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1 1 Feinberg, “Abortion,” in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, Tom Regan, ed. (New York: Random House, 1986), pp. 256–93; Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, II, 1 (1972): 37–65 [see chapter 1 in this volume], Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide (New York: Oxford, 1984); Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” The Monist, 1. VII, 1 (1973): 43–61; Engelhardt, “The Ontology of Abortion,” Ethics, I. XXXIV, 3 (1974): 217–34; Sumner, Abortion and Moral Theory (Princeton: University Press, 1981); Noonan, “An Almost Absolute Value in History,” in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, Noonan, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard, 1970); and Devine, The Ethics of Homicide (Ithaca: Cornell, 1978).

2 2 For interesting discussions of this issue, see Warren Quinn, “Abortion: Identity and Loss,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, XIII, 1 (1984): 24–54; and Lawrence C. Becker, “Human Being: The Boundaries of the Concept,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, IV, 4 (1975): 334–59.

3 3 For example, see my “Ethics and the Elderly: Some Problems,” in Stuart Spicker, Kathleen Woodward, and David Van Tassel, eds., Aging and the Elderly: Humanistic Perspectives in Gerontology (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1978), pp. 341–55.

4 4 See Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion,” and Tooley, “Abortion and Infanticide.”

5 5 This seems to be the fatal flaw in Warren’s treatment of this issue.

6 6 I have been most influenced on this matter by Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives (New York: Penguin, 1977), ch. 3; and Robert Young, “What Is So Wrong with Killing People?” Philosophy, LIV, 210 (1979): 515–28.

7 7 Feinberg, Tooley, Warren, and Engelhardt have all dealt with this problem.

8 8 Kant, “Duties to Animals and Spirits,” in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infeld (New York: Harper, 1963), p. 239.

9 9 I am indebted to Jack Bricke for raising this objection.

10 10 Presumably a preference utilitarian would press such an objection. Tooley once suggested that his account has such a theoretical underpinning. See his “Abortion and Infanticide,” pp. 44–5.

11 11 Donald VanDeVeer seems to think this is self‐evident. See his “Whither Baby Doe?” in Matters of Life and Death, p. 233.

12 12 “Must the Bearer of a Right Have the Concept of That to Which He Has a Right?” Ethics, XCV, 1 (1984): 68–74.

13 13 See Tooley again in “Abortion and Infanticide,” pp. 47–9.

14 14 “Present Sakes and Future Prospects: The Status of Early Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, XI, 4 (1982): 322–6.

15 15 Note carefully the reasons he gives on the bottom of p. 316.