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5 The Suffrage *

The principal debate on the suffrage came on December 11 on a motion to reconsider the vote in committee of the whole to abolish all pecuniary qualification for the franchise. The issue is developed in the brief speeches of the Reverend Edmund Foster of Littleton and Warren Dutton, George Blake, Josiah Quincy, and James T. Austin—all of Boston. Some reformers assailed the existing suffrage requirement as “aristocratical,” but neither reformers nor conservatives put much stock in this objection and approached the question largely as one of expediency. Even Quincy, who was remembered as a Federalist champion in the Jeffersonian years and who was now embarking on a career in state politics, based his defense of the qualification on prospective rather than present dangers. The motion to reconsider passed on December 12 on the casting vote of the president. Blake, who had the responsibility of steering the revision of the third article through the convention, now backed away from the universal suffrage he had earlier advocated and proposed a taxpaying qualification. It was promptly approved and became one of the fourteen recommended amendments.

The resolution offered by Mr. Keyes, on Saturday, and referred to this committee, proposing to abolish all pecuniary qualification in electors of officers under this government, was taken up by the committee.

MR. NICHOLS of South Reading moved that the committee should rise. Negatived.

MR. PARKER of Charlestown moved to pass over the resolution, on account of the absence of the mover. Negatived.

The question was then taken on the resolution, and decided in the affirmative, 185 to 157.

MR. ALVORD of Greenfield moved a reconsideration of the last vote.

MR. FOSTER of Littleton said he was not present when the vote was taken, but he should have voted in the affirmative. He would not question the right to require such a qualification, but he had been for several years convinced that it was inexpedient and mischievous. Either a greater amount of property should be required, or none at all. Great difficulties were occasioned by this requisition at every election, and continual questions asked of this sort—what property have you? have you the tools of any trade? Yes. What else? A pair of steers my father gave me. And if this was not enough, then, he said, a note, which is never intended to be paid, makes up the balance. Men in this Commonwealth become freemen when they arrive at twenty-one years of age; and why oblige them to buy their freedom? They perform militia duty—they pay a tax for all they possess, that is, their polls. Nothing, he said, of so little consequence in itself, was so ardently desired, as an alteration in this part of the constitution. Men who have no property are put in the situation of the slaves of Virginia; they ought to be saved from the degrading feelings.

MR. BOND of Boston said the reverend gentleman was mistaken on one point. The resolution did not confine the right of voting to those who paid a poll tax; but paupers also were embraced by it.

MR. FOSTER said he did not mean to allow them the privilege of voting.

MR. DUTTON said he was in favor of reconsideration. He had voted against the resolution, which, it is now understood by those who supported it, ought to be modified so as to exclude paupers. Although the resolution as it passed, was without limitation, still he was willing to consider it, as modified in the manner suggested. It introduced a new principle into the constitution. It was universal suffrage. There were two ways of considering it. 1st. As a matter of right. 2d. As a matter of expediency. As to the right, he inquired why paupers were excluded at all, if it was a common right; and if it was not, then there was the same right in the community to exclude every man, who was not worth two hundred dollars, as there was to exclude paupers, or persons under twenty-one years. In truth there was no question of right; it was wholly a question of expediency. He thought it expedient to retain the qualification in the constitution. It was in the nature of a privilege, and as such, it was connected with many virtues, which conduced to the good order of society. It was a distinction to be sought for; it was the reward of good conduct. It encouraged industry, economy and prudence; it elevated the standard of all our civil institutions, and gave dignity and importance to those who chose, and those who were chosen. It acted as a stimulus to exertion to acquire what it was a distinction to possess. He maintained that in this country, where the means of subsistence were so abundant, and the demand for labor so great, every man of sound body could acquire the necessary qualification. If he failed to do this, it must be, ordinarily, because he was indolent or vicious. In many of the states a qualification of freehold was required. He thought that a wise provision; and if any alteration was to be made, he should be in favor of placing it there, rather than upon personal property. As it was, he thought it valuable as a moral means, as part of that moral force so essential to the support of any free government. He would not diminish that, for in the same proportion it should be, from any cause diminished, would the foundations of the republic be weakened. He also considered it as unreasonable, that a man who had no property should act indirectly upon the property of others. If gentlemen would look to the statute book, to the business of the Legislature, or to the courts of law, how much of all that was done, would be found to relate to the rights of property. It lay at the foundation of the social state, it was the spring of all action and all employment. It was therefore, he apprehended, wholly inequitable in its nature, that men without a dollar should, in any way, determine the rights of property, or have any concern in its appropriation. He also contended, that the principle of the resolution was anti-republican. It greatly increased the number of voters, and those of a character most liable to be improperly influenced or corrupted. It enlarged the field of action to every popular favorite, and enabled him to combine greater numbers. The time might come, when he would be able to command, as truly as ever a general commanded an army, sufficient numbers to affect or control the government itself. In that case, the form of a republican constitution might remain, but its life and spirit would have fled. The government would be essentially a democracy, and between that and a despotism there would be but one step. Such would be the tendency of the principle, and so far as it operated, it would change the structure of the constitution. The qualification which is required, was intended as a security for property. He considered it as a barrier, which ought not to be removed, and could not be, without danger to the State… .

