Читать книгу Bioethics - Группа авторов - Страница 87

This objection is closely related to the two preceding, violation‐of‐rights objections, as the idea is that, even if cloning does not violate a person's right to be a unique individual, or to have a unique genetic makeup, or to have an open and unconstrained future, nevertheless, people who are clones may feel that their uniqueness is compromised, or that their future is constrained, and this may cause substantial psychological harm.

There is, however, a good reason for viewing this objection as unsound. It emerges once one reflects upon the beliefs in question – namely, the belief that one's uniqueness is compromised by the existence of a clone, or the belief that one's future is constrained if one has knowledge of the existence of a clone. Both beliefs are, as we have seen, false. In addition, however, it also seems plausible that those beliefs would be, in general, irrational, since it is hard to see what grounds one could have for accepting either belief, other than something like genetic determinism – against which, as we have seen, there is conclusive evidence. If, however, the psychological distress would necessarily be due to irrational beliefs, the solution is readily at hand: if cloning that produces persons were allowed, society would need to act to ensure that cloned individuals did not acquire an irrational belief in genetic determinism, thereby preventing the distress that might otherwise arise from a false and irrational belief.

Notice, too, what would happen if cloning became a familiar occurrence, and suppose that society had somehow failed to ensure that John, who is a clone, did not acquire the false beliefs in question, and that John has come to feel that he is no longer a unique individual, or that his future is constrained. If Mary is also a clone, she may point out to John that she is different from the person with whom she is genetically identical, and that she has not been constrained by the way the other person lived her life. Would John still persist in his irrational belief? That does not seem likely. Accordingly, distress that might arise in such a case seems unlikely to persist for any significant length of time.