Читать книгу Where in the World is the Berlin Wall? - Группа авторов - Страница 12

According to statements by Jan Šejna, the Czechoslovakian deputy defence minister who defected to the West in 1968, Walter Ulbricht, the chairman of the GDR’s Council of State and head of the SED party, had already put forward the idea of building a barbed wire barrier through Berlin at a Warsaw Pact meeting on March 28^thand 29^th, 1961.¹⁹ Against this background, Ulbricht’s statement at the press conference on June 15^th, 1961, that no one had any intention of building a Wall becomes understandable; the events of August 13^th were to finally expose it as a lie. The fact that large quantities of construction materials such as fence posts and barbed wire were already being stored in Berlin in order to implement such barrier measures also points to longer-term planning. The decision to close the border was finally made in July and early August 1961.²⁰

After the Vienna summit and the dramatic supply crisis in the GDR, which in turn lead to increasing levels of people fleeing the GDR, Ulbricht decided upon a propaganda offensive. In it he demanded the solution of the Berlin question and the conclusion of a peace treaty. At the same time, Ulbricht urged the Soviets to close the borders immediately. Khrushchev made his decision (probabely on 20^th July), and insights into the intelligence agencies regarding the military strength of the western powers, American politics and planned defensive measures.²¹ The Warsaw Pact states would also be involved in the decision. From August 3^rd to 5^th, 1961, a conference of their party leaders was held in Moscow to discuss the problems associated with the proposal of a peace treaty and that of the open border with West Berlin. Walter Ulbricht was criticised by his counterparts for slow economic growth and high consumer spending in the GDR. Ulbricht underlined his own position that the border to West Berlin was to be held responsible and demanded it to be closed with immediate effect. However, the Warsaw Pact states feared incalculable economic sanctions in the event of a border closure, which would not only affect the GDR.

There were only two possible solutions to the problem: complete control over all access points to the West, including air corridors, or to build a wall. Since complete control of the airways was not feasible, Ulbricht’s insistence on the immediate closure of the border and the position on the problem of the open border, which had meanwhile been adopted by Khrushchev, led to corresponding support for the planned measures.²²

A central argument for the decision was the volatile economical situation in the GDR and the increasing numbers of people leaving for the West. When Ulbricht returned from Moscow, the SED politburo began putting the plans, which had been discussed in Moscow, into action. (Which, in agreement with the Soviet side, were technically already being prepared). On August 10^th and 11^th, the People’s Chamber, the Council of Ministers and the East Berlin Magistrate adopted resolutions on border closure, the wording of which provided by the Sed. Only comrades in the highest political ranks were let in on the plans in order to keep them secret for as long as possible. At the same time, logistical preparations were being made and all the stops were pulled out on the propaganda front to prepare citizens for the radical measures.

It was via this propaganda offensive that Ulbricht invoked fears of military action from the West from which the GDR needed to protect itself. But for the GDR government, this was not actually about protecting GDR citizens, it was about preventing them free access to West Berlin. The aim was to stabilise the GDR.

The action was led by Secretary of the SED, Erich Honecker. He coordinated the complex task of closing the border. An operational group was formed at the Department for National Security to carry out the planned action. Whilst Soviet troops in the GDR and adjacent Eastern Bloc countries had been reinforced between May and July 1961 by several hundred thousands²³, cordoning off the border was to be conducted by the GDR border police, riot police and the company brigades. Entities of the National People’s Army had to be on emergency standby to stop potential attacks from the West. A third security squadron was formed by the Soviet troops at the “ring around Berlin”. The Ministry for State Security (MfS) was responsible for the internal political protection of the Wall’s construction.²⁴ The GDR Ministry of State Security was in charge of securing the building of the Wall domestically. The mission operated under the names “Mission Rose” and “Mission Ring” and took place right across GDR territory.²⁵ The records of intensive supervision of the GDR’s population were to be passed on to the Ministry hourly for the first two days. All mail in cross-border traffic was subjected to control, and telephone traffic to West Germany was completely interrupted. A state of all-encompassing supervision was to be established.