion. He did not agree that it was necessary. He contended that it was not. He found that all religious communities, besides supporting their own religious teachers, contributed large sums to the extension of the knowledge of Christianity to other countries. It was not necessary for securing the maintenance of the ministry, and it had a tendency to produce strife and contention. Persons were taxed in societies, who were accustomed to attend religious worship in other societies, and this produced jealousy, strife, ill feelings towards each other. The ministers in many instances do not wish it. They had rather labor with their own hands for their support, than that the stock and property of their flock should be taken and sold for their maintenance. He wished to strike from the constitution a provision that was not necessary for the support of religion, and which tended to produce strife and jealousy. It would reduce all the religious communities to a level, and would introduce a spirit of harmony and emulation for the support of religion, and he believed in a short time the amount of voluntary contribution for religious purposes, would be greater than can now be raised by the hand of power. If we would attend to the subject in its operation on religion, we should find it would have a good effect, to remove all restrictions, which operate to give exclusive privileges to a particular denomination. He wished to have the constitution so amended that there should be no inconsistency in it, and that each religious community should be entitled to equal privileges… .
… MR. CHILDS stated as a general principle, that the right of every individual to worship God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, was one which no government could interfere with. Whenever government had undertaken to exercise an authority in this respect, it was an usurpation, and when this usurpation had been submitted to, the worship rendered was not sincere. In our own government, unless it could be demonstrated that it was necessary to the support of government, and clearly for the interest of the community, it could not be fairly exercised. He would call the attention of the committee to the argument of the gentleman from Boston. He would not admit that he or any other gentleman who would support the report of the select committee felt a greater interest in the support of religious institutions than gentlemen who would advocate the resolution which he had proposed. The gentleman had said that the committee were unanimously of opinion that the support of institutions for religious instruction and worship were essential to the happiness of the people and the good order of society, and therefore ought to be supported by legislative provision. He, Mr. C., would draw a different conclusion from the same premises. He argued that because religious instruction and worship were essential to the happiness of the people and good order and preservation of government, they ought to be left to the free support of every individual, according to the dictates of conscience. He contended that this was the only mode in which religious worship could be properly supported, and the mode in which in practice under the constitution it had been actually supported. The principles of the third article in the declaration of rights had been abandoned in practice, and the resolution before the committee did not deviate from what had been the practice for many years in the Commonwealth—what had been recognized by the Legislature—and from the general sentiment of the people. He believed there was no state where there was so much refinement—so much instruction, and so great a regard for religion as were to be found in this Commonwealth. He was willing to go as far as any gentleman in this eulogy of the character of the people in all parts of the State. But he would not admit that this character was to be attributed to the inefficient and inoperative recognition of a principle in the constitution. It was to be attributed to the general support of common schools—they were the primum mobile of improvement in the Commonwealth. He appealed to the example of the town of Boston where this principle of the constitution had no effect, and yet there was nowhere to be found a higher degree of improvement. The example of Rhode Island had been appealed to as a case to show the necessity of some constitutional provision for the support of religion. But Mr. C. said that the low state of morals and improvement in that state could not be attributed to the want of a compulsatory provision for the support of religion, but to their want of common schools. In Providence, where schools were encouraged, as much attention was paid to the support of religion as in Boston. This amounted to a demonstration that the effect was to be attributed to the general diffusion of education by common schools, and not to any provision for the support of religion. The example of New York, he said, had been appealed to, but there was there the same want of schools as in Rhode Island. It was proposed to substitute the word Christian for Protestant. He called on gentlemen to define Christian. Clergymen differed on the subject. What would be called Christianity by one, would be called infidelity by another. Who knows what will be the state of things some years hence. The time was rapidly approaching when men professing to be Christians will be so opposed that if this part of the constitution is retained, the Commonwealth will be in a state of greater dissension from theological differences than they have ever been from political controversies. The resolution proposed by the select committee, declares the principle thus—the Legislature shall have power to compel the people to support religious teachers; but if gentlemen would examine it in its details, they would find that it would accord in practice with the principle in the resolution proposed by him as a substitute. In this construction his opinion was supported by the argument of the gentleman from Concord yesterday. That gentleman was consistent in his views, and for adopting a consistent course. Mr. C. said he would rather adopt the consistent principle of that gentleman, than the contradictory one of the committee. The proposition supported by him was explicit, and it would be known what was to be depended on. The principle maintained by the committee with the qualifications with which we had accompanied it, would keep the State in constant quarrels and collisions. He repeated that rather than take the report of the committee, he would take the proposition advocated by the gentleman from Concord. Our forefathers had been repeatedly brought forward as affording an illustrious example. He presumed, however, that their example was not to be adopted in everything, and contended that this was a domination of the same kind, and only differing in degree from that which every body at the present day disapproved. He would state how far, in his opinion, government has a right to interfere in matters of religion. So far as the laws can take cognizance of offences committed against good morals, government has a right to interfere; but the principle which leads us to worship God, is beyond the control of government. The gentleman from Concord had said, that if we abandon the means of supporting religious instruction, we should be obliged to resort to a standing army to enforce obedience to the laws. He, Mr. C., would reverse the proposition. Establish the principle that government has a right to compel the support of public worship, and a standing army will be necessary to carry it into effect… .
