Читать книгу Theories in Social Psychology - Группа авторов - Страница 27

Philip Cowan, in his preface to Piaget’s Intelligence and Affectivity (1981, p. xi), wrote:

Affect is likened to the gasoline that activates the car, while the engine (cognition) provides structure for the energy and direction of the car’s motion. Affect as “energetics” can combine with cognitive structural schemes to focus the individual’s interest on a specific thing or idea.

Because it influences an individual choice of whether to exert intellectual effort, affect serves as a regulator of action. Because it influences the choice of specific goals, affect also plays a role in determining values (internal interest projected outward so that things and people appear to have a certain worth). By regulating action and determining values, affect influences our tendency to approach or avoid situations.

An understanding of human affect (i.e., emotions and moods) in influencing the magnitude of psychological reactance is crucial to the development of reactance theory, which has comfortably maintained itself as a purely cognitive theory over the last fifty years. Emotions are intense with a relatively short duration, and the cause of the emotion, normally, can be identified. Unlike emotions, moods are lower in intensity and are more enduring. Emotions may influence moods and affect states (George & Jones, 1997; Papousek et al., 2008). Even though reactance theory can be classified within an appraisal theory of emotions, the literature has consistently focused on a cognitive model in the application of the theory. The degree of psychological reactance is moderated by the particular affect state aroused as a result of the cognitive evaluation of a particular threat to freedom. The degree of reactance, therefore, is a function of affect arousal, which, in turn, is influenced by the specific emotion or affect state provoked.

Reactance is unpleasant, and therefore will provoke negative emotions (i.e., primary and secondary) such as frustration, shame, fear, anger, sadness, guilt, contempt, and disgust (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987). Some important contributions to the understanding of affect states and emotions and the implications in reactance reduction provide a strong rationale for an Affect Arousal Reactance Theory (AART).

An emotion energizes and prepares the individual to respond and has at least four different aspects – feelings, actions, physiological arousal, and motivational programs (Frijda, 1993; Rosenzweig et al., 2005). As Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2009) recognize (also see Lazarus, 1991; Rosenberg, 1998), an emotion involves cognitive appraisal, subjective experience, thought-action tendencies, internal bodily changes, and facial expression. Plutchik (1994) identifies eight basic emotions. These emotions are arranged in pairs of opposites: joy/sadness, affection/disgust, anger/fear, and expectation/surprise. However, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) argued earlier that comparing emotions in such pairs is somewhat problematic since, for example, joy is a positive emotion and sadness a negative one, but both anger and fear are negative emotions – these pairs do not exist in comparable continuums from positive to negative but are typologies. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) utilized six dimensions in the description of 15 emotions (primary and secondary emotions). These dimensions are: desirability of the situation (pleasant or unpleasant); anticipated effort in the situation (low effort or high effort); situational certainty (certain or uncertain); attentional activity to the situation (low attention to high attention); degree of control over the situation (self or others); and control attributed to the situation (situational control and human control).

Therefore, emotions (e.g., anger and frustration) would vary depending on the dimensions that are involved in determining the particular emotion.

A major conclusion drawn from their study was (p. 831):

Our results show that people’s emotions are intimately related to their cognitive appraisals of their circumstances. The subjects rated past emotional experiences along six appraisal dimensions, and different patterns of appraisals were strongly associated with different emotions.

Zajonc (1980) puts another light on the expression of emotions. He argues that there are emotions that are grounded on cognitive appraisal (postcognitive emotions) and emotions that emerge before cognitions (precognitive emotions).

On postcognitive emotions Zajonc (1980, p. 151) writes:

An affective reaction, such as liking, disliking, preference, evaluation, or the experience of pleasure or displeasure, is based on a prior cognitive process in which a variety of content discriminations are made and features are identified, examined for their value, and weighted for their contributions. Once this analytical task has been completed, a computation of the components can generate an overall affective judgement.

Bargh and Apsley (2001), writing on Zajonc’s argument against this temporal order of cognition and emotion, state:

He (Zajonc) asserted that the notion that people go through life in a rational manner, objectively weighing the pros and cons of various alternatives prior to taking a position as suggested by extant information-processing models, might be little more than wishful thinking. Instead, he argued that the affective qualities of stimuli such as good/bad, like/dislike, or approach/ avoid might be processed extremely quickly and efficiently and, consequently, could be among the very first reactions of an organism to its environment. Within an affective primary framework, individuals gather information about various alternatives, not to make more information choices, but to corroborate their initial preferences and desire.

The intensity of emotions differs. The sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system is crucial in creating the necessary physiological arousal associated with negative emotions involving brain activity in both the hypothalamus and the amygdala. The debate on autonomic arousal of emotions has consistently appeared in the literature, from the James-Lange theory to Canon-Bard’s critique, and from advocacy on similarities of autonomic response to empirical testing of physiological arousal of different emotions (Funkenstein, 1955). However, this debate was systematically addressed by Levenson et al. (1990), who found distinctive autonomic response among emotions. Their study also shows that the highest emotional intensity was displayed for anger, followed by fear and sadness – negative emotions associated with reactance.