… MR. BLAKE was in favor of reconsideration, because he thought the subject had not been fairly examined. He was not satisfied that the right of universal suffrage ought to be exercised, but many weighty reasons could be urged in favor of it, some of which he would state. He did not consider it as changing a fundamental principle of the constitution, if he did, he should oppose it. He said that the constitutions of most of the states in the Union required no pecuniary qualification; those of South Carolina and Virginia, which require a freehold, were exceptions, and he did not mean to speak of the states newly admitted. The example of other states, however, was not of much weight, as we ought to be an example to ourselves. Life was as dear to a poor man as to a rich man; so was liberty. Every subject therefore, involving only life or liberty, could be acted upon, with as good authority, by the poor as by the rich. As to property, the case was different. But our constitution involves all three, and the question is, how the power in relation to them shall be parcelled out. Our constitution has made the senate the guardian of property. The senate is the rich man’s citadel. There, and there alone, the rich man should look for his security. Every man who pays his tax—and he did not know why not paupers, as they were liable to military duty, ought to possess the privilege of voting. To deprive a man of this privilege till he acquires property, was an encroachment on the fundamental principles of our constitution. The constitutions of most of the other states give the right of voting to every man who pays his taxes; not mentioning anything about paupers. He said the requisition of property was in this town, for a long time, a dead letter, until the Legislature, a few years since, made some wise provisions concerning elections… .

… MR. QUINCY said, that the proposition before the committee had been considered by those in favor, as well as those against it, as one for universal suffrage; but that it was not such a proposition. Universal suffrage is suffrage without qualification. Suppose the proposition adopted—still you have not universal suffrage. The qualification of age, and of sex, remains. Women are excluded—minors are excluded. The real nature of the proposition is the exclusion of pecuniary qualification. This remark is material, because the only principle alleged in favor of the exclusion of pecuniary qualification is just as strong in favor of the exclusion of every other qualification. Other gentlemen had alleged reasons in favor of the proposition from considerations of inconvenience and of expediency. But the only gentleman who had alleged in its favor a principle, as the foundation of a right, was his colleague (Mr. Blake). His principle was this. “Life is precious. Liberty is precious. Both more precious than property. Every man, whose life and liberty is made liable to the laws, ought therefore to have a voice, in the choice of his legislators.” Grant this argument to be just. Is it not equally applicable to women and to minors? Are they not liable to the laws? Ought they not then to have a voice in the choice? The denial of this right to them shows, that the principle is not just. Society may make a part of its members obnoxious to laws, and yet deny them the right of suffrage, without any injustice.

Again—it has been said that pecuniary qualification was contrary to the spirit of our constitution. Those who took this ground had not favored the Convention with their definition of the spirit of our constitution, though it was very plain from the course of their arguments that what they understood by it, was a spirit of universal or unlimited liberty. Now, this is not the spirit of our constitution; which is a spirit of limited liberty; of reciprocal control. Reduced to the form of a definition, this is the meaning of the term, spirit of our constitution—The will of the people, expressed through an organization by balanced power. Every man, therefore, who would compare any given provision, with the spirit of our constitution, ought not to recur to principles of abstract liberty, but to principles of balanced liberty. With respect to those checks and balances, which according to the form of our constitution, constitute the character of Massachusetts liberty, those gentlemen take a very narrow view of the subject who deem that they exist only in the separation of the powers of government into the legislative, judicial and executive; or in the division of the legislative power among three branches. Every limitation of the exercise of any right or power, under the constitution, makes a part of that balance, which will be disturbed by its removal. The provision of a pecuniary qualification is of this nature. It is one of the checks in our constitution. How it operates, whom it affects, whom it benefits, are worthy of consideration. In the course of the argument in the Convention, it has been considered as a check, in favor of the rich, and against the poor. Now the fact is, that it is directly the reverse. If we should suppose the rich, acting as a class, this is the first provision, which they ought to expunge. And on the other hand, it is the last, with which the poor ought to consent to part. In its true character, this provision is in favor of the poor, and against the pauper;—that is to say, in favor of those who have something, but very little; against those who have nothing at all. Suppose all qualifications of property taken away, who gains by it? The poor man, who has just property enough to be qualified to vote? Or the rich, whose property is a great surplus? The rich man’s individual vote is, indeed, countervailed by it, as well as the poor man’s. But the great difference is this, that the poor man has thus lost his political all; he has no power of indemnifying himself. Whereas the rich, by the influence resulting from his property over the class of paupers, has a power of indemnifying himself a hundred fold. The theory of our constitution is, that extreme poverty—that is, pauperism—is inconsistent with independence. It therefore assumes a qualification of a very low amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence. Undoubtedly it excludes some, of a different character of mind. But this number is very few; and from the small amount of property required, is, in individual cases, soon compensated.

At the present day, the provision was probably worth very little. In the present results of our elections, it would not make one hair white or black. But prospectively, it was of great consequence. In this point of view he put it to the consideration of the landholders, and yeomanry of the country. The principle was peculiarly important to them. Everything indicates that the destinies of the country will eventuate in the establishment of a great manufacturing interest in the Commonwealth. There is nothing in the condition of our country, to prevent manufacturers from being absolutely dependent upon their employers, here as they are everywhere else. The whole body of every manufacturing establishment, therefore, are dead votes, counted by the head, by their employer. Let the gentlemen from the country consider, how it may affect their rights, liberties and properties, if in every county of the Commonwealth there should arise, as in time there probably will, one, two, or three manufacturing establishments, each sending, as the case may be, from one to eight hundred votes to the polls depending on the will of one employer, one great capitalist. In such a case would they deem such a provision as this of no consequence? At present it is of little importance. Prospectively of very great. As to the inconvenience resulting from the present provision, this was amply balanced by its effect as a moral means, and as an incentive to industry… .

… MR. AUSTIN of Boston said that gentlemen, who were unwilling to change the principles of the constitution, instead of striking out this qualification ought to increase the sum, on account of the change in the value of money; he thought, however, that it would be impossible for them to effect this, and experience had shown the impolicy of requiring the present qualification. He would not contend against the right of requiring it, though there were strong arguments on that side, but he considered it inexpedient. The provision could not be carried into effect; it was the cause of perjury and immorality—it did not prevent a fraudulent man from voting, who owed more than he was worth, but debarred an honest poor man who paid his debts—and it tended to throw suspicion of unfairness on the municipal authority. He asked, what will you do with your laboring men? They have no freehold—no property to the amount of two hundred dollars, but they support their families reputably with their daily earnings. What will you do with your sailors? Men who labor hard, and scatter with inconsiderateness the product of their toil, and who depend on the earnings of the next voyage. What will you do with your young men, who have spent all their money in acquiring an education? Must they buy their right to vote? Must they depend on their friends or parents to purchase it for them? Must they wait till they have turned their intelligence into stock? Shall all these classes of citizens be deprived of the rights of freemen for want of property? Regard for country, he said, did not depend upon property, but upon institutions, laws, habits and associations. This qualification was said to encourage industry;—it was better to depend on the principle of character and independence which a man feels in exercising the privilege of a freeman. If taking away this qualification would weaken the moral force in the community, as had been urged, he should be for retaining it; but that force depends on education, and the diffusion of intelligence. One gentleman (Mr. Quincy) had looked forward to our becoming a great manufacturing people. God forbid. If it should happen, however, it was not to be expected, that this modicum of property required would exclude the laborers in manufactories from voting. It was better to let them vote—they would otherwise become the Lazaroni of the country. By refusing this right to them, you array them against the laws; but give them the rights of citizens—mix them with the good part of society, and you disarm them… .

Democracy, Liberty, and Property

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