… MR. WILLIAMS of Beverly said, that some gentlemen seemed to suppose, that all who were in favor of the present proposition, were in favor of removing all religion from the State. He wished to remove this impression. He considered that religion was of great consequence to the Commonwealth, and that the government should protect all persons in the enjoyment of their religious rights and privileges. He was opposed to the present provision in the constitution. He understood that the third article allows a tax which favored one religious denomination, and he understood that the report of the select committee had the same object. He thought the terms of the constitution were not so explicit and intelligible as some gentlemen had asserted. He admitted the premises in the third article, but not the conclusion. He considered that liberty of action and of opinion was given by the constitution to only one religious denomination, that of Congregationalists. He denied that the operation of the constitution had been equal, as the gentleman from Concord had asserted; but he said some persons had been obliged to pay, where they had received no benefit. Sometimes the taxes of minor children were paid to the support of public worship where the father attended, and where they did not. He understood it had been said that persons might go from one society to another at their pleasure. He denied the fact. He mentioned that in one town there was a society, comprising almost all the inhabitants, and that afterwards a society of Congregationalists grew up there, and taxes paid to the treasurer were applied to the support of this worship in consequence of the provisions of the constitution. He thought this was unequal. He agreed that contracts between the teachers and societies ought to be enforced; although some gentlemen thought otherwise. He did not apprehend, if the present proposition were adopted, that the Sabbath would be neglected, that public schools and other benevolent institutions would go down; for we had experience to the contrary. He objected that it was impossible to enforce the present provisions. He thought it unfair to say that religion did not take care of itself originally, because it was protected by its author; for its author had no power to protect it; except so far as miracles went—our Saviour derived no aid from the civil arm. He said that under the word Protestant, which applies to a great many varieties of religion, the government had established one particular denomination. He denied the propriety of mixing civil and religious institutions. When in the dark ages, from which we ought not to take example, the amalgamation of these two distinct things was made, it was done for improper purposes, and was attended with mischief. The people had no right to establish any religion, whether Protestant or Catholic, or any other. He hoped the substance, at least, of the proposition of the gentleman from Pittsfield would be adopted… .
… MR. SALTONSTALL said he rose with unusual embarrassment, because the subject had been so ably discussed, and still more, because of its intrinsic importance; he thought it more important than any that had been considered. It is a trifling question comparatively, how the council shall be chosen, or whether there be any council; whether the senate be founded on valuation or population, or how the house of representatives is modified—we shall have a Legislature so constructed as to insure a free government—but strike out the constitutional provision for the support of public worship, and who can tell the consequences? As was said by the able gentleman from Boston, (Mr. Blake) we have heretofore been inspecting the superstructure—we are now examining the foundation, and he doubted not the result of the examination would be that the foundation would be found laid firm and deep, and capable of sustaining a superstructure that may rear its lofty head to the skies. Two questions arise—first as to the right of government, and second, whether there is anything in the subject—religion—which should prevent or restrict this right. There is no subject upon which such inadequate views are entertained as the duty, and of course the right, of government. A stranger acquainted with this subject, would be surprised at some of our debates upon the rights of the people in framing a government. They have a right to adopt such measures as will promote the happiness of the people and the good order and preservation of civil society. Whatever tends to promote these great objects, it is the duty of government to cherish and support, because these are the objects for which government is instituted. The design of government is not merely the security of life against those who would attack it, and property against those who would plunder it, but to improve the character and condition of those who are subject to it. Mr. S. enlarged upon this point. Is it true then, that the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government, do essentially depend upon piety, religion and morality? All seem to admit this, and yet their tendency to promote these great objects has not been sufficiently considered. The Christian religion is the great bond of civil society. It teaches us that we are all children of one beneficent Parent, who constantly watches over us for good, who notices all our actions, and will hereafter reward or punish us, as they have been good or evil. It teaches us that God is everywhere present, that he knows our most secret thoughts, that he sees us where no human eye can, and will call us to account when human laws cannot reach us. What an immense effect would the single doctrine of accountability have on the conduct, if properly realized. Our religion also contains the most comprehensive as well as minute directions for our conduct towards each other, declared under the most tremendous sanctions—all our hopes of happiness, all our fears of suffering; directions, which in proportion as they are obeyed, supersede the necessity of human laws. But this is not all—