Research by Keltner et al. (1993) is supportive of the view that affects influence the way we make judgments and attributions of future events and responsibility. Siemer’s (2001) study supports the dispositional mood model’s view that our moods influence our generalized appraisal inclinations. Findings by Lerner and Keltner (2001) have also shown that our cognitive evaluation of risk is influenced by the specific affect state. Fear states were more likely to incite pessimistic risk evaluation than anger, which was more likely to create optimistic risk assessment. These effects were moderated by certainty and control (see also Johnson & Tversky, 1983).

The importance of appraisal to emotions (i.e., primary, secondary) was articulated by Lazarus (1982) and later elaborated by Smith and Lazarus (1993), who categorized six appraisal components related to primary and secondary appraisals. These categories falling within the primary and secondary appraisals include motivational congruency (evaluation of goals); motivational relevance (commitment); accountability (assignment of responsibility of blame and praise); problem-coping potentiality (resolvability); emotional-focused potentiality (emotional management of situation); and future expectancy (changeability of situation). The emotions aroused would be determined by the set of components that are present. Smith and Kirby (2001), in elaborating on Smith and Lazarus (1993) theory, note that the appraisal processes take place correspondingly and involve an automatic associative process, a conscious reasoning of events, and a continuous appraisal- detector process that assess the information that comes from the associative and reasoning processes. The emotion experienced is a result of these dynamics.

Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) posit that anger emerges as blame and is assigned as a negative event to a causal agent external to the individual. Unlike other negative emotions, anger is associated not with an avoidance tendency but with an approach motivation inclination. Berkowitz’s (1990, 1993, 1999, 2003) cognitive–neoassociationistic (CNA) model of anger emergence postulates that both avoidance and approach tendencies can be generated by an aversive situation and not just one or the other. Extending this argument to reactance theory, a removal of a freedom can create both fear (flight) and anger (fight), depending on the circumstances. One emotion may overpower the other determining the intensity of arousal and degree of psychological reactance.

Harmon-Jones and Allen (1998) found that anger was associated with more left anterior cortical activity than right. This brain activity was explained more by approach motivation associated with dispositional anger. Generally, negative emotions and avoidance motivation are associated with the right anterior cortical area of the brain, while positive emotions and approach motivation are associated with the left anterior cortical area (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). The authors suggest that dispositional anger is associated with approach motivation and less with withdrawal or avoidance motivation. Later, Harmon-Jones and Sigelman (2001) research findings confirmed that state-induced anger was also associated with left prefrontal cortical activity. Further, left frontal activity created by anger does not restrain amygdala action but is “co-varying with it” (Harmon-Jones, 2004). The relationship between left frontal cortical activity and resolution of inconsistency via approach motivation is also supported by Harmon-Jones (2004). Also see Harmon-Jones et al. (2013) for distinction between approach and avoidance motivation.

Steindl et al. (2015) also argue for a research focus on reactance and other negative (and positive) affect rather than mainly on the current emphasis of anger. They note that Chadee (2011) advocated that approach motivation was an important prerequisite for the occurrence of psychological reactance. Consistent with Chadee (2011) theorization and testing the approach motivation hypothesis, Mühlberger et al. (2020) with the use of electroencephalography (EEG) found an association between reactance and increase activity in the left frontal alpha asymmetry, an area of the brain associated with approach motivation. This relationship was found for personal experience of freedom threats and not indirect experiences of observing the freedom of others threatened. Reactance evokes particular kinds of emotion, and the emotions evoked will determine whether there is left or right frontal brain activity. This fact has implications for the reduction of reactance, especially in volatile and high-risk situations.

Mention of physiological arousal and emotions are scattered across the many works indirectly related to reactance theory. A few reactance studies have used the emotion/affect dimension to assist in explanations of behavior. For example, earlier research had indicated that reactance was associated with somatic tension and increased activation of the sympathetic nervous system, as reflected in increases in both epinephrine and norepinephrine (Price et al., 1985). Brehm and Wortman (1975) model implies emotional intensity as a factor that increases striving to overcome failure and decreases in motivation as a function of being unable to control and determine outcome. However, the concept of affect intensity was never integrated or elaborated in the theory.

The literature is practically void of systematic research on reactance and emotions. Neither is there an integration of findings on affect into the theory or any kind of theory modification. Brehm (2004) notes, with respect to cognitive dissonance, that more consideration is needed of the role of affect state, to which little emphasis has been given. Miron and Brehm (2006, p. 8) acknowledge the importance of understanding the processes in arousal when they stated:

Obviously, more work is needed to chart the physiology of reactance. An investigation of this sort would help explore important questions such as what happens to reactance arousal when one cannot restore an eliminated freedom or whether observers experience reactance arousal when they witness threats to other people’s freedoms.