Читать книгу Bioethics - Группа авторов - Страница 73

I shall sometimes use the expression “neo‐Lockean person,” and this for three reasons. First of all, as just mentioned, disagreements exist concerning the correct interpretations of the passages where Locke introduces his idea of a person, and no stand need be taken on that issue. Secondly one might want to include in one's concept of a person elements that Locke does not mention, such as desires concerning one’s mental states at other times. Thirdly, the term “person” is sometimes used, especially by those who believe that abortion is seriously wrong, in two other, very different ways: sometimes as a purely evaluative term, meaning simply “entity with a right to life,” and sometimes as a purely biological expression, meaning “member of the biologically defined species homo sapiens.” Such uses of the term “person” contain no reference at all to consciousness, or to the capacity for thought, or to any mental states whatsoever. The expression “neo‐Lockean person” functions, then, to rule out such interpretations.

Constant use of that expression, however, would become a bit tiresome, so I shall often simply use the term “person,” with the understanding that it is always an abbreviation of “neo‐Lockean person.”

What, then, do I mean by “person”/ “neo‐Lockean person”? The answer is that a neo‐Lockean person is an entity that has, at least at one time, a memory involving a conscious thought about an earlier state of consciousness. Something that has never enjoyed a single state of consciousness is thus not a neo‐Lockean person. Similarly, something that has never had a conscious thought cannot be a neo‐Lockean person. Finally, something that has never had a memory thought about an earlier state of consciousness cannot be a neo‐Lockean person.

A neo‐Lockean person exists, then, when the consciousness condition, the conscious thought condition, and the memory thought conditions are all satisfied.