“How small, of all the ills that men endure,
That part which laws or kings can make or cure.”1
It is on the observance of duties of imperfect obligation, which human laws cannot reach, but which are the great care of religion, that our happiness essentially depends. Can the regulations of society make us kind and affectionate and faithful in the relations we bear in life? Religion extends to the heart—human laws concern actions alone. Religion cleanses the fountain that it may send forth pure streams to refresh society. Christianity also furnishes a model of the character she would form. Moreover, it reveals to us the perfections of Jehovah, the great object of worship and source of all good, and commands us to be “perfect as he is perfect.” Who then can doubt that the happiness of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government do essentially depend upon such a system of “piety, religion and morality.” These are principles in which all agree—the essential principles of piety, religion and morality. The constitution then asserts that these cannot be generally diffused, but by the institution of public worship and instruction. Mr. S. enforced this. It then follows as a necessary inference, that to promote these great objects, the people have a right to invest the Legislature with the power, &c. (as in the constitution). And why not this as a civil institution, as well as any other means for the same end? It provides a most beautiful and liberal system; making it the duty of towns and parishes to make this provision, but consistently with perfect religious freedom. No denomination is established. The election is given expressly to each society, and of course to the majority of each. There is no more hardship than in being obliged to contribute towards the support of a minister than any other teacher. You may have no children to send to school, or may dislike his opinions, or his mode of instruction, or may be willing to contribute to the same object in some other way—but the tax you must pay. The right of society in both cases rests on the same foundation—the right to tax for the common good; and the reason is the same, the common benefit received, as members of society. Objections have been made to the abstract right of government, and to the particular provisions of the constitution. It is strange how much sensitiveness there is on this subject. No one hesitates to confer on government the power of inflicting any punishment, even death itself, for any crime; but the moment you would attempt by the influence of religion to destroy sin in embryo, an alarm is excited! Mr. S. then answered the objections made against granting the Legislature any power on the subject of religion,—as, that “religion is under the protection of the Almighty, who will take care of his church”; that “his kingdom is not of this world.” His kingdom is not of this world in the highest sense, because our final reward will be in another; but in a most important sense it is, because it would make us good members of society—would prepare us for a better state by making us good in all the relations of life. We are told that the kingdoms of this world will become the kingdoms of our Lord. May not governments coöperate in this glorious design? (Mr. S. noticed other objections, which we have not room to insert.) We are told that the constitution grants exclusive favors to one denomination. Will gentlemen read the constitution? No language can be plainer. It is most explicitly declared that “every denomination shall be equally under the protection of the law.” It is elevated far above all partial considerations—it regards all in the equal favor as all agreeing in the same essential principles, and leading to the same great object, the Father of all. If one parish alone, in some places where there are several societies, have the right of taxing non-resident lands, &c. it is because they have been left in the possession of this right. When a part of a parish (referred to Lynn) became Methodists, they separated, and petitioned for an incorporation with certain powers, which were granted, have they any right to complain? And so of the other societies, and the little remnant is left with the obligation to support public worship, and would you deprive them of their ancient rights? Would you punish them for adhering to the religion of their fathers? There is nothing exclusive in this—it would be the same, should the majority of a parish be of any denomination. This principle is not confined to parishes; it is the same as to towns. When a part is separated, the remainder has all the rights of the town not expressly granted to the new corporation.
