Читать книгу A Companion to Greek Warfare - Группа авторов - Страница 31

The Persian Empire’s founder Cyrus II (c. 559–530) established Persian control over the Greek cities in Ionian Asia Minor in the 540s when he conquered the Lydian Empire.² Under Cyrus’ family, the Teispids, no conflict with mainland Greece is attested. The so-called Persian Wars, a series of military campaigns against alliances of certain Greek poleis, were fought in the early fifth century under the Teispids’ successors, the Achaemenids: the Ionian Revolt, the campaign of Datis and Artaphernes (leading up to Marathon), and Xerxes’ invasion and its aftermath. Xerxes’ war played a special role in distorted, Western concepts, and triggered everlasting, biased images of an impious tyrant flooding Greece with soldiers but unable to defeat the brave, free-spirited Greeks who were inferior in numbers but superior in manly courage.³ In Greek literary sources, these campaigns were mostly called the Median War (Medikos polemos) or ta Medika (Hdt. 9.64). Consequently, Greeks siding with the Persians were accused of Medismos or medizein with its complex meaning and “specially derogatory and odious connotation.”⁴ In truth, the Achaemenids did not aim at subjugating the whole of Greece, and not all of the Greek poleis fought against the Persians.

The roots of Darius’ and Xerxes’ campaigns can be traced back to the end of the sixth century. While according to Greek—particularly Athenian—interpretation, the Persian kings were aggressors who planned to enslave all Greece and—in later reception—even the world, in fact Athens’ policy was the central factor leading to the wars.⁵ In 507/506, in order to receive support against Sparta and her allies, Athenian ambassadors accepted the offer by Darius I’s brother Artaphernes, the satrap in Sardis, to give earth and water to the king in exchange for Persian help. By accepting this compact, Athens became a part of the Achaemenid Empire. Engaging in window dressing, the Athenians blamed the ambassadors for this mishap. However, they could not have acted on their own account without any instructions or permission, even in this early stage of (proto-) democracy. It is also incredible that they were unaware of the consequences of their agreement. Probably, quickly shifting alliances and factional strife in Athens caused indignation about the arrangement.⁶ Perceiving Athens as a member of his empire, Darius acted in accordance with his royal prerogatives when he ordered Artaphernes to make the Athenians restore their expelled tyrant Hippias, who had taken refuge at his court (Hdt. 5.96). Athens was unwilling to obey. In order to be publicly rid of their inconvenient status as dependent members of the Achaemenid Empire, the Athenians made an ostentatious political statement in the context of the Ionian Revolt (500/499–494) against the Persian dominion.

In accordance with the general outline in Herodotus’ report, this uprising is predominantly seen as a consequence of the ambitions of individual Ionian tyrants, namely Histiaeus and Aristagoras of Miletos probably pushed by a widespread discontent with tyrants.⁷ The older hypothesis that an (alleged) economic depression led to the revolt is contradicted by archeological evidence. In 494, the uprising in which Cyprus and Caria also became involved was finally crushed at the sea battle of Lade (Hdt. 6.13–14). Miletos, the leading Ionian city, was captured (Hdt. 6.18). When in 492 a peace settlement was imposed on Ionia, Mardonius, Darius’ most important general and an Achaemenid himself, reportedly established forms of “democracy” in the cities (Hdt. 6.43).

Subsequently, Mardonius restored Persian control over Thrace and Macedon weakened during the revolt (Hdt. 7.108.1). Both regions had become Darius’ subjects in the course of his campaign against the “European Scythians” (514/513). Amyntas I of Macedon had given earth and water to Darius’ ambassadors and become the Persian king’s hyparchos (Hdt. 5.18.1, 20.4), in this case meaning a client ruler, not a satrap. Amyntas will have recognized the chance to elevate his and his family’s status by connecting with a worldwide empire. Presumably, Macedon’s short-lived secession from Persia about 496 was initiated not by the Argeads but by influential Macedonian nobles disliking the upgrade of their primus inter pares ruler, and also by Thrace.⁸

