Читать книгу Bioethics - Группа авторов - Страница 103

One quite familiar suggestion is that one might benefit mankind by cloning individuals who have made extremely significant contributions to society. In the form that it is usually put, where it is assumed that if, for example, one had been able to clone Albert Einstein, the result would be an individual who would also make some very significant contributions to science, the idea does not seem especially plausible. In the first place, whether an individual will turn out to do highly creative work, rather than being determined simply by his or her genetic makeup, surely depends upon traits whose acquisition is a matter either of the environment in which the individual grows up, or, alternatively, in view of Pinker’s point, of the prenatal wiring of that person’s brain.

Could it not be argued in response, however – at least if one sets aside the second of those possibilities – that one could control the environment as well, raising a clone of Einstein, for example, in an environment as similar as possible to that in which Einstein was raised? That, of course, might prove difficult. Even if it could be done, however, it is not clear that would be sufficient, since great creative achievements may depend upon things that are to some extent accidental, and whose occurrence is not ensured by the combination of one’s genetic makeup, the prenatal wiring of one’s brain, and the general kind of environment in which one grows up. Many great mathematicians, for example, have developed an intense interest in numbers at an early age, and even if one leaves aside the prenatal brain‐wiring view, is there good reason to think that, had one been able to clone Carl Friedrich Gauss, and reared that person in an environment similar to Gauss's, that person would have developed a similar interest in numbers, and gone on to achieve great things in mathematics? Or is it likely that a clone of Einstein, raised in an environment similar to Einstein’s, would have wondered, as Einstein did, how the world would appear if one could travel as fast as light, and would then have pondered the questions that fascinated Einstein, and that led ultimately to the development of revolutionary theories in physics?

I am inclined to think, then, that there are problems with the present suggestion in the form in which it is usually put. On the other hand, I'm not convinced that a slightly more modest version cannot be sustained. Consider, for example, the chess‐playing Polgár sisters, where the father of three girls succeeded in creating an environment in which all three of his daughters became very strong chess players, with one of them – Judit Polgár – becoming the strongest female chess player who has ever lived. Is it not reasonable to think that if one were to make a number of clones of Judit Polgár, and then raised them in an environment very similar to that in which the Polgár sisters were raised, the result would be a number of very strong chess players?

More generally, there is strong evidence of a very significant hereditary basis for intelligence, as Bouchard (1997, 55–6) and many others have argued, and it may well be that the right combination of heredity and environment plays a significant role in the development of other traits that may play a crucial role in creativity – traits such as extreme persistence, determination, and confidence in one's own abilities. So while the chance that the clone of an outstandingly creative individual will also achieve very great things is perhaps, at least in many areas, not especially high, I think that there is reason for thinking that, given an appropriate environment, the result in a number of areas may well turn out to be an individual who is likely to accomplish things that may benefit society in significant ways.