It is said also to be inoperative. It is indeed too inoperative, and ought to be made more effectual; but this objection does not well come from those who complain of it as exclusive and oppressive. Some little cases of individual hardship have been stated, and some law suits have grown out of it, in which however those who complain, claim always to have obtained a remedy. What general law is there, or what part of the constitution against which such objections may not be made? They prove nothing against a great principle. But it is said some do not go to meeting, and shall they pay for what they receive no benefit? They do receive a benefit in the greater security of everything dear to them. One objection was not to be expected—“that ministers were now too independent!” The great objection that meets us at every turn is that “religion will take care of itself.” Where has this experiment been tried? Not in Europe. I know not where except in Asia Minor; and where are now the “seven churches”? Those golden candlesticks have long since been removed. We are referred to the support of dissenters in England, and of the various denominations here, but does it appear that this support would have been given, except religion had been established in England, and provided for in our constitution? In this country the fearful experiment is still in process, whether religion will take care of itself, and as far as tried, it has not been successful. Mr. S. then referred to several states, where, except in large cities, very few settled clergymen of education are to be found. As to the unequal operation of this article in Boston, &c., by its own terms it does not operate on any place where voluntary provision is made. Its indirect influence does much everywhere. Mr. S. made objections to the report of the select committee, and showed in what manner he thought the resolution under consideration would produce the same effect as expunging the third article. Is it then expedient to abolish this provision? It is for the advocates of the change to prove this beyond all question. Show the evil it has produced. Point to the oppression it has caused. Whose rights of conscience have been violated? Go not back a century for cause of persecution—point them out under the constitution. If a few cases of individual hardship have happened in the course of forty years, cannot the same thing be said of every part of the constitution? And is it wonderful, under a system extending through the Commonwealth and operating on so many thousands? Mr. S. then argued that there had been no oppression, no general complaint—referred to the small vote for a Convention as proof that no great evil was pressing on the community. But from the clamor that has since been raised, one would suppose we had been groaning under an inquisition! It is strange how men are carried away by sounds. What excesses have been committed under the name of “liberty,” what excitement may be produced in a perfectly free country by the cry of “Priestcraft”—“Law-religion,” and “Toleration!” This subject is closely interwoven with our history. We ought not to make a constitution on abstract principles merely. What arrangement it is expedient to make here, is a very different question from what it might be in some other states, where a similar provision has never existed. The support of religion has always been a great care of our government. Massachusetts is a religious Commonwealth. But for the devotion of our fathers to religion, the spot where we are assembled, might still have been a wilderness. It was this that inspired them with courage to brave the dangers of the ocean, and land on these shores. Their first care was the support of public worship. How soon did they lay the foundation of our venerable University,2 and “Christo et Ecclesiae” was it dedicated! As the settlements extended, the little colonies of families always took with them a minister, as the pastor of the flock, and one of the first houses erected was always a place of worship. To provide religious instruction was always an important part of the municipal concerns of each town, and the same laws were made on the subject of schools and public worship. Through the whole period of our history, religion and education had gone hand in hand, and united in forming the character of the people. The temples of worship and instruction have been side by side. Our religious establishments are part of our system of education, schools of a higher order, to furnish instruction in “piety, religion and morality.” How great and good must have been the influence of such institutions. To gather together in the house of God, and there be reminded of their common relation to our Father and to each other; to listen to the sublime doctrines and moral precepts of Christianity—what a great though silent influence must it have had—“it falls like the gentle rain from heaven”—“it distills like the early dew.” Mr. S. then described the manner in which the State had been divided into parishes, each with its pastor, &c.; the salutatary effect produced on the character of the people, and the cause of learning and civil liberty. Mr. S. thought the adoption of the resolution would end in the destruction of very many religious societies, not immediately; the good influence of our institutions may prevent that. Our temples of worship will decay and fall around us. Those beautiful spires that now ornament our towns and villages will fall to the ground. The effect on the character of the clergy will be pernicious; the inducements to enter into the profession will be lessened, and there will be no permanency in contracts with ministers. The dissolution of so many religious corporations will be an act of great violence. We have heard much of the corporate rights of towns—we must not touch them, even if necessary to correct the greatest evil under the constitution, the numerous house of representatives—no, corporate rights and privileges are sacred things. And are not the rights of parishes quite as ancient and sacred and much more important? If any evils, correct them—but why destroy several hundred corporations? Allusions have been made to the errors of our ancestors. Time, which tends to the abuse of all human institutions, has improved ours. The bigotry and persecution are gone—nothing remains but the good influence. Never was there a denomination of Christians less sectarian, and proselyting, and persecuting, than the prevailing denomination in Massachusetts have been under this constitution. I say it with confidence. Some have strange fears of an establishment! But what is to be established? How is it to be brought about? Will the government undertake the work? Have the church accumulated treasures for this purpose? Have we a body of aspiring ecclesiastics aiming at this object? But how can an establishment be made under a constitution which declares that “no subordination of one sect to another shall ever be established by law,” except the broad establishment of Christianity. And this without interfering with the rights of conscience of any man. The question may now be, whether a great moral revolution shall take place in the Commonwealth. If this article is struck out, what a shock will it give to the moral sentiments and feelings of thousands,—the pious, the moral part of the community, who feel that we have no right to deprive them of what was designed for the good of posterity as well as our own. I stand as in the presence of our ancestors; they conjure us not to destroy what they planted with so much care, and under the influence of which we have so long flourished; but to transmit to posterity what is only a trust-estate in us. I stand as in the presence of posterity, calling upon us not rashly to abolish what was intended for their good—their entailed estate, their precious inheritance. Let us not in one hour destroy the venerable work of two centuries! Above all, on this day, the anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims—when two centuries have rolled away, and we by means of their principles and their institutions have grown up and become a great nation—let us not reject the great principles of our prosperity—let us not overthrow all that was dear to them. This will be a poor tribute to their memory, a poor expression of our gratitude. No—let us bring a better offering—let us cherish those principles and institutions, and transmit them to our children and to children’s children to the latest posterity. This will be the most durable monument to the memory—the best memorial of the character of our forefathers… .