Athens came to the aid of the rebellious Ionians by sending 20 ships (Hdt. 5.97.3). Coming as it did before Themistocles’ naval program, and in view of the permanent Aiginetan threat, this was no small gesture.⁹ Euboean Eretria, an old ally of Miletos (Hdt. 5.99), joined Athens by sending five ships. Both parties were involved in the Ionian capture and raid of Sardis (498) during which the local temple of the goddess Cybele (Hdt. 5.102.1) went up in flames. After being defeated, both parties withdrew from the war, but the dispatching of 20 ships made the Athenians rebels in the eyes of the Great King, hence representatives of drauga, the evil lie according to the ideology circulated by Darius (DB §§ 10, 52, 63; cf. DPd § 3). This openly hostile act, in Athens’ case even a rebellious insubordination, publicly challenged Darius’ authority and called for immediate punitive reaction in order to avoid further insubordination by imitators.¹⁰ As Herodotus states, “these ships started the troubles for both the Greeks and the barbarians” (5.97.3). Allegedly, Darius swore vengeance against Athens, ordering one of his servants to remind him of Athens three times every day (5.105.1–2). In 490, as a response to the poleis’ intervention in the Ionian Revolt, a Persian sea force under the command of Datis and Artaphernes was sent to Greece. Eretria’s punishment was accomplished: the city was sacked, the inhabitants enslaved, a payback for Sardis’ fate (Hdt. 6.101.1–3). However, when the Persians sailed to Attica to punish Athens, the Athenians under Miltiades, aided by Plataea, won the battle at Marathon, and hence remained unpunished (Hdt. 6.102–117.1). In Athens, Marathon became one of the important lieux de mémoire, proof of the city’s glorious past and military superiority, especially because of Sparta’s failure to come to their aid, something that enhanced Athens’ glory.¹¹

After Darius’ death in 486, his son and successor Xerxes became enmeshed in the unsettled Athenian affair that challenged the Great King’s authority. First, he and his advisors aimed at a diplomatic solution. During 483–480, they tried to prevent Athens from going to war while isolating her in Greece by courting other non-involved parties (Hdt. 7.32, 132–133.1). Herodotus reports that they won over Thessaly (at this time dominated by the Aleuads from Larisa), Dolope, Enia, Perrhaebia, Locris, Magnesia, Melos, Phthia, Thebes and the rest of Boeotia except for Thespiae and Plataea (7.132). However, Athens rejected all Persian offers to come to terms with Xerxes. Her response was clear: building up her fleet (Plut. Them. 3.5–4.6). Financed by the silver mines of Laurium, somewhere between 100 (Hdt. 7.144) and 200 triremes ([Aristot.] Ath. Pol. 22.7) were constructed. Athens’ massive reinforcement triggered an arms race, forcing the Persian side to consider an invasion by both land and sea and on a much wider scale than planned.¹² For good reason, Persian leading circles tried to avoid such a huge logistical task. Ironically, the timber for the Athenian ships and oars probably came from Macedonia. In turn, Athenian payment helped Alexander I, the Argead owner of the timber business and Xerxes’ loyal ally, finance his support of the Persian campaign.¹³

Even during the invasion, Xerxes and his general Mardonius strove for a de-escalation, sending Alexander I as an ambassador to the Athenians to persuade them to cancel their war plans (Hdt. 7.143.3; 8.136.1–2; 8.140–142). The Athenians chose to persist, as did the other Greeks who had joined them in a “Hellenic League.” The inscription of the serpent column dedicated to Delphic Apollon after the victory of Plataea lists 31 League members.¹⁴

When in 480 Xerxes’ land forces had crossed Macedonia, Alexander I managed to clear a path for the Persian troops through the Vale of Tempe into Thessaly by diplomatic means, but Leonidas of Sparta and his army made a stand at the Thermopylae and thus delayed the Persian advance, presumably a decisive factor with regard to logistics: for, toward the end, the Persians ran short of supplies.¹⁵ Athens was evacuated before being captured and sacked by the Persians. Later on, the Athenian memory of the Persian conflagration of the Acropolis and temple of Athena (in revenge for the destruction at Sardis) was kept alive as an everlasting reminder of the courageous Athenian stand in the Persian Wars. Pausanias (1.27.6) attests that even in the second century CE Athens’ damaged and blackened statues of Athena were on public display, allegedly the very artifacts burned by Xerxes’ Persians and left as memorials by the Greek warriors. The story that Xerxes stole the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, one first attested by the Alexander historians, is likely to be a propagandistic invention. These historians wished to credit their hero with the return of the statues.¹⁶

The Persian fleet was defeated off Salamis in 480, in a battle the Athenians claimed as their own victory.¹⁷ Xerxes left Greece, entrusting affairs to Mardonius. In 479, the Persians lost the battles both at Mycale in Asia Minor and Plataea in Boeotia where Mardonius was killed in action (Hdt 9.46.1–63.2; 9.101.3–102.3). Sparta contributed the lion’s share to this victory. Hence, in Athenian cultural memory, Plataea played a minor role, particularly in comparison to Salamis (cf. Thuc. 1.73.4–74.3).

For the Persian side, the campaign was an annoying waste of lives, time, finances, and resources—surely a blow to Xerxes’ image but neither so serious nor the devastating setback the Greek sources make it out to be. Firmly establishing Achaemenid control over the rich satrapy of Egypt was much more important than the trouble in peripheral Greece.¹⁸ Indubitably, the Persian Wars meant much more to the invaded Greeks, and particularly the Athenians, than to the invading Persians.

The Persians withdrew from northern Greece, attacked by the Thracians and spared by the Macedonians (Hdt. 9.89.4). They left a power vacuum. Thracian ethnoi, Argead Macedonia and Athens tried to annex as much territory as possible, apparently based on mutual arrangements.¹⁹ The Athenians under Cimon cleared the territory by eliminating the last Persian strongholds at the Thracian coast (such as Eion) and Chersonese.²⁰ In the Aegean, they gained control of most islands and the Hellespont. In the (early?) 460s, at Eurymedon in Pamphylia, under Cimon, they damaged the Persian fleet severely by destroying the important Phoenician force (Thuc. 1.100.1). Persia lost control of the Ionian coast. Athens followed them in the leadership over the Greeks of Asia Minor. As the Ionian Revolt had made clear, dominion over the Ionian cities depended on the naval supremacy in the coastal areas of Asia Minor.²¹

While the Persians showed no ambition to return to Greece with fresh troops, there was common fear in Greece that they would. As a reaction, and as a way to glorify their own role in the Persian Wars, the Athenians convinced other Greek to join their first naval confederacy, the Delian League, founded in 478/477 (Thuc. 1.96.1–2). They proclaimed they were the only power capable of securing their League’s members from future Persian attacks (Hdt. 7.139–140). By developing their hegemonic methods, Athens seems to have learned from the enemy.²²

The Persians failed to return, and meanwhile the Delian League alienated its members by its rigid hegemonic politics and a strict no-exit clause. The Athenians were deemed oppressive. The consequence was a widespread wish among their symmachoi to be set free. In the Peloponnesian War, Athens’ opponent Sparta exploited this discontent.

It is a matter of debate whether in the early 440s, after Cimon’s campaign against Cyprus (451), the Peace of Callias (named after the Athenian ambassador) was settled between Athens and Artaxerxes I (465–424/423). Reportedly, it restricted the areas of naval action: Whereas the Persian fleet was excluded from the zone between the Bosporus and Lycia, the confederate Greek fleet renounced action in the Levant and in Egypt.²³ In view of the lack of explicit contemporary evidence, some scholars suggest that the Peace was invented in the fourth century to highlight Athens’ past glory. If the Peace existed at all, perhaps it was not a formal treaty but an informal arrangement.²